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Thesis Abstract 
This thesis was undertaken in the belief that 
there was scope-for a new examination of the complex, 
but fascinating interweaving of developments in Prance 
and Great Britain which led to their last violent 
confrontation of the eighteenth century. The six- 
month period which followed the overthrow of Louis XVI 
in the revolution of August 10,1792, was a time of 
sudden, bewildering changes of fortune for Prance 
and for its immediate neighbours. Britain, though 
physically unscathedo was exposed to the influence 
and reality, of, the Revolution in a way totally un- 
foreseen in-the complacency of Pitt's address to 
Parliament at the beginning of 1792. 
While, studying the diplomatic exchanges between 
the two governments it became apparent that there 
were many pre-occupations of d6mestic politics which 
occupied positions of crucial significance in the 
minds of Pitt's administration and of the Convention 
and Conseil Executif. No-one who seeks to illuminate 
the deterioration of Anglo-French relations in the 
troubled autumn of 1792 can realistically avoid the 
internal concerns of either country. Consequently-9 
there is considerable emphasis on British reaction to 
the supposed encroachment of revolutionary principles 
on domestic tranquillity during and after Novemberl 
1792, and the more introspective but fundamentally 
important absorption of the French in Louis XVIIS, 
trial and the future shape of the Revolution itselfq 
which festered throughout this period. 
The overall impression is one of two governments 
caught in the contradictions of the collapse of the 
ancien regime, aware of the new forces of ideology 
and public opinion but only partially comprehending 
how to direct themp conducting their dealings with 
each other in a-mixture of ignorance and prejudice 
rooted in the depths of their ancient rivalry. Caught 
up in this web, the leaders of the Revolution and of 
George III's England were unable to avert a conflict 
which was to bring about, as the conservatives had 
dreaded, "a universal change .......... in the opinions, 
manners and customs of men* 
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Proloizue 
The eighteenth century was an era of deep and 
bitter rivalry between Great Britain and Prance. 
The struggle for Imperial domination in which the 
two countries engaged was undertaken in the belief 
that the possession of overseas territories was 
fundamental for national economic survival and for 
political leadership in Europe. The relationship 
betýeen the French and British governments was based 
on distrust in time of peace and a passion tinged 
ýith nation I alistic overtones in time of war. 
' The 
Revolution in Prance introduced new dimensions into 
the Anglo-Prench relationship while also feeding on 
ancient emotions# aspirations and prejudices. - It'ie 
this complex of old resentment re-inforced by the new 
direction of revolutionary France which gives the 
period immediately prior to the Revolutionary Ware its 
special interest. This thesis is a study of six 
troubled months which witnessed the dissolutfon'of 
Britain's convinced neutrality in French affairs and 
the onset of the most fiercely contested dispute 
between the two countries whose physical proximity 
was in almost complete contrast with their inability 
to comprehend each other's outlook. 
The old view of the period betwe'enlugust 10thr 
1792 and February late 17939 developed by Professor 
J. -Holland Rose in his - two'volume Iff'ork"on''William Pitt 
the Younger before the First World War has occasionally 
a 
been modified but never seriously questioned. Rely- 
ing, for the most partq on diplomatic sourcesq 
Professor Rose concluded that the British government 
taking their stand on international law and their 
commitment to their beleaguered Dutch allies, had 
behaved with utmost rectitude and even forbearance 
in the face of French arroganceg tergiversation and 
threats. The war is thus seen as a direct result of 
French aggressiong a deliberate policy of harassment 
by a desperate people without any recognizable form 
of government. This view9 however, did not originate 
in 19129 but in Januaryq 1793 with the British govern- 
ment itself, who had carefully sought to demonstrate 
the intransigence of the revolutionaries. The French 
government held a similar opinion of the Pitt admin- 
istrationg but their arguments have be_en more readily 
obscured by the confusions of French administration 
after August 10th. and the harrowing background of 
furious tension which surrounded the trial and judge- 
ment of the king. 
Even of itself, this abstracted diplomatic 
approach might have suggested an interpretation of 
affairs beyond the narrow confines of the official 
British explanation. The Anglo-Dutch relationshipq 
an important element in the period before the outbreak 
of hostilitiesp was cohsiderably more strained and 
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complicated than is. normally supposedq causing the 
British continued concern up to and beyond Febru, aty lst- 
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The United Provinces were also the centre of much 
undercover diplomatic activity, which was abortive 
but gives useful insights into French and British 
attitudes. 
Beyond these initial qualificati'on'sg however, 
it soon becomes clear as-o'ne-reacýes into the writingsq 
speeches and newspapers of the time'that it is-the 
climate in which-decisions of both"in terns, I tional 
and-domestic importance-were made which iS*of'crucial 
significance for-our understanding of the developments 
after the-overthrow o-f the king of France. In order 
to comprehend"the Anglo-Prench conflict of 17939 it 
is' neces sary to consider the leading ; -'p6litical'-p erson- 
ages'in both countries, *-the functioning of their-' 
governments and'their major pre- 'oacupations. - ViiSý 
opens up a larger frame of reference in which-an 
attempt is made to assess the interaction-of-domestic 
concerns and European--events. 'In Britain th6 time 
between August 10th. 1792 and February lst. 1793 was-" 
one of considerable trauma. The shook which ran 
through many sectors of-society in Novembe3ý, 1792'has 
frequently been understrese, edo "The'British government 
believed that a series of internal problems might, be 
transformed-by the growing menace of the Preiý6hýRev'01ý 
ution as a military and ideological threat0"There-, 
after the British-government'viewed the progress'of 
the-Revolution by the li"ght of thei'r-ownýsituation. 
They had almost no useful intelligence-from Francep 
if 
butq more fundamentally, they lacked the ability 
to interpret itq so alien to, them were French politics 
in the autumn of 1792. Perceiving with horror the 
novelty of the'Revolution-they clung all the more 
tenaciously to their long-established ideals of an 
ordered, prosperous society. At the turn of 1792- 
1793 no British politician-could comment on domestic 
affairs without making the inevitable connection with 
France. The language of Edmund Burkeg stillregarded 
as extremist, in August 17929 could be heard on many 
lips-six months later. - 
_The state ofýFrance after the deposition of, -, -,, 
Louis'XVI, is generally referred to as one, of. turmoil. 
Despite theýdifficulties-ofidealing with, *a, period of 
, the Revolution in. which therelwas-little administrative 
coherence. and an'alarming increase in faction-fight- 
ing amongst the deputies, of the Conventionq the 
Revolution's confrontation with Great Britain in 1793 
cannot properly be understood without-considering the 
issues which dominated-, France. after August_10th, -. ý :,. 
particularly the controversy over the trial of the-king, 
a'-dilemma which bedevilled-, the, country after, the - 
second revolution. -While-louis lived, the-., confusions 
and incongruities multiplied.: The French were victor- 
ious in, Europe but. diyided at home. ý, Struggling-with 
, the-remnants-of administration from the. Legislative, -,,, - 
ýAssembly-aware of the possibility of'civiI_w4r9' the 
-deputies, impaled each other on the barbs of their 
II. 
1 
had yet to learn'toýcope with internal division in 
time of war. -Dumouriez's victories could not supplant 
the doubts which-iniensified-while the king lived. 
For this-reason considerable emphasis has been placed 
on French'-domestic pre-occupationsý particularly. 
those relatingýto administration after: August loth. - 
and'to"the king's--trial. The picture presented-is an 
attempt to, indicate more, than,,, the, causes-of the break- 
down-of diplomatic, -relations between two neighbouring 
European states. --Revolutionary France, propelled by 
. 
the. original-'impetus ofýBrissotin rhetoric and power- 
seeking-into'--a-continental, war, struggled to produce 
cohesion' -and"moral"Justification from doubt and. dis- 
array.., ' Great Britainqýproud of%its, orderly-prosper- 
ity'reacted-swiftlytand with alarm to the. intrusion---ý-, ýý 
ofýthe, 'many-headed-French monster into its--insular,,, 
tranquillity4'o Dominating public opinion after November, 
17929 Pitt's governmentq formerly almost disdainful 
of Europeg prepared itself rather haphazardly for an 
unwelcome but inescapable-conflict whichq it believedg 
would shortly annihilate France and-blot, the Revoluti6n 
from-memory in defeat., "Both countries stood at the 
6ross-roads of the eighteenth century. In examining 
the, wide range of problems which faced-them after., the-, 
events ofýAugust'-10thel-An, France it is h6ped that a 
fullerýimpression of a. crucial and often'7comparatively 
neglected phase of, the, development-of, revolutionary-ý 
Europe will', be gained. 
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rhetoric. The Britishl amazed at the spectacle of 
such irreverence for parliamentary proceedings, did 
not know how to jildge these, men of physical and 
oratorical violence. 
French foreign affairs were not conducted in 
such a rarified atmosphere: but-their exercise suffered 
from-. 
_. 
the same stresses. The French were not without 
competent diplomatists and agentag but they had 
placed a premium on revolutionary fervour rather than 
tact and exberience. French representatives were 
compelled,, often for the good of their careersq to 
pre, sen. t an exaggerated. appearance-of r, evolutionary 
patriotism-in, -their. public 
behaviour-and in, their, 
reports. Yet a good number of these men. were exper- 
ienced in diplomacyv as were their English counterparts, 
and. had, begun their service under the ancien regime. 
The habits of, intrigue which they had acquired were 
by no means a produc-t1of the difficulties of France 
in, the months after August 10th. In the last two 
months of peace, despatches sent from England were 
notable for a reasonable degree of accuracy and 
caution., The agents were. amazed by the extent of-, ý 
English government reaction to the volatility of 
November but they recognized the very real POBsibility, ý 
of-war under such circumstances. 
_The. 
domestic, and foreign policies of. France_ in 
these six months reveal to the full the near-ruinous, 
e, ffect. -of uncertainty and animosity'on a country rhich 
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Chapter 1 
Great Britain, and France after the War of Amerjcan 
Independerioe-'. 
In deciding the outcome of the struggle between 
Great Britain and her rebellious North American sub- 
jects, France played a crucial role. A decade after 
the apparently stunning loss suffered by-Britain, the 
two old Imperial rivals were at war once more, The 
circumstances had changed greatly, -though throughout 
I 
the long conflictp. -terminating only in, 1815, there 
were echoes of the international pre-occupations and 
interests ofýan earlier age, When Britain and France 
went. to 'war on February lst. 17939 the French Revolution 
was on the point, of passing into its fiercest' and most 
desperate stage. -Plagued by an internal struggle for 
power, by rising ideological conflicts 'and the un- 
, welcome appearance of. civil war, the French, seemed-tO 
have deliberately courted disaster by declaring war 
on Europe as a whole. The Britishp who were psycholog- 
ically well-prepared for war after an uheasy autumn, ',, 4'- 
saw themselves not merely as the'defenders of internat- 
ional law, but of a society which they believed to be 
piosperous, 'orderly and-just. The two protagonists 
! were ancient, enemiess but with a new vocabulary'andýnew 
concepts. The war which began in 1793 lasted a gener- 
ation, and, -despite attempts at resurrectiong 
destroyed 
the form and the outlook of 18th. century society in 
both France and Great Britain. 
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The, developments. of the 178OZe gave little 
indication of the nature of the, conflict which was to 
follow. In Austria and Prussia in 1783 it was generally 
felt that the loss-of her American colonies had reduced 
Britain to the rank of a second or third-rate power. 
Yet-British politicians. had often manifested a certain 
disdain, for the grasping whirlwind of continental dip- 
lomacy, and during the 1780's. they exhibited caution in 
disregarding, European squabbles and concentrated on 
building up. the-considerable empire, which they still 
held. WilliamýPittp the young Prime Ministerg was 
faced with, political confusion, and acrimony, on taking 
office and passed. through two, anxious, years. untilt in 
1785t with, a,, temporary unsatisfactory_, solution to, the 
problem of Ireland, and, a long-term, and.. more positive 
settlement of-Indian affairs, he was able to-give more 
of his attention to building up, British resources and 
steering her again towards a role in Europe. 
The British were to demonstratel over a'period of 
years, that their neighbours had been mistaken in their 
assessment of Britain's world role after, the outcome, - 
of the War of, Indopendence in America. Even before, 
this loss, Britain was beginning to broaden, iis approach 
to the intricately related questions of colonieB. and, 
trade. 
(') 
The rigidity of heavy reliance on the 
mercantilist systemg though still supported'by some 
V., Harlowq The Foundin& of the Second British 
Empire, vol. ii. 
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prominent British politicians, was being replaced by 
a somewhat more flexible outlook. Britain not merely 
survived, but prospered under the impetus of deVeloping 
trade and settlement in the areas, remaining under her 
control, particularly Canada and India, as well as 
seeking a more permanent place in the trade of the 
Par East and the-Pacific. 
This-ability to re-define her Position and inter- 
ests as an Imperial power was matchedq though to a 
lesser degreep by an-interest in reform at home. Pitt 
toyed with parliamentary reform in his first years of 
office, though'he,, was-soon to-become convince -d that 
circumstances were not-suitable for altering the consti- 
tution* He was more effective in dealing with the 
economyq particularly in-re-organization of financial 
departments. Aided by-a number of expert colleagues 
he was able to bring about a period of stqbility'and 
of growth to a'country whose prestige was badly damaged 
in 1763. 
Basing his policy of recovery On efficiency in 
government at home and expansion of'Britain's commercial 
position overseaso Pitt moved back into-the European 
arena through"a series of trade'negotiations. 
The most spectacular'British success at this time was- 
(1) For'details of these negotiations see J. Ehrmanq 
The British Government and Commer6ial Negotiations_with 
Europe, 1783-93, Cambridge, 1962. 
- 
11 
10 
the Eden Treaty of 1786 with France. Even while the 
terms of this treaty# which caused widespread controv- 
ersy in Francel, were being argued over, the British 
government was coming out of. seclusion to play a 
major part in the Dutch crisis of 1786-87. Though 
Pitt made no diplomatic commitment other than the 
Triple Alliance in the 17801sq British triumph in 
ridding the ýnited Provinces of French influence 
further added to the confidence of his administration. 
British recoveryl though it had its high-spotsq 
was essentially a gradual development harnessing 
existing resources. The stability of Britain during 
these years found its most obvious expression in the 
complacency of the ruling class.. A predominantly 
rural society stilljEngland was the preserve of a 
minority of landownerso whose attitude to life was 
characterized by. an unrivalled degree of smugness. 
The long constitutional conflicts of the seventeenth 
century had, produced a de ' 
ep-seated belief that'England 
had evolved to a maximum state of perfection. Reaction 
to the insidiousness of French revolutionary ideas, 
which seemed, after 1792, to threaten the roots of 
societyq was to be srift and--savage. It was from this 
group of landed gentlemen that the government found its 
firmest support, in the months preceding the outbreak 
of war in 1793. 
France during the 1780's followed a pattern very 
m, uch, the rever se of developments in Britain. The_vict, ory 
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of the Americans brought only financial disaster for 
the French. The governmentp having resorted to loans 
under the Controller-Generalship of Jacques Necker, 
was brought face to face in 1786 with the realization 
that a sweeping overhaul of the nation's fiscal system 
was fundamental to the health of the economy. The 
financial crisis focused French attention on internal 
disputes as the ancien regime clung defiantly to-its 
standar'd'ý in the last'years of dome'stic pe ace. The 
monarchyg half-heartedly supporting important reform 
which would have undermined the financial privileges 
and social position of the nobility and clergyv was 
easily represented as a tyrannical institution cutting 
at the liberties of Frenchmen. Its most implacable 
opponents were not the old nobility but the lawyer- 
aristocracy of-the Parlements9 a group mainly created 
a century. before-by Louis-XIV. France became increas- 
ingly introverted during the years before the Revolution. 
The loss of the contest for supremacy in the United 
Provinces was bitterg coinciding as it did with the 
negotiation of a trade treaty considered'detrimental 
to the French interest. After 1786 Britain and France 
were temporarily outside the mainstream of European 
diplomacy, which was more concerned with troubles in 
"ýcandinav_ia 'and Eastern Europe. Br . itain remain IeId al6of 
from choice,, France from necessity. Watched with 
occasional curiosity by statesmen across the Channelq 
the Bourbon victory of'1783 had given way to Revolution 
12 
in six years. 
Thus Great Britain and Franceg within the space 
of a decadeq had embarked on two very different courses 
which were to bring them together again in war. -at 
the 
beginning of-1793. The contrast between form. of 
government, political practice and even the. person- 
alities of French and British politicians was marked 
before 1789, and was to become even more striking 
during the Revolution. The French Politicians with 
whom Pitt's administration dealt in the 1780's were 
later replaced, not merely once, but many times. By 
1792-the British knew very little about their future 
opponents and had almost no time to assess, themg., a 
situation which led to misjudgement. of the abilities 
of some of the revolutionary leadership. This rapid,,, 
changeover in French personnel was not paralleled in 
Britain. 
, 
qffices. changed hands as Pitt dispensed with 
older, or_indecisive men, but his major advisers at, 
the outbreak of, -the 
French, Revolution. occupied-vital, 
positions, ten. years, afterwards. 
,,., _, 
The, theory of government in Britain, as well as 
its. officers,, did, not, undergo the. tumultuous changes 
of France. The 
- conflict. 
between king andjarliament 
in, the seventeenth century had_resulted in the develop- 
ment,, of. a limited monarchyp unique in Europe. The 
disputes. on the position-and prerogative of, the king 
at.. the b6ginning of George III's reign had, died down- 
so that, by 1783 
__ 
the major topics of controversy., 7ere 
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the colonies and trade. Ministries were often based 
on the shifting alliances of groups of individuals 
rather than on the formidable machinery of the modern 
party system. The king, at this stage with over twenty 
years' experience. in governmentq remained a considerable 
force.. George III--didýnot have an outstanding intellect 
but, he. took-his duties seriouslyq attempted to keep 
himself. well-informed and was always ready with an 
opinion, He did-not-initiate policyq but no minister 
could expect, to by-pass his vigilance or deceive him 
with an ill-prepared line-of argument; Since his assent 
was required for all measures of national importance 
it was necessary for, the--lking and, his chief minister 
to work together with. reasonable harmony. George 
had-learnedýto curb his extremely definite feelings of 
prejudice in, public contact, with politicianeg though 
he still could not abide Charles Fox. Throughout the 
entire perio. d, of,. tf2is-study the king was required to 
work with William Pittv a young man whose illustrious 
father, had-terrorized-him. in the early yearsof his , 
reign., Pitt and George, 
IIII 
were never closeq but they 
acquired a'real feeling of mutual respect. 
With, the. ending of'the American war and the-feel- 
ings aroused by the peace treaty, the ministry of-the 
talented-but largely isolated Shelburne came to an end. 
It-was. follovved, by the. ungainly coalition of Fox'and 
North, which appalled the king. He, did not have to-'. 
endure the'ministry'long. The coalition could-not 
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survive the passions roused by Fox's East India Bill. 
Out of this quagmire of conflicting interests and 
allegiances Pitt emerged in 1783 as the one politician 
with some hope of providing the leadership in a more 
solidly-based administration. -At the ageof 24 he 
was the youngest person ever to occupy the position of 
First Lord of the Treasury. 
Pitt, was not without politi. cal experienceg having 
been Chancellor'of the Exchequer for a brief spell 
under Shelburne. At firstq however, his ministry 
appeared very shaky; it was not until 1784 that a 
. -general election. 
improved, his position. The younger 
Pitt*led Great Brita in,. in his first ministry of 
17 years' durationg. through a period first of real 
prosperity and growth in which parliamentary reform 
was still'talked of as a possibilityg and then through 
one of continual war with France and rising social 
and economic difficulties. Considering the great 
importance of the years 1783ý-1801, it is perhaps sur- 
prising that Pitt should remain essentially a shadowy 
figureq not a subject of controversy, but merely of 
lack of interest. Indeedy it seems that Pitt so 
committed himself to political lifein this turbulent 
period, which he and few other Englishmen adequately. 
understood, that he submerged his individuality in his 
devotion to government. Shortly after Pitt's deatht , 
thosewho had known Pitt best'co=ented on this commit- 
ment to national affairs. "I don't recollect amidst 
3,5 
the many years in which we lived almost unremittingly 
together, " 'wrote-Dundasp "that I ever had a walk or 
a ride with him, that, -. a, very, considerable part of the 
time was not occupied in discussions-of a public 
concern. "(') ý He-left-behind no. vvorks to propound 
his views, -nor did heAndulge in the petty. detail of 
letter-writing by which even some ambassadors' wives- 
of the period-reveal. themselves more. completely than., 
he. -The correspondence"he rieceivedýwas prodigiousp-, 
but when one turnsý. to Pitt-himselfýas source there is 
little enoughzto satisfy-the curiosity... -Even his 
parliamentary speeches'l, frequently well-written and' 
arguedq lack the immediacy of those of Fox. 'As Pitt 
isolated himself from contemporary society-so"he-'has 
isolated, himself from histbryi, -'Though Pitt enjoypd- 
oompany. and, could, be an, interesting'andýlively host 
he-n-uver, particularly'sought'it. -. 'He-. 'showed-no-Lintereat 
in-, the arts,, inýcultivating-businessmen or in social 
contact"vvith'the Opposition, lPitt lost-contact vyith' 
society even, more completely after Henry-Dundas began--, -1 -1, 
to. encourage him to drink. 
Nevertheless, Pitt carried the name of a famous 
father and had been brought up in the conviction that 
he. would one day play his part in the leadership of 
(l)-'Lord-Idelville-, to Viscount Lowther, July 25thp 1806, 
H. M. C. '. -'13th report, - appendix part viig, LonsdaleýPapers# 
189. 
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his countryq Unlike his father, however, Pitt was 
much more reliant on the advice and support of the 
small but important group of men who served him through- 
out his ministry. In the 1780's he wouldq upon 
occasion, take upon himself the drafting of instruct- 
ions such as those sent to Sir James, Harris at the , 
Hague during the Dutch crisis of 1786-7t but there is 
much less'sign of this independence during the crisis 
Of the autumn'of 1792. 
(') 
Pitt's-interestg like his 
Judgement of meng, was variable. When interest was 
aroused-he could be forceful and effectivet though, 
there is a noticeable lack of willingness to take an 
independent line after the sobering lesson of the 
Oczakow: crisis.: On Pitt-'s-powers of judgement even 
friends were-not altogethercomplimentary - "He-appeared 
to meoll wrote'Wilberforcep "to be defective-in his 
knowledge of human nature, or that from some cause or 
another he was less sagacious than might have been 
expected from his superior--talents in his estimate of 
future events and sometimes in his judgement of character. 11(2' 
See the letters written to Grenville immediately 
after news of the Revolution of August 10th-reached 
Englandq Fortescue U. S. op. cit. iiq p-p- 302-303 
also his correspondence wiýh Dundas in November, Pitt 
Paper eq ii, below, Chapter S. 
(2) William Wilberforce quoted in Harlowo OP- cit- iis 
247. 
17. 
Pitt had earned-the reputation of'a belief in 
Pýrliamentary-refor'mý, In'this'he was-supposed to be 
r 
the disciple of Shelburne; ý though he no doubt owed-, a 
great deal to his brief'period under Shelburne's . leader- 
ship, the older man's influence was probably more 
pervasive in a general than in a specific'way. Pitt's 
interest in pa3ýliamentary reform was only a part of an 
interest in administration as a whole. In his deference 
to the'perfection of the order which had'produced the 
society'in which he'. livedt Pitt was, as his most recent 
biographer'has'pointed'outt intellectually up-to-date. 
(') 
6hange was to be effected from within'thesystem, not 
forcibly from outside. ' Such were the feelings w-hich 
Pitt shared with the men of his generation. Opponents 
and'eritics later'accused"him of betraying the issue 
of*refo'rm, without-ever pr operly understanding his own 
limitations'of outlook. 
-The men whom Pitt selected to Cabinet and advisory'-', 
positions shared many of his views on order and stability 
in' I Britain. In-1792-3'ý'they provided him-with Ia solid 
front of support in his government's stand against t#e 
menacbnp,, f French-subversion. Before thisp his Cabinet-, 
which was still'developing aB an institution hadýbeen 
characterized by lack of, cohesion. Pitt. was not in a 
strong, position, -in 
theearly years and this introverted 
young-man was aided by ministers who were often them-. 
(1) J. Ehrmano. The Younger Pitt. The Years of Acclaimq 
London, 1969. p. 166. 
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selves distant individuals.. -Some of these figures 
need be mentioned only briefly. The Secretary of 
State for Home Affairs-, Thomas Townsendq Lord Sydneyq 
was an-,. unassuming man-of meagre abilities. 
(l) The 
other, Secretary, of State, for Foreign Affairs, was the 
young Earl of Carmartheng later Duke-. of Leeds, 
(2) 
Carmarthen made up for inexperience by the enthusiasm 
with. which he-followed his-duties, but his powers of 
judgement were not strongg he tended to make forth-. 
right , decisions-based-on-personal prejudice and he 
became, increasingly-_inolated from Pitt, before he 
resigned during, the, debacle, of the Oczakow crisis, in 
1791-t The-Duke,, of Richmondi 5) who-ý-supervised defence 
and armamentsi, had. far-ranging intellectual interests, 
including, parliamentary reform; -he could also be 
overbearing, a-quality which did-not attract him,. to 
Pitt as a close-associateýover. any length. of time. 
The Lord Chancellorg Thurlow, 
(4) 
was-high in the esteem 
ofc, the-king,, but was such a caustic andýformidable 
personage that he was someone not, to be confided in, 
but dreaded. 
I", 
Pitt's closest advisers and friends, who were ýlater 
to occupy-the. positions, of Sydney and Carmartheng, were 
(1) Thomas Townsend, first Viscount Sydney, 1733-1800. - 
(2) Francis Osborne, 5th Duke of Leeds, 1751-1799. 
(3) Lennox, Charles, 4th Duke of Richmond. and-Lennoxg 
-1764- , 
1819- 
(4) Thurlowl Edward, first baronp 1731-1806. 
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/ 
the Scottish politiciang Henry Dundas(l) and Pitt's 
cousing William Wyndham Grenvilleg later Earl Grenville. 
(2) 
There was little love lost between Grenville and Dundas 
but with Pitt they formed a triangle whose combined 
views and actions were of the utmost importance to the 
direction of British politics at a time when-the 
revolution in France first began to intrude on the 
greener pastures of national kevival, in the spring 
of'1792. Henry. Dundas was, 'one of tiie moot competent 
and durable politicians of his age. His rise was 
basedý-on. perspicacityq political gambling and dis- 
honesty. In the tradition of his family he managed the 
administration and personnel of Scottish politica. 
At the time when he decided to throw in his lot with 
Pittg, because'he rated Pitt's chances of survival as 
higher than those of other contenders, he was already 
well-versed in the seamier side of political life. 
Unlike Pitt, he had never for a moment toyed with the 
idea of parliamentary reform; he had no wish to see 
the system altered and he scarcely felt any affinity 
with what seemed to him the dangerous connection, of- 
reform and'subversion. The spectacle of the Scottish 
populace rioting and forming French-influenced-corres- 
ponding societies in 1792 brought out all his instincts 
of organized suffocation of the impudence of, the,, lower 
(1) Dundast Henry, First Viscount Melvillep 1742-1811. 
(2) Grenvillev William Wyndhamq barony, 1759-1834. 
/ 
I orders. He, was a man with a strong head and a strong 
stomach. In Londong fellow members of parliament 
regarded him as uncouth; he never attempted to dis- 
guise his Scots' pocent or to participate in the more 
refined culture of the English capital. 
Most-people-who had business with Pitt's other 
close adviserg his cousin'on his mother's side, were 
struck unfavourably by., Grenville's extreme reserve, 
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which amounted almost to frigidity. Grenville was 
Politician, not a, career diplomat, and his punctilious 
observance of diplomatic formsand etiquette was in 
marked contrast to the initiative and action sometimes 
dispi 
, ayed by, the ambassadors abroad. -Grenville worked 
hard. and his intellect. was sound, He had a-full- 
knowledge of European affairs and direct experience of 
diplomatic-negotiations diiring the time he spent at 
the Hague in the final phases of the Dutch crisis. 
In his dealings with the agents of other hations Grenville 
seems to have stuck firmly to the view of himself as 
spokesman for the official policy of the king, a situ- 
ation in which it would be improper for him to allow 
his own personality to come through. Chauveling the 
French ambassador in the last crucial months before 
the outbreak of war in 1793 found the British foreign 
minister virtually inscrutable. Admittedly Chauvelin 
was probably not Grenville's intellectual equall but 
it remains true that Grenville was better at writing 
official declarations of British policy than 
in 
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participating in the cut and thrust-of personal inter- 
views and exchanges. Only in his letters to his elder 
brother, the crotchety andoopinionated Marquis of 
Buckinghamg(') do we see a more open side of the Earl 
of Grenville. 
There was a third figure amongst Pitt's non- 
Cabinet advisers in the 17801s Who hardly, stood on 
the same rank of personal proximity to the minister 
but whose abilities and immense specialized knowledge 
made him-anAndispensable aid at a point when one of 
Pitt's, priorities was to build up British trade. This 
was the President of the Board of Trade, Charles, 
Jenkinson, Lord Hawkesbury and later first Earl of 
Liverpool. (2) Politicallyq Hawkesbury was something 
of a self-made success. He had the reputation of being 
a king's man, and was regarded as untrustworthy by many 
of his contemporaries. Aloof in manner and bearing, 
Pitt and Grenville sometimes referred to him as the 
"Great Man-11, He was not an advocate of free trade but 
a supporter of the older mercantilist school. Despite 
his reputatiom. and scorn of new commercial ideas he 
was of material assistance to the British government 
in the 17601s. 
Grenvilleg George Nugent-Temple, first Marquis of 
Buckingham, 1753-ý1813. Served as Lord-Lieutenant Of 
Ireland, 1782. 
(2)' Jenkinsonq Charles, baron Hawkesbury and first 
Earl'of Liverpool, 1727-1808 
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The governmental system within which Pitt and his 
colleagues worked was, despite the changes of the 
Revolution of, 1688, in many-respectsq without organ- 
ization or well-defined areas of responsibility and 
control. Though admired. by Montesquieu and other 
Enlightenment thinkers it remained a mysterious structure 
to most of Pitt's contemporaries. A number of offices 
and departments, had authority for unconnected aspects 
. of government. The Navyq fundamental to British defence 
and prosperityq., was administered by several. different 
departments, including the Admiraltyq Navy Board and 
Secretariat. Financial-organization based on the 
Treasuryq was archaic. Everywhere there were, office- 
holders, who, had, purchased the positions which, theyý 
occupied-and, regarded them jealously as: property. -. -The,, 
Court continued to occupy aplace of central, importance 
in the interweavings of British administration. - ýespite 
limitations on his-freedom of Actiong made.. -statute in 
the 16801sq the monarch retained considerable influence 
in diplomatic and armed services appointments. The 
general tone of the manner in which things were carried 
out in Britain was-leisurely. During, the-. silmmer recess 
it was difficult to get, anything done. 
The-organization of the. Foreign Office and diplo- 
matic service reveals much about the handling of inter- 
national affairs. The Foreign Office-as a distinct 
Ministry was only created. in 1782. Its personnel was 
extremely small and only the Secretary of State himself 
Z3 
was gnificant in the policy-making process. In the 
1780 s'the Ministry was assisted by one under-secretary 
(two after 1790)9 ten clerks, a keeper of State paperal 
a Secretary of Latin, two. commissioners of the paper 
(1) 
officet two'decypherers and a Deputy Gazette writer* 
While the system certainly avoided the Prench-, pitfall 
of having'work. i divided amongst numbrous clerks, thus 
adding to the time taken to get things doneq the British 
had-so-few assistants in their office that work-piled 
UP"and often months passed before despatches were 
dealt with,, 
For the diplomats themselves the delays brought 
about, by neglect and understaffing were regarded as 
one. of the. hazards of the career and not necessarily 
without ben. efit. In the absence of instructions envoys 
were often left reasonably free and the more capable 
ambassadors 
- 
appreciated 
. 
this. In the 1780/8 and early 
1901s the British ambassadorial serviceg the lower 
ranks of which were often occupied by the younger sons 
of nobility and politicianeq was graced with some 
unusually distinguished gigures. This was especially 
true of the embassy to the Hagueq which was filled 
first by Sir Jame_s Hariisq a man whose craft, wit and 
resource made him the outstanding diplomat of his 
(1) Cobbanj -A. Ambassadors and Secret Ag'e'nts--, -"-'* 
; ondon, 1954P P. 17. 
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generation. 
(') 
After Harris''departure his place was 
taken by the inore., pedes-trian, but very"capable-Lord 
Aucklandq whop as William Edeng-skilfully,. negotiated 
the 1786-commercial-treaty, with France. 
ý2 
The, French 
embassy itselfýhad been less-fortunate. In. the 1780/s 
this vital. pooition was-occupied by Lord Dorset, 
(3) 
who Yvas at home in, Parisianisociety but thoroughly 
incompetent in his diplomatic,, office. -, In. -. the 179049 
in Berlinýand then Viennat Auckland's-younger brother 
Morton, 'Edenp(4) proved, -himself to. be'an. ambitious. man 
vtithout: recognizable, ambitiong whose: chief skill lay 
(1) Harris, Jamesq first Earl of Malmesburyt 1746--1820. 
The most detailed account of Harris' Career in the United 
Provinces is in Cobbanp Ambassadors and Secret Agents, 
op. cit. He was not actively engaged in diplomacy between 
1788 and 1796, when he. was put in charge of secret 
negotiations for peace with France. 
Edeng Williamq first baron Aucklandp. 1744-1814. 
After considerable early experience in Irish affairs Eden 
embarked on a diplomatic career in 1786 which lasted until 
he left the Dutch embassy in 17930 He was la er to serve 
Pitt and Addington as joint Post-14aster-General and was 
President of the Board of Trade under the Ministry of 
All the Talents. See below, Chapter 7 and passim. 
(3) Sackv"ille, Johng 3rd Duke oIf Dorset, 1745-1799. 
d on f rst-'ýaron"ý" -1830. 
(4) E en, 'mort enley-_ 17_52 
---p 
-- 
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in whining complaint. '. Lord Elgin, recently"arrived" 
at-, Brussels, when*the:, French armies begaii to'nenace'ýý 
the-AustrianZetherlandsp had'to be coaxed into sending 
maps. of the'. Icampaigns and-caused great'amusement_byý, _', ', 
sending"his --butler with one, despatch and - especially, 
recommending him to Lord Grenville's attention. 
(1) 
z--, 
In many-cases, the secretaries of legations-were-pre- 
vailed upon to send relevant--information and some of 
them" prove d'extremely. useful- in-complying with"such 
requests. _ýThe carrying'of, -the'ýdespatches themselves 
wae,, entrusted. to individual-messengers'Vwho-, --braved 
danger and the elements"-tocarry the-letters through. ý, 
Often, these-men had good knowledge of a'country's geo--,,,,,, -, 
graphy, and langU'age. -"Ocoasionallyg-. they, were, given-, 'I 
i; 9re scope'to-act'as reportersýand not just-carriers-, "-. - 
ao'in, theýcase'of, one Masong who-, observed the, departure 
of Thomai3'Paine,, from'Dover-in, -Septemberg 1792. 
(2), 
(1) Bruce, 'Thomaso' 7the Earl of Elgin and- '-llth. Earl 
of-Kineardine-1766-1841. -'After embarking on'a military 
careerg'Elgin, was-appointed in 1792 to the Court of 
Brussels.: ' It-was, in, 
-hisicapacity 
as ambassador-to'the! -, _, 
Ottotan Empire'ý'that'he*''first-acquired-, an interest'ing 
the Elgin- Marbles. 
(2). Burges to Grenville, September-, 1792-- H. M. C. 
Fortescue MS, - -op., cit. 119 P-3o, "' 
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French government structure in the'1780ý8 was a 
0-1 product'of 
the era of French grandeurg the reign of 
Louis XIV. During this long reign many reforms in 
administration begun by Henry IV were revived and made 
more effective. The intendants, in particularg became 
a vital part of the chain of control between Paris and 
the provinces. The organization, of departments, 
ministries and provincial government had not altered 
significantly since the previous century. There were 
many capable men employed in the service of the French 
government, The personnel ok the secretarial ranks of 
the Ministries was the preserve of respected bourgeois 
families who were the favoured dependents of the Ministry 
and the king. Most of these #ien committed their work- 
ing lives to the service of the French, crown as did the 
intendantsq amongst whom may be counted some of the 
I most capable 
and enlightened individuals of the ancien 
regime. Yet there was one insuperable problem; all 
these men were_functionaries. Whatever their interest 
in their work they had no freedom of initiative. Every 
new policy or major decision had to come from Paris, 
where the king and his ministers presided over the 
exercise of power. 
Under these circumstances, the character and ability 
of the king were of crucial importance. - 
The divine 
right of kings had received its most explicit formu-, _ 
lation by Bassuet in his glorification of monarchy, under' 
Louis XIV. Louie' own views on his responsibil, 
itiest 
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his creation of government by spectacle, his devotion 
to the goal of glorifying France had all created a severe 
burden for his successors. Neither Louis XV nor 
LutLis XVI was able'to meet the'demands put upon them; 
Louis XV lacked the interest in government or the 
strength of purpose necessary to devote hi; 2self to 
ruling. Louis XVI9 though imbued with the same high 
principles as his predecessors, had insufficient faith 
in his own judgement and was too ready to listen to 
the pers . onal whims of his wife and courtiers. The 
Prench'monarchy-had to be a force, to give vigorous 
intelligent leadership or it became merely the tool of 
faction a'nd'inte I rest groups*, It . had gone so far-down 
the road of--dec I aying sp1endour that when efforts were 
made in the 1770's' to restore royal power to the 
practical application of its absdutist theory, fierce 
opposition was met from those groups which had profited 
from the waakness of Bourbon direction in the 18th. century. 
The greatest opposition to the attempts to 
establish a kind of Enlightened Despotism in France 
came from the landowners whov for social and economic 
motives refused to part with the-principle of exemption 
from taxation on their estates and from the compar- 
atively new aristocracy of the parlements. This small 
body oIf men who sat in the thirteen sovereign law courts 
of France was mainly descended from the noblesse de la 
robe, the titled group created from amongst prominent 
bourge I ois families by Louis XIV. They regarded themselves 
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as guardians-and interpreters of the French consti- 
tution and. attacked all measures. which seemed to under- 
mine their position. Their chief importance for the 
French'governmental process lay in the fact that they 
registered royal edicts and could block registration 
for a considerable times which frequently occurred in 
the last years-of ' 
the-, 
Iancien, 
regime. Theparlementaires 
acquired a. great deal of-popularity, at a time when exten- 
sion of monarchical. Quthority, was a. controversial issue 
by, representing, themselves to popular, opinion as defend- 
ere of-the liberties. of Frenchmen. In truthl theywere 
interested only in defending and maintaining the power 
which had accrued, to-their position. As a body, they 
were self-centred. and, reactionary but it should be 
remembered that some prominent revolutionaries had 
s, erved on the_,, Par'lement, of Faris and had there regis- 
tered disapproval of its stand. The monarchy had only 
one effective method of curbing the obstructiveness 
of fhe parlementaires and that was by banishing., them 
from their positions. Such actions only contributed 
to parlementair, e propagandag making them appear, as 
martyrs in the cause of justice and liberty. 
. 
Tho_se. who. dominated_the practice of French. politics 
in the 1780, s were the, Kingg. the Queen' and the Ministers 
who occupied the posts of Controller, General 
Finances and Minister for Foreign Affairs. The King 
was a man with a slow'mind'easily'swayed by stronger 
personalities Isolated his- palace' 'ai Versailles t 
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it was easy for Louie'to regard himself as the father 
of, his subjects without ever really comprehending the 
deep-currents in French life. But he was not as stupid 
as some. of'his nobles and'his youngest brothert Artois. 
Louie XVI found his greatest reserve of dignity and 
f6ra"e-in thelast-months of his life'as a prisoner 
upholding the power, and trust which'he embodied as a 
monarch The British, came late to any sympathy-for 
Louis; 'after the Plight to Varennes the British 
mini*Ster inParis w as fo rthright in his condemnation 
Of the kingls'folly. 
(-')ý 
Geo-rge'III'viewed him'as'an 
equal'who''ou'ýh-ý-to'ýreceive'the respect-dueýto a king. 
Louii3'xVl, s exe`6utic6nýoffended many - sensibilities 
amýoss the, -Channelp'but thetBritiali, 'reaction was not 
withoýLt' ýpolitibal,,, sign'ifican'c ,e in'terms of relations 
(2) 
with revolutionary, -Prance-ýlateý,, in'January, 1793. 
Unlike Brit'aint where Queen Charlotte occupied 
*, herself with producing fifteen children, Marie Antoinette 
carved out for herself a significant and disastrous 
role in the politi'bs of the ancien regime. The Austrian 
Archduchess had arrived in-Paris as a high-spirited, 
teenager. She understood little of Prance'or'of 
French politics but ishe'doon became an-important-, '- 
adviser, to her young husband. - Though lier'knowledge 
of specific issues', was slight she had very definite 
(1) Lord Gower to Grenvilleg June 
H. M. C. Fortesque MSO op. cit. 117- 
(2) See below, Chapter 11- 
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opinions-on individuals -and it was lin I the sphere of 
appointments that she', had, the greatest influence on 
Louis XVI. 
. France's 
last controllers-general were faced 
with. the 3naTnTnoth-task of-decreasing French debts while 
at the-same time-injecting new life into the French 
economyO Turgot and Calonne both realized that little 
could. be. achieved,, while, the privileged clasees were 
permitted. to'continue, their exemption'from-taxation. 
Their pursuit*of this aim cost both of them, their - 
Positions.., Necker hoped that, given timeq- he-could 
develop-faith in'the economy which would be a spur to 
production and inve8tmentq but-his, concealment-of,. 
French'bankruptey'. was'as unwise-as it. was'dishonest. 
During the years. in which. Pitt was guiding Britain-I" 
towards'stability"and growth by nourishing--commerc'e 
the French were tied, by the anachronism of their' 
fiscal and economic system. 
In strong contrast-to the belated creation of a 
separate department for foreign affairs in Britain,, 
the-Prench ministry was regarded-as the most important 
in the.,, country. The last, 'Minister8 of the ancienlý., ý, 
regime came from bourgeois families recently'ennobled. 
The-Comte de Vergenneog, minister until 17879 had taken 
France Into the A; ýerican. war and had been a' vital-- 
figureIn the peace negotiations of 1783--- Despite the 
enmity. of the queen and leading courtierst Vergennes 
was a-dominant political figurýp,. until hip-death. 
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His caution and hard work were well-known in diplomatic 
circlesp but his reticence hid a certain amount of 
indecision. Vergennes had entered, the war without 
any certainty that the Americans would ever act as 
indebted, junior partners., In the relatively quiet 
years between 1783-69 Vergennes remained very much at 
the helm of French politicat until Calonne's announce- 
ment of the country's economic crisis brought the 
French government squarely back to consideration'of' 
impending crisis at home., Departing in timely fashion 
: CrOm the international'seenel Vergennes died at the 
height of the Dutch crisis. 
The organization of the Ministry, of Poreign Affairs, 
was not materially altered. until a major overhaul"by 
Dumou 
I 
riez in-1791. At this pointg many employees'of 
questionable, revolutionary ardour were deprived, of 
their positions. The allocation of corresnondanna 
sectionsv or'bureauxt as they we, re, knownt dealing with 
various areas of the world was also expanded and' 
altered. In. 17839 the Ministry was composed of two 
directions politiques responsible-'for handling corres- 
pondence, as well as a bureau des archivest a bureau' 
des fonds and a secretariat. Nearly all of these 
divisions individually employed more men that composed 
the entire staff of the British Foreign Officep and 
the chief, civil servants within each section more men 
of some importance. 
(') 
P. Masson, Le Departement des jkffaires 
Etr 9-e-r-es 
pendant la Revolution, Parisp 18779 Ch, - i- 
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The quality of diplomatic representation was 
variable and became even more unpredictable after the 
outbreak of the Revolutiong when patriotism was more 
often important than ability. Although the personnel 
in French Missions changed, often-several timesp during 
the Revolutionj many pf-the men elevated to high dip- 
lo#atic status had probably been on the fringes of 
diplomacy during the ancien rI egime. Their. capacity 
fo. r intrigue, however bungledp was at least the equal 
Of their predecessors, The post of ambassador to the 
United Provinces at the Hague-, waB disastrously, filled 
thr Ough-most of the 1780 and 17901s. The Marquis- 
-de Verac(l). was no match/for Sir James Harris in 17879ý 
though L. ord Aucklandq in 17929 was eventually to find 
some"goo d'points in his rivall'the recalcitrant ambass- 
ador de Maulde , . -The ambassadors of the revolutionary 
period came from widely differentp andq in some cases, 
(3) 
unspecified backgrounds. Chauvelin, in Londong was 
a former marquisi but'citizen Thainvilleg sent to take 
(1) Veracq Charles-Olivier de Saint-Georgeg marquis de, 
1743-1828 
(2) de Maulde, Emmanuel, dates unknown, see belowg-Chapter 7, 
passim. - 
. 
(3) Chauvelin, Bernard-Francoisq Marquis de9B. Paris, -1766 
Inherited lie)- ffice of Master of the Wardrobe. 1791. aide-de- 
camp to m 
(rech 
de'Rochambeau. Named as Minister Plenipo- 
he 
to our tentiary to ourt of St. James, 19th. Aprilp 1792. apparently 
on suggestion, of Talleyrand. Recalled January 21st. 1,793 and, 
ordered by George III to leave Great Britain on January 24tlý 
Nam-ed, -"aS ambassador to Florence on his return to France 
but 
imprisoned August, 1793 because of - his noble background and 
suspect, sympathies.. Released after 9th. Thermidor. Served 
-RaPolean after Brumaire-. _ 
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over fr om de'Maulde in the United Provinceeg was a- 
young - officer in the revolutionary armies. 
(') 
Standards of ambassadorial propriety and behaviour 
altered drastically. Edmond Genet was scarcely more 
popular at St. Petersburg than he was in the United 
States of America. 
(2) 
' Ambassadors harangued foreign 
courts and sometimesq as in the case of Bourgoing in 
(3) 
Spaing lectured their own superiors in France. 
De'-Maulde defiantly stayed on at the Hague two-months 
after he-had been recalledý 
-"A look*at'the mahy differences in the structure 
Of government -and diplomacy in Great Britain and France, 
pro'vide_s_ý'furt'her insights in to'the differences in out- 
look between'the'two societies. One important notion 
th , ey-did'sh aI re'q despite Pitt's attempt in connection 
(1ý Despatches to and from Thainville in A. A. E. 9 
C. P. Hollandeq 583. 
- 
(2) Genetq Edmond 1763-1834, son of a pamphleteer 
and brother of two of Marie-Antoinette's ladies-in-waiting. 
Envoy to Russia and the U. S. A., where his outspokeness 
caused great controversy in the mid 1790's. 
Bourgoing, Jean-Francois, 1748-1811. Bourgoing was 
well established in diplomacy before the Revolutioni 
had accompanied Montmorin to Spain in 1777, as atta he t 
the embassy. Minister at Madrid, 1791-3. Continued 
his diplomatic career under Napoleon. 
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with the Eden Treaty to ridicule such prejudiceal was 
the conviction that they were inveterate rivals. The 
activities of revolutionary France in the autiamn of 
1792 strengthened the feeling that French aggressiont 
whatever its formg was directed against peace in general 
and Great Britain in particular. The period between 
1783 and 17919 with one exception, witnessed a lull 
before the impact of the Revolution on relative British 
calm was felt-(l) Pitt"s government were not interested 
in war, or even much interested in Europeg unless their 
allies or traditional concepts of thelbalance of power 
seemed threatened. Britain reacted to the French revol- 
ution initially with only marginal interest. The want 
of information and curiosity about European affairs 
perplexed and rather disgunsted Lord Auckland when he 
(2) 
was on leave in England in the spring of 1792. up till 
the first week of November, 17929 Lord Grenville was 
of the opinion that Britain was better out of the 
Euro ean maelstrom. The contrast between this neutrality ý/Bpritish 
commitment to'war in February, 17939 is 
striking. 
In the menacing but nevertheless more tranquil 
world of the 1780's Pitt was concerned to build up 
British strength, and thus her role in Europeg steadily 
but cautiously. He was not interested in cultivating 
The exception was the Dutch crisiel see bblow. 
(2) Auckland to Lord Henry Spencer, March 20 1792, Auckland 
. 
2-0rrePIR-On-dencet OP- Cito ii. P. 398. 
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any definite set-of alliancesq, though Carmarthen had 
hopes of-establishing a northern alliance system between 
Austria; Prussiat Russiap Denmark and Great Britain. 
Pitt's major-problems after 1783 were to foster trade 
and build'up British interests in new colonial directions. 
Lord"Hawli'esburyp'- .a protectionistq was important in 
the passiilg of 1786 Navigation Act. Hawkesbury had 
not-ýet been raised to'-the peerage in 1786, and it was 
in his'capacity as Mr. Jenkinson that he took steps 
to`ensureýBritain the lion's share of the carrying 
proper means could be devised, ý'. to tadeq remarking, 
secure the navigation-trade to Great Britainp though 
we`-had`-lostýa-dominionq we might'almost be said to 
have"'gained a'n'empire.! 
ý(1) 
Britain. also'hoped to expand the area in which 
she traded. '"'The-enhanced importance, of the Par East 
in British eyes was amply demonstrated by, the-govern- 
ment's inability to'come to terms with their supposed 
alliesq the Dutchq- over commercial arrangements in 
Par Eastern waters. ' The resolution of the crisis-over 
Indian governmentq which had led to Pitt's rise#-was 
achieved in 1784, by setting up a ministerial-level 
board of control to supervise the governme I nt of" 
Indian territories'but leaving to the East India Company 
(1) 
, 
Jenkinson in House of Co=ons 
_April 
llth 1786, quoted in 
J. Ehrmanj The YounEer Pitt,, P- 339- 
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the appointment of: offficials from, governor-general 
down. The British also had hopes. of, improving-their 
trade in-the Mglayan regions and enlarging-its scope 
to-include China. There was also need for action in 
the western portions. of-the empire., and especially-in 
Canadaq, which had. received an influx of American-loyal- 
ists. after-the war. and was demanding'a-change in-1ts 
constitutionalýarrangements. In 17899 Grenvilleg, then 
Home-Secretary# introduced the Canada Actq which'ý, - 
divided the country into a British, upper, region-and a 
French,, lower oneg each-. with legislative Assembly and 
Councilg-lexecutive, Council and Lieutenant-ýGovernors 
under,.,, the- , Governor-General., -Though 
learning, from the-ý. 
mistakes-, of, Americaii rule., the government-still, believed 
that--, the British, constitution should be extended, - 
wherever feasible, -to overseas, dependencies. 
Nearer to, home the gover=ent was still faced with 
an insoluble problem infIreland. Pitt's efforts to--,,, 
grant greater freedom to-, Irish trade and possibly in- 
troduce reforms into the Irish Parliament met with- 
opposition from Protestants, and suspicion from Catholic 
patriots. The defeat-of the, Irish., propositions in.,. 
1785 was-, the first, major reverse of Pittl. s ministry. 
Ireland remained an arena which was dangerously-open 
to internal disorder-and exploitation, of, its, grievances 
from-,, outBide; - the threat of civil war,, there. loomed 
in the minds of English politicians in 1792. Pitt and 
his closest colleagues had little respect for the 
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Protestant. government. in Dublin but they did not want 
to see a collapse of all order across the Irish Channel. 
(') 
Pittle. hopes of, making the-status of Ireland and 
her relations withýthe-rest of Britain more reasonable 
were only, a smallpart, of-the wider effort to, develop 
a strong commercial empire. in the many areas, of British 
dominion which, still remained after the loss of the 
American colonies. His attitude-to-the most favour- 
ablet type of relations -to -be ý`Cultivated with Europe 
further"tefledted his-ýcommitment to, prosperity. and 
stability as, the best means of restoring-Britain, to 
her. -rightful,, rank as a world power. -,, Pitt's,. early. 
emphasis, in foreign-, relations was-thus, to make contact 
on, a, commercial,, level-rather than, teeseek to play a 
forceful, diplomatic role-which might-lead, to 
-the 
dis- 
turbance and-expense, of-war. The most well-known 
product of this bout, of commercial activity is, the 
treaty negotiated with France, by William Eden in 1786. 
However, there were-seven other treaties under nego- 
tiation between 1785 and-1793t. with, Portugalg Spaing 
Russiap Polandq Prussiaq the two Sicilies and Holland. 
Of these9conly the Russians eventually-signed a commer- 
cial convention with Great Britaing in March,. -1793. 
It was in France that Britain had her most, striking. - 
success in this. -decade of commercial endeavour, At 
first sight. it seems strange that two countries-who 
(1) See Belowg Chapter 
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viewed each other, with a great deal of-suspicion 
should have been, able to reach a'significant and com- 
prehensive commercial^arrangement at a time when they 
were also wrestling for-an influential hold over 
Dutch politics. The final agreement was probably 
reached because of Eden's skill and persistence and the 
support, given him by, prominent French ministers. - 
Theýissue of'the Treaty had become something of a 
faction fight'within French ranks. The future' Lord- 
Auckland-seems'-t6'have done his detailed preparation 
carefully"beforeýeetting, ý7outý'and since--he had-not 
shown'an-over-delicacy'-, for-political attachment at 
hoMe'he`obviousily had"milch to gain by returning 
triumphant. -. The'Tieatý was controversial in both-Great 
Britain, and France. - The-French did not relish the 
prospect ofýtheir country being flooded by BritýSh` 
manufactured goods but-many'British farmers and pioducers 
were auspicious at-the thought of opehifig the doors too 
wide to France*- EdEýn'was angered by what appeared'-to 
him to be the unreasoning conservatism of his critics 
in Great Britain - "I"am'satisfied by'all the sound 
principles of national, policy.... that it would not 
only have been absurdt-'but immoral in the extreme to 
have declined, the present experiment, great and precar- 
ious as it'maj-"-be; In%the present moment it-gives, --, 
bread and-employment and prosperity to millions-' 
Aucklands journals (1) Eden to Sheffield, Februaryq 17879 
ind _ Correspondenc - e, op. cit. iiq P__. p- 402-403- 
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Considering the slowness and obstructiveness which 
pervades the other. treaties under-discussion, partic- 
ularly that, with Spaing the signing of the 1786 treaty 
with France was a notable victory for Pitt's admin- 
istration., 
Yet in other areas of contactq Anglo-French 
rivalry9 rather,,, than amityp was still very.,. evident. 
It was in the United Provinces that. the French ancien 
regime.. had its last, confrontationý. with Britain. The 
possession-of, a-dominant hold over Dutch politics-, 
wasýof great_importancefor'both countries,. The 
British_had actually been at war withýthe, Dutch in 
the, closing years of the-wider American conflict; 
afterý1783,, they. were, Btruggling to establish their 
presence-in the'United Provinces by ýupporting the. 
House of, Orange against the aspirations of the Patriots, 
a predominantly bourgeois merchant group prominent 
in Amsterdam and Rotterdam. The Patriots were seeking 
to curb the power of the Stadtholderg who wass tech- 
nicallyq the first servant of the state. They wished 
to establish a government which gave them a greater 
say in the policy-making process. Some of them had 
already absorbed the principles of, the American 
Revolution but although their leaders took refuge in 
France after their defeat in 1787 they were not greatly 
in sympathy with the radicalism of the French Revolutiong 
a fact which some Frenchmen realized in the autumn of 
1792. The French continued to encourage them after, 
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1787 without ever providing muchýactive support. 
The British government in 1786'had, no wish-to 
see French inflUence-'ýestablished inýa small, state which 
they rather, regarded-as their gateway to Europe"and 
whose geographic and strategic''interests seemed 
similar to, their own Pitt' W'a&ninlstration w6'reýnot 
particularly IdOve'd'by'the Plight"Of'the United provinceaq 
a once-thriving Imperial power-now with a pathetically 
weak executive'qýbankrupt-East India Company and almost 
. non: -: exi-ste, nt nairy. ' In factq their- lack of interest 
in"the"'real'state""of, the country they sbught-to direct 
led tliem-to'-mak'e"-some'dangerous-assumptions-lkbout"' 
Dutch, 1, strength', which pro, ved alarmingly unfounded_, '-as'--' 
war - with"' France'-be*c me aI "Aistinct joslsibili*tý in" 1792. 
Pit-Os-administration were not qu iýck 'to -realize 
the''i . mportant hold which the I --French had establisheýd- 
over Dutch affairs-in 1786. "The - main4credit for, the 
vital preliminary work of undermining the French,, - 
position must-go to Sir James Hirrisql'Who faceddan 
extremely difficult tasi'when-he first arrived at the 
Hague. Harrisp with the`support-'ofýthe Stadtholder's 
wife Whilhelmina, a ni'ece'of-Prederick--the, Great, I andý--, 
the Grand Pensionary' o f'Hollandq Van Ae Spiegel(') 
(1) Van de Spiegel$ Gra'nd Pensionary of Holland, '-leading 
Dutch adviser and supporter of the Stadtholder until'the 
fall of the United Provinces and his imprisonmeiif in-17950 
'ke 
was to play an i portant role in the secret negotiations 
with General DumOuriezq November, 1792-February, 1793. 
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attempted to build on'the support of the remaining 
loyal-provincesg'particularli'Gelderlandg and establish 
a party which'would be-able to combatTrench influence. 
He was eventually, 'given a substantial sum of secret 
service money'but, hia-main'Btrengths'lay in his ability 
whichýwas far euperior toýthat of-the French ambassador 
at the Hague and the energetic support of Pittq when 
-the latter's interest was aroused*. 
- In mid-September, 
17879, the-British'government announced-that it could 
no-longerýremain a spectator-of French interferehoe in 
the, United Provincese' By this time a situation approach- 
ing-civil war-e'xisted. The Princess 
temporaiili-'arrestedýbyýa'Patriot'ýforce'and the'Prench 
seemed to-, beorganizing-an army. At-the - -height*of the 
crisis-t, while Britain-was demandin'g thaflth: 6 I army, 
camp--at! 'Givet-be disbandedg, the Prussians invaded Dutch 
territory. The French in 1787t were'already beset by 
the domestic crisis whichculminated in'the Revolution. 
They had hoped to control the United-Provinces by 
intrigueg not violence, and they backed down. In the 
first European crisis-of hii-' 'ministry-ýPitt had met 
with resounding success. Within the next year a Triple 
Alliance was signed between Great Britaing Prussia 
and the United Provincesq though the treaty remainedg 
in realityq a dead letter. Britain had little sympathy 
for Prussia's aggressive policyq particularly in regard 
to Poland. Her main interest was to dominate the 
United Provincesq a wish which was fulfilled. 
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The successful conclusion of the Dutch crisis 
prompted Pitt to take-a more direct line in ensuing 
problems with Spain: and Russia. For Francep the years 
between 1787 and. 1789-were a, period of great opposition 
to. -the French monarchyp ending-inýthe summoning of the 
Estates-General for Mayq. 17899 andthe Revolution 
which followed. -Early signals. of the troubles of the 
future, had, been noticed by-Auckland in 1787. 
(') 
The 
aristocratic, revolt-of 1788, inspired by the parlement- 
_airesqýhad. ierupted 
into mob-action, often led by 
lawyersl,, ýIclerksq which 'was especially serious in 
Brittanyý ý, _The Third Estate was-left with-little-option 
but-totbreak-the-stranglehold of-the-two privileged 
orders, ', and in, what was really a series of revolts, 
ýtriggered off., by, hunger, and, fear in the provincesg', the 
French populace-. at length added its own physical 
presence to the weight of bourgeois demands. Louis XVI 
himselfj just before the fall of the Bastillej shied 
away from a head-on clash, hoping that moderation would 
lead to a better chance of re-building his position. - 
The spectacle of the'strength and fury of the Parisian 
crowd Trompted a caucus of-leading moderates among the 
nobility, to bring about, the, dramatic abolition of 
(1) "There is a strong disposition'ýin-this 6ountry 
(2rance) to make changes in the constitution of the 
17879-, Aucklandl. Journals and Correspondence 9' op--cit- 
ip 
government ...... Eden to Loughborou&q--November 8thp 
446. 
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feudal rights on the night of August 4th. Despite 
these developments1the political crisis of 1789 was 
not halted until the October days, when Parisians decided 
to make their king more accessible by returning him 
from 
' 
Versailles 
-to,, 
the, palace. of the Tuileries in the 
capital, Ji, ithin the. first few months-of the Revolution 
a hard, core of 
I 
nobles who could not stomach the 
changes left in 
-the 
early wave of emigration. Thereafter, 
in Prance, the, Constituent Assembly sought unsuccess- 
fully to deal with the. problems, of, landownership, and 
the loyalty of members'of the Catholic Churcho while 
the, 
_Royal 
Family grew more, and more restive'and the, 
discontent of the urban and rural poor increased. 
,,. 
The British government, had been an unconcerned,, -. - 
spectator in most of these early developments of the 
French Revolution. To. see France embroiled. in, domestic 
discord served the British, interest wellf sotlong as 
malcontents did not-seem. to_, be influencing, the British 
Isles. A number of liberals praised Prench e. 
fforts.,, 
'at 
establishing a broader constitution which' 
itvas 
felt, ought to be modelled on the British 
for maximum 
effectiveness. 
(1) 
When thefirst troubles of 1789 
became known, Britain was still gettixlg over 
the 
Crisisp which political controversy, 
, 
of the Regency 
might have brought an untimely end to_pitt1s,,, 
a. dmini- 
(1) Sheffield to Aucklandq JanuarY 8thp 
17909 
Auckland, Journals and CorrespondýJnýc 
op. Cit. it 
366. 
44 
stration, Two international episodes in the early 
years of the Revolution further. illustrated Britain's 
lack of concern-at developments in Prance. War seemed 
near on two occasions, but in neither case was the- 
French Revolution an, issueo In 1790 the government- 
bristled at-, the possibility of conflict with Spain 
over an incident--which-had taken place at Nootka-, Sound, 
a"remote-north-weet-Pacific harbour. 'The territorial 
boundaries of this, region were still-in dispute and 
Spain stuck by-her ancient claimsýto-this-coastline. 
The Duke of-LeedsA=ediately took-a tone'in, his-,, - - 
correspondence'-with Spain-which: Pitt considered imm- 
oderate,, but on-hearing a set of detailsq, which were 
not altogether accurate'q froig the owner of the seized 
shipsq Pitt. decided that full-reparation, must be''- 
demanded and a permanent agreement negotiated to settle 
the problem finally. The fur trade of the west 
Canadian coast had its outlet in Canton and Britain 
is 
was also developing a whaling interest in the disputed 
region. The slowness of Spanish response brought a 
strong reaction from the British. The fleet was 
mobilized axid, in face of this intransigence the 
Spanish tried to invoke the Family Compact, but received 
no positive assistance from the French Assembly. 
The role of the British secret service in bringing 
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about-thid result remains! obscure. 
(ý)-ý The agreement 
eventually, reached with-. Spain-guaranteed British 
fishing rights-in the Pacific Oceanq-. an important 
principle-for an, administration committed to, o, verseas 
expansion. "The British! public hadýgenerally remained 
unexcited: atl.. the-ýprospectýof. war with'Spaing some-, 
finding it hard to, believe that'hostilities could- 
break out over a place of,, which they had: never-heard. 
(2) 
, run-of suocess. 
in So,, farg Pitt,, had,,. had a notable, 
his'dealings withiEurope. - 
In 1791, %even, as, thesitu- 
ation--in,, France worsenedgýhisiposition-,. seemed-. secure 
inýbothl'-the domestic and internationaltspheres. 
During'1791,,, there--wasqýýhoweverg onefBetback 
'confrontation with-Russia.,,,, r':, The-Briýish-A;. government_, I-had 
always regarded'ý-, Ithe pretensions, of the northern European 
(1) Both Mirabeau and Louis XVI at one stage showed 
eagerness to support the Spanish in their call for assist- 
ance. The British government had two agentsq Hugh Elliott$ 
1752-18209 later envoy to Denmark, and William Augustus 
Milesp 17530) - 1817 (see below, Chapter 11) in Paris 
at the time* 
(2) "Here we are going-to wart and for what? ...... Pitt 
is tired of peace. He bullied France so effectually 
three years ago that he is determined to try the same 
thing with Spain. "(AnthonyStorer to Aucklandv October. 22ndq 
1790) Auckland,, Journals and Correspondenc op. cit. i'q-" 
P. 374. 
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countries as rather distasteful. Pitt had kept out 
of the Swedish and Polish'criseB of 1788-9 with some 
difficulty. He was convinced by Ewartq his envoy in 
Berling that Prussia-, would support him in curbing the 
extension-of RussianAnfluence at the expense of the - 
Turks. -The point-atýissue*-was. Russials claim to the 
Black, Sea port. of. Oczakow. Pitt was misinformed by 
Ewart and, had miscalculated-the reactions of both 
Catherine II of Russiaýand his-ownýparliament. The 
Russian Empress did, not respond'. to British, -threats 
by,,, badking, down-land, parliament proved unexpectedly 
obdurate,, when, it-refused to vote', Supplies'ýfor'a fleet; 
-caused--Pitt 
some loss-of face'but'. the'dent The affair 
inýhis: -record_wasýonly elightq-though his self-confi- 
dence,. may. have, -been-, more damaged. 
Despitethia. minor--cloudg most Englishmen were, 
optimistic about, the prospects of4loontinued peace, and 
prosperity. In France, the siiTnTner, and_aut=n of 1791 
brought a succession, of. crieis,, and,. aýnew-set, of-, poli- 
ticians, This co*bination, pushed the-couhtry towards 
confrontation with, Austria and Prussiat, but gave, no 
real indication that, Angýo-French relations would break 
down within eighteen months, 
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Chapter 2 
France and Great Britain, 1791 - 1792; 
the background to the Revolution of August 10th. 
'You have nothing to hope from the interior of 
your dominion. Nothing. Nothing. " Richard Burkeq J. P., 
to Louis XVI9 '6th August 1791. 
-In the summer of 1791 the Constituent Assembly 
was nearing the end of its work amid an atmosphere of 
general"unrest. The Civil Constitution of the Clergy 
had caused dissension through6ut Franceq--the economic 
situ, - ation"'was steadily worseningg and the emigresq though 
without'much prospect of immediate Imperial aidt began 
to mass their forces on the Rhine. The tense situation 
assumedýcrisis proportions overnight when Louis xVI, 
attempting, to precipitate his confrontation with the 
Revolutiong fled from Paris and was arrested at Varennes, 
a town some distance from the north-eastern border. 
Those who suspected the king's acquiescence in the 
measures taken by the Assembly, and who detested the 
influence of his wife, were to have their fears con- 
firmed by the document which Louisq optimistically 
supposing-imminent freedomg left behind. The king 
stated that, he had accepted the legislation passed in 
his name under sufferance. Such a disavowal of the 
, 
system,, under which government had previously operated 
was particularly damaging at a moment, when a new 
. constitution.,. was about 
to be put into Sor6e., There 
.,, were-not. many, 
influential men yet prepared to face-the 
ILQ 
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reality that the king's intransigence was calculated 
to jeopardize the long-term success of any kind of 
compromise between the ancien regime and the Revolution. 
The official version of Louis' flight was that he had 
been abductedq but the Assembly was, acutely ýtrare 
that the king's action invited turmoil and invasion 
and its interim measures foreshadowed the steps taken 
in August, 17929, 
_, 
when the Assembly once more assumed 
full sovereignty. 
The flight to,. Varennes also provided a focus for 
the political agitation in Paris. The question of a 
republic was now freely discussed in the clubs. 
(') 
It seemed that afundamental difference of outlook 
was developing between those who wished-merely to con- 
so lidate, the gains of the Revolution achieved up to 
that point and those who were not satisfied with legis-ý- 
lation which guaranteed 'the predominance of a compara- 
tively prosperous I professional eliteO' 'The feeling 
grew that the only way to safeguard liberty. was to 
abolish the monarchy. The leaders of the Constituent 
(1) It was also mooted in the press. Brie-sot's Le 
Patriote Francais strongly condemned Louis - "Que le 
roi ait deserte son post, e de sa propre volont(rq clest'uný, - 
delit qui ne laisse aucun doute; le me'm'o re e*c"rit et ne"-s 
signe de sa main, en offre la, preuve'ir es stible ....... 
il 
' est evidentp 
d'apres cet eerit, que le roi-ne veut point 
peut "tre le roi de la nouvelle constitution.! etre. ne e 
Le, Patriote Prancaist ed. J. P. Brissotq June, 25th. 
1791. 
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were determined, to take positive steps to avert the 
threat of disorder. from the radicals', campaign. On 
July, 17thg-17919- a crowd gathered on the Champs de 
Mars to demand the deposition of the kingg was 
fired ong after an-incident by-Lafayette's National Guard. 
In the general suppression of radicals and the popular 
press which followed Danton fled to England and 
Desmoulins and Marat went into hiding. 
(') 
The Champs 
de Mars rankled in: the Republican mind for two years. 
It, was mentioned in, the trials of the Girondins and 
particularly that, of Brissotq(2) who had not been near 
the, Champs de, Mars on-the day itself. His answers on 
his, prior knowledge of the petition signed on July 17th, 
and of-, ite-wordingg were very evasive. 
(3) 
(1) In England Danton made the acquaintance of a number 
of men with radical sympathiesq notably Thomas Holcroft, 
the playwright and Thomas Christieg a Scottish_pRlitical 
writer. These links were not entirely lost; in the early 
autiimn of 1792, Francois Noel, the secret agent sent by the 
Conseil Executif re-established contact with Danton's friends. 
(2) Jean-Pierre Brissot, b-1754. Journalist. Editor of Le 
Patriote Francais and of th&Societe des Amis des Noireq a- 
negro emancipation group. Elected as deputy for Paris to 
the'Legiala . tive Assembly having sat in the Municipal 
Aýsembly of Paris. An opponent of Robespierrep he was 
arrested-after the Revolution of 2nd. Junes 1793 and 
guillotined October 319t. 1793. 
(3) Tr'ial_of Brissot, A. N., W. 292. 
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The Assembly now pushed through its final measures 
towards the new Constitutiono under which Louis was 
re-instated by taking the oath of September 14th. The 
Constitution embodied the aims-of the bourgeois of 
liberal outlookq who had been by-passed-by the; privilege 
of the ancien regime. The distinction between active- 
and passive citizens for electoral purposes was main- 
tained and the allocation of seats for the; legislature 
in the departements was based on a combination of 
population and taxation. The king. still retained sig- 
nificant powersq notably in the exercise of the veto, 
which could postpone the passage of any decree for the 
length of'three assemblies. He was also the nomi 
- nal 
head Of the diplomatic service and armed forces. The 
Constitution did not appeal to the more democratic out- 
look of a man like Robespierre and it was totally in- 
compatible with the king's conc. eption of-his role. There 
wasq howeverg general deference for the Constitution 
and a considerable amount of optimism when the new 
Legislative Assembly met. 
The Constituant had, voted in May, 1791, on the 
-suggestion of Robespierreq to exclude its members 
from sitting in the next Assembly. The new legislature 
th3ý perience 
'Ifore., 
inevitabl. y contained men who had no ex 
of government and, whose enthusiasm for the daunting 
, 
task, which, lay ahead of them was not necessarily, 
, matched, by ability. Some men, notably Brissots were 
already. established on the political scene. The 
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Legislative-also contained a number of distinguished 
provincial-lawyers, later labelled Girondinp, 
(') 
by 
their, opponents because of the departement which they 
represented., Linked by. -friendship with 
Brissot and . 
with, Madame-Rolandp 
(, 2)_ 
whose salon attracted several 
talented men$ they formed an eloquento though loosely- 
knit group. 
The situation in which the,. Legislative Assembly 
took over the exercise of government was unpromising. 
(1) Among the most prominent men from'the south-west 
were Guadetg(Marguerite Elie)', *'b'. 1755, leader of Bordeaux 
bar, 1789, exe Bordeauxq June 17949 and Gensonne 
(Armand)v b. 17589 procureur of municipality of 
Bordeauxq 1790. 
(2) Madame Roland (nee Jeanne Philipon Manon) b. Paris, 
1754. Talented and ambitioueg she was obsessed by the 
virtues of ancient republicanism. Wife of Jean-Marie Roland, 
former inspector of commerce in Paris'and inspector-general 
of manufactures at Lyon. In 1791 she established a salon 
at Paris. Her husband became Minister of the Interior, 
March 1792. He was dismissed June 13th. and re-instated lOtl 
Augustq resigning 22nd Januaryq 1793. Madame Roland was 
arrested after Revolution of 2nd June91793 and guillbtined 
9th November. Rolandq who had fled to Rouen, committed 
suicide November 10th. f 
Madame Roland! s circle also included Vergniaud (Pierre 
Victurnien) b-17539 a lawyerg ex., Paris, 31st- October 1793 
and, Buzot (Francois Nicholas Leonard) b. 1760, lawyerg 
deputy for Eure in the Convention. Found dead with 
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Divisions in France seemed to be growing; the king 
himselfg, at the very head, of government had given 
damning evidence of his disloyalty to the nationg yet 
efforts to bring him round were made over and over again. 
As, well as the break-up of the Constitutional monarchy 
from within there was the growing threatp throughout 
the autizmng of conflict-with Austria and Prussia. 
Brissot and his supporters attempted to turn this menace 
into a positive forcel to unify France and to compel 
the-king to show where his allegiance lay. 
Mhe British, government had observed French tribu- 
lations-without any official comment. Edmund and Richard 
Burkeq Jr. attempted to chide ministers into action 
and met with-a, politep even vaguely amused, but entirely 
negative'response. George III found some. sympathy 
for the French royal famuly during and after the Plight 
to Varennes, but Lord Gowert, in Parisq felt otherwise 
"If this country ceases to be a monarchy it will be 
entirely the fault of Louis XVI. Blunder upon blunder, 
inconsequence upon inconsequenceg a total want of 
11(2) energy of mind ...... Most British politicians laid 
increasing emphasis on calm and prosperity at home, 
a comfortable contrast to the problemsp both internal 
and externall which beset France. 
(1) ýDundas to Richard Burke, Jr., 20th Septemberg 17919 
Burke, Correspondence, vig p. 404. 
Gower-to Grenvilleg,.. -July lst, 17919 H. M. C. 
Fortescue, MSSq iit P. 117 
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While Britain remained aloof, other European 
countries were compelled to register Gome comment on 
the course of the revolution in France. Before the 
Flight to Varennes both Austria and Prussia were con- 
cerned with the future of Poland and Russian intentions 
rather than with the fate of the French monarchy. 
Prance was only of peripheral interest, always provided 
that the revolutionaries did notýbecome actually aggress- 
ive and push into Belgium or the Rhineland. Few people 
in France wereýaware of the Emperorts lack of enthus- 
iasm'for direct conflicto with the exception of Marie- 
. 
Antoihette, who herself became convinced that the 
monarchy could only be restored to its former position 
by'warp. a war'which would crush the revolution. The 
attempt at. escape-made by his sister had manoeuvred 
Leopold into a situation in which he felt some kind of 
formal statement, however hollow-soundingg had to be 
made. On August 27th. 1791, he and Frederick William II 
of Prussia issued the Declaration of Pilnitzj in which 
th; y undertook to restore order'in'France if o-ther 
monarchs would join them. The French reacted sharply 
to the declarationg which. they took as an insult and 
a menacep but'no other monarchs came forward to,, assist 
Leopold and Frederick William. Lord Auckland found the 
declarationl"ill-conc, eived and undignified" but no-one 
in England believed it to be a genuine threat. 
(') 
Auckland to Grenvilleg September 7th. 17919 
H. M. C. Portescue. MSS, iiq p. 186. 
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"These great Princest" wrote Grenville to Dundas, 
"are desirous of saying. mUch and of appearing to have 
a greatlinfluence in the course of eventel but ...... 
they are quite determined to-do nothing. "M Neither 
was, there likely- to be any aggression from_ Spain, 
still, nominally tied to, France by the Family Compact. 
-,,,, 
For a varýety, of-reasoneq howeverg almost every 
political grouping in Franceq except the Robespierrist 
minority in, the-. Jacobinsg were to commit themselves 
to war during theturn. oý the year 1791-2. The 
Briesotins and the Royalists-for reasons already men- 
tionedq Lafayetteand, Narbonne(2 because they, hoped 
a.. short and successful campaign would restore the 
prestige. of, the monarchy. The Assembly itselfg-increas- 
ingly influenced, by Brissot, began, to force, the Emperor's 
hand in November 791,, when it ordered. the Elector 
f ri r, a pr the Emperorg to disperse the 
emigrC orce, s o erritory. French foreign policy `ko'-"`6oon-: Ieoame 
little more than, a. web,, of mutual, deceit, 
with Louis XVI publicly assenting. to aggressive legis- 
Grenville to Dundasq September 14th. H. M. C. 
FoxWscue MSS, iiq p. 192. 
(2) Louisq, Comte"de Narbonne-Laraq b. Parma 1755. 
Col. of Royal Piedmont Regimentq Minister for Warp" 
December-1791-March 1792. Much disliked by Louis'XVI 
While,, in-officeg-later escaped,, to, Englando returning-, 
after. Brumaire. D. 1813. 
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lation while privately'writing to Leopold urging him 
to oppose French demands. '"'The"Robespierri sts were 
disgusted-to note that no-one appreciated the very 
real dangers to which the French people were being' 
exposed bymen whom they'suspected as empty self- 
- seekersp ýeihaps even in'league with the Court. 
Robespierrels'criticisms went'practically unheeded, ' 
but the deep suspicions engendered at this time were 
no I t-forgottený: -in the power struggle of"the autiimn of"1792. 
The'belligerent sentiments-of the Assembly were 
primarily directed'against Austria and Prussia. 
Brissot affected to'be knowledgeable on diplomatic 
affairs but there were others who fully'appreciated 
the'disadvantages of a European war'and the need to 
take steps'before- hostilities _. began. The neutrality 
of England was of, c onsiderable importance and confirm- 
ation of the British i attitude became necessary in 
January, 1792, as relations deteriorated 'with Austria. 
At this point jalleyrand crossed the Channel'on 
an unofficial missi6n'to'sound'out Pit"Os administration. 
Talleyrýandls mis'sion is particularly interesting for 
the light, it throw. s on Bri'tish Policy at the beginning 
of 1792, since some of the, same questions and problems 
were,, to,. recur in seven. monthel-, time. The-initiative for 
the-journey Eývidently. came from TalleyranAimself. 
(1) Talleyrand'-Terigordq Charles Maurice de., B-175 
Bishop of, Autun.. ý, Took Civil Constitution of Clergy. 
In England and U. S. after August lbth, -1792. ' Adviser 
to Louis XVIII. 
56 
In a letter to his friend Birong the future generalp 
he related how he had suggested Biron, as the emissary, 
but that DelesBiart, 
(l) 
the Foreign Ministerg had 
insisted that Talleyrand go. himself, on the grounds 
that this would bring home to Austria and Prussia France's 
determination-to take strong action. Biron in his 
reply said that he doubted the Minister's good faith 
and believedýthat he was hoping to bring all the powers 
dowh on France -. 11je ne serais, pas embarasse-'de prouver 
autrement que par des conjectures-qulil cherche des 
ennemis-a la France pour armer. --touteB les puissances 
contre-la revolution; il a ri9_iste'-aý,. VOB bons conseile 
tant qulils ont pu etre utilese ... o-Quant a-l'Angleterre, 
M. Delessart ne sait apparemment, pas. tout le bien qutil 
fait en vous determinant ay allereee. * It 9 
(2 ) 
but he , 
went on to warn that Talleyrand-would not receiveýa- 
very warm reception in England. Carrying a letter of 
introduction explaining that he had no official status 
but was going "pour differents objets qui 11interessent 
personnellement, " Talleyrand'arrived in England on 
(1) Lessartq Antoine Valdee de. B. 17429 Minister of 
-Tinance 
in 
_1790 
and of the Interior in 1791. Minister 
fo± Foreign Affairst November 1791-March 1792. Impeached 
by, the Legislative Assemblyq he was massacred at 
Versailles, 9th September, 1792. 
(2)1--Biron to Talleyrand 7th Januaryq 1792. G. Fallaing ed. 
La Mission de Talleyran; \a Lýndres_en, l792---'-_' 
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t") 
January 24tho. 1792., Four. days-later. he, aaw Pittt 
an interview which,. passed , 
"tout. en politesses. 11- 
Grenville wasstill , 
in the country thusIconfirming-,,. 
Talleyrand's., opinion that things were dealt with, ina 
leisurely fashion_, in, England. 
, 
Despite, the vagueness 
of-his interyiews. with the Ministryq Talleyrand was 
encouraged and-, stayed, in,,. England till-early March. 
His own, letters. did, not, give-many concrete details of 
his conversationst. but aýmemoir written shortly after 
his return to-France and, the,, report, -he made on 
March 
15th to, the Comite Diplomatique,., Andicate. that his 
mission had two. predominant'aims. The first was., to, 
seek positive, assurances, of, 3ýeutrality and, the second 
was to suggest, exchanging, the,, West-Indian sugar', island 
1z, (2) 
of Tobago for a loan of four or,, five, million potinds., _-,,., 
Neutrality,,, wale, thelmost important,,, isBueg,. and., ýo, '., 
Justify 
it Talleyrand_could present, a, deta, iled,. argument., The 
main reason that France, feared,, British, reactions, wai3, 
the likelihoodq in the event of wargof the invasion 
of the Low Countries. Talleyrand maintained in 
March 1792, asthe Conseil Executif, and_Convention. main-,,,, 
tained right up,. to., the, outbreak, -of,, war, 
in, February, 1793, 
that. there was, no threat to-the Dutch, inany_occupation 
(1) "AN FT, ' 4395. 
(2) ýJ. 'Petrie, in a letter to Grenvill6'dated'March l3thp 
described"the advantages" d-drawbacks'of-theýisland an' 
of Tobago. ' 'H. M. C. - Fortescu6' . MSS. (the Dropmore Paý , 
vol. iiq - p. 256. 
58 
of Belgium. In this respect the-Revolution of August 
10th. marked no change in the official aspect of French 
foreign policy. These ideas were developed in a memoir 
entitled "Rerflexions pour la ne-gociation d'Angleterre 
en cas de-guerre-11(l) If war with Austria and Prue-Sia, -- 
was really unavoidableg', it begang French troops would 
almost certainly penetrate the Low Countries. "Il-est 
possible que l'Angleterret en vertu de son traite , de 
la Hay, eq avec feu Leopold et. 1a. Hollandq prenne, ombrage 
de llenvahisseFment de ces belles provinceaq se fasse 
N 
semblant de croire que nous voulons lee joindres a 
1'empire franSais. " In such-a--ýeaseqýTalleyrand, recomm- 
ended the following argument "Vous avez 6te"sage 
jusqu'a present; vous avez respecte-nos.. embarras. 
Nous vous declarons que 11 envahissement - dont-vous -voulez 
faire le pretexte d1une menace contre, nous'lest un acte 
I., purement defensif. Nous portons la guerre danB les 
. 11 
etats de la maison d'Autriche pour eviter notre ruine 
le, en operant la sienne pour la punir de"llingratitude et 
de la mauvaise politique avec lesquels elle sacrifie , 
une alliance aussi., avantageuse que la-notre a de vaines 
prejuges. .: 
Rous vous attestons qulil estýcontre les 
e, . principes de notre constitution-, de conquerir. Nous 
derkaronsque nous, ne. voulonsýpoint, -garder-les pays ni 
les joihdre, -a notre empire. " Thisýstatement,, was-, aný 
. illustration of the way in which French foreign policy 
was to Justify-the contradiction between aggressive. 
(l)- A. A-E. i -C. P. Angleterre, ' 580. 
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actions and. its,, former, pacific decrees. Talleyrand 
, went. on-to-, suggest-that if Holland-chose-to join Austria 
and. 
-Prussiag-Britain 
should carefully, weigh. the advan- 
tages of engagingAn a-war with France. This-would, 
be-an expensive ventureq. potentially damaging to British 
commerce. -Invasion would'. be virtually impossible and, 
even the traditional attractions might turn sour - 
A 
ý'Vous-:, prendrez--nos Colonies? Clest. peut etre nous 
rendre. service; carAl faudra que vous vous prepariez- 
k 
a, y-, eoutenir l'affreuse, guerre des-noi=. ". c 
The, British government would-quite, probably. have 
found the-tone of-such-advice notlýmerely-. frank_but, 
patronizing. 
The British government had. refused-to. give---, 
Talleyrand, any official-assurance, iof their., intended 
neutrality and,. he: had, had to-, be content., with, personal 
comments., from Grenville"and--Pitt.., On-hiB, return 
-Talleyrand reported-to., the. Comite Diplomatique-that 
it., seemedýllhighly_-probablell thatq, -in. the, -case, of.,, VVart 
Britain-, would, remain neutral. 
(', ), 
-. -, Pitt's administration 
dfd. not, want to make the slightest, commitment until- 
the. situation necessitated, it the ýbeginning of - 
March Grenville instructed-Gower that he was-ý if 
approachedg. to-expre as himself.. to. -be ? entirely, -,. -un---_ 
acquainted%with theAntentions otyour, governmentý'on,,. 
1 
(2) 
this subject. 
t'915thc March-1792,11 -*A'Ng P79 4395. (1)! '-Talleyran'd, 8 repor 
(2) Grenville to Gowerg March 9thq 17929 P. O. 27/38. 
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The country to which Talleyrand had come did 
not give the appearance.,, of. being especially; interested_ 
: in French affairst-org. indeedp foreign affairs, -ini, _,, 
, general. 
Lord, Aucklandgthe ambgBsador to the Hagueq. 
, waelsomewhat irritated by the ignorance which he 
found in London while on leave - "I have a long letter 
from Mr. Burges" (Under-Secretary in-the Foreign - 
_Office), -, 
he,, wrote to his First, Secretary in Hollandt 
,! Ibut,, so. farýas politics are concerned the remarks which 
he makes are, general and chiefly calculated to, explain 
'thatýEngland, 
has little. concern now-in, what-is-going 
f orward- on the- Oontinent.,, -He - adds --that 
the whole, is'. 7 
involved, toolmuch-in darkness to be, 
-a subject'ofispec- 
ulation.... -, His remark that we have no-concern-in 
foreign politics is truet--in another sense'--to a,, degree' 
that I-cannot. describeýto: you- I am,. every, -dayl--seeing-, 
well-informed men of allcbscriptions and -it, is-'a- strict 
truth..... that none-of. them, have ever, mentionedthe 
death, of, the Emperor or-, -the change of, 
the Spanish;. '-- 
Ministry-otherwise-than,, in the sameý_tone with which you 
would. remark the., deathor,, removal of. a-. Burgomaster at 
Amsterdam. And, this indifference to foreign affairs 
is general through the kingdom; you may find it even 
in our newspapers j'e'rhip'6"-it--maý be"Justly attributed 
to the great prosperity of the country,, which confines 
all attention to interior and insular details. I have 
lately much wished to pass a day at the Hague for the 
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sake of a little rational conversation. "(') It is 
possible that Auckland, once away from the'international 
scene, rather over-stressed the detachment, of, Britain. 
I He was an extremely well-informed and not particularly 
modest man. 
--The British government most certainly did not 
wish to be involved in a'European war but they kept 
an e ye on'the situation'throughout the first monthsý' 
of"1792. -Auckland's'observation on the lack of interest 
in Leopold IIts death may have been true in terms of-, '- 
general- conversation 9 but the government were far 
from blind to its", significance.. Grenvilleg' writing to 
the British, 'amba'ssadorýin Paris,,. required! Lord'Go'wer's 
P- particular'attention, at-a-moment, when'-the general. ---I,, 
interestis'of Europe-appear-to be-so', intimately-connected 
with wha't', 'isýpassingin-France.? 
) 
-'It-is%true-that"the 
British, government had noývery', -great opinion of-the 
policies of the European"'powerst and-for this reason 
they wOre at pains'to"keep Holland, 'outýof. any, embroil- 
ment into: whichýAustriag-'as-iulerýof Belgiumq might'--, 
ksh to-draw*her. - Lord-Grenvill'e'-was'. especially 
(1) Auckland to Lord Henry Spencer, March 20th. 1792. 
Auckland, Journals and Correspondence, vol. iiq P-398. 
(2) Grenville Gowerg, March 20th. 1792. P. O. '27. /38. 
Gower, George Granville Levesong Earl Gowerg-lst Duke 
of-'Sutherland. 1758-1833, Edu. ' Oxford. ' Travelled 
extensively in Europejýappointe-d ambassador to Francev 1790 
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scathing on the Austrian regime in the Low Countries 
"I feel very strongly that-this is not a time for-' 
embarking in gratuitous and unnecessaryý guara4 ie s', 
particularly of forms of government and still more 
particularly in the case of a government wholly destitute 
both, of wisdom and honesty. "(') 
The main explanation for theýBritlsh, attitude - 
at the beginning of, a, year which was to see unprecedented 
changes in Europe lay, in the domestic', policy, of Pitt's 
administration. Pitt-himselfg optimistic that his pland, 
for nationalrevival were-gradually leading,, the country 
towards prosperity and securityg, had ventured the 
opinion that England might reasonably, expect fifteen- 
years of 'peaceful cle-velopment. , In 'consequenceg"army 
and navy estimates had been reduced, no doubt snother 
reason for Grenville'B refusal to-allow thel)utchhto 
become involved'in any military'arrangement, with'the 
Emperor'. Th6 pr'ospect-of; -confrontationg, or even: 'un- - 
necessary contact with revolutionary-Francep seemed' 
unwise. Britain was-certainly tranquil and'prosperous 
in comparison with France j but - the satief actiorj-'of A,  
government supporters'was - not a universal'sentiMent. 
The'populations of the, growing manufacturing towns in 
Scotland and the-north and midlands-of Vngland did 
not occupy-their thoughts with-the funds and the 
(1) Grenville--, Auckland,, January 17th. H. M. C. 
IA 
Fortescue MSS, 
"OP 
cit-I p., 
, 
251'. 
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national'annual revenue. _Theyq, -like. the-artisans who 
practised crafts centurieslý-oldt. were, concerned with 
the day-to-day necessities of life.,. Timestl--for them9l. 
were-not. easy, and their-dissatisfaction grewv though 
it was more-a sub-conscious sensation of-Aiscontent 
than an articulated grievance. 1 The catalyst which 
transformed-such'widespread disenchantment into deep. 
felt -criticism was the publication of-the second, part 
of-Thomas, Paine's "Rights of Man". The devastatingly 
irreverent tone of, Painelsýonslaught on. a. system-which 
blanketed the investigation-of improvement &Lnd change 
beneath the weight of deferýence%forýthe, pastq cut at 
-the roots-of the society in, which he--lived. -,!. -In-America, 
Paine, had. seen a system, based on. equality of rights at 
. work* -He, ý for one, knew that, times were. changing.. 
!! Mankind are not now to be-told, that-. they, shall, not 
think or, they,, shall-not read; and publications that 
go no further than to investigate-principles of govern- 
ment-9 to'invite men to reason and reflectq, and to show 
. 'the errors'and excellencies. of different systemag-, have 
a right to appear. " Part II of the Rights of Man sold 
on an altogether unprecendented scale throughý6Ut'the 
British Isles. Paine's audienceg however, did not 
merely confine their activities to reading. Even 
before the appearance of his book groups had met in 
different parts of the country to discuss the need for 
'reform 
of parliament and the franchise. The London 
Corresponding Societyq opening its doors to members 
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unlimitedg: wasýformed'in. ýa, tavern'off the Strand in 
Januaryg,, 1792. In a-country, where restlessness was 
inereasingg-the: danger from the-ý, spread, ofýFrenoh ideas 
was'not. to-be underestimatedg, Lord', Auckland-wrote - 
! Me extravagance and, profligacy. of. their doctrines , 
have. not yet infected-usýmaterially; but-I'dread them- 
as, I, would the plague in my'neighbourhood.... n(l) 
i4it, The-French; -pre-occupied. with, the coming war, -. 
were primarily interested, --in the,. assurance. of-neutral- 
ity which. Talleyrand,. brought-. back-viith. -himj. --ratiler 
than any possible discomfiture of Pitt's administra- 
tion. On March lst. the Emperor Leopold died and his 
son Francis soon showed that he was not likely to 
compromise with the revolutionaries. The Brissotins 
moved still further towards direct hostilitiesp attack- 
ing the Austrian influence at Court and impeaching 
Delessart. Their position seemed assured with the 
installation of the Patriot Ministry on March 10th., 
after the dismissal of Narbonne o andq the new 
4", Z 
minister of t- he Int , eri 
, or and Cl vDiere 
2) 
9- Minister for 
(1) - Auckland_, -! Grenvillet March . 14th. -, ': H. M. C. Fortegeue 
MSS ýp. ', 262. ý 
(2) -01ýyiýertep, , Etienne., ý, 
b-. -1735--, - Swiss, banker. -Exiled 
from. Genev"als/fter revolt ýof 1782-ýs, Links with,, Briesot. 
Minister of ýFinance March., 1792 and again in-, August. -,; 
Arrested 2nd., June, 1793. ý--Tried.,. by, ý-revolutionary,, tribunal, 
Co=itted suicide 8th., December, ' I' -- -, -, " - -, - -ý', Iý : 1793. - ý-- ý--I. I., -ý -1- ýý 
: -< -- ; «:. 
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Finance were, friende. of Brissot, but Dumouriez(l), 
'who replaced Delessartp had rather, different aims, 
since he envisaged a short war, which wotild, restore 
royal authority, rather than consolidate-that of the 
Assembly. As the outbreak of war approached in April, 
Dumouriez continued the policy of keeping on reasonable 
terms with. Great Britain and her Dutch ally by accred- 
iting new ambassadors to the Courts of St. James and 
the Hague. The instructions to the British legationg 
which consisted of the former Marquis de Chauvelin 
(2) 
(1) Dumouriegg'Charlei'Francois Duperier, b. 1739. Welcomed 
the"Revolution as an opportunity to improve on his 
chequered career. 'Foreign'Ministerg March-June, 1792. 
Commander of army of the"northq won battles of Valmy and 
Jemappes (20th'. Sept. and 6th Nov-1792)9 but became'disenchanted 
with revolution"and involved in bitter dispute over organ. 
ization of supplies'etc'. 'fo'r his army-in occupied Belgium. 
Defeated at Neerwinden; March-18thg*17939 fled to the 
Austrian lines, -5th, April* After an uncomfortable exile 
settled-, in England,, whdre, he died. 'in 18234'o 
(2) 'Chau'v'e'lin,, Blernard-Prahcoist Marquis de-'B. 'Paris, 1766. 
Inherited the*office of"Master'of-the Wardrobe'. 1791 aide- 
de-camp to-marechal de, Rochambeau. Named, as, Minister-Pleni- 
potentiary,, to. -, 
Court of, St., Jamesq. 19th., April-1792,,. appar- 
ently on suggestion-of-Talleyrand. Recalled January-21stq 
1793 and ordered,, by George III to leave Great, Britain on 
January 24th. Named as ambassador to Florence on his return 
to France but imprisoned August 1793 because of his noble 
background and suspect sympathies. Released after 9th. 
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Talleyrand and--the-'Swiss Duroverayýl)j-indiýated'that 
France'-still felt some insecurity, over Britain's react- 
., oow I ions-to'the war - "Les dispositions manifeBtees"par le 
Ministere'Britannique'a M. Talleyrandp, durant'sa 
mission's, Londreaq quelques favorabýles quIelles'parai- 
seent au syeteme-de'lý, neutralite 
e9 nels ont'-'point . ýt suffi- 
santes pour. nous inspire -une, parfaite securite sur 
les intentions'reelles de'lcette-puissance. "'''It was 
fearedIthat the British governmentq neverýentirely 
trust-worthy, mightýus6`the declarati6n, of'war as's. 
pretext for changing -their policieck especially 
if 
Holland'seemedithreatened*-ý I'Quelque-soientýl es 
. 01, lo, IN A 
evenements, votre premiere attention--devra etre d' 
entretenir lee dispositions temofgnees-a'M. '-'de'Talleyrand, 
de faire'valoir les'raisons de . 'politique/g''tant'inter- 
ieure-qulexterieure, qui'ýdoivent'detourner le Minis"t'e're 
Britanniqueg-je ne, 'dis; pas dlentrer dans, 'la coibinaison 
des puissances'contre la--Pranceg mais, deý la"fEiioriser.... " 
This was followedýbyýa-. detailed-just, ification-of the 
French*position in which, the adtions'of the European 
powers were-compared'to those of-Louis XIV against""- 
Great Britain'4- on*behalf'of-the Stuirts. "L6 Minis'tere 
(1) Duroveray, A Swiss with diplomatic experience and 
ability, -intended as. adviser to Chauvelin. ""His conduct 
gave: rise to, misgiVings and he was'recalled, 11 1 th October 
-1792. -'Remained-in 
England and at the end of'January, 
1793 was passing on information'to the Britishý. g-ove I rnment. 
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ni"la nation Britannique veuillent-entrer-dans un 
concert'q'ui porteýatteinte, chez un-peuple voisin a ceý 
principe au quel'la-Grande-Bretagne est-Iredevable de 
sa prosperite. " Theembassy was also instructed to 
rI eport on-the inteAor-situation of the'British-Islest 
although it'wasfelt that the extent of, the reforming 
spirit was probably' exagge rated. 
(') 
ý-The position of-the new Prench diplomats was un- 
comfortable. , Reaction to'Chauveling' as he -, was -later '_ 
to inform his'enemies in*Francep was pointedly chilly, 
(2)ý 
foroiýg'him into comparative isolation*' --"M. Chauvelin 
continues a stranger--to: his'diplomatic-brethren",, wrote 
Under-Secretary Burgesýon 29th.. -Mayq "and-, 'does, not, gain 
upon'the public opinion.,, 
(3)", 
The instructions, given. 
to, 'Emmanuel de Maulde,,, as ambassador-to-the Hague,. ._ 
differed, considerably from ChauvelinIs.,: In, view. -of,, -the 
British government's'known interest in upholdingthe 
Stadtholderýthe wisdom of, urging definite,; contacts., --. 
I with the Dutch Pa'triotS, was questionableg, z', even though 
support w6s to be given with circumspection -. ýIlses,;, 
liaisons'dlabord-seront"'secre - tea, ' et en leur donnant, 
des esperances pour l's ir il evitera e, ater, une 
explosion tant que lui- E)) croira poUVoir 'afassurer 
(1) Projet d'Instructiong ChauvelingTalleyrandg 
Duroveray, 19th. April, -1792. A. A. E. C. P. Angleterre 580. 
(2) S e-e Below 
(3) Burges-to-Aucklandq Mai-29th, Aucklandl Journals 
and Correspondencep iit -pop. 409: ý- 410 o' 
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la neutralite parfaite. Car une revolution pre-- 
maturee en Hollande pouvait nous attirer sur lee bras 
toutes les forces de l'Angleterre et de la, Prusse. 11 
It was also stressed that continuing Dutch-neutrality 
was the single most important benefit for which the 
ambassador was. to strive. "Notre premier inter t eat 
d1avoir le moins, dIennemis possibles a combattre; - de 
nous assurert sinon llamitid"9' du moins la parfaite 
. 11, neutralite des autres puissances, et surtout des celles 
qui ont avec nous des rapports plus, raproches et, plus 
directs. "(') The two sets of. instructions were issued 
on. April 19th.. The following day the Assemblyq real- 
izing that its deliberately uncompromising-attitude 
towards Austria had finally).. met with direct resistances 
voted, by an almost overwhelming, majority to declare war. 
The French were quite correct, in their assumption that 
the British government was unlikely to, be unmoved by 
the, imminent outbreak of war. On April 20th. Grenville 
wrote to Gower asking for-a full reply and the-best 
information "with respect to the present state of the 
French, army on the frontiers, of the Low Countries, to 
the. supposed projects which may be, in contemplation 
of any invasion of the Austrian dominions. " 
(. 2) 
As France went to warg domestic, -concerne,, were 
still predominant across the Channel-* Throughout the 
(1)", Instructions to de Maulde-9 seized by-the British 
in November 1792. P. O. 37/42. 
(2) 
., Grenville - 
Gower, 20th. April 1792t P. O. 27/38. 
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41 
summer 1ý of'1792 Britain , watched the det eriorat I ion'of 
government in France with some amazement but little", 
real comprehension. Even so, the situation in the 
British Isles was not so stable as Pitt would have 
wishede The success of Paine began to alarm 'the auth- 
orities and strong action was advocated in order to 
stem a flood of seditious literature and to curb the 
activities, of the so-called democrats. The first measure 
of'repression was an-indication of the manner in which 
the government attempted to handle later difficulties 
involving the explosive combinatiop of sedition and 
discontent. The impulse for immediate steps came, from 
Henry Dundas, the Home Secretaryq early in May. 
Dundast himself. a Scot, was disturbed by the agitation 
for burgh and parliamentary reform north of the"border., 
An'attack on the provost of Lanark early in May con- 
vinced him that a proclamation-should be issued against 
seditious writings. "Whatever is'right'to'be donev" he 
wrote to Lord Chancellor Thurlowq "ought to be done 
quicklyg'andg above all, we'must avoidý, impressing, those 
who have on public grounds proffered their aid that his 
Majesty's government is, backward and tardy in taking 
such steps as may be thought-necessary'for repressing 
those pernicious practices and-doctrines which are 
afloat and which cannot be met and resisted at'too 
early'a stage Dundas had-never shared even Pitt's 
(1) Quoted in H. Furberg Henry Dundas, Viscount Melville 
(1936) p. -79. 
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early. enthusiasm for parliamentary'reform. He was. 
determined to meet seditious literature-with the full 
force of the law. His advice-was-,, taken and on May 21st. 
a royal, proclamation. against seditious, writingswas 
issuedg requiring 11ajust confidence in the. integritý.., 
and wisdom of parliament. "ý,, The, proolamation's success 
was'dubious, for it brought Paine into, even, greater 
prominence. The Ministry, derived, some comfort, from 
the flood-of loyal. addresses even though these were 
not entirely spontaneous. Letters exchanged between 
Lord Grenville, and his brotherg the Marquis of Buokinghamg 
I- ,, -, ý-Iý--I. C -ý- 1W -%ý 
indicate that., the, addressee, foreshadowed"the more,, _,.,. 
highly-organized Association. movement, of, Novembert, 1792. 
"I think-the Address perfectly unexceptionable as it 
now. stands, 111 -wrote 
Grenvilley "but Ishould-wish to 
add, a sentence. somewhere, expressing, the satisfaction 
and concurrence, of, the country in, the. sentiments,,, -- , 
expressed, by Parliament onthis, subje. ct. ý. be, cause. I think 
it may not be indifferent to.. future debatesq, to have 
to, quote, ex ressioneof,,, this. sorti. in. ýorder to show p 
thatp on a, great occasion like thisq-, the, sense of., the,, 
people. was immediately, and, completely expressedby 
I-, "I -'. . 1.111-, - j.. , -- ., -- -1 ý- 
Parliament ...... Do-you, advertize,,, the meeting, in the -- -, I, .I- 1ý .-,, ý,, 1, ---ý, _; " ", - ý- -: -I I ". 1, 
London papers? "(') A further point of similarity bet- 
ween the first signs of alarm in May and the emergency 
in November was the discussion of a coalition with 
(1) Grenville to Buckingham, June 21st. 17929 Buckinghamp, 
Memoirs gf tlae Cgurts and_Gabinets of GegrzA TTT9 vol- 
211. 
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the Whigs, - a-prospect which failed because of Foils 
total-un, willingness to*work under Pitt and-the Duke' 
of PortlandlB refuial, to*desert'Pox. 
-Despite the'Biitish'governmentls., fears*'ofýthe"ý 
effe6ts-of sedition on law, and. 'order-at a-time'when'dis- 
content. was evident in certain areasll-there was no 
immediate danger of'loSsý-of: control. --At the I -beginning 
of June,, 1792 in Franceg-the final,, breakdown of the 
.... Conatitutidnal compromise--was'inliinent. -' There were 
-several crucial factors in', the"-development"of the'ý'-"-' 
crisis. The firstwas tlie'-ineffectiveness'-of'the Legis- 
lative Assemblyq deserted-, by the radicals in the Jacobins 
and the people of'Paris-'in-,, the'sections'-and"6corned*-- 
by"the king. 'The, Assembly I s'- loss Of initiativeýwas 
exploited byýthe'Jacobinsj who'grew', closer to the'people. 
It is significant, -,, toojýthat. rust-of-'the Assembly'- 'dist 
was not confined to Paris; -'. -The-departmentalý'federeat' 
who: arrived in, Paris*-to. celebrate'the fete de-la"' 
Federation in July and'. to man, 'the-camp at'Soissons- 
near Parisq played an important part-in the overthrow 
of the monarchy. Paris was, physically responsible for 
many of the Revolution's. greatest moments, but the 
song which immortalized the aspirations and the 
.& 
4 
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defiance, of, the. Revolution,. cameý. from,, Marseilles. 
Another vital element, in, the breakdown 
_of , government 
was. the attitude of. -the, king. -, Louis, XVIthoping, -to 
prof it from., the splitwhich, had developed -between -the 
people and their representativesl decided to defy the....., 
Assemblyt believing that, any_, ensuing. disorders wuuld. 
leave the country.,, absolutely-ldefenceless, in-the face 
of the Prussian invasion..., -In,. the background of,, this, - 
combination. of, poliýiqal., diffigultieelwas., a, -_renewal 
of the economic. crisist-, thii3,, time,, in, the,,, form of grain- 
shortageal, accusations of hoardingq, and, ý. the more,,, --., 
serious 
_menace. of_. 
inflation. 
The end followed swiftly on the outbreak of war. 
This was not simply because of the, early, disasters, 
caused byzlack., of discipline, and. traininggIn an army 
which, had lost many of, its offýcers,,, through emigration. 
The-Briesotins, who had urged,. the,. national,, benefits of 
warg., had-, failed. to appreciate. that. to arm ordinary,,. 
men, in,, -the, _service_of the revolution, ýwasjýto introduce 
(1) 'The, Marse'illai ,8 '6a'me"to Paris at the request of 
Charles BARBAROUX (b. 1767), ''se*cretary-general of the 
Igarseille's"N"ational Guardq who had been in Pari's'since 
February 1792 urging support for his municipality against 
% 
the royalists of Arles and Avignon. Elected as deputy 
to the Convention for Bouches-du-Rhone he opposed the 
Parisian, deputies and fi6d to the Gironde after the 
Revolution of June 21ýd 1793. E xec . uted Boideaux' "-1794. 
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a! new, and, formidable element into ýthe -, ýpolitical'lscene. 
Hitherto the -people had'intruded in_ý;, the great- crises.., 
of, the, revolution ý only., when the power. of -physical -- 
-, -Reduced, to-the status, of, passive persuasion, was needed, 
citizen in, the first, years of, therevolutiongthe, co=on 
man discovered thatthe, war had, given, ýhim'indispens&-,, ý, -I,,, 
bility-and identity., 'ý, The. lvolunteerwholeft 
his, fields 
or,, his'workshopito. enrol-in the-army, -was: notýdisposed,. ý! 
to. *be'used -as a pawn in,, the, ', strugglq, fOr -political 
control;, Willing, -, toýmake heavy, eacrificeso-such men-, 
asked"in return,,,, the. guaranteeý-of-lia!:, system which, would 
safeguard, -their-, livelihood, and, ý, -grant thema,, voice in 
the conduct ofýaffairs. ', ' 
,, Seniqingýthe threat. to-its, influenceiýthe, 
AsseMly 
made-a7finaYeffort, to impose. its, will, on the,. King. 
The'decrees-ýofý, May,, 27th. and. 29th--,, and-June,; 8th--_, 
ordered-the deportation of non-juring priestsq the. 
,, setting abolition, 'of the Constitutional; ý, Guard--and, 
theý 
. up. of a. 'eamp-of 20,000-mational-guardsmen nearýParis. - 
The-coereiveý, intentions'-Of,, -Buch 
legislation-, waB. obvious. 
The'king-meeting foroe-withýforce-decided, -to,. veto-ý. -- 
the"first and last decrees'q',, though his, decision was, 
not, f ormally-, known-, till'' June 19th. ', In, ý, theý* interim,,, 
more pressure was brought to bear on him in a letter 
from the Rolands. "Siret" it begang I'lletat ou se 
trouve la Franceq ne peut subsister longtemps. Il 
faut qulil se termine par un coup d'etat, dont lee 
-suites 
doivent vous interesser autant quIelles 
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interessent llempire.... une grande arise me- hace la 
Francý'; elle ne peut 6tre evite"e que'par-l-lletabliese- 
ment de la confiance du peupleýdans les'intentionB de 
,--,, I/ -A votre Majeste;; mais cette'confiance doit etre etablie 
non par des protestationst'mais par des faits. 11 
The tone of such a letter showed not*merely presumption 
-buý-almost complete, lack'of*appreciation'of: the king's 
character. Louis, had never been happy'With the Patriot 
Mihistry-and'on June'l3th, three days X er, the letter 
r 
(2) 
f 
wasýwritten, he dismissed Rolandq C 
nalvieree 
and'Servan. 
Dumouriezq never slow to assess the-drift-of--events 
himself resigned, within'the next,, few'daysi'taking up 
the post'of general'of the-army'of*the north. ' Dumouriez 
was succeeded by two supporters of the king, first" 
the Marquis de Chambonas and secondly the'Chevalier 
Bigot de Sainte-Croix, who'had almost no influence on 
. affairs. 
The day after his veto-of the decrees-became-""" 
publicly known, the king-received ominous warning'that' 
discontent in'the capital-might, no longer be confined 
to discussion in the sections and'-denunciation"in'the 
Jacobins'e', On June 20th. -a large crowd, who had been 
celebrating the annivereary, of the-tennis-court oath, 
17 2. '- Published,,, - Roland. to. Louis-XVIg lune-10th. ý 9 
in. Le Patriots Francais. 
(2) Joseph Servang. MiniBter of, War, May 1792.,, Re, 
appointed. 10th.,, August, 1792p. _retired 
through-, ill-health 
in October. 
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broke into the, Tuileries palaceq-, surroundingýand, 
jostling the royal'Ifamilyq while demanding-, the sanction 
of the vetoed-decrees-and the re.; -instatement of'the 
Patriot Ministers. ' Louis XVIVealt. slocessfullyAwith 
the intruders-by an,. impressive, -display,, Iofl: composure 
and dignity.. The, origins, of the, journee-oflJune 20th. 
remain obscure. - "Cette, manifestation. -. '. *. -ne fut''" 
lloeuvre, niýes partisans,, de Robespierre et-de'Dantong 
ni de ceux-du. Ministere'Rolandý-Dumouriezg'mais'-celle 
du peuple-des faubourgs qui intervint brutalement, 
1 
4, dans la, querelle entre. la-legislatureet-leýro 
In the absence of definite proof". this'definition!,. 
of a spontaneous, crowd action seems: plausible. 
.. -There was'some counter-demonstrationg'-presumably', ',. 
royalist-inspiredt during the following. weeko, which 
brought forthright co=ents, from the-sections to the'-. -, '-. ý 
Assembly --. "Les-*torches de laýguerre-civile slallUM4nt.. 
oo, o* cl, est a. vous de lee-eteindre. "_ The Jacobins, 
always-conscious of the. popular moodqidrewýBtill closer 
to the sections after June, 20th. -. ",, "Si nous ntallon's 
pas-dans nos sectionsg nous nlaurons rien, fait. Car 
on ne manquers, pas de dire que nous ne,, so=es ici qul-une', 
(3) 
poignee de faotieux. " The 
'position. 
of Paris, was.. 
(1) 
. 
'Brae ý_ch', '-ý 
- F. La Commune du'Dix-Aodt, 1792. ' Paris 1911. 
pl. 
, 
(2), 
, 
The Gobelins sectiong quoted in Braeschg op. cit., p. 68. 
(3) Danton to the Jacobinsq, Journal des Debats de la 
, Societe des amis de-la Constitution, -no. 
217, 
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strengthened, still further at theend of June and. 
-I'. -I--ý-, .--.. 1- Zli", 
beginning of July by Lafayette's failure,.,, to, close the 
Jacobins and the. arrival of-the, federes fromthe 
departements to celebrate-Uftjy, -l4th. -, -. The declaration 
of, the state. of emergencyg. la Patrie- en danger, gn 
July 22nd. brought, the entire question, of-the organi , s-, 
, 
ation of government in a time of national,, crisis. into 
immediate prominence. On July 15th. in, the, Jacobinst 
Billaud-Varenne, had demanded_the overthrow. of, the 
monarchy. 
The. British, spectators of, the demise, of.: the French 
monarchyt commented on the news transmitted,, -from Paris 
With increasingamazement. More, than-onceýthey,. compared 
the, violence, of France with, the tranquqjity, 9ý;,, Britain. 
"We have nothing here but peace and prosperity-at; 
home-and no, other concern in, the miseries and misfortunes' 
of, other countries-than what humanity,, calls 'for. 11(2) 
Grenville,. writing to'Gower on. JulY 19th. 9 summed-up,, 
the essence of, the British outlookp,, which was only 
dissipated, by, the'events of-the, first-Awo weeks. of,,., ---- 
November, 1792. --, 
(1) Billaud-Varenne (Jean Nibholas), b- 17569' was one of 
the most radical members of the Jacobins. Men suchas he 
and Collot d'Herbois, (Jean-Marie) b. 1750, ' became'more 
I influential duringýthe summer 6f-l792-'I', Both-: Billaud and 
Collot served on the Committee of Public Safe ty and were 
exiled to Cayenne in-1795. Billaud died. in. Haiti. in 1.719. 
(2)' Grenville toý-G, oý'w'e'r Ju'ly'19thý, 1792, H'. 'M. C. - Fortescue Mss. 1 11, 
p. 294. 
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'As the leýders of the Jacobins'drew towardsthe-"- 
sectionsq the'Brissotins drew towards the king. ' They 
8, till'had great influence in the Assembly but'thiý,, ý 
was'of'no value if the Assembly'itself was beingýby- 
passed'by'a'third force. "'Striving desperately'to out- 
manoeuvre*-their political opponentag-Vergniaiidp Gensonne 
and-Guadet'embarked'on a dangerous and-ultimately 
futile course. The corresýondence; 'which-they began 
8 riking'-evidence in-their very with the court'i 48t, -'that 
greýt'fear of-a, 'po'pular insurrection'the I Brissot-Rol6aid 
group had'10st! . all"grasp-, of political-realities. The 
inconsistency'of their approach-was, astonishing-ý 'In 
May'they'had-denounced the"Austrian'Committee atý'Cou 
an 40tion which .1 implied 
11 deepdistrust I 'of th6, king,, I yet 
in mi&-july; in order-to trj'ýto salvage"'a"bankrupted 
Political-system, -they-were-'prepared to, b, egin*negotia-, 
tions: 'ýith-. the'. king-. for, a, new', "Patriot'. 1. ý*_ Mini s try, -,,,,,, 
LOuis-XVI'was-'thus able to. ensure-., the*, -ineffe6tiveness 
of -, the 'Ass embli., 
" "' The'- king i':, like'_'sL11 Europe'. 
after, the publication of the_Duke of Brunswick's mani- 
festo, was awaiting the Prussian invasion, with its 
promise of the destruction of Paris if resistance was 
met. 
While-, the, BrisriotinE3. tried. to save themselves 
through. -the monarchyq the sectionsq in permanent -. - 1 -1- 1.1.1 1- 111-; zý-, 4'' C. "-ý7 
B-ru, ns, w-ic, ký"s"'Ma'nifestol'mainly'drafted-by'-ýthe 
'6migres, was known-in France-at'the end'of"July. 
') 
session, after July 25th. followed the,, lead of Billaud- 
Yarenne. On July. 30th. Theatre Francais admitted passive 
citizens. and. the next. day Mauconseil, repudiated its 
allegiance, t'o'the king.., The authority. of-the Assembly 
was-now virtually, at an end. "Un nouveau. ferment 
revolutionnaire tourmente, dans sa base,, une-organisation, 
0 politique., que,., la. temps n1a, pas consolideeg", wrote 
Ve*rgniaud. (') Francewas. menaced from within and 
withoutp a. circumstance which, the declaration., of'. 
'- 
emergencyt, la patrie en dangerl, confirmed on July,. 22nd. 
In-Paris theatmosphere was-ver ., tense. At 
beginning of August the sections. were determined', to 
seek a decisive, solution, to the,.,, crisisp-, and on August 3rd. 
Petion,,, (ýý. as rýayor of,.. Parist., pýpsented'a petition to 
the Asse#iblyýdemanding, ýhe., deposition of, the, king, -,, _ CLMIAý 
"Tant, que nous aurons un roi. sembla'blýevaj, liberte ne 
peut slafArmir et nous voulone(demeurone/libres. Par 
un reste dlindulgence nous aurion4-dýre"pouvoir vous 
demander la suspension de Louis XVIP tant qulexistera 
(1) Vergniaud to Bozeg July 29th. Vatelp Vergniaudg 
Lettres, Manuscrits et Papiers. 
(2) Pe't'ion de Villeneuve, Jerome. b. 1753. Lawyer. 
Deputy for 3rd. Estate of Chartres. Escorted Louis XVI 
back to Paris after the flight to Varennes. Mayor of 
Paris 1791. Very popular in simmer of 1792. His eclipse 
after August 10th. brought him into conflict with 
Robespierre. "'Found dead with"Bdiot''June-' 9 1794' 
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le danger de la patrie; --. ms, is la constitution sly 
opposee"'Louis'M invoque sane cesse la constitution; 
nous 11invoquone a'notre'tour et nous demandons sa 
d6ch6ance. 11 The-sections had called the Assembly's- 
its 'response"'enflamed p-op'ular opinion sti . 11 . bluff. 
further. On August 8th-. ''it'failed. to impeach'Lafayette, 
who had been unable to close'the Jacobins club at the 
end ofJune, The next day-$-still hoping that -the*king 
might be brought'to face the necessity'of survival by 
'Working within the Constitution, - it voted to' suspend''' 
further discussion of petitions demanding the deposition 
-of the king. "' ' The''Commune held' that""the*-people must, 
have recourse to insurreotion t6"'reclaim the sover- 
eignty which the king had usurped' , and, the Assembly" 
forfeited. 'In the'night of August-9th-10th it met at-- 
the Hotel de Ville'to direct'the'struggle'for power. 
-f- 
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Chapter 
,,,., The. Revolution of August 10th. . 1792 and its, -, . 
immediate implications...... 
,, -- 
During the early hours of 
_August _-'10th. 
theý'citizens 
of -Paris were summoned toinsurrection by the, ringing%, 
of,,, the tocsin of theýCo de/liers Monastery. In the- 
aftermath of, the fli of the royal family from the-. 
Tuileriesýto the(M: a: n:; get and the ensuing slaughter of. _., 
li 
the , ing'. s. Swiss guardo, the fury of the people, could 
be plainly. seen. , 
The Assembly sat in permanent'session, 
but atý, that point it, was.,; no more free or--influential 
. 
than Louis himself., -ý The. seeds of the dilemma'whichý, 
Wa8ýto'haunt, France, until, the fall of Robespierre were 
sown within,: the first few-hours of August. 10th. - The 
populace had, risen in, arms, to reclaim the rights which 
the, inaction and self interest-of. theýLegislative, ý 
Aseembly,, had. enabled the-king. tp usurp;. ýthe people 
had, been-compelled. to. resor, t--toýviolence'to recapture 
its sovereignty. The-tasic-problem. was to'. find a.,, 
form of,, government powerful enough to-cope, with the 
exigencies, of-a crumbling economy-, and a foreign: warq-, 
yet, so--, constructed that the'sovereignty of-the, people, 
invested in ite. representativesq.,, was. ýseento-be exer- 
cised-to-the maximilm. publio: good and. not abused.,, -- I This 
was, a, ýproblem of great complexity and inescapable 
immediacy; the, men of the Conventiong among whom 
very genuine convictions and political self-interest 
were intermingledp produced a series of expediental 
0I 
none of which 
-provided 
a lasIting 
-solution _ýtq,., 
thel 
difficulties inherent An, the overthrow of Louis XVI, 
, 
The.. proclamation of the Commune on August. 10th. 
justified. the insurrection and, outline. d_the slteps which 
were, ýeing. -taken to re-establish order... -It, was phrased 
with-the, confidence of, men who had followed-an irre--- 
vocable-course of behaviour and whop, in so doingg had 
seenitheir determinationtriumph. ". Citoyens, -P-) Peuple, 
pýace' entre la mort etýlle age vient de, 
ýLevýir 
la ruine de la patrie. en. rep? ýenant-une-seconde fois 
se8 droit8. Le souverain. aparle;. L, des, magistratS 
no=es,, par, la, majorite deB, sections. viennent, --de,, prendre 
e, seance, a la Maison. Co=une. ýCettemesur . 
ýýecessitee 
par.,, les circonstances va romp7e, tou's, les-filsý'd'e'. 11 
intrigue ...... le,. p"pleq,, 'c. 
ette. a. fois'-ci ne.. sera_ paB. -,, _.., 
leve, en. vain..... "(, 
') The insurrectionary., communeq 
which, included Robespierre, among:, other,, influential figures, 
-in, the maint composed of men who 
had 
'! 
ýat on the 
two, committees sent from-, the sectionsýto'die. auss, the 
deposition of-the king. It. had, declared-itself in 
peimanent, session during,, the., nig4t of. August, 9th-10th. 
Although. the Assembly was still sitting 'ý_qqmmune 
was 
the onlyý real authority in Parieg-andg. because it,,., - 
controlled, the capital it also,, decided, the fate of 
France.,, 
(1)"'Proclamation'of. the Commiin e 10th. Augu6t'1792, ' 
quoted'in Braescht Cit. 
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--The Revolutionlof'Augkst'10th. profoundly affected 
wiery'aspect of administration andýpoliticsý, in, France 
and was'eventually responsible for'transforming France's 
position,, in., Europee'"-Altliough it-had'immediate-'effects 
on-the monarchyg' the Assembly an'd, on-diplomatio, rel- 
ationsl'ýit'did not immediately'dispel the'-uncertainty'. 
of-, the future.,, ' "Thoseý, who,, had'actually'participated 
in-, the: insurrection or who unhesitatingly approved of 
it were `few ý iii` number. "' 'Bothý'ýthe'Commune'and-theý- 
Assemblyý'claimed to, represent, the--French-'nation but 
such a claim was-premature'-and-rash before provincial 
reaction"to the-ev'ents 6f-August-10th'*. -was known. -In 
the uncert'a'in'period just-before-the revolution the', 
Assembly-had-receivedia'number of anti-republican--, --ý 
petitions'- "Legislateurs. 'La'patrie est-en'danger des 
scelerats trament--Ba perte; -clest contre ceux que- 
nousýelevons la voix. -Nous-ne vous-ferons point-'- 
ente'ndre'les 'acc"ents I ýde-la'flatterie; -- clest le langage 
des e*scl'ave-s'. ', Hommes librest nous, vous. -dirons-la 
A. ,14 veri- , de-llentendret vo teý vou-OeA ýs dignes el, lee 
representants du ppuple-frangaise Nous avons, voulu. ý, 
une'constitution:. -qui"fixat', l'es'devoir's*et, -lesýdroits 
duýoe - uple et du mon arque'. ",,, A I similar petition from 
Lille'was'signe dýby men'of-varying occupations 
ell Itperruquier, tapiesiert--negociahtv bourgeois, ''commiag 
'loiq''cirierq, epicier. "(l), 'ý Similarlyq soldatv' homme de 
, the reaction of many 
functionaries in local government 
was far from certain. Many of these men were broadly 
Petitions to the National Assembly in A. K.., BB 30/17. 
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in-eympathy. with the Rolandist viewpoint. ----! Their: 
commitment to a new . and, more radical f ormý'of - gov4rn: -" 
ment WBB-cautious. Half-heEýedness in the government 
of the. provinces affected. the'nation's internal"- 
tranquillity,, and was, a. source of concern, in" Paris 
As. early, as. August 15th'. -, the National'AssemblyýýdecreeA 
that all public officers were to take'_an-oath. of-. `: 
loyalty.... to the nation. 
-I_-., Howeverýindecisive_the reactions of-private indi- 
viduals. towards a change of administrationg-the- 
LAI ]Revolutionýof Augrt. 10th. had'irreversibly seaiedýthe 
fate,, of'-the monarchy. Although the king was merely'' 
suspended71nitially and. his, personal fate not decided 
on for_some, monthsj'ýthere was'a-considerable revulsion 
of'feeling. against him. The king w4s condemned in the 
revolutionary press as a-traitor who had'eaused the 
be - spJ: lt blood of, thousands, of innocent patriots-tO 
The, violence-, of. reaction varied but. it, -pointed'unani 
mously-towards-. the same end* ýLe Thermometre-'du Jour-, 
consideredý, that the'revolution would be"Ibien plus 
Ole fatale, a Louis, XVI-qui l'a-causee qufau peuple qui. ne 
f revolution que, ce sly.. est. portekqu a l1extrem 
monarque pu facilement 4viter sli e3u lu tot 
ecouteýlla majorite"-du peuple dont il-Cesle represent- 
ant qjie-, a. majorite de see v_alets. 1'(l)-, I, -Prudho_=ej'in 
Les 
(Re/vplutions, 
de Paris; " -inveighed a"gainst the, 'fallen 
(1) Le Thermometre du Jour, - (6de' Dulaure) 11th-Augusto 1792. 
84 
tyrant-- "Citoyensl la place de Louis-Ne'ron et de. ., 
Medicis-Antoinette nlest pointýdans les tours'du, Temple. 
Le-soir mtme-du-dix aout leur tete devait,,, -tomber--sous 
latguillotineg trop heureux dlexpierp', par une seul 
mortq,. le trepas de. deux mille patriotes et llintention 
bien constatee ou ils etaient dlen egorger centmille"(1) 
Thus was raised one of, the most important issues of 
the coming months# the contradiction between 
of thepeople and the continued existence of, the king. 
Thie'theme was developed at length by-.,, Sain 
- 
t-Just in 
Hn Le 
(2 
rý the Convention and by ebert ie "Ducheene where 
the. vicious personal attackslon the royal family were 
apparently intended to, bring home to-the sans-culotte 
reader, the corrupted nature of monarchy. 
..,, 
The end of the Legislative Assembly -wa's also'', 
secured-as. an immediatexesult ofýAugusý'ItlOth; only 284" 
of its.. 749 deputies remained in session. This minority, 
though-ousted. for practical purposes by the, Communeq 
c1ung, to-the vestiges of ite, former power-and, was not 
slow to attempt-to re-impose its authoritys' There were 
certain fundamental steps which the Assembly, alone 
could takeg: however discredited it was in the_eyes. of 
the men who, had-, organized the revolution. Acting on 
I the. -. precedent established by-the flight toýVarennesq - 
the-Assembly suspended Louis, XVI from his functions as 
laid down. in the 1791 ConBtitutiong'and-took upon 
, 
(l) LesýR; 
ý-lutions 
de Parisq (ed. L-M Prudhomme) 
llthe-18th. Augustp 1792. 
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itself: full'sovereign-powers. Louis'was replaced by 
a provisional Executive Council of six ministers., _ 
It-was indeed vital'for-the Assembly to take-some 
positive-action, since, it alone could legally speak 
in, the'. name-of,, the-whole, country-and no'other body 
had, the-. power-to legislate crucial interim- measures 
or-prepare, for the election of a new parliament. - 
The,. -Assembly was. also-quick. to appreciate-the need 
for'official clarification of the positiong, partly 
as: a'means-of restoring credibility, to France on the 
international level. "LlAssemblee nationale doit a 
la Nation I J, Europeloa la posteriteog'-un compte - 
severe des motifs-qui. ont, determine ses: dernieres 
resolutions., Placee entre le devoir de. rester fidele 
a ses-sermentsq et celuiýde sauver la patrieg elle a 
voulu... les,, remplir-. tous deux a, la fois et faire tout 
ce-qulexigeait-rle salut public sans usurper lee 
pouvoirs que-le peuple ne, lui avait pas confidEk. " 
The Assembly had only'seen one sure way in-which. 
liberty, could"be saved. "Cletait de recourir a la, 
volonte"'supreme du Peuple-e de lui inviter a, exercer 
immediat6ment ce droit inal en le de souverainZ6te*'- 
que la Constitution a reconnu et quIelle n1avait pu 
sounettre a aucune restriction. Vinteret public 
exigeait que le peuple manifestat sa volobte par le 
voeu d1une c nvention nationals, formee des representants 
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-. -I investis par lui des pouvoirs, illimites.... 
The., Assembly spoke-authoratitively, even, though,. the, ý 
ýFýumph, of., the pýople, owed nothing, to, its-efforts.,. 
_....... Moreoverg such a proclamation, disguised the, 
fact., that the, deep-seated distrust and, antagonisms-,, 
of the first, six months., of-_l792., 'wqre 
now,. fully., in the 
open., -In'the-weeks after the overthrow. of-the, 
king. 
it-was by no means certain. to-whom political. power-, 
wouldýpass.., The, Commune soonfound. itselfAn, open.,, 
conflict. with-the Assemblyq a, dispute which, developed 
into-the, prolonged struggle between Parisian,, and 
proyincial,. deputies.,, 
_-The-Brissotinsg, 
E3haken. but, not 
defeatedg-. looked to, recoup their-loss of, prestige. in 
the Convention, 
While France began the constructionlof a'new 
government, the rest of Europe, was-compelled, to, revise 
ýts, policy. -towards, her. In, Britain itself, '. 
the govern- 
ment, had. reacted with. a certain amount. of alarm to, the 
Revolution-of August 10th. 9-news of which reached 
Whitehall. on August-15th. 
(21), 
Anupheavalýin Francev 
(1)""'Exposition des"motife"dlapres lesquels IAssemblee 
nationale'a proclame la convocation d1une Convention 
10, nationale'-et'prononce le suspensioh du pouvoir executif 
dans les mains. du roi. 11 'A N,,. 'A, D, 1/102. ' 
(2) "The London"Chroniclet August 16thq-1792. ' Burney 
Collection of Newspapers, B. M. 
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probably set off by the Prussian in, ýasionq -had-been 
but th expected throughout'the simmert e, suspensionýofý` 
the king caused dismay-in'-government circles*--' Even 
before reports of'August 10th. reached England,, Lord" 
Gower had written-askingýif he should make-some-kind 
of formal statement about the'gafety*6f the royal-4- 
family*(') This request gave the-Britis I h'-go'vernment' 
some pause for thoughtq for though most men felt indi- 
vidual misgivings for the fate of., 'LouiB XVI'and Marie-ý 
Antoinetteg British'policy had'always'been'to--remain 
neutral with ragard to Fran6els interior-as, wellý-as 
external affairs'o 'The decision-on"this subject was 
considered important enough'to, warrant'Cabinet consul-ý 
tation. ' Grenvilleg"who would'normally, have"discussed 
the phraseology of"an answer-with Pittq wrote-to'-Dundas 
on August Sth'-- "I' am'unwillin .g to'take upon, myself 'a 
decision-of so-much'ýimpo'r*ýta"n'ce'-without knowing theý----- 
opinion of' such-of'the King's other ministers'as'are 
within reachl'and , still, more'without'submitting the., 
point'to , the I 'king himself' 11(2) The' de sp at ch vhi ch 
Grenville' I submitted for Dundasl'comments-ý's-t-a16d' c'a'tegor- 
ically. that-the British ggvernmentlfelt'that-'the French, 
king'and*queen would'derive'no-advantage' from"'-any" 
British announcement', respecting their present situation 
"On the contrary ....... : all 
that canbe doneq by, personal 
(1) Gow6r'-to Grenvilleg August 4th, ', P. O. - -27/39'*-----, 
_, 
(2) Grenville toDundasq' August Sth., P. O. 27/39 
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intimidation and by'the apprehension of a superior.., - 
forceq appears alreadyto have been done by., the declar- 
ation of. the Duke, of Brunswick,. . -Pitt himself, In 
a brief but direct-note to Grenvilleg summed up the 
essence,, of,, the, British, view of,. France 
'on 
the'.. 
'e've 
of 
August 10th. 7_11I, see b -a copy 9f 
Lord. Gowerls: despaýtch 
, 
of the 4th. that he desires, instructions__with a, view 
to the eituation, of,, the King,. and QUeenq whichq however, 
will probably be-decided'either. by the Assembly, -, or. -the 
mob before any,, instruction. could reach'him. ,. Even. 'if., _. _ 
this were not so, I see no-step. that could.. be-taken,,, 
(2) 
that, would not do more harm, than good. " - 
The crisi's in France,, broke. -at, 'an, awkward, 
time for 
Pitt's administration. 
-When 
first news ofýthe. fall,, 
of the monarchy, reached, Englandg,, Grenville,, was, out 
of London on his honeymoon., 
_Dundas 
was in temporary, - 
charge of'the Foreign Officep but, the_onusýof decision- 
making fell. to Pitt himself. Realizing,, -that, a number 
of important decisions regarding-diplomaticýýtiquetteq 
though inevitably with wider implicationsp, would, have 
to be taken without loss of-time, Pittbetrayed, some-,,. - 
concern in his correspondence with other ministers., 
The future of official diplomatic relations and of 
the personal safety, ýofýem asýj, staff 9', "was"the"fiist 
Grenville to Gowerg 'August-8th., P. O.. 27/39. 
Pitt to Grenville,, August 9th-f H. M. C., Fortescue 
MS op. cit ii p. 29ýý II 
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object of attention. Grenville ýwas kept ýwell-informed 
of Whitehall's views, , . '. 'you will see, by -the copy, of -.. 
, ý, theýdespatch sent today, to-Lord Gower,,. the. line, which 
we. have thought it necessary. to.! take, -after the late 
eventsýin France. I wish. we-, could have had-time-to 
know your. sentiments. firstq but, that seemed-impossible. 
The'Duke of Richmond, my brotherg-Lord Hawkesburyq, '-ý 
Dundas, and myself all concurred in thinking it, absol- 
utely-necessary to lose no'time in bringing, Lord Gower 
from, Paria. 11(l) Pitt added-that-it was-now, felt proper 
toýmake a general comment on the: British government's, 
fears'for'the personal safetyýof Louis XVIi-as. this 
might discourage, those bent on-. furtherýmoves against 
the king from subsequently-seeking refuge in Britain. ". 
'Such-a, comparative-volte"face mayýhave-, been brought 
about, by pressure from Breteuil throughýthe Bishop, of 
(2) 
ý, -ýýLýeri- The-language. in,, which-the-British-govern- 
ment, expressed, -their-anxiety, for. the,, safety-of 
the 
,,. French king and queen was-carefullychosentoýensure 
that, those inýpower'in-Parie would-, understand, ýthatý- 
neutrality-was,, still, 'the basis of British policy towards 
France. 
. On August'ý17th. -ýDundas, sent, ýtheý, completed' 
Pitt to Gremillep August 17th., H§. C. Fortesque 
OP. alto lit P. 302. 
(2) Baron de Breteuil, 1733 - 1807, a-royalist, 
headed administration llth JulYo,, 17899, 
_after 
dismissal 
of Necker. Pitt referred to him in the letter previouslY 
cited. 
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despatch, which gave-the official -British ýreaction- 
to August 10th. "As, it appearsq, in"the present'-state 
of affairs, the exercise of the executive -"power -has 
been withdrawn from His Most Ch±istian'Majesty9, the. 
credentials which'have ýhitherto been made'use of ý by-, 
your Excellency can no longer be valid. 'Hisý-Majesty--- 
is therefore of opihion that you ought notý-to'remain 
any longer in Paris, ' as well on thisý'account-as because 
this step appears to-him the most conformable-to-theý 
-hitherto, "", principles of neutrality, which he has 
observed... . ', in all the conversations-that-youtmay have 
occasion'to hold before your departure you will%take-, - 
care to express., yourself in a manner 1, conformable. -'to-, - 
the sentiments'hereiný-communicated to you'and you will 
take, especial-care not: to negle'ct-any-opportunity of- 
declaring that-at-the same'timeýHis Majesty-means to 
observe the-principles of neutrality. -o-'*-he, "does'not'l, 
conceive that, he departs from, these principles in 
-manifesting ....... his solicitude for the'-personal' 
situation of their-Most Christian Majesties and, the-- 
Royal Family. '.... 
Gowerl. s recall, presented an immediate difficulty 
which was never satisfactorily, solved in the remainder 
of the period. before the outbreak of war. The problem 
was how, to get information from Paris and who to employ 
Dundas to Gowert, August, 17th q', -Anniial-Register; -, ', 1792. 
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on-this task., Burgeso the Foreign Office Undpr- 
S. e_cretary, suggestedg_on August. 15th. p. the. sending of 
Captain G. eorge Monrog whose, abilities he considered 
quite suitable_for reporting day to, day-developments 
of the, Parisian turmoil. A-Foreign Office Messenger, 
Mas, ong. accompanied, Monro because he, had. a good, command 
of Fr, ench..,, Monrols mi'asion was evidently considered, 
-temporaryg to coincide with-the French crisis. , He. was 
less. effective in his reporting, than William: Lindsay, 
the'Secretary to,, the-Prencli, legationg who managed to 
leave France-in of September,. -Monro;, 
stayed less, than-_two. months in. Franceg returning only 
in mid-D. ecember.,:, Either, through, lack of. availableLmený 
or lack of-forethought, theBritish government-had-no 
permanentý. unofficial agent in-ýrance after August: 10th; -..,. - 
Ambassadors-from other, -foreign, courts,, wereý, also 
hastily-withdrawn from Francep, which,, became. praatically 
isolatedlon the'-official level of diplomacyg thoughlý., -,,. I. 
both the. American and-Spanish. -Lambassadore-remained,. in- 
Paris for some,. time. Gen6rally, it was. -felt-,, that'., any 
government establi'shedýin, France, would be short7lived, 
(1) Burges, James"Bland, 1752 --"182'4. Appointed to the 
Foreign Office in 1789. Vlroteýpamphlet attacking Paine. 
Retired from his'position later to make room for a 
personal friend'of Grenville's. 
(2) Burges to Grenvillep August 15th. 
9 H. M. C. Forte scue 
MS9 op-ýcit-- iiq'ýýP-p- 301-302. For George Monro 
himselfg see below. 
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as the, allied forces were believed, to be capable of 
taking Paris without much opposition though nobody 
was, very clear as to. what,, might-happen after,. that. 
The French found that the Revolution-of August-10th. 
hadýposed problems. within their own-diplomatic service'. -'ý' 
A numberof officials, overseas professed', their'loyalty 
to Louis XVI and refused. to serve, the new. governmen-6.. 
- "Plusieurs agents, ont abandonne., leurs fonctione. et.,,.. 
ils, ont donne. pour, motif de leur. 'lache desertion la 
suspension duýr 
1, ý Theover-riding aim. of. -French-foreign-policy after 
August 10th., while-the invasion still threatened-and 
the disapproval-of many,, governmentSseemed,, likelyt was 
to ensure'the*continued neutralityý_of-Great, Britain., ' 
10, On Au4t, 18th., the ConBeil: Exe I cutifýsent an official 
co=unication'to Chauvelin'explaining the situation 
in France for the benefit of the British ministry-ý- 
"Le'c seil executif provisoire-a, qui 16 plus imperieuse 
0,101 des 
Cne"ce 
sites reelles, du: salut public vient de donner 
naissance au milieu des evenements-ýterribles du dix . - 
aoqt-croit'devoir a toutes'les-, puissances et'partic-%..., ý, 
uli'erement 
Na, 
celui qui: comme l'Angleterre se'sont'maintenu 
aýVegard de le, France dans lee bornes"dlune'stricte 
N neutralite'g' l1expose'le plus s*incere des faits-qui 
. viennent de se passerg des fortes raisons qui lee ont 
determines et des sentiments inalterables qui animaient 
l-,, A Nj- F 479 4397. 
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la nation'francaise. 11(l)" The`ý'meiioir, we'nt-on'to ex'plain 
-that confidence had-long since 
been ebbing'away from 
Loui6ý'XVI-ýand, that he had deliberately tried toý 
encourage'internal strife., The French were always-, 
anxious-to-draw-the"parallel between'their own"situation 
. and, thýtý. of"Biittiiný, --in"', 
the 17th I ýcentury. --Replying, to 
the note-which"Lord Gower,, communicated*on, his recall-, -! 
which're-affirmed-British-neutrality and her-, continued 
intention"not to'Meddle in Fren6h"affairsqthey-wrotet' 
"We are'noV'surprised at"sUchla-. declaration made'byl"an' 
enlightened"and high-spirited nation'who-have, been the 
ýfirst to acknowledge and'establish the,, principlesof 
'no t"thought the Natioiýalý'Sovere'ignty; '... '. "whooo'p. *. ýliave, 
too dearly'purcha " sed I by'-long: convulsion6 andýviolýntl-"`,! ý'ý 
storms'that liberty which'has be6n', -productive'of. -so-,,,, 
much'glory'and*-prosperity. 
-Although'they, wished to remainýon,,, reasonable terms, 
with'ýthe British I governmentý the Co nseil"Exd`b'utif, at 
first hesitated, -, about"keeping an ambassador"in London. " 
Their, immediate"response to the situation'after'AUgust 
,,, -4 _ýý, -II1 11 1ý- ý_. ' -, -' loth' 0 was to'recall-Chauvel, in'and', to's6nd", onlyýunofficial 
agents to Britainv"to report'on'the''state of-iffairs 
the"r'e"'''and to'ke''ep open channels'of"o'o'm'munication-"--', 
(1)_,. Memoir_, of, the. Conseil Exe'c"`utif., Provisoire, to 
Chauvelin, August. 18th. A. A. E. 9 C. P. -Angleterreq 
582. 
(2) 'English translation in, the Chatham Papers, at the 
"' P4R0,, ýý ý, -, I Public Record Office; ' 30/8/333 
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should the. need arise-for, more definite links., There 
werejerhaps two reasons, f 
-or.. 
this, attitude. The, ý',, 
", 
quqýtioned. the. wisdomg,. e' Conseil, 
_Executif 
may have. ven 
the, tactfulness of maintaining, a-legation, in London 
Iýhen. the British had withdrawn Lord, _Gower. _Theyýmay,,, 
also have been unsure, of-Chauvelin's, complete,,, loyalty, 
and of. the feelings, of Talleyrand and, Duroveray towards 
the new, order in Paris. On. August, 25th.,, Chauvelin___ 
received a note, telling him-that. he_would, be-,. recalled. 
(') 
But Chauvelin had powerful, friendsl, nota, bly,, the'Belgian 
bankerp Edouard Walkierýsj who, was his father-in-law., 
, 
paper and his, He could also be very,, persuasiveon- 
plea., to be permitted to stay in Great, Britain, was,, 
granted. 
- 
Much to hisjury, a, succes-. slion,, oflee, cre. t,, agents 
was also sent., The, confusion which arose later, over,, 
theýrole of French diplOmatst official-and. secret, -in 
G. reat- Britain, appears to have resulte'd, from-thilel-'ehange 
of heart over retention of, the-embassy,, in Londo 
Since the. British, government, received,. the-, Offilcial 
interpretation of French policy. fr I om the., legation, in' 
Portman Square -the reactions and. attitudes. 
of,. embasey 
staff were themselves of, considerable significance. 
Chauvelin's enemies in. France would-have. been-appalled,.., 
by his, initial respbnee to the fall of. the monarchy, 
which he was, unwise, enough to, put down in writing. in 
the form of a note to the British 'government. He 
(1) Lebrun, to. Chauvelin, August 25th. 
-t 
A. A. E. 
C. P. Angleterre, 582. 
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described the events of August 10th. as criminal and 
disastrous and, went on,, "La liberte 
"I de- ll, AssemblIýe 
mationale vient dI&tre, violee***9* dans ces, tristes' 
conjonctures leýsoussigne croirait manquer a--ses 
1-11 1-1 devoirs, les pluesacres slil neýse h9tait de reclamer 
en, faveur de la'--nation et du, roi, dont lee interets 
lui ont ete ldgalement confies lee effete de cette'ý 
sensibilite. genereuse de cette amitie'dont sa-Majeste 
lui a, donne en. diverses occasions les touchantes- 
assurances. "M-The ambassador realized, almost-, at, ý-- 
once the extreme--, dahger to which such public"voicing 
of his private feelihga might expose-him-: ýHis request- 
for. the paper to be returned to him was granted, by 
Pitt., In marked contrast were'the comments which-the 
ambaseadori'sent to his own government. "iCommenting on 
the, information which hadý, come to light'since'August, -- 
lOt'h. 
-he, wroteg-., "Je nlavaifi, pas-, 
besoing' Monsieurg, de 
ces. -nouvelles, preuv es, pour 
'une 
opinion, formee-111, 
Q; tl rur 
sur, cesýevenements et pour 
nge 
. 'llimprudence et 
r 'Joues- la,, perfidie de, ceux, qui se ont-" rop lon gtemps'ý 
du peuple, et nlont que-trop Justifies sa, fureur en', ý-,, - 
- 11 
(2) 
llamenant. ýsi pre\s de sa perte 
The Revolution, ofýýAugustý10th. ýhad, thrown. "th'eyoung 
ex-marquis into a-iposition. -of-extreme,,, importance, so 
far, as, the, handling-of,, theý'delicate-diplomatic-, relations., 
(1) Memoir by Chauveling August 16th, in P. O. 27/39ý/, 
--(2) Chauvelin to Lebrun, ý August 31st. A. A. E. 
C. P. Angleterre, 582. 
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between Great Britain and, France mas concerned. , -, -The,., - 
situation required highly-skilled handling and, Chauvelin's 
inability to deal adequately with the., problems of the 
autumn of 1792 did not necessarily. arise from incom-, 
petence.. Chauvelin was not simply, the hot-headedo, 
arrogant young fool that his detractors, depicted-ý His 
main f ailing - 
lay.. in the 'f act that . he. could not 
keep 
personal considerations out of-his diplomatic-tasks. 
His keeh'sensitivity saw insults '. too -readily..., He 
bitterly resented, the other agents. sent, by, the-Prench,, " 
governmentp, complaining that their presence-in Great 
Britain. made a mockery of his'position..: To such, 'meng- 
especially No'e'l and Scipion. Morguev'-he-was almost 
always obstructive and sometimes rude. His attitude 
created unforeseen difficulties at aý-time when the 
French government badly, needed: harmony among, its agents 
in Britain. 'Yet-the'fault, wasýnot"all'Chauvelinli3. ý, I 
There was some justification for his argument-thatýthe 
only thing to be gained from the proliferation, 'of, -. -", '" 
French agents in Great Britain was a-variety*of-diff- 
erent opinions of the situation there, He'was-himself 
a hard-working man who constantly-Istrove-for information 
with which'to supply his-government. ý,, Everýsince hisZ. - 
arrival-in Mayq 17929 his position had been 
; 
'acutely 
embarassing. He subsequently'denied that he had wanted 
to accept the post'as ambassador and'it is'evident that 
he chqfed a't'being put, under the control of Talleyrando 
and, feeling that he was little better than a figure- 
97- 1 
head'. England, he' was received with- extreme frigid- 
ity9.. for he was'a nobleman who had betrayed his birth' 
in the service-of the Revolution. "Je, passais telle- 
ment*a Londres pour un factieux et un Jacobin-que les 
liaisons de'Fox et ses amis avec moileur ont ete 
reprochees l1annee derniere sous ce rapport dans le 
parlement d'Angleterre-11(l) Chauvelin has been charged 
'with contributing to the. -deterioration of relations 
between England and France by deliberat4ly mis-repres- 
enting the gravity and extent of anti-government feel- 
7", 
ing in Britain. A careful reading of the ambassador's 
despatches (and, indeedp of those of some other. Prench 
agents) shows that apparently sweeping remarks are. 
frequently phrased in terme'of po. ssibili: ties rather 
than certainties. Chauvelin-realized that he had to 
present a patriotic toneg critical Of the British 
government, but he also knew that his own-future and 
the continuance of peace between the two countrieso 
was in the balance. The necessity of keeping the door 
Of communication open, with Pitt's administration and 
his own difficult position with regard to his oy. vh 
country were a constant strain for a young man whose 
impetuosity was greater than his diplomatic experience. 
Out of tune with the developments in France and 
only occasionally and belatedly informed of what was, 
going on there, Chauvelin had no option but to sit 
(1) Letter written_by Chauveling 22 Pluvioseq -I 
an iiq A Nt P 7t 4434. 
/ 
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back, like the British govIernm. ent 
-and 
await the out- 
come of., the allied march - on -Paris Only ýwhen this was 
known, it was generally ýfeltq%could any real judgement 
of the 'permanency, of. the form, of -. ýgovernment, under 
construction-in, Prance-, be made*-. -, 
71 
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Chapter A 
0 structure and functionir. g of sovern, =ent 
In YrAnce After Jkuzust 10th. 
-- 
'on no 41atingue ; olnt Asset que nous no so=--on 
; As daze UA toaps do constitution; noun 80=6a an 
. 01 100, revolution *t cleat des assures uniquezent revolutionn- 
air* quill f4ut ; ro: %1r**0 - batirev 2Sth. Auguat# 1792. 
It Is necessary to oxaZine the structure and 
fu. 1ct1Cn1n4 of governzent 4f ter the Revolution of 
IuZuOt 10th, In orJor to appreciate the frazzework In 
'h1ch rronch ; alloys both dozostio And forsieng was 
r'440,4.4 to uadvratand that the tensions were not 
merely broutht about by the struggle for power but 
"ere &Igo the result of An attszpt_to stabilize insti-, 
tutlOnG 444pt44 or created after Auciat 10th. o and to 
44k* then *ark effectively. Contszporarion in other 
Parts Of Xurope %or* azaced at the spectacle of the 
dovolo; zont of the republican experiment in a country 
deeply 444 Increasingly co=itted to war* the more so 
4" In the Autwun of 1792 the roTolution ooe=od to be 
At war %Lth Itself. r, &. ny politicians in England could 
not 10110ye that there was a gavernzent in Prqncel 
they d14 Act know. whore Authority lay or to who= it 
'hoUI4 to Ascribed And they %oro, extr#=oly reluctant 
to 4QkA4*l*J4* tt. o 1ýoasibillty that men generally regarded 
so rAtble-rousera wore 04y4ble of estublishing a system 
%h1oh 121cht survive In the face of all the odds. '' 
Yr4noo 414 144ood ; roo4nt a bewildering picture to 
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Anyone who tr1*4 to discern how policy was =ado fro= 
day to days but It In easy to be over-improaaed by 
the r4vinZa in the Cogydation. In structure at lonat 
the Pronch did not make a radical departure 
fro= the old for. -a a. -d in nuzaroun cases offices were 
hold by men who were already fa=illar with the exercise 
Of Politics. Tto workInz of the Institutions adapted 
after Augugt loth, Uhl envisaged AD tozporary until 
the pro"-uleAtion of the now constitution. The saaential 
Problez which faced rrAr-ce In the autu= of 1792 
*ago In C41nt-Just's words to for= the republic. 
The clrcuzatancen In which thin formidable task 
*40 bf&uA war@ thozoolven significant. There were in 
raalIty '' two stagen of developzent. The first was the 
Period In which preparatlone'vare =ado for the opening 
of the Convention, six *asks between August loth. and 
"PtOAter 'lot, in which the exercise of power was 
d1v1d4d between the Yaris Co. --une And the-Conasil 
oe '"cutif rrovisolre, which had taken over Louis MID 
executive fUnctlonag It was in this periodg ao=oti=ea 
rather paradoxically referred to an the Interregnum, 
that the I-ruagjAn invasion wag at its most msnacing,, 
Thloo In Ito turn. had dirdat boarlng'on"events w'hich:. 
U-n4arlIn4d the Cravity of the internal situation and 
th* aboanco of a respected for: % of government. - -. he'* 
r"PtlAbor Uasancres, in which about-19300 prisoners, 
Political and non-pollticale were curderadq horrified 
1204orAto OPInIc. In rrAnco and outraged Britain., -' 
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These, grim occurrences were a sign of the temperament 
of the people* It is possible to connect the months 7, ý 7 
of August and September 1792 with the Terror of the 
Year II but the comparison does not, immediately convey 
the true state of, affairs. The First Terror lacked 
the organization of, its successor. There were certainly 
some elements, of emergehoy rule in-17921 for-example, 
the,. sending, of commissaires en mission into the departe- 
ments, and the. requisitioning of men and armsq France, 
no longer'a monarchyp but without any properly estab- 
lished alternativeg had to rely for her immediate.. 
survival, on, the-decisiveness of the Communet the will 
, 
people to resist invasion and the dubious of her 
prospects of Dumouriez's army. The-second stage of-. ' 
development began with, the first session of the 
Convention on 21st. Septemberv when, the new legislature, 
elected by_universal suffrageo, abolished royalty and-' 
started to, decree both for the, country's present needs, 
and for themore permanent organization of its government. 
. 
Government, in-France after August 10th. was thus 
in'the'hands of an executive of, six ministers and a 
legislature of 7,49 memberst much of whose, business was 
delegated, between committees. It would be unrealistict 
howevert to ignore the role of the Communeq both 
, 
because of its importance in the weeks after the fall. 
of the 
, 
king and the mutual s: Uspicions of the Commune, 
and 
, 
the Legislative Assemblyq sentiments which-we're; 
_,,, 
carried into the Conventionp. and played an important;, 
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part, ýin, the'dispute, between Paris-andthe-lprovinces-,. ý 
This'-, controversy, formedýpart-of'the increasing-rancour 
and introversionin,, the Conventiong a, mood-which-domin- 
ated'. the, deputiesrat-wtime when, more,,, of;: their-attention 
might, reasonably have been concentrated-on maintaining 
the goodwill of the. neutral nations.,,:;,, 
The, British gotrernmentq in official, and unofficial 
contacte, with, -France-after 
August 10thp dealt with the 
executive power, yet very little--was known, of the: 
ýunctioning ofthe Conseil Executif,,, Provisoire. -Some 
of-, its.. ministers were scarcely more than names. - Pitt's 
administration did not realize how Briesot-and--his 
associates had been, ýcompromised by the Revolution and 
tended to, regardýthem still as the instigators:, of, events, 
thoughthey had already marked. out Robespierre as an 
extremist. ''-As the attention of observers 'was naturally, 
drawn'-to the content-and particularly the style of 
debate, in the Conventiong the role of the Conseil Executif 
was not, given, much consideration in general-comments 
oný-French I political proceedings., The significance of 
the-Conseil, -, at'-this time, and the importance of some of 
its, members should notq however, be overlooked, 
T); e, council, of six, ministers formerly used'to 
advise,, Iouis XVI was, retained after, *August, 10th.,, It 
began its work within three days, of, th6'insurrections... 
,, and-, 
'its links, with the previous system-of government' 
,, were. further strengthened by the inclusion of, Rolandp--, 
Claviere'and Servant the Patriot Ministersq"dismissed 
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in-, "Junee'--, Their re-instatement was probably an attempt 
on-the'part-of-the Assembly to balance the effect of 
the-ascendancy of the.: Commune. The Ministers were 
appointed byýthe Assembly but could not be chosen, from,,, 
_- 
amongst'lthe'ýdeputies. The only connection between the 
two-branches' of government occurred when the Ministers 
came, *to--present their reports to the Assembly, and., 
laterý_the'Convention. The theory of the separation 
of'powers was by no means overthrown by the August 
revolution. -, The O. ouncil'survived 'Until 12 germinal; 
Year, ', II; ýwhen it was abolished by order ofthe-Committee 
., of-Public Safety. .. 
It-has-been generally'assumed that 
in', itsý'function, of promulgator, of the decreesývoted 
by', the;, Conventions theýlCouncil was merely, rubber- 
stamping, 'decisions'already made and, it. is, true that. 
the1colleictive influence of the council, was smal1q, 
though: ',, early in September it was responsible for. 'the, ---_ 
import-ant, -, work'of issuing c, ommissioners'with credentials. 
The. ýCouncil, as a body,, howeverg became isol-Vated from 
political. --life in'a way, that the ministe'rsq, each with 
individualýresponsibilities to his own department, did- 
not. 
'-, In other respects the Conseil-Executif suffered', 
-from. the confusion which persisted. throughout-the 
autumn of 17929 and. which' was a sign, of the instability 
of the republic. The, Council alone was supposed to, 
receive the correspondence of public functionaries I and 
of the generalsjýbut bewildered officials, frequently 
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uncertain'as'to*'the"'functions of the various authoritiesq 
oiten-addressed . their reports to the Convention. The 
Consei 'was'a-product of the insecurity of the times, 
embodyingý'a-number', of contradictions., At a period 
ýhein"týe! "government'of the 1791'Constitution was'so 
hated-one'of its"appendages was incorporated in the 
new'system. ' Of the functioning of the Conseil Executif- 
we know only the'basic details. It met three times a 
we'eij'-'the'-'office, o'f president being filled in rotation. 
Its' secretaryq - Grouvelleg-was only permitted-to record 
iheldecisions"taken so that we have h0 way -0f finding 
out about the'deliberations, which, preceded them. '-, It 
was"rare for'dissenting opinions to be expressed. 
ýher; "are-reports, from' Beaumarchais and_Madame, Roland 
of di . sagreements within-the, council but their authen- 
icit The ministers' chief ý _'y-'is hard to prove. 
1 
, contribution lay in their, taking charge of certain 
areas of politics which were beyond thescope of the 
Conýention " 'and , -its, 
I cozpmittees. It was in this sphere, 
that the'actions and abilities of the six men were 
most significant. - 
T 'he seil Executif provisoire consisted of Con 
Roland, 'Minister. of the Interiorg Servang Minister for, 
War, Monge, ' Minister for the Navyq Claviereq Minister 
(1) See the introduction, to the 1969 supplement to vol iq 
of: Receuil-des Actes du Comite de Salut-Public'et du'-Aý` 
Conseil'ý-Executif Provisoire, q ed. M-. Bouloiseau.. 
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for, Public Contributions, Lebrung Minister for Foreign 
Affairs and Dantong Minister for Justice. - Thoggh 
nearly all the Ministries had some connection with 
France 'a European positiong that of Foreign Affairs 
was obviously. of greatest significance for Anglo-French 
relations. But Lebrun was a newcomer to such high', 
Political office and he was not the Conseil's most 
important member-e-_ The maix who dominated France in the 
critical. period after August 10th. was the'Minister for 
Justioeg,, Georges-Jacques Danton. Despite thepretensions 
of the Rolands, Danton was the effective head of the 
Conseil Executif izi, the crucial first weeks of its 
existence. Danton's inclusion in the same body with 
men of-strongly opposed temperament was probably intended 
as a, concession to Paris and the Communeq for he had 
previously served as deputy procureur. His identifi- 
cation 'With the popular movement was likely to be useful 
at.., a 
: 
t. i, me.,. of, instability when he might, be'needed to 
exercise his influence towards moderation. -Condorcetq 
giving his, reasons for having, voted for Danton as 
Mil&ister, saidt "il fallait'dans le minist%e'ýre un homme 
A qui, eut-la. confiance de ce me"'me'peuple dont lee agit- 
atione venaient de renverser le, trone. 11(l) 
Danton's role in the French Revolution has been 
the subject of much controversy since Mathiez's 
(1)-ý-ýular'd, '-A. t "Danton et la Revolution du 'dix aout 9 to 
La Revolution Pran2ais 1893. 
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rI e-instatement. of Robespierre painted Danton as aný 
unprincipled scoundrel.:., His importance inthe national 
crisis of the'autumn of-1792 isqýhoweverjl-beyond challenge. 
I'Danton ...... a fait, le dix aoutp". wrote Billaud-Varenneq 
an, opinion which, if not'accurate, does_convey. the - 
regard-inýwhich-. the new Minister-of-Justice was held. 
No study of, France'afier'the I Revolution of August 10th. 
would be complete without some-assessment of Dantonqý* 
since the'extent of his influence-in domestic and, 
foreignýaffairs was considerable. 
-ýc, -ý. Danton, ýborn in'ý1759 at Arcis-sur-Aubep was the 
same-age as Pitt and Grenville', The revolutionaries, 
andýýa. 'number. ofýtheirýBritish counterparts in. politica 
and diplomacy were relatively young men. Like 
]Robespierrel-Danton maintained his connections with 
his-home'town-until his death. , After the re-marriage 
of, his mother: Danton was-sent by his, step-fatherg 
Jean Recordaing to study at Troyes. In 1780,, he arrived 
in Paris to, 'study law, and was still ohly a junior 
lawyer wheii. he, made an advantageous marriageý. to, 
Antoinette-Gabrielle Charpentier in 1787. In the. first 
years of--the Revolution Danton became'active in1he 
Cordeliers-Club. where he met Camille, Deemoulins.,. -The 
speech he made, when heý took his first important-post 
in'Parisg',, that-of deputy procureurg was_, typical.,, of the 
direct. and compelling character of his. or. atory,. his.., 
most pot ent weapon. - "La nature m1a donne -I en partage 
lee formes athletiques et la physion0mie apre de la 
,- 
A- 
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A 1, .+ I/ ýIIIA liberte. " Exempt du, malheur dletrene -d-. lune de-ces---- 
races priviligees suivant-nos vieilles institutions'q 
ol J'ai conserve, endreant'seul mon existence civile, 
s6it; 'd'ansýma vie'priveeg soit,, dans la profession que' 
Jlavais"'embrassee--de'-'prouver'que je, 'savais allier'le 
sang-froid de'la rais6n-e "la haleur de l1ame et 
ia-fer, mete du ciractere. "'(1)' 
The I full' force of -this el; ýuenc'e and'of a very'" 
sharp' political acumen-w as brought to bear on the 
situation " of 'F'r" a'n'c' e 'a' The immediate fter August 10th. 
4, ýSli ifferences -'and'-organize'the, war necessity was"'to iik-d 
effort. Danton wasquick to, -appreciate that a show 
f un ty d"'determination-from those in'power would an 
be, of immene6'-'ýalue-in , producing and-strengthening the 
-His determination'soon will"of'th'e, ''people'to resist'* 
itself'"felt'among'his weaker, or'less experienced 
colleaguesý -Madame Rolandl'in'describing the appoint- 
ment'of'the commissioners sent early in September wrote 
*that the'laziness'of most of the ministers had enabled 
Danton-to despatch his'own'nominees into the country- 
8. i Wh'il*e"R'olan Id was advocating I retiring'across, - 
thIeL oire, - I "Dant on was telling the peoPl'e 'that "or ganiz- 
ation'of' resources' andpabove all$-boldn I ess, would 
m01, ý, 'defeat' the'Prussi'ans-.. 'Instinct had enabled'hi' 't' 
gQ&ge*with great perception the reactions'of the'"'----,, -' 
volunte6r. ' His position -was furthýer: strengthened iný' 
(1) Oeuvres de Danton, -ed. 'A., Vermorel, Paris 18669' , 
POP* 109 114. 
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i` thatp at. a-time of much mutual suspicion and recrimin- 
ation,, he. seemed to. be., concerned with the survival of 
his country above all, else. Inddedq it is rather 
_surprising 
to note, that at a, period, when men frequently 
indulged in'lengthy. denunciation and self-justification, 
Denton did not deal in personalities. A number of the 
I--- %ý --. I 
commissioners on-mission felt themselves responsible- 
to Danton aloneg, as theýonly minister whose, patriotism 
ýhey considered, to-be beyond dispute. 
was such esteem that earned Danton the enmity 
of-others in political life., Madame Roland's-detest- 
ation, of Danton, was, the reaction of a person unable to, 
recognize, ability. which:. did not, conform to her own - 
views figure repoussante, et. - 
atroce, et quoique je-me. (oisse bien qulil ne fallait 
juger, personne par, paroleg que je nletais assuree de 
rien, contre Jui ...... qulenfin il, fallait-seýdefier, des 
apparences, jeýne-pouvais, appliquer llidee dlun homme 
de, bien su it 
(1) 
ý e,,: visage...., ** There were others, -, 
Robespierre, himself at, a later dateg who, suspected 
that Danton's familiarity (which Robespierre found as 
vulgar as'Madame'Roland) might be the mask of a time- 
server-, of--dubious-, integrity. - It has been suggested, 
in4'an attempt''to balance the rather exaggerated views 
anton's career that for a man of his era there was-' 
no real contradiction between accepting or misappropT7 
iiatihg money while at the same time maintaining a 
(1) Madame Roland, Me"moires, p. p. 254 255. 
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genuine co=itment to a cause. 
(', ) 
In this respect 
Robespierre's uprightness was unusual. Danton was a 
realistic, politician -and _it, would 
be difficult to 
explain his actions in the autumn of 1792 p other than 
as those of a man who felt deep concern for the future 
of his country. 
At the end,, of. September Danton left the Ministry 
of Jus. tice.,. to the regret of some of his supporters who 
f. elt that his,, influence 
Conseil Executif than i: 
succeeded-_by,, Garat.. 
(3 
- 
mean. that his influence 
could be better used on the 
a the Convention. 
(2 
He was 
His. departure did notp, however, 
. 
over-the Council was at an end. 
Especially. -with-regard to foreign policy the advisory 
role which he played during, the fruitless negotiations 
with the Prussians after their defeat-at Valmy was 
probably carried on into the area, of Anglo-French- 
relations.,, References in, the correspondence of Francois 
Noelq- who,, continued to, serve Danton in 1793p are suffi- 
cient to, indicate Dantonls,, influence, even. when he was 
only a deputy, for, Paris in, the Convent ion. 
(4) When 
(1) See the article on Denton by G. Lefebvre in 
Sur la Re'volution Fran'caise, Paris, 1963. 
(2) IfJfai une peur terrible, mon cher Dantonp que vous 
ne quittiez le ministere; j1en serai d4soleýcar jfy ai 
be , soi n, de - votre te"t Ie Dumo uri . ez to 
1, Dant I ong 
28th. Septembert B N, n. a. f., 3534. 
(3) Garat., Dominique-Josephq 1749-1823, ', a writer and 
moderate. 
(4) Letters from Noh to Danton, September-Octoberp 17929 
A N. AF 11.63. 
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questioned_, on, the, -part, he, had-lplayed, in--, the,, direction 
of, foreign.. affaire. at his-trialt Danton-, was, perhaps--. 
less,. than-straighýforvward -, "Pandant. mon ministere il 
slagit dl. envoyer, un ambassadeur. a' Londres pour resserrer 
1! alliance. des-deux peuples. -. No'elo. journaliste-contre- 
revolutionnaire, est-propose"'ýpar Lebrun et, -Je,, ne mly 
oppose-pas. ', A, tce. reproche je 
®re/p 
ndsqueýje n! etai 
, 
Sýý., 
pas; Ministre des, Affaires Etrangeresý-ý-On-mla, presente 
. 11 les-. expeditions;,. -Je nl, e tais pas le, despote du Conseil 
It. is, lpossible-,, that Danton, was seeking-some,. kind-, of--ý1,7,, 
settlement,. which would, -have, prevented the., outbreak,, of 
hostilities with Englandq searching-throughout,, the 
autiiinn, for, compromisesý, which, lhe 
personally thought. would 
stabilize, the-revolution, even, including'saving. the.. -,.. e. ýi,, 
life-, of--Louis XVI. -He. 
failedl-howeverp to appreciate 
that. -in-., the; atmosph after Augustý-10th., em-which-prevailed 
any-settlement! which seemed%to call_in,. question,, theý, - 
justifiability-of, the second-revolution-wo. uld have 
splitkFrance apart., The opinions which he,, expressed,; 
after, August, 10th. 9 on, Maratp Rolandl. 
the'war-with-, 
Britain and., the. state of the-army. An Belgium,. were,, -all 
(2) 
carefully-researched before, his trial. 
1 
-in--, temperament so.,. unlike-. Pittl nevertheless Dantong 
similarly,,, ldft. behind fewý. letters, or-writingsl-indicative 
of his-political'philosophyO, -. He,, wasa. man, for, whom--I, -' 
government, was. -, theý-business of-themomentrather-thanil: 
Oeuvres, de", Danton, g-,, Op., Cit. --. p.,, 288. 
A N, A P-iiq 63. 
ill 
the-promulgation-, ofýtheory. ý-'ýThe, Conseil Executifg, on 
which, het-had, made such a, -valuable. -contributiong ceased. 
to. exist a-few-days. -, before, his death. 
ý--_It. is not surprising that. in the, crucial weeks 
after the-overthrow of the monarchy Dantonlsýposition 
in Prance caused, ý, him to-be frequently consulted on 
overseae, relations. ý,, 'After August, -10th. -the. office of 
Minister-forIForeign Affairs', "was filled by-Pierre 
Lebrun-Tondu, -, former-head of-the Ministry's. first 
division, -, which', was responsi, ble for correspondence with 
Britain. ]I'. Lebrun had" - in- other-" words p been a senior 
official,. -but still,, of, the class-which-the-Prench 
termedg,,, rather disparagingly, ', Commis; ' "Il, passait. 
pour un, esprit'sage, " wrote Madame'Rolandq "parce qulil 
-1/1 -I------- ____ I- etait, assez. bon co=isý, Il,, conn issait-passablement 
saý'carte:, diplomatique: etl redi r avecý'bonsens , savai 
un'rapport-ou une lettre. "(1). Madame, Roland'B-Judge- 
ment would.,, notýnecessarily-impress,, the'reader'that-- 
thefnew: minister was'a man. of anyýgreat, -ability. 
'- Yet- 
Lebrung whose, --varied'eareer had. taken"him', through a- 
variety of.., countries. and occupations. wasýýnot-unfitted 
to--"fillýthe, 'role: -now assigned-to him*,. He was, a reason- 
_.. -ablyýcompetent man. ýwhorhad. 
failed to find a,.. place for 
himself, -before--1792. -'Lebrun.. -was 
born in-Noyon in-1754. 
As, a-youth-. heý,. enteredýa seminaryp, 
-butý-exhibited,. 
greater-'ý' 
, aptitude--Ifor-. mathematice 
than theology. - ', -He'-vvas'allowed 
(1) Quotedin P. Massong OP- eit- P. 163. 
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to'enter the Observatory, but left, after a 'short. time 
Hisýdeparture'-fr6m, military, serviceg to join-, the army* 
whether, desertion or'notg' was'sudden and-he eventually 
found his way! -to Liegeq then in'a state of upheaval' 
just'before, its attempt to break-from the Austrian 
Empire; - At Liýge he f ounded, the Journal ý General', 'de 
1'Europe, w"paper, which he continued to publish, ''until 
llth. Auguat - 1792 ,, in Paris af ter his., 
f light from 
liýge during the 'revolt. Lebrun': gra'dually established, ',, 
himselVamong those who were on the rising, tide of 
the Revolition. -An December, 1791'ie led ! a. deputation 
of Liegois4o the ! Assembly ito- ask -for. the'formation- 
of a---leagueýof volunteersand_he'ýlater became-prominent 
on'. the-, Comite"des-Belges et, -Liegois-ýýUnis. -ý' He was,, - 
introduced-to Dumouriezqýwho, appointed him in Marchq 
1792 as head of'the premier, -bureau 
bf the-Ministry-of--.. 
Foreign Affairs'., In-effect he took over from Dumouriez 
on August'l3thivAince'neither of'the general's success- 
orst,, the. Marquis de Chambonas, or Bigot de Sainte-Groix 
hadýýhad, any: effect on'. the running of. the 
. 
de partment. " 
ý, '', ý'It'has, been-caid, that,, Lebrun was influenced-by 
Dumouriez, Danton', and Brissoto-The three make a'rather 
unlikely trinity and each would have held different 
ideas on the running of the Ministry. Dantont though 
Minister of Justiceg was'v by his 66n admission consult, ed 
by Lebrunt but their relationship after Danton took 
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his seat in, the,. Convention--is, not-, clear. 
(1), 
-- Dumouriez's 
bcheme to push,, into, Belgium was very close to _. -Lebrun' 
heart, but. he- -scarcely, have had. much-, immediate', , could., 
-, 
protege, once, the Belgian campaign had influence on,. his 
begun-to consume his-attentions, after Brunswick's 
retreat. , 
Soon -after August 10th. it appears--that Lebrun 
did-write to Dumouriez seeking basic advice on his new 
post -. 1l. Vous. me demandez-mes avis sur votre departe- 
mento mon cher,, successeurt avec la franchise deýllhomme 
qui a, en lui-meme ýt out ce, qu I il f aut p our f aire . 'un 
a bon ministret mais. qui, en meme temps cherche, -slentourer 
de conseils pour, choisir et; se 
I fortifier, dans son sys'Oeme.. j, 
(2: 
There is little-, to-connect-Lebrun with Briesotg', though 
Brissot in his capacity-as Igember of, the COmite Diplo- 
matique,, was undoubtedly-important at. the turn-of the 
year when relatione, with England, were-severely strained. , 
It was to Lebrun's advantage that he had, worked 
in his own ministry.: He possessed first-hand, knowledge... 
of the mechanics, of. French diplomacy and he was. able 
to write his instructions. and reports clearly. '-He soon 
found, howevert that directing foreign affairs was a 
complex task and-, that. the. Bituation was beyond, his 
(1) Danton received a number of payments from the Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs in August and Septemberg but these may 
have been used for sending secret agents into the provinces. 
Masson, op. cit. p. 262. 
(2)- Dumouriez to Lebrun, August 16th. 'V A. A. E. 9 
C. P. Pays-Basq, 183. 
3.14 
control. By-the end of November it-was evident that 
domestic affairs. were impinging on France's relations- 
with the whole of'Buropeg but Great Britain and Holland. -ý 
in particular., In, such'. oircumstancesýthe Convention 
increasingly dictated-the, direction of poli_cyo The,. 
paradox of-military victoryand domestic uneasiness 
gave a. further, edge-to-the use of impassioned rhetoric 
by politicians., Lebrun found-himself, in. December, -, 
in the position of havingo forforml. s sakep'to, present 
defiantýand aggressive-sounding reports: to-theýConvention 
whileýstill-searching desperately. to ward off, impending 
hostilities with Britain. -His links with Dumouriez 
proved his, downfall, after the general's defection.. ', - 
He was proscribed by'the Revolution of June'2nd-9 17939 
but had. to remain in office until'arreplacement'was, -,, 
f ound. , Before he could be--- formallY --larrested. 
he. f led 
and remained some time in hidingg where he produced an 
indignant'defence of his conduct - "Ennemi'de la , libertel 
Juste ciell. moi qui combats et qui-souffre pour, elle, 
depuis, dix ans.. 'ýConspirateurl - Et pourqui?,,, Moig' qui 
tous les despots ont proscrit et avOue, a la mort?, -., 
Traitr a)a Patriel., -Moi qui ne sais plus dans, quel 
coin du monde reposer ma,, t'eteg-depuis*que-cette', patrie 
si ch\ere a cesse dletre-pour moi un asyle assure". 
"'(1) 
The, Ministry of ForeignAffairs conducted corres- 
pondence with other nationeg, transmitted explanations 
7 (1) liemoires, hiE3toriques et Justificatifs de mon 
ministerep A. N, W 305. 
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of French'p'olicy to them'through-representatives-in-- 
its embassies and 'was'-the only, organ'of - French, govern- 
ment'with', which the British dealtq although unofficiallyq 
during the, -autumn of 1792., But as, theEuropean conflict 
grew fiercerg "I threatening', to"encompass--even thepreviously 
neutral-nations, the'-activities"of-'the, other ministries 
were" , also'ýof'significance for the, -future, of: knglo- 
French"r6lations. '. The Ministry. ýwhich'was rapidly to 
assume crucial importance duringýthe`autumn'and winter 
of, 1792-3'-was that"for War., -It--was, also the centre- 
of a-bitter'dispute-between Dumourie2; 'as general of the 
army . of-theý"Northaand Pache as Ministerg"a dispute 
wliibhýcu't'-'aýt the"-roote-of, Dumouriez's victoryin'Belgium 
andýreverberated'in-the faction-fighting of the-.... I. - 
Convention. *, --The need's'of the armies of the republic 
grew so I rapidly I that the Ministry of, _Warq 
though it- 
'ýaS'tlY iný6reased the numbers of, its employeesp was 
ýUiite una'ble' toý cope. with the situation., -The importance 
Of'the, 'dispute over'supplying Dumouriez's army was not 
--lost on, the, Britishqwho were watching anxiously in 
l, odee-Dumouriez decided to attack. t, he'Dutch,. A, printed 
-copy, -of.., the report of-Dantong Gossuin and-the other 
. -, co=issioners'to. 
the, army of the North was,, place, d on 
file-in the British: Poreign Office. 
Two other ministries also came into contact with 
the British government ln-the'period"ýefore wap. The 
,, 
(l),.. -. The, rep, ort'is, in F. O. -, 27/41. 
I 
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connectione. were indirectp but, of,: -someýimportance in 
revealing Britain's views, of, the-republiels, survival- 
Jean-Marie, Roland's huge anddisorganized Ministry.,, of,,, -,., 
the, Interior had. wide-ranging responsibilities; Among 
these-were subsistances, a pressing problem after 
August,. 10th. In face of the insufficient harvest 
orcedto,. buy, corn, abroad., Roland had_agents France was, 
in. Germany,, England. -and the.. United, Provincesg but they 
were closely, watched: by, representatives, of the-British, 
government.., Pittla.. administrationI realizing the die- 
astrous, unreat which, would, be, caused in France by food-.,. 
, 'Bhortagýeýg,, attemptedito, -. thwart-, French, efforti3-to buy-_ 
corn.,. in,,, Hamburg, and Amsterdam. andq on-November 13th., 
an. Order in, Council, was issued in London forbidding-. - 
the export of grain. 
A.. further source of interest, to the BritishIgovern- 
ment. was., the,. currency used, by French agents to. purchase 
. grain.., 
It, was known that the assignat was, falling, in 
value, and-IFrance's enemies-believed that grain was. 
being-bought with a debased currency. The-role of 
Claviere's Ministry of Public Contributions-remains' 
obscure"in this respectýbut*at the beginning-of 1 17939' 
. realizing the connection between the assignatsý'and' 
Francefslcontiiýued ability to surviveg-the British 
.1W Richt, the'consul in Ameterdamg, reported regularlY"- 
on French corn purchases from mid-November. See his 
letters of this period in P. O. 27/41 and F. . 0.97/247. 
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goverriment, -. oontemplated, ýmethods'of, manipulating the 
rate, of exchange'to', theýdetriment, of'the French. 
Is administration did-not,, like the idea of , Clavie're's PitV 
purchasing gold, with-assignate-which were worth next 
toýnothing,. in-any-other money. 
-,, ý, Despite-the-contrasting structure of British and, 
French Ministriesp British politicians were at least 
accustomed to conducting business with a minister of 
the-Irench, Crown, The opening of the Conventiong aI new 
representative, powerg-introduced an unknown element 
into,,. the,. machineryýof French-government and the character, 
of-revolutionary. politics. The British'had_very little 
way-rof, comprehending the hopes andexpectations ivhiýchý- 
the, Convention embodied at-its outsetq or the passions 
whichý. soon'threatened to divide it permanently. 
opening of the Conventionp government 
inlrance-had operattd-ll through the extraordinary 
measures-taken to-meet the, crisis-'by, existing insti- 
tutionsq. the National Assemblyq-the ministerial, coungil 
and,, the Paris Communeq which had-themselves been*modified 
to'the needs of the situation after, -August 
10th, The. 
Convention at'its-commencemeniýwas regaiaed. with very, 
great, reverencep for it,. ýwas the aspect of government 
which-. -represented'the will ofIthe sovereign people. ' 
.1, Anonymous memoir written for--iitt'at'the'ýýeginning 
of 17939 P. R. O. 30/8/334. See below'. 
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There was also, a widespread feeling of qptimismg in 
factq, a, beliefj that a lasting, form. of government would 
ismergefrom the Convention' s,, -labours., -. 
The. violent,,. 
ora, ýory, which-soon. came. ý-to. cýaracterize-the debates. --.. 
greatly impeded, the attainmený of; the', aims"for which.. 
it, -had been. createdg and did much to-obscure its, -work- 
ings from, therest of Europe. 'Britaing generally 
accustomed-to order and. sobriety in-parliamentary pro- 
ceedinge, assumed that the appearance of anarchy-in the 
legislature: was-a_sign of disorder-. throughout governmentq 
in ýFrance. 
_:, 
Some deputies were, aware of this -and - feared 
the detrimentaleffect it would have on-the republic's 
chances of-recognition., However disorganizedg the- 
Convention, was. central to the functioning of government 
in, France, -in-the-autlimn of"1792 and-to the political 
dev&lppments'which. influenced-the-nation's relations 
with-Britain and the-future of the Revolution'itself. 
, -For, 
Frenchmeng one of the most significant'aspects- 
of-the. Convention was its importance as-an institution, 
and the-principles which itembodiedo the, sovereignty 
of the., peoplet, the unity of the French nation. and, the 
obligations of the representative. These-ideasq often 
connected in, the writings and speeches of leading revol- 
utionary,, figures,, were frequently re-iterated in-the 
first. months, of the Convention. They were capable', of, 
a, 1variety of 
interpretations. and'tlýe is'sues of, unity 
of-theýnation was. to become a. subject of, bitter,, dispute 
in'1793 and 1794, when "the Republic one And, Indivisible" 
Ila ý. 7 
was-'more of a political weapon than a reality. 
The' men who ýc ame to, occupy the seats, Of the 
Convention were the first elected to national office 
by univereal'suffrage-in-France. Despite the distinct- 
ivene'es'of the, body which they were about, to form and 
the-, momentous nat 
' 
ure of their 
/ask 
their elections had 
beeý: -conducied_on"'a well-established 'pattern. Voting 
was conduýted-iný'p'rimary'and electoral assemblies, but 
in'Parisq as a show of direct-participation by the 
secti'ons', ", ýhe'prim'ary'as's'emblies, ratified the choices. 
Voting took-place on 26th. August'and 2nd. September. 
The number of"those who participated was surpriningly-, 
small; '- th'ere, was, certainly no justification for'the 
representatives to claim that they had been elected by 
the people'of"Frazice in any numerically literal sense. 
Only--about-one-tenth of seven-million possible voters- 
exercised"their suffra-e ', The'reasons for this seem 9 
almost 6ertainly-to lie in the instability, of the times. 
The general"air''of-uniCertainty -and . recrimination would 
no haveinspired, men who had to vote, aloud publicly. 
The-rump of the Legislative Assembly gave way to 
the749ýnew-deputies, on-21st. -Septemberg 1792, the day 
after'the Pr'ussi . an invasion was halted at Valmy. The'-, 
Convention's original-'aim was to present the country 
withýa-new constitution'q laying down'p-inýthe'meantimeo 
th; 'fab'ric of'republican governm-ent. - In', theýday-7to-`, '- 
daý "sý; ssions- of --the Convention - the stormy - exchanges" 
delayed*discussion of the content of, the-conBtitution. 
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On, some occasions, they even. impeded-the functioning of 
the Convention, itself, The British do not appear to 1- - ., " -1 .I. ", -.. Iý, 
have, devoted much-attention to understanding the new 
institution across. the Channel. Pitt and his colleagues 
had-the. debates available to them,, in, Le Moniteurg the 
official government publicationt but the debates- 
obscured rather than illuminated the machinery of French 
government. 
-, 
At. 
-the opening of 
the, Convention the main 
topics of British, interest were. the, September Massacres 
and, the fate of Brunswick's march on Paris. The British, 
too-7 inevitably made, comparisons between the civilized 
nature of speech, and, criticism in the House of Commons 
and the, frenzied tone,, of French proceedings.. Even 
surroundings in France. were uncomfortable. Ifeeting, 
each,, day, in. the Manege, a. cramped building altogether 
unsuitable for a-debating chamberg the 749 men listened 
ýo speeches whose order had. be, en decided in advance. 
The, subjects might, range over, 
_individual 
denunciation 
and. justification,, to the. introduotion or-discussion of 
vital pieces of legislation. ' The order-of. the day was 
frequently-interrupted by shouts of criticism and 
derision,, often-encouraged from the publile galleries. 
At the turn of the year-1792-39 the Montagnard deputies, 
whooccupied-the'high seats on, the left of the Maneige, 
began to resort-increasingly to organized barracking 
Under, such circumstances, the office, of Presidento which 
was originally a prestigious func, tiong became unenviable 
in theextreme. The Assembly was. supposed, to'become 
1 Pi 
silent when the President donned his red cap of'libertyq 
but on more than one' , occaslon'the attack'extended to 
him'personally. - 'The Piesident once-rang his bell"for 
silence'for fifteen-minutes, until it broke. "It is 
hardly surprising that'British'observers assumed-that 
sucli's'pectacles'revealed the complete lack. of any- 
proper government structure in'France. "The Convention's 
members', 'h6weverl devoted'mo, ý`r's'-"time 'to''the business of 
politics. ' -Sessions began each'day*at'9 a. m. 9 though 
by-no m-e'ans'all the deputies arrived at this hour. The 
C onventi I on-sat oii Sundays and did'not observe festivals 
such 'as -Cliristmas-Day.. ' 
The bulk of the work of preparing and bhaping 
legislation wa's done'outside. the-orbit of observation, 
in the committees 0f the Convention. -'-The task of 
providing'a basis for I the republic was in the hands of 
a comparatively small number of meng 
'some 
of whose 
members'were"not the inexperienced-firebrands that 
f6rehgn''comment'ators depicteds It was from these comm- 
i the Conseil Executif received the laws it ttees tha 
was required to'promulgate. Observers who were attempt- 
ing to' assess the stability-of French government or 
arrive_ýat. some basic understanding of its structure 
-. would*not-readily. have'been aware of the contribution 
of`th6ýConventionls committees, A'single spokesman 
generally-explained the-motives behind decisions which 
had.,, been'taken, but, because of the circumstances of the 
country certain committees, for example, those for. 
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diplomacy, legislation and general- slecurityg were 
especially prominent. The Comite Diplomatiqueq for-: 
whom Brissot frequently acted as,, spokesmang played 
almost no part in Anglo-French relations. until. January, 
1793, concerning itself previously with, Geneva and-, 
Belgium. The functioning of the Committees was con- 
siderably impaired by the general atmosphere, of the 
Convention. Moreoverp the very fact that-work 
split between so many groups did nothelp in, -,, giving 
shFýpe to an overall system of legislation.. , 
effectiveness was hampered by national, crisis, a I 
nd, -.,.,,,, 
personal animositieso-for their membership, frequently 
overlapped. 
(') 
It was in the rivalries among the deputies them- 
selves that'the root cause of the, functional diffi- 
oulties of the provisional system of revolutionary 
government lay after August 10th. The differences had. 
sprung from political disputes engendered, in the Spring 
of 17929 but they were also'caused by contrasting 
temperament and general outlook. 'They did, not necess- 
arilý spring from any disparity, of 'social background, - 
for the composition of the Convention was not in, any 
way. truly representative of the people'ofIFrance as a 
whole. This is hardly surprisingg for meh, with some 
education and means of support were likely to have 
(1) 'There is no detailed study 'Of-the 'workings of the 
Co=ittees of'the-. Convention. 
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great advantages in elections over struggling artisans 
and peasants. ý The Convention- was ý mainly, composed, of 
men from the middle to lower. ranks of the -bourgeois 
occupations., They may not-, all-'have been the-equivalent 
/ 
of English gentlemen. (though' some - of the. Brie sotine', were) 
but they were hardly the -rabble of, the. popular.., imagin-, 
ation iri Bfttain, 
, _It, became evident 
fromIthe moment, of,, the'opening 
of the Convention that-'the differences: of-opinion,,,. 
'would resolve themselves into the emergence. of, broadly 
aligned groups. There were' no par, tie 
. 
s, in, themodern-, 
understanding. of--the. term;, - 
during the revolution, 
party,. or, faction,, waB a-. name used tol discredit opponents, 
since it implied an*attempt to destroy.., the: -'stateby, ý_ 
encouraging disunity-o The British concept, of, an 
OPPosition-, ýwas_entirely alien-ý, _--The 
opposing groups in 
the Convention were labelled Girondins and, Montagnards 
but, though each upheld, a number-; of., ideasq neither, had 
. political programme., - 
The-distinctione, were lost, oný, a, 
the Britishq, who viewed--all. the menAn-the Convention- 
collectively'asjacobins of varying shades oflextremism. 
Reacting slowly, to. changes-in--the,; Plrench, political 
climatev the British identified Brissot and-his group 
as chief mischief-makers, forisome,, time. after, August, 10th., 
not realizing, the. threat posed. _by 
Robespierre, and,, the 
Parisian deputies. The Brissotins were, jealous of lost 
pre-eminenoe'and fearful of theýintiusion of. "the mass I es 
into'politioai'lifel' fearing p, opular despotism'as'much' 
]2k 
as . 
they., despised aristocratic privilege. 
The Girondine were a, loosely-knit group, connected 
with, Brissot and Roland. Their strategy- was to estab- 
lish dominance as as the Convention opened,. basic- 
ally--, by taking over the, committees., Though apparently 
successful at -firstq -they soon came 
under -, attack.., Their 
ý. failure: arose, from their. identification with, the dis- 
credited legislative, Assembly and. its-betrayal oflthe 
-people before, August, 10th. and an excessýof individual- 
, 
ism, in their ranks which made any united approach - 
impossible. -, Inýthe months before the proscription-of 
ýmany, so-called Girondins -, on June 
2nd. , 1793 9 this 
loosely-knit groupir)gwas -to identify.. -, itself with 
several: compromised causes;.,, their. damand, for popular 
ratification of, the king's judgement, cast doubts on,,, 4- 
: their, co=itment, to. the, Revolution of August, 10th-g-',, 
ýthe reports of the Comite Diplomatique advocating-war- 
': with England, 'were subsequently, reproached for being 
ill-advised and the defeotion of Dumouriez in, the spring 
ýof, ý1793, connected Brissot and some of his acquaintances 
with. a traitor. 
(') 
Robespierre was a familiar, figure to British,, ý, 
,, politicians, 
identified with the, radical, wing of the 
, 
Revolution.. The emergence, of an organized, group around 
him. was not, the subject of much British comment while 
(1) The trial of the Girondins't A. N., W 292, turned 
particularly on their actions between Augustý10th. q 1792 
and June 2nd., 1793. 
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itý-was "actually taking-place-. ' The Montagnards were 
co nnect I ed, with Paris, but"also attracted a'growing number 
of -departmental, deputies. Aware of the debt they owed 
toýihe`ji6ple in the overthrow of'the king and the 
fighting'in-the' war, -many Montagnards were'disturlýed 
by thehardships. inflicted-on, the people'but the"concept 
the, state. through unity and, the oi-: Feg 
direciion-'of vigorous government exercised by a'compar- 
atively smallýnumber'of meng'shared by their leading 
figuresg--was-basically, too-ihtellectual for*there to 
nts-o -resonance with the'day`toý-day. demands be 'many"poi- ,f 
of the "'-sections. 'Using, tlýe Jacobin. s club as a discussion 
1ý -, '* 'I-, I -s' on centre fOr'ire-arranged'action'the Mountain was 'o, 
able-to'meet the disorganized attacks of the Brissotins. 
Seeing'that, their opponents1had an essentially negative 
approach"to the . probl - ems I of'government the RobeePierrist 
ý'ý-realized I that the. only way by which they might deputies 
hope to-dominate was by encouraging the confusion until 
it"reached a, point, where the Brissotins were totally 
discredited. -''-'- 
`Iii 'between these 'warring. groups wereýthe great-- 
number , 'of'deputies whose allegiance tended to alter 
with I 'th e"ebb"'and-flow of the struggle but who-felt-no 
great pers6nal, -commitment to either side. "- Initially" 
the , ýe men-, wer e, 'p'r*obably'bewildered-by-the uns , eemly'-, 
deýionstratiois'_iii a b'o-dy which'the people'had once 
regarded with reverence'. . 
In general their eppathies 
tended to be with the anti-Parisian stand of the 
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Brissotinsq since they had no wish to be dominated by 
, the, capital. - The continuation of hostility, within 
, the Convention came to, be regarded asýextremely 
detrimental to the security of Francep and in December 
-. Barýre ýemerged, ýas spokesman,, for the Centre. Barýre 
ýhad - sensed that - the conduct of - the Convention was 
forcing neutral Britain to, dipmiss the possibility of 
any, firmly-established government emerging in France. 
ý-was -during, the trial. of the'king that the Centre 
. began-, t6'-drift away from the Brissotinst when it 
became, apparent thatýattempts to compromise would 
, be construed as treachery. 
., -Th'e, original purpose of the Convention was never 
fulfilled'. 'IThe Montagnard constitution of 1793 was 
not put, into practice and the Convention remained 
unti'l-. its dissolution on October 26th-9 17959 a body 
undertain of,. the'purpose-of its existence. 
Bewildered'bý, the outpouring of'verýal violence 
in, 'the'Convention, --possessing -only scant'informati, 
on", 
on, "the'committees-and, the, Conseil'Exd'outift the British 
govýr=ent-may'well'have, derivedýtheir highly unfavour- 
able"impressions of the conduct of politics in France 
from another'source. ''The'Parisian Commune, a body 
composed-'of municipal officials and section represant, 
atives, had brought about the Revolution of August 10th. 
and pla ed a vital part in government for a short time' 
(l)_,. -: -'See'-belowq Chapter 9t passim. 
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afterwards. The personnel of the Communep lawyers' 
clerks, 
, 
lesser-7known, journalists poor parish priestst 
corresponded much more closely than, that of1the 
Convention, to-the British image, of mob. domination. 
(', ) 
The deep split, between, the Commune and the Assembly 
was. not,. understood in Britaing where Santerr. eq Petiont' 
Carra and, Manuel_were still mentioned as the instigators 
(2) 
of revolutionary excess. 
l... 
It 'was the. effects of the 
Communel, s,, vigorous emergency measures which the 
British knew most about and found most repellent. The 
September, Massacres horrified British opinion and 
coloured, the, ggvernment's. eatimate. of France for some 
time. Information received in Britain was very inacc- 
uratel,, but it was, the lurid detail-of the slgyings and 
the fact,. that no attempt was made to hunt down their 
perpetrators which aroused, the greatest1comment. in 
Britain. 
It isunlikely-that the-full facts, of. -the September 
Massacres will ever be known but even. if-they were not 
formally instituted by, the Commune-there_, seems to have 
been tacit encouragement initiallyand subsequently no 
action, was iskento, stop., them. The massacres coincided 
with, the news that,, the, fortress. of, Verdun was, about to 
fall. The Commune, proclaiming that the enemy was at.,, 
(1) P. Braesch, op. cit., p. p. 245, - 264. 
(2),, Burke to Grenville August 18th. 9 1792 9 Burke, 
Correspondencet- ed. T. Copelandq, J. Woods and others, 
viio P. P. 173 --178. 
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the''gates of Paris', " acted with vigour to safe-guard 
public dider and"resitore morale in the capital. ' On 
Septe-mb-e*r 2nd. 9 a"second comite de surveillancep a 
co=ittee I responsible . for policing Parisq was instituted. 
It's m embers werd not confirmed by the general council 
0f the'Commune"and it contained some meng particularly, 
Marýat`, "'-w'h'o v-v, er*e* regarded by more moderate members of 
the Co=un'e' as extremists. 
The Communels'declaration of emergency pointed 
towards two courses of'action. The, first was a call 
to arms, embodied in'the proclamation of 2nd September 
exhorting'aiti , iens to-gather for military se'rvice-on 
th6-Champs de Mars. It'was not'enough, howeverV 
to concentrate-sol6lY'on fighting the foreign enemy. 
-The prisons were full of suspects"and even 
theýNational 
AIs seibly 'w as , untrust . w'orth ye A pri . son plot would. have 
had a disastrous effect on,: Parie, at-atime when many 
men'had'jOine ,d 'tlie army and left the-city da 
I ng I erously 
und6fended. '' The"p -on"maseacree-which lasted from 
2nd-4. -'7th: ' September'were probably-irompted'by"the 
Veli4f`that'a tr'eacher6us--group within"the capital 
must be, destroyed.,. The mentality, of-those who partici- 
pated in the, slayings is only comprehensible. in te rms 
of: the, intensity of, the national,. crisia., -The murderers 
(1)-De6laration, '6f the'Paris Commune'q''2nd* September, 1792 
cited"in'A. 'Bo - eart, Documents Authenticlues'pour servir 
'ýeý'dYDanton 'p-118, Bruss I els, 1861 a, llhistoi 
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probably thought of themselves as performing, a task 
and, f elt no regret f or what they. had done There is 
no 
, 
direct proof, that the Comite de Surveillance of the 
Commune was responsible for the organization of the 
Massacres, but it considered-them perfectly , justifiable. 
There-was, a grim logic in. the circular letter'-which it 
addressed to,, the,, depar ents on September 3rd, '' 
"La, Commune de Paris set/hmte d'Informer, ses'freres''de 
tous les, departements quIune partie des, conspirateurs'-. 
feroces-de - tenus dans lee prisons a'etemiseý'a mo I rt 
par le, peuple; actes de justice qui lui ont paru indis- 
pensablesq, pour retenir par la terreur'les le"gions de- ý 
traitres caches dans see murs au moment ou il allait 
marcher a l1ennemi ..... 
The reaction of moderates was highly ckiticalp 
but in England, where reports fixed the total of those 
(2) dead at, 79000, there was universal. disgust. , 
Members- 
of, the. diplomatic corps had. known some of those 
murdered and shuddered to think of events in, France 
_'. 
'all my ideas of happiness'-are shaken by, the 'calamitous 
history of Francep every-circumstance, of which passes, 
(1)''Cir'6ular letter ofýthe, comite de'surveillance of the 
Paris, Communeq signed Duplai'nq 'Pani s_ 9 Serg I entq Lenfant,,, - 
Jordeýuil, -Maratv Defourges, Leclercg, Duffo'rt and Cally4 
quoted-in Bougeartq op. cit. ý-P-p- 121 -122. 
ý2) 'Aust, to Grenville, -September'Sth. 0 H. M. C. Forte scue 
Ids jiq op.. 
''Cit. 
P. 310. 
-. -.  
.! 
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_from, 
day to-, dayj through, my, hands,, and. disturbs. lay 
mindýboth sleeping and waking-"(').,., The murderof.. the 
Princesseý, de Lamballe especially captured the-imagin- 
ationg. -bec. ause of her rank and place, 
inýParisian 
society. ýA-: telling contrast between the fury-of the 
mob., action-on the streets and the artificiality of 
polite society, was provided by, William Lindsay a few 
days before-he. left 
British-embassy-was 
dinner. 
1-at-the Palai 
broughtýthem to-Ithe 
lackýof-interest'on 
head, 
-, was outside on 
Paris. The secretary to the 
one of a number of diplomats taking 
s Royal when noise of the mob outside 
windown, The Due d'Orleans obvious], 
hearing that, his former: ihistresele - 
(2) 
a-pike did-not. warm Lindsay's heart. 
The British, appalled, and, depressed by the September 
news from Parisq'were re-inforced in'their view of 
the-violence and. instability of Frenchgovernment., 
They_'saw. only%a seething mass of violent men threatened 
with. destructionýby. armed, force from-outside'and their 
own immoderation from within. - Lacking information 
and. amazed. by,, the later-rush of French*victory the 
British: knew, very little about the structure and function. 
ing-of-government in France in the six months before 
the outbreak, of war. Their-impression of chaos was, 
comprehensible'and by no means inaccurate. The 
machinery of government in France after August 10th. 
(1) Auckland to Sir Gilbert Elliotq September 29th. 
Life and Letters of Sir Gilbert Elliot, ed. Countess 
of Mintop iig p. po 66 - 68. 
(2) Burge s to Grenville. 
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reflec . te dt .- he un - cert I ainty of, a nation which had- 
declared itself a republic but had yet to adopt'-an 
organized republican system. The men who were 
attempting to consolidate the second revolution 
were caught in the contradictions; the situation and 
'the measures taken were revolutionary-but, 'in'order for 
administration'to function with regularity it was:.,,. 
necessary to incorporatep at-least until', the'newl-, -ý 
constitution was r eady some of-the'-previously, existing 
institutions, The strains were greatqýbutq much to 
the wonder, of the rest of Europe, France continued 
to*support a war, pursue diplomatic relations with-the,. 
neutral states and'organize the-running ofýthe capital 
and'theý'provinces despite the increasing hostility 
between politicians. ' The continuity with-the-pre-', 
August'10th. system, in some b. ranches-was not fully 
appreciated by spectators nor was the ability and, 
'-determination'-of some of the most-prominent men. in 
Political--life. '-It wasigenerally felt that-total-, 
collapseýmust inexorably-approach. There wasq-thoughg 
no reason for either Great Britain or France to. assume 
a breakdown of relations at the*end'of'September. '- 
The'British were comfortable in'their neutrality and 
the French'wished them'to remain so. 
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mbasureCof-' the)-British')View ^ofnther-. in--m- 
stability -'of,; goveriament--iný -Prance .. -, af ter. -, August 10th" 
, IIEVItha-t, bL. lwell.;. 'qu4lifiedýiambaEisadqR-ýAu qh- ap 'Lor-dz: Gavver 
t2200p'zf3ý0plýkd6d)1by. -an' itinerant I-e overnmentLepy-, as 
G. e, orge . Monroý*'('ý-ýMonro, wI ascawa yrfro I m, -Taris. 1be 
- twee n- 
OctAer'l-st 'axid s'ome"time towards the' middle of 
D'ýcember`. 'While' back in England hIe attended meetings 
of the London Corresponding Society-and reported'on,, 
themq''whi'chý perhaps gives some indication of the 
British-government's'priorities. He'ýwas by'no means 
a-suitable choice for the-demanding-role which his' 
Positioýýiniaiis required him tolfill. His description 
ýof the-'internal politicsof Frajýc'e underlined the 
chaoti pictu which was, the overwhelming impression 
"re 
derived by those in authority, in, -Britaing but it did 
so wit'hout'reasoned argument'for the opinions. put 
f 6r, ward _-- It' wo"uld_-seem,, in, factq that Monro's pre sence 
in Prance was as much designed to spy on th, e British 
radicals who lived, there, far from harmoniouslYo, in, 
White's Hotel. His December letters told of arguments, 
between Paine and Prost. Early in-January his mission 
ended, in some. oonfusion when. he was recognized by one 
of'the men from, a British-corresponding society which 
he, had penetrated and he was-denounced as a spy. 
There are very few accessible details about Monro's 
background, other than that he waslan army c- aptainl. and 
po 
'sýib1y, 
Scottish, (A*, Algerq Englishmen in the French Revolution). 
Some, of his despatches are published in 0. Browning, ed. The 
Deatatches', of Lord GowerqkLondonq 1885- ý_On his domestic'. activities 
, 'see his jetten, to . Dundas t from Bristol,, 9th, Au ust,,. 1792. in_ýý: 9 
'A*ý')Aspinallý ed *", -Early t 
English, Trades; Unions, -1949 and J. ýYalvins 
English' Demo-cratic*Societies, and ýP8pillar. Radicalism'g--, -1791-1800, 
-Part. )lIolYork DePhil-,, ý1970o'- 
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Chapter 5 
The Months of Delusion - September and_October 1792 
Despite-the advance of the Prussians and the 
disordered state of, politics in Paris the French 
approached the many problemsof foreign affairs after 
the revolution of August 10th with optimism. They knew 
that. the crux of their relationship with Europe lay 
inthe maintenance of the neutrality of Great Britain 
and her ally the Dutch The diplomats and 
politicians were as aware as their predecessors that 
Brithin was not an opponent to be considered lightly. 
The British navy continued to be regarded with a certain 
avvet,, not, simply because of the number and strength of 
its, ships, -, the majority of whichq 
in the autumn of 1792, 
had not seen action for some yearsq but because the 
British were able to man an entire fleet in a! nmatter of 
(2) 
repks through the ruthless weapon of-the press-gang 
(1) Lebru'n'ls'speech to the Convention on September 28th 
(Le"Moniteur, vol. XIV P-p-59-62) dealt with the attitudes',,, 
of the various powers of Europev stressing the importance 
ofýAngloý-Dutch neutrality, unlike the despatches it was 
intended forpublic consumption and bore marks of the 
Thetoric which was'. 1ater to characterize French propa- 
gandav ej3pecially the emphasis on the different outlook 
of, governments and their, subjects. 
(ýý, 
''Ion 
sait que sa marine est dans tous les, temps si 
bien ordonnee_quIen-moins de six, semaines., elle peut 
avoir en-mer. une flotte conside-rable. 11 Lebrun's 
speechg 28th Septemberg ibid. 
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k, toward Britain in September a4d early October was not 
merely the result, of a, belief, often repeatedg that it 
was,, against. British interests to engage in hostilities. 
In place. of the-essentially, negative standpoint of the 
earlier. -period of the revolution, which had consisted 
of. both, countries ignoring each others", difficulties at 
the official, -levelg-the French believed that they - 
oould-propose-the-basis of an alliance. 'The idea of 
Britain. joining with France against Spainp with the 
ultimate purpose of dividing South America between'them. 
seems an-. extremely unrealistic vision. The French may 
haveýfelt-. -_that Britain was still capable of reacting 
favourably to, a-. scheme which invoked the name of a 
traditional,. enemyvýonly-two years after-the incident 
at, Nootha'Soundo' 'Moreoverg Britain had recently, lost 
an_'empire:, in-, Xorth*America and might be looking-to 
recover-'her.. prestige elsewhere. The idea, of an anti- 
Spanish-alliance, was, fervently supported by Francisco' 
Mirandaq-aý. Venezuelan, who had become a French general('). 
In-other-respectsq toot France had reason to feel that 
after the disastersýof the summer, foreign affairs 
(1) Francisco Mirandat Dumouriez's subordinate- 
acquaintance of Brissotp became increasingly anxious 
at the position of the French armies in Belgium in the 
first months of 17931brought before the revolutionary 
tribunal after Dumouriez's defection, but released, 
Miranda sought aid for South American liberty in Europe. Died a 
prisoner in Cadiz, 1816. 
134 
might becomeýmore stable. l-, 
The, Prussian_invasion,, had 
been-defeated. by, its, 
-own 
over7-rigid. -high, command, terrible 
weathero-and the.. experience of Kellerman's troops at-,. 
'ýalmy. Thenegotiations which followed removed the 
'enemy from,, Prench, soil. After Brunswick's retreat, the 
discomfiture, of,, the allies appeared completet for,, the 
Prench-,, were, pressing southwards into-Savoy, and the, ý, 
dominions-Of. the King of Sardinia and Turin., The 
military-successes were noto howeyer, matched by 
corresponding., development ofstability at home., These 
contradictions contributed towards, the hardeningý, of 
French attitudesq, -particularly with respect to Britain. 
,,,,,,,, The-, experimentation-vvith new 
ideasp however un 
acceptable, tol. those-lvvhom they were intended to impress, 
was a product of the situation in which the revolution- 
aries found themselves and perhaps also of their 
inexperiencee"'The'failure of the allies created a 
temporary vacuum, which they were trying to fill. 
The'appar'ent introversion of, Great Britain was part'of' 
a well'established policy of non-involvement in 
European-affairs until Britain or her interests were 
directly threatened. This policy had'almost become, 
if not among the government themselves, at least among 
the governing classest an attitude of mind. The French 
were regarded as a-contaminating influence, 'a nation 
incapable-of satisfactorily ordering-their -own", 
concerns. "However I be afflicted, " wrote the Earl, 
of Charlemont on the very day of the second revolution 
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"in'Francel"II-am not surprised at the present state 
of France, I'know them we 11, and though'heaven 
"forbid'Zthat'I should say-they are not capable of liberty, 
"yet-most certainly they are by no means fitted for 
, --that'ý'constitutionswhich their foolish philosophers 
'have--given them. "(') Similar opinions were to appe ar 
,, even-'more forcibly after the recall of Parliament on 
'December 13th, when the European situation had changed 
. -Aiamatically. Charlemont's condescending views 
I were 
(2) 
-echoed by Foxi who claimed to be pro-French Very 
-few people had seriously considered the possibility 
'Of'Prussian defeatq and9while the outcome remained-in 
-. 
-the--balance 
the British government believed that 
ýneutrality was-the only proper course to follow, '- 
(1) Charlemont to Edmund Halidayt August 10th,, 1792, 
H-M-C. 12th report, Charlemont MSa, p. p. 
_197-198- 
James Caulfieldo first Earl of Charlemont, 1728-17999 
ý,, ý2 ý -, * ý, -, 31 1- Irish stateemant favoured reform of Irish'administrationg 
but opposed to Catholic emancipation and union with England. 
(2) Pox to Lord Hollandq September 3rd - "There is a 
want of dignity and propriety in everything they do ...... 
to be amusing themselves with funerals and inscription, 
and demolitions of statues and creations of honorary 
citizens is quite intolerable ...... Memorials and 
Corresponddnce of Charles James Fox, ed Ld John Russell, 
Vol. II, p. p. 368-370. 
136 
This line was maintained in the face of some foreign 
pressure. There were other pre-occýpations of a more 
immediate naturep which tended to, absorb attention 
while affairs on the continent seemed shrouded by un- 
certainty. The state of Ilreland-and Scotland gave rise 
to_growing concern. In Irelandp, as the. Catholic move- 
ment for extension of civil rights gained momentumv, 
the weakness of the Irish government. at, Dublinýwas 
fully revealed. At the same time, the agitation for 
reform of parliamentary representat ion in - 
Scotland 
ýwas also becoming more serious. Even in England it- 
self there-were signs of discontent. Riots were a 
normal part of life almost every year in late eight- 
eenth century England but the harvest of 17920, though, 
not a failureq was not sufficient to dispel fears-ýof, 
the_results of a rise in breqd prices. '' 
There, was, howeverp one problem which connected 
the situation in Prance more directly with the, state 
of Britain. It was the first link in a chain of 
recognition which came to identify France with dis- 
ruption in England. Shortly after the revolution of 
August 10th many Prenchmeng particularly nobles and 
priests, but also some former members of the Constitu 
. ent 
Assembly escaped across the Channel to arrive penniless 
in Britain. Their numbers increased after the 
September Massacres. Most of the newcome rs posed 
problems of social relief which could not be adequately 
met by 
I 
the south coast pI orts. More serioust though, 
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was-the nagging I anxiety that a flood'ofioreigners 
, "of dubious'background and opinions would be spread 
throughout'En'gian-dj'where there was no - provision'for 
their s'urv'eillance-. -'This'filtering throughýof-the 
continental'u'ph'eaval contributed to rising uneasiness 
-in Britain , -The government were watching France, but 
little'--more*. - The, delusion of. both countries contrasted 
strongly with the startling events of November. '-',, 
It'is possible that the two administrations, 
despite the pressure of circumstances-and inflexibility 
Of outlooi'9"'would'at least have modified their appr - oach 
to ,e., 66iplexities of external relations if they had 
been provided with regular and enlightened reports- 
from th-eir'agent's'on each other's-soil. - In'this. respect, 
the-e'n'ding, of'official diplomatiC"links had a detri- 
mental effe . ct on Anglo-French relations. It is true' 
that ambassadors were not necessarily efficientg and, 
as in`thý6'case of Chauveling-were sometimes very un- 
popular in the countries-to which they were appoihted, 
but týýy -, were a constant source through which inform- 
ation -could be'received. It was up to their govern- 
ments'to assess their despatches. After August 10th 
, 
_r'61atibii_s_'bbtween Britain and Prance suffered the dis- 
. advantages of. an unsatisfactory 
but established link, 
in the io`rm''of the 'French legation at Portman Squ . arep 
and 
- 
intermittent spy reports from an army captain and 
an Irish priest, sent to Paris from Whitehall. Of the, 
two, the English approach was by far the more casual. 
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Such an eventuality had apparently not occurred to 
his employers. 
The unreliability of British intelligence was 
notorious after August 10th. Early in-October a letter 
passed on from the Post Office at Dover stated that 
Brunswick-had defeated the French and captured 
Dumouriez(l). Even this type of report was relatively 
sparse -, "I met a. person belonging to the Secretary 
of State's Officeoll wrote the Duke of Portland, 
11 -who assured me that everybody now knew as much of 
France as ministers didi and probably more, fdrtthtt 
Thelusson received the earliest and best information 
from thence, andq he believed that what came to the 
Secretary of State's Office was the last and the wOrse. 
"(2 
This, impression. would have been re-inforced by one 
of'-the'Foreign Office under-secretaries' admission to 
the ambassador at The Hague. -, "I would willingly 
oblige your-Excellency with any of our-spare French 
(1), tLetter forwarded by Mr. Gibbon, Deputy Agent for 
His Majesty's packet boats at Dover, October 7thl P. O. -27/40 
(2) Portland to William Windham, October 13th 1792. 
The Windham Papers (ed. Lord Rosebery) p. p. 106-7 
(B, -M. Add'* USS'0 37845) 
Peter Thelusson (1737-1797)o member of Prench 
Huguenot bankin -g familyoýCame to England 1762, estab- 
lishe-d-head office in Londoh. 
14o' 
/ 
papers, but having abandoned all French connections 
we have only a single set of Moniteure at pre s. ent which 
Lord'Grenville reserves to'himself. "(1) French news- 
papers were obtainable in Great Britaing but divorced 
from the reality of day-to-day proceedings in Prance, 
which were hard enough for Prenchmen to understand, 
they'lacked the immediacy of a reliable source in 
Paris-itself. 'The only-. otger suppliers of information 
much of'it more imaginary than usefulq were the 
emigres. 
The French suffered from the British problem in 
reverse. They had too many agentsy'sending back, 
upon occas . io - n, ., conflicting evi. dence. Such a situation 
arose out of, an almost haph4zard approach to the 
mecýýnism of-diplomacy. 
(2), 
In this respectq the 
influence"of Dantong who was in a position to-give- 
adviCe but unable to supervise its pr ticalapplication 
would seem to-have led to unforeseen difficultiesO, 
Thý'Brýitish'were never sure whether the proliferation 
of French'agents, was the result of disorganization in 
Paris, or, "-moiesinisterg part of a, deli4ýerate, plot to 
encourage dissidents. What was originally an, error of 
(1). George Aust to Lord Auckland, October 23rd. 
ý. M. Add. MSS. 
-34445. 
(2). 
-Talleyrandq and especially 
Duroverayq who-was 
recalled in October, were regarded with suspicion 
and exercised, less influence than before-August 10th. %-, 
Duroveray did not comply and remained in England. 
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judgement,, made, at, the highest levelýin_the, Executive 
Councilg:. contributed, towards: increasing. reservations 
on, the, intentions'of France among British, ministers. 
The, -mistakeýlay, 'in, the, over-hasty decision,, to-recall 
Chauvelin%and replace, him, by a number-of observers, 
qf,,, whom, Prancois Noe'l would be the principal. When- 
it., was decided., to., permit Chauvelin-to remain in 
ýnglandg, No*e*11s, mission became, in effectIredundant, 
a factor., which; he, was, himself to acknowledge in- 
directly. ý')'_,. 
' 
, -., 
The-difficultiesp however, were to prove more 
complex,, than mere, illogicality of approach by the 
Prench., ministers. Lebrun had been premier commis. of 
the. first, bureau of the ministry for some months and -., -. -_-, 4, I- 
it. is, unlikely that he did not know of Chauvelin's 
9ýýreme, 
_ýensitivity. 
This had been forcibly-demon- 
s, trated on July 27th. 1792, when the ambassador. - 
berated. the, Minister Chambonae. for failing to apprec- 
iate the qdb7aa'r'u_`s`sýment caused by the unheralded arrival 
q; 
-Pcipi 
n Morgu as second-secretary "Si'vous- M 
voulez, bien, reflechirg Monsieurý, sur, la nature-des 
relations, quiýdoivent exister extre un sous-secretaire 
ýe_legation et le Ministre dans les Bureaux-duquel il 
travaille, si vous considerez qulil slagit de quelqu'un 
jýii doit vivre sous le meme toitv manger a ma tI able, 
et: de. "qui je dois'repondre tant a la cour aupres de-": -. - - -- 
(1) Noel to Lebrun, 18th S'eptember, A. A. B. C. P. Angleterre 582. t 
I k2 
1-1 %ý. laquelle je suis aceredite, qu'aupres du Roi et de la 
nation-francaise vous sentirezq jeý'peuseq Monsieur, 
qulen. supp6sant meme qu6cla place, fUt n4e-essairep elle 
I--- 11(i) ne devrait pas gtre--donnee. sans ma connaissance. 
Chauvelin took No'e'lls arrival with similar unconoealed 
displeasure, and was reported, as saying at one point - 
Uh quelle insulte plus eruelle peut on me faire que 
de, me faire passer de'mains en mains comme un enfant 
11 (2) ý a qui'llont fait ebianger de prýocepteurs.... This 
clash of. personalities was extremely disadvantageous 
to': the, Prenchgýwhoýperhaps, -justified, the retention'of 
an official and, unofficial dgent, 'on the grounds that 
such'an arrangement would, give-a broader base to the 
intelligence from England. 'Itýis, fairly. evident that 
Chauvelin, oontinued to bemistrusted - I'M. Chauvelin, " 
wrote Mergez. to,, his cousin,, Danton, "dot& les principee 
sont-tres mode'5'es- quoiqulau. dehors il fasse-le Patriote.,, 
(3) 
Theýsituation, might, have-been a-little eased if 
Noel had initially-exhibited a. modicum of tact.: 
Though, not-exactly-. setting. himself-up as aýdirect rival 
to Cnau'velin; "'Noel I _proceededýto go very I -much his own 
way. It could be argued that he was metely following 
the letter of his instructions, but circumstances 
. 
(l, ) -'Chauv elin'to-Chambonasp 27th, Julyp-A. A'E. gC. PýcAygeterre 581 
(2)-'N6ý1'to Lebrun, 'gth Octoberg A. A. E. pC. P. Angleterre 
(3) Merge-z to Dwiton, ý'qth Octoberg A. N. "'A. F. 119 63. 
it 
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had altered, their applicability. His'contacts with 
the opposition were of little real value and it 
appears that he. spoke almost no English, a significant 
drawback for -a 
_man 
in his position. '(') He developed 
and sustained an attack on Chauvelin which was based 
not on direct, criticismv but on demonstrating that 
he was-totally. unnecessary-in the position which he 
then occupiedq, that the British disregarded him 
completely, and-that Chauveling though doubtless a 
talented young mang would be better employed anywhere 
other than in Britain. But Noe'lls position was not 
itself very, secure. He was vehemently attacked by 
Marat in the, revolutionary preseq when it was known 
that he-was--, going to England an d he revealed-him- 
self to be a'careless correspon"nto irritating Lebrun 
by-the incoherence of his despatches. 
(2) In December 
he was ordered to take up, the post of charge"dlaffaires, " 
at the Hague, an indication of the fact thatq at a 
t ime when relations with'England were fast deteriorating, ' 
Noel was regarded as dispensable. The dispute between 
himself and Chauvelin had resulted in the need for a 
(1), Noij- Lebrun'q 18th Septemberg relating that he had 
dined-. the previous night with Priestley - "Quoiqulil, 
parle. peu francaisq nous nous sommes fort bien eXtendus..:. " 
A-A. E. 'p C. P. Angleterre 582. ' 
(2), 
- Lebrun' to'. N0161 v 30th October. A. A. E. 
C. P. Angleterre 583. ''l 
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third agentv Aubrietg--t. u be sent,, to,, survey-both of 
, 
them. 
(') 
Chauvelin and'No6l were both passed over in 
the struggle, for an attempt at unofficial. talks with 
Pitt's ministry by Maret-at-, the--end of. November. 
If, -. there was any kind of categorization of, the 
agents, pent.., by,, Prancep. it sometimes lay-in differenoes 
of aim. One of. the main reasons_- behindChavelin' s 
retention may have be, en, his ability to 'transmit 
accurate,., admiralty intelligence and to be presentýwhen 
and. if,, the. British government deeired,, formal talks. 
(2) 
Noel-was to maintain contacts with,, friends, of-Prance 
and letsome of. the ideas which France had for an 
alliance be known-through, them. There were, others-I 
vvhO've,, 
'missions 
vvere'-temporaryv,, as Lebrun explained to 
Chauvelin, -,, "nous avons_enyoye,, en,,, Angleterre-plusieurs 
personnes-chargees de missions partioulieres ....... ces 
'A. 'A. E. 9 00 - Angleterre'supple. 29y'Aubriet to Maret, PO 28th November 1792, 
(2) Chauveliý vy'as_abl'e'to obtain"regular and accurate 
reports on. 'the state'of the'British namy through a man named 
ýital, `French by birthg-who worke'd under the Duke of Richmond, 
6n*7 7'ýih'iový'eýmberf Chauvelin w'r'ot'e "-"Il 't'ravaill ,e dans le 
bureau-ou slexpedie tous les ordres pour Ilapprovisionnement, 
et'pour'llarmement, soit de llarmee de terre soit de la 
Marinds'-Par-la nature de sa place il aýconnaissance-de, tout, "--' 
de- ee de- , qui peut, 
faire prevoir-un armement. 11 est-a, port"ý' 
Juger de 1-lactivite 0 de 11importance et de la promptitude 
que, le Ministre y, met. 11 Vital had been-an agent since the 
days of la Luzerne. A. A. E., C. P. Angleterre 585 (Supple-1792) 
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missions-pass-ageres . nlayant aucun rapport avec la 
CV 
04 e vous nI aurez `rierC5ýaeur dire ni a., 
ý, 
eur ý commun- 
. 11' -A i, ýque concernant'le' plan de negociation'que-vous etes 
6harge de sui'vr-e. 11(l) All these men-were also'sending 
back`repo3ýts on their'view of English affairs, 'in 
general. Itýis-difficult to a'ssess their overall 
influence in'Prance, ýb I ut the'Council, daily o'ccupied 
with many other, concernsv did not bother themselves 
with unravelling - the web. , `No&l'siimmed up the efficacy 
6f this c'onfused attempt at-widespread: intelligence 
coverage when he'said - "ces'missions'croise-es. ne 
(2) 
vale'nt-, pas le'-diableo o' 
'The, French view of Britain in*the,, early'autumn 
m0nthiof 1792'was derived from. "the'composite picture 
painied by'-'the-'ambasiador and Noýl"-an , dýalso-from'the, -, 
asieseme'nt-of, probable British 'reac, tion, by, French 
poli'ticians. -----The*earlyýviews of ilie internal'situation 
ierer'ma'rked'', by-a'considerable degree`ofý'moderationý' - 
Ireland, ias' always an area''of interest and would be 
potentially 'a-great danger to'Greatý'Britain-. in-the-eve*nt 
of, hostilities between France and Britain "Cette 
consideration aussi puissante que de-e-Iiicate me , rite* 
(3, dletre forlement pressee dans des entretiens particuliýres. 
(1) Lebrun to-Chauveling"6th-Septemberl'A. A. B. C. P. Angleterre! 
fi 582 
(2) Noe-l to Danton, 14th Septemberp A. N. 9 A. F. II 63. 
(3) "Instructions donnees. a LT. Frangois No; *l allant a 
Londres 29 aout. 11 A. A. E. C. P. Angleterre 582. 
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No attempt, was-made at-this-early stage to connect 
disorder with a possible revolution. Nogl,, on his 
arrivalt wrote--. -. "il ya du meccontentement mais on- 
ne p6ut. pasvtirer de fortes inductions, de-cet etat-de 
choses. "(11) 'It. was evident to French-observers,,, - 
however, -that.., the. British were alarmed by-the pussociation 
of violence with: the term Jacobinism and, that'recent 
events in,.: France. -, had merely strengthened-these un- 
fortunateimpressions. ' No9l found. thatýheýhad to 
exhibit--, caution.,, -. -The adverse publicity: which. -his - 
mission, had aroused'in, the, Trench-press had put the 
British, 'government on-the alert I'Si je-suis signale-- 
ici, co=e, Jacobing je n! ai-rien a faire. Vous ne 
ýouvez-. ývous--faire, une idee de, l! horreur qu! inspire ce 
mot. ", The. news of, the September-Massacres and the 
clash: of powers in France'had-further damaged the French 
, cause---., -'Ila marche retrograde 
de l'Assemblee nationale 
a ltegard de la, Commune, et, le refus quIa, fait celle - 
plel; ci., dI( a a, seule. autorite'ýque. les bons, citoyens 
(3) reconnaissent ont-fortifid"ces mauvaises impressions. 
Noel to Lebrun, September 3rd, A. A. E. C. P. Angleterre 582 
(2) Noe'l to Lebrun, September 10thq A. A. E. C. P. Angleterre 
582 
(3). 
-Noe' -to Lebrung ibid. 
'; ' -1- 
-- 1----4**- 
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It was.. in these early. -days 
that.. British-doubts,, about 
the stability of gover=ent, -in-., Franoe. wereformed. I 
The-, French were aware, that-the one7f3ided picture 
of., affairs would not gain them any support or enhance 
their reputation-in, England. The-. suggestigne, put 
forward to improVe'this, state of affairs--were precisely 
the, kind_-of undercover activityp directed at influencing 
public., op-inion, which, were, so much dreadedby the, 
British government.: -, The, Frendh, faith-.., in, the merits 
of propaganda. provided the-. revolution-withapotent 
new weapon*-. On 14th September Marc-Antoine, Jullieng 
then, a.,, friend of Brissot, and'Condoreetv but. later a 
disciple, of Robespierrej wrote that, attempts-, ought ta-11 
be,, made to-, clarify British, publicýopinion on-Pranoe 
"Clest, dlapres ces conside'r"ations que, jtoserais prier, 
Mqns. i-eur le Ministre. ... dlenvoyer, incessamment, dans. 
la, ville-de Londres six ou, douze agents secrets qui, 
pourront etre en correspondence, exacte avec plusieurs 
patriotes de, France.... Ces agents aurout des rdco- 
mmendat-ions aupres des journalistes bien intentionnes 
pour nousq, qui par-euxýseront e-c-lairee eur les faits, 
qulils,, exposeront dans toute, leur verite..... que ces 
douze. 
agents voyent'chacun dans leur societ"e"'particuliere 
ou, dans, les-cafe'S-. et, lieux ptiblidsqý, mais aans jamais 
sl&fficher, -deux ou trois cent personnes, voila deja 
plus de trois mille anglais ramenes dans notre partiq 
I quf 'par. une, multiplication progressive peuvent en 
ramener plus'd1un million ...... Brissot supported 
Jullien to Lebrun, 14th Septembert A. A. E. C. P. Az&leterre 
582 
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Jullien'siviewo(l) It was a scheme-more easily written 
about than put into practice but it was only a more 
extreme aspect of the French desire to publicize 
themselves and the decisions which they had tak 
e ro the more immediate expedient of translating the proces- 
verbaux of the 10th, August into all the major Eur eaft, 
languages. 
. ý: '. These schemes were part of a belief that it was 
possible to enlighten other nations: and to encourage 
goodwill towards France;, the unsettling effect which 
might result in, a country such as Britain was only 
dimly. 
-perceived. 
Indeedq both-Noel and Chauvelin 
were later to-complain that in order to present-the. 
British-government. with a definite set of proposals 
as I 'aworking basis for discussion fuller instructions 
would--be. ýneeded.., At the end of Augusto the-French 
were'still, 'dealing in, generalizations. The instruct- 
ibns; given, to., No6*l on'August 29th indicated that no 
startling-changes, in-Anglo-French relations were 
envisaged. -, "-British interests were not turned towards 
France-I'Llinte-r'e"'t, de son prosperite"'co=erciale fait 
a l'Angleterre une trop forte, loi de-la paix-11 The 
main--purpOse of-Noells'mission was to ensure that 
Britain did not'depart from the neutral conduct which 
(1) Brissot to Lebrunt 15th September, ibid'. 
(2). Roland to Lebrun, 4th September'q A. A. E. Memoires 
et Documents., Franoe 648. 
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I she had observed up till August 10th. There were 
hints that the kind'of suspicions prevalent in ancien 
regime-diplomacy were still very muc alive - "comme 
il sera encore longtemps permis de 
(rev ýer enCldoute 
ýa sinedrite des negociateurs-anglaisp Francois No6l, 
des ses. premilres liaisons slattachera'a pen6-trer les 
_, ment veritables 
intentions d1un gouverng que, plusieurs 
politiques el'obstienent a-. regarder comme l1auteur de 
la., prolongation de nos troubles. " 'Despite the caution 
whiohj-12aý, -French agent needed to exerciseq there was 
an 
_attempt,. 
to re-assure and to suggest the basis of a 
more permanent alliance. The French were not slow, to 
recognize-that any, possible invasion of the Austrian 
Netherlands might, givq Britain-cause for grievance - 
"Un des principaux motifs de deiiance de l'Angleterre 
est, la-crainte_ que les principes francais et le 
voisinage des armees ne fasse renaltre en Hollande 
les, -, m. ouv, ements re 
- volutionnaires, dont elle est de , Ja' 
le. theatre. Prancois NoZl sera autoriser a faire 
cesser a cet egard toute inquietude. Il observera 
quýejes, patriotes Belges ne sont nullement disposes a 
favoriser. la, cause des patriotes Hollandais 
On peut mýme. assurer l'Angleterre que la France est 
disposee a ne lui donner aucun appui ....... It was 
also, stated, that the Leg`ion Bataveqý. a military corps 
formed amongst Dutch patriots in Belgium, would. be dissolved. 
"Instructions donnees a fiýrancois Noe*l. -... "-op. 'Cit. 
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HoweverTwell-intended these sentiments, they were 
further evidence-that the French had'no way ofcom- 
prehending-British reactfon to a change in--the estab- 
lished oraer'of'-internati-Onal affairs, or-the growing 
ýear'of, the, creeping menace of French-ideas. 
"The 'main aim-in thisearly period of'contact after 
the overthrow'of the king was to gain the goodwill of 
Britain'by proposing, a scheme which would appeal to 
her'self-interest andunite, her permanently with France. 
The-global'vision, of revolutionary politicians at this 
timeq-however eccentric it may appearo was another 
f aodt ofthe Frenchýpe%chant-for propaganda. -'Noel had 
been authorized,, to-'put forward the-*idea of, -the division 
of-SOuth-America--so", that, -France, and-Great Britain could 
work"together-for-the, peaceful'-development of the 
westerrý-world. -, This*elaboration 'of the propagandist 
outlook'continued during the'succeeding, months. - It 
provided both a justification for Prench"extension of 
the'ýwai--and-aA antidote to the damaging-effects'of 
divisions-withinýFrance, itself. 'What-seemed-ridiculous 
in'ý'Oct o'be'r"-a'pp'e are d -* me I nacing-1-in November when the 
French-, turn6d'-their attentions towards Europe rather 
thatthe American. 'continent., 
The ý, attempt', to , establish- a- long-term -extra- 7 
ýuropean-foreign policy-soon. -after the, establishment 
ofzrepublican., -government. was basedýon.. -a decision to 
cLbandon--the, family., Compact--with'Spain.:, I-The, positiori 
of., -Spaln was-crucial-, to, both France., aR d, Great Britain-, -, --,, 
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in the period prior to the outbreak of war. Neither 
i country could be entirely sure of Spanish reactions. 
The British were concerned that the Spanish government 
should not, through any fear of invasion across the 
Pyreneesp make a precipitate. acknowledgement, of the 
republic which would embarass the rest of Europe. 
The-Rýench, on their side, had to ensure that they 
gained the' goodwill of England before Spain was 
tempted-to-opt for safety by aýflying with Britain. 
Spain profited considerably from this state of affairs 
byýýplaying*on-both countries. 
(') The change of 
ministry from Aranda to Alcudia (the future Godoy) 
even enabled her. to prolong the battle of wits. The 
Spanish', persisted in claiming, '. particularly with 
regardýto'Englandq that ministerial instructions had 
notý. been-made-clear-to them. Thus they succe I ssfully 
prevaricated without making any commitment. There 
may have, been a certain amount of truth in Spanish 
protestations, for, the diplomatic situation in Madrid 
was'. 'far from satisfactory. 'The French ambassador to 
Spain'-becapeýinvolved in a, dispUte iitli'*L"ebru*n, -which- 
did notýease his po'si , -ýion. 
(2 
Britain wast-at this 
(1)"'L6--desisein de VEspagne est de se conserver en 
mesure avec lee puissances coaliseesp dIattendre le parti 
qui pTendra la Cou. r de Berlin.... " Lebrun to Bourgoing,. 
10th'November, A. A. E. 'C. 
_P* 
-, Espagne 634. 
(2) T he ., dispute 'was ov er acI ircular which Bourgoing had 
sent to French consuls and merchanges without ciders from 
Paris. A. A. E. C. P. Espagne 6349 Novemberý13th- 
le 
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time, without an ambassador in Spain. Before the 
arrival of the Earl of St. Helens the embassy was 
under Francis Jacksong a very youngfirst secretary, 
much suspected by Bourgoing, the French ambassador, 
as acting in a high-handed and anti-French manner. 4 
The French, -though confident 
that the bait of 
t- 
. Louisiana would,, sway, Britain in their 
favour, were not 
entireiy sure of their position. They watched the 
situation very closely in Sepýember and October. In 
the last ten days of September Noel reported a runour 
that, the Spanish ambassador, in London had, been 
instructed to work in co-operation with the British 
government. Lebrun responded, by advising him to 
cultivate the friendship of del Campo so that he 
could. more eaCily assess the situation. NoiTl found 
this. instruction, difficult. to carry out. Del Campo 
was-well-established at the Court of St. James and on 
good, terms-, with the king; No; ýl considered him un- 
approachable. Whatever their. anxieties, the French 
derived. some, comfort, from the belief that Spanish and 
British interests werep at root, still too conflicting 
for,,, an, alliance. between them. to work -, "nous croyons 
difficilement-que 1'Espagne-eut*offert alors a 
l'Angleterre, comme motif determinant, des avantages 
commerciaux, dans ses portes de I'Amerique meridionale. 
LIAvidite anglaise d1une part et la jalousie espagnole 
deýllautret relativement au-commerce de ses pays 
d1outremer formeront longtemps encore un obstacle' 
Ae 
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insurmontable, aýtout trýtý ce-g%Are entre ces 
deux puissances; qt vous, en. avez, la preuve.,. dans les 
:! iggociations qui.. ont precede et suivi. 11affaire de 
Nootka Sound...,. " 
(1) 
It was felt thatp-if offered 
the opportunity, -. 
Britain would like to see the Family 
Compact, ended altogether,. No6`1-gave it as his opinion 
that this wouldbe one. of the main, terms of any treaty 
which Britain, and. -France-might negotiate. The. other 
likely_, British.: demands would be the dafety, of. -the 
king,,. aýd quýenv., the. cession_of. the-, West. Indian-lisland 
of Sto, Luciag,, co=ercial. preference. in, Frenoh ports 
(2) 
and. ratification. of. the 1786 commercial'treaty. 
:. t,,, Such a-. treatyg. or. even, the preliminary. discussion 
of one was purely'-speculative. Yet for, all of., September 
and, the. first,. -half,, of.., 
Octob, er it was. the, chief hope 
for,.. future,, relations, *wit. h Great. Britain., Less 
academic were other negotiations atýthe end of September 
which, may%have contributed,,. to-the-gradual, re-assessmeýl,, t 
of links,, with. Britain. -,: The. talks, with the Prussians 
were a relatively-ýobscure-epýsode, forthe,, majority of 
Fýrenchmen, They appear, to, have been directed from the 
Paris,. end. by-, Danton. Throughout the period of the 
Prussian. invasion,. Danton had. been in touch with the 
armie, s.,., He corresponded with Dumouriez butg,, wishing 
to, have-an independent view of, affairs at the front 
(1) -Le'brun'to No9l, 30th October's A. A*E. C'*'P. 'Angleterre 583 
ý2)"-"No'dl to'Lebriui, 23rd September, A'. E. C'OP. ' , Angleterre 
582 
i toe' ce 
t 
/ ff 
he had sent Billaud-Varenne as observer. The criticism 
levelled at the outcome of the discussion with the 
Prussians was that the victory haa not been followed 
through and-that-the enemy had been allowed to slip 
throughýFrench hands and to continue the war. At 
Dantonle"trial a member of the jury askedy "Pourriez- 
vous dire-laýraison"pour laquelle Dumouriez ne 
poursuivit'pas'les Prussiens, lors de leur-retraite? " 
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I To which-Danton replied "Je ne me melais de la guerre 
que sous des rapportsý'politiques; les operations 
militaires-mletaientýtotalem,, ent etrangeres. Au surplus, 
jlavais''chaige"'Billaud-Varenne de surveiller Dumouriez, 
clest lui, "qulil faut interroger sur cette matiere. " 
The bilance of'strengthq however, was by no-means; 
entirely on'the'Prench side. Their armies were 
spread throughout-, *Franceo-in the Rhineland and down 
to"Savoy'and, Nice; it was more realistic to ensure 
that"thý`-Prussians abandoned'their advance on Paris 
thall, to -, attempt"the-annihilation of'the combined 
armies*- The-'complete withdrawal of the invading 
forcies-providedý-an immediate saf, eguard for the stability 
of, the republic in the crucial first reeks of its 
existence. It'also enabled Dumouriez to follow a 
scheme. near to his heart, that of turning his troops 
north into Belgium and using them in a country where 
the inhabitants were already ill-disposed towards 
their own government. The French could not hope to 
(1) Oeuvres de_Danton,, ed. A. Vermorel, p. 291. 
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follow through their victory-in the sense of-ensuring 
that the Prussians-and-Austrians were permanently def- 
eated. The retreat was, a very grave: setbackand, ý 
altered the entire situation but its significance lay 
primarily in the. change of attitudes it brought about 
in Europe. 
The-Prussian negotiations, however limited their 
success, -:. did bring about'a change in the French view 
of-themselves and-their position, in'Burope. 
(l) 
They 
acquired a certain confidence which gave them a sense 
of national-pride.. This was made-clear-in the inform- 
ation'sent, to Chauvelin and No; lduring-the. -course of 
the discussion 'Vous y, verrez 1) Que la nation 
fransaise est reco8hnjue, 2) qulen demandant Louis ZVI 
co=e un represen ant avec, lequel'il put, traiter le 
Roi de Prussev par une contradiction bizarreg'fait une 
,"k Oe demande, conforme a ce qu. 1avait etabli-la constitution 
contre laquelle les puissances ligueeýs ont pris lee 
armesp et dont elles ont accelere la chute. 3) Vous 
y verrez-. llaveu formeg que ltancien gouverneme-nt 
nletait pas propre au'bien du Royaume. -. - - These were 
(1) The Executive Council, parti, cularly wished to avoid 
the impression that the Prussians might dictate to them 
over the future of Louis XVI Lebrun's report to the 
Convention, 26th September, in Le Moniteur, t. xiv. P. P. 59-62 
(2) Lebrun to No9l and to Chauvelin, 28, th Septembert 
A. A. E. C. P. Angleterre 582. 
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heartening deductions, but the Foreign Ministry was 
C 
uneasy as, to the extent of British influence over the 
Prussian 
' a. 
Consequentlyq No9l was directed to find- 
out whether the Prussian line had been taken as the 
result of an agreement made with Britain before the 
invasion and whether the king of Prussials, propositions 
were sent-to England at the same time, or even before, 
they werepassed on'. to France. Thiswas a_curious 
development in the, French view of Britain, as Anglo- 
Prussian relationshad been, extremely cool since the 
formation of-, 'the. Triple Alliance in 1788. The French 
had found it difficult to dismiss the idea that at a 
time, when significant changes were taking place on 
the,,, continent the British foreign office was as aloof 
as it professed-to be. There were widespread rumours 
in-Europe that Britain had exercised an inhibiting 
influence on the Prussians. On October 26thq Grenville 
wrote, to Elging the. ambassador in Brussels, "I say 
nothing. to you on the inexplicable event of so many 
great-, expectations. Myý, public despatches will, 
authorize,, you to contradict the foolish reports of our 
having, contributed to this eventq whicho on the 
contrary, we cannot but regret. "(')French observers 
in Britain had reported that George III had a relapse 
into insanity on.. hearing the news of Brunswick's retreat. 
,,,,.,, "_, 
The ignominious end of the ill-fated Prussian 
invasion had its effect on the position of the allies' 
H. M. C. Fortescue MSS,, ii, P. 324. 
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and the entire course of the war. For some weeks the 
allies, especiall'y-Austriag'debated'vvhether there was 
any possibility of continuing the'war. The retreat, 
which began in earnest on October lst gave the French 
some breathing space; it also afforded Great Britain' 
the opportunity of re-assessing the position in Europe. 
The British governmentq though aliazed by the military 
failure, had known for some time that there was little 
harmony between the Austrians and-Prussians. The 
Austrians1were in a difficult'position- their armies'- 
had'proved superior on the field but they were scarcely 
able to-support the financial burden'ýof a'campaign 
whiýh-now-seemed de stined to carry on into the'spring. 
There'was'talk in'October and November of the Emperor 
acknowledging the'French republic-'if the-safety of: -' 
the royal _ family was' guaranteed. 
The first news which reached Vienna'was'not' 
credited by its inhabitantsq but when repeated con- 
firmation excluded all doubt respecting the authenticity 
of the fact there appeared symptoms of disappointment, 
discontentv astonishment. The Duke of-Brunswici was 
suspected of having accepted a bribe, -and the Cabinet 
of'Berlin of having played false to'Austria ........ 
"In regard to the government of this country, it would 
seem that the universal success of the, Prench arms and 
still more the rapid progress and dissemination of 
their principlesp has seriously alarmed the members 
who compose it and I do not think myself far wide of- 
158 
truthin saying that these combined causes have dis- 
posed the leaders of this monarchy to listen to terms 
of accomodation in case any should be offered by France, 
which could be accepted without co=itting the honour' 
of their sovereign.... "(1) 
The failure of the offensive on France and the 
lackof amity between Austria and Prussia brought into 
focus the aims of Catherine II of Russia. This devel- 
opment too was interesting for British observers. 
'The 
despatches from Charles Whitworth in St. Petersburg, 
though slow to reach Whitehall confirmed suspicions, 
that the Empress, however much she deprecated. the 
French, was primarily concerned with maintaining,. 
control. of Poland. Russia had only given a'very 
small amount of financial and military aidg, but this 
was enough to keep the Austrian. Emperor and the King 
of Prussia bound to-her while diverting their interest 
tovvards-. France-rather than Poland. Brunswick's 
. retreatq though a set-back to Catherine in the short- 
term,,. since she had-no wish for, any. kind of peace, to 
be, made,. with Francep-held the promise of-further, 
advantage for the Russians. _ The British government 
became, suspicious that Catherine would regard any 
French aggression as rendering inevitable British 
(1)"--'Alexander Straton'(first secretary in Vienna) to 
Ldý - Hervey, 12th November, F. 'O. 528/79* Hervey Papers. 
t 
entry into the conflict, thus leaving her free to hold 
complete away over Poland and to turn her attentions 
(1) 
once more against Turkey. 
Involvement in the war continued to appear both 
unnecessary and undeEirable to the British government, 
even up till the first week of November, 1792. This 
insistence on neutrality was maintained in the face 
of eyýdent displeasure in the reactions of the allies. 
The policy of neutrality was connected very closely 
with the British attitude to France and the views they 
had formed on the future course of the war. Pitt and 
his colleagues had no very great opinion of the 
general political competence of the Austrian and 
Prussian governmentsq but they had'a very strong 
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impression of the turbulence of France. They could -, 
not imagine stability and the will to resist gaining- 
any ground under such circumstances. Consequently, 
there, was little. to be gained fr'om making cause.. 
with the Austrians and Prussians and perhaps being 
tied-to an-agreementon'the r'e-establishment of the 
ancien regime aný the partition of-Fr'ance. Britain 
would be more-influential in the-role of mediator. 
The., government could not'see that events-required 
them. to abandon the position which they had adopted 
in-April and pressure from'the allies for definitive 
expressions only increased their belief. in the 
Despatches for Septemberg Oc'tobery November in ri). 65/23 
i 
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consistency of their approach to European affairs. 
In mid-September Dundasq after"'consultation with 
Pitt and Grenvilleg issued Sir James Murray, the 
British representative to Brunswick's armyq with an 
outline of the government position with regard to 
France "When the Duke of Bru4swicli again introduces 
any conversation of the nature he has lately done 
in his interviews with you, it will be easy for you 
to convey to him that the system of neutrality which 
His Majesty has adopted respecting the affairs of 
Prance, would of course have precluded him from 
obtruding his opinion on the subjects which might 
probably occur for the consideration of those powers 
who! ýe armies had entered France under the command of 
the Duke of Brunswick ..... At present, and uninformed 
as to the particular objects in view, it is 
impossible 
for me to say more than in generalg to express 
the 
hopes of Iiis Majesty that the result of the present 
interference of the''powers of Germany may be the re- 
establishment of such a'-government in France as, on 
the one handq would protect other powers from a 
renewal of, that'spit-it of, re'stlessness and intrigue 
-which 
had, -so often been fatal to the tranquillity 
I 'Of 
Europe, and, on the other-hand., secure to the Executive, 
Government such a degree olf energy an dvigour as might 
enable. it, to extirpate those seeds of anarchy and 
misrule'which, had So peculiarly of latet characterized 
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the whole transactions of that distracted country. 
(') 
George III fully concurred in these sentiments, but 
he rather doubted theý., wisdom of actually stating them. 
(2) 
Pressure on the British government did not end at this 
point. The Austrian and Neapolitan ministers requested 
,a 
further statement of British refusal to succour 
those who might harm the Fýench royal family. The 
king's comment on this declaration typified, the limit- 
ations of the British attitude in September - "The 
answer to the joint note of-the Austrian and Neapolitan 
ministers ...... is perfectly conConant with my senti- 
ments., Undoubtedly there is, no step that I should 
not willingly take for the personal safety of the 
French king and-his family that does-not draw this 
country into meddling with the-internal-disturbances 
of that-ill-fated kingdom; the taking, every, step not 
to shelter-assassins-is what we. 'owe to our, ovvn 
characters., 
4.3), 
Prance, was ill-fated, but still., s4e hadinot 
fallen. There were signs that. though, most Englishmen 
who had an interest, in, European'-developments. could 
.9 
not credit the possibility of successful, grench 
(1) Dundas to Sir James Murrayq September 12th, H. M. C. 
Fortescue MSS II, op. cit. P-313. 
(2) George, III to lord Grenville, September 8thq H. M. C. ' 
Fortescue MSS II, op., cito-, -p-310, 
W' Teorge III to Grenvillep September 22nd, H. M. C. Forte cue 
LSS II, op. cit. P-317. 
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resistance, they were still uneasy at the point when 
Brunswick's invasion was reaching itsýfinalphase. 
Grenville's brother voiced these feelings, -as he, tried 
to occupy himself. with the problem of his estate 
"You do not talk in your letter of any stay at 
Dropmore, and Woodward is anxious not to risk planting 
so earlyoýand-therefore I say nothing to you about 
your plants from my nursery till the last week of 
October. Beforeýthat period the Duke of Brunswick- 
will be a man-or-., a,, very little, mouse. -,, I have great 
faith in him, but ..... in all events, it appears that 
the. Prench-army. have, recovered-their panicl andl 
though they are as: lowas-ever in my, estimation, yet 
their new ally the month-ofOctober will operate 
very powerfully, in theirfavour., I-cannot describe 
to. you, the, 'anxiety, -I 
feel$-and, jay., -obligation to you 
for-, constantxiýformation-11(l),,,,, The-decisiveness 
with which louis-XVI, had been removed from. his, functions 
had: -caused general surprise. Whatever, the'nagging 
doubts,., the news that the Austrians were leaving 
French soil. defied belief amongst, those who had 
spent-a-lifetime-in politics-, and diploiacy.. 'It, ýalso 
-1 had, moreigrave implicationsp. as Lord, Auckland pointed 
out to his-brother. -An Berlin--, "On'the 7th (of 
October) Iireceived-by. )a--Imessenger from Brussels 
Buckingham. to- Grenvillep October 7th,, II. M. C. Fortescue 
MSS,, II,, --, 
-0p-ý, _ci, 
t-, P-320 
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the first account of the retrograde motion of the 
combined armies. I confess'. to you that this is an 
event which surprises me beyond any that I recollect 
to have met with in a life of some experience in 
the bustle of this world. A step so little suitable 
to the declarations and manifestos which preceded' 
the invasion by the combined armies would not, have 
been otherwise than under the pressure of necessity ..... 
The unfortunate royalfamily is left in a situation 
of more strife, hopelessness and danger than if no 
effort had been made, in their favour ...... These 
however are'small considerations-in'comparison of- 
the triumph given'. to the cause of Jacobinism. 11(l)" 
Auckland always had, lan awareness of, the'influence 
of foreign affairs, ýon domestic-events. "Reaction in 
Britain did. not make'the connection with. so much- 
clarity. The-news,. shook government'circlesv'fixing- 
attention. on Europe'ýtemporarilyq'but the'retreat 
appeared in Britain-to_ýhave., been the, 'result of a 
combination of allied-incompetence and French-desper- 
ation. ' British observers were-especially struck by- 
the,. blot on Brunswick'sýmilitary'reputation. -ý This 
assessment, served to strengthen'the belief that nori- 
involvementýhad been a sensible policy which should 
be maintained.. Some months rould elapse before an 
(1), 
- Auckland to Sir, Morton -Eden, October' 9thp' Auckland, 
Journals and Correspondenceg-vol'. II, 
-P. 
453 
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organized campaýgn could be undertaken once more. 
Meanwhile there was sufficient to occupy attention 
in the state ofýthe. British isles. 
The government viewed the situation of Great 
Britain in September and October 1792 with watchful- 
ness. The Opposition later accused them of complacency, 
but the politicians of Pitt's administration did not 
react with the totality of outlook which had early 
seized Burke. 
(1), 
They saw a number of separate 
problems and dealt with them as such. The general 
atmosphere was tinged with some uncertaintyg but the 
autumn, unless the harvest had been goodq was often 
a"difficult season. There were signs of discohýtent 
in some sectors of the labouring population. In 
themselves these were not a cause for great alarm. 
It was in the general context of affairsy where there 
were new considerations, that they acquired significance. 
British radicals, who had gone into a form of hibern- 
ation dirind-the summer while the future of France 
was in doubtq began to re-emerge and to publish 
prolifically. Once more the name of Paine was in the 
air. The position in Scotlandq toov became more 
menacing and Ireland remained dangerously'near violence, 
though for reasons which were more readily discernible. 
Burke urged Grenville to abandon neutrality on 
August 18th Burke -to Grenvilleg Burke, Correspondence 
ed. J. Woods and others) vol. VII, p. p. 173-178. 
I 
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None of these problems, however, had the immediate 
impact- of the flood of French, refug6es, which first,. 
brought home the inescapable fact-that events in, 
Franceýwould have. an effect on,, England. 
The government quickly realizedithat the-ýnew, 
emigres-were more than just. a nuisance -. "The:: influx,, 
of foreigners, -since the, late outrages,,.. at,, Paris,;. is 
immense and-. -daily: increasing. - It will. -become; very., - 
inconvenient to have. the countryg, especially this 
metropolia, filled,, vvith so, very many-, strangersjif , 
they (we)-,, do,. not_: take., some, means,, toý. prevent-it; -but 
what is at present. only an,,,, inconvenience,, willl, -in a 
shortýtime, becomeý, '. truly dangerous.. "ýý) -. ýThe admin-7.,, 
istrationvdid not wantoa: definite. link oflthis sort 
withArance;, AGeneral concernlwas. expressed for the 
aristocraticoladies, and, -gentlementwhoýhad bpenj, -, 
obliged to-flee-in circumstances. _, 9f personal-humili- 
ation-. from Franceq but, sympathy, ýýwas not! universal. 
Authorities-at a--, numberý, of,, portsibegan. to, grow., uneasy 
wondering-how,, _they, could_feedo-,,,, 
house--and., clothe the 
unfortunate, emigres.,, - The-ldt'relets., of,, London. thronged 
with, them-, and subscriptions-were opened for their- 
relief. Thisg: toog,, IýýL4ý, its'-disadvantagýp -, -, 
"The 
fools-here are-opening-subscriptions., for their-relief 
and support, which, I understand, our own poor take 
(1) 'Dundas to., Grenvillej-, ýepýember 12th- H. M. C. Fortescue MES 
OR. 
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amisal and in my judgementv not-without reason. "(') 
Opinion. on the, merits of the displaced French varied- 
in government circlesq but the general impression 
is that most of them were regarded as little more 
than tiresome after the initial sympathy induced by 
the-horrific details of massacre and carnage in Paris' 
on,, August 10th and during the September Massacres. 
11I, am miserable about the French emigrants being in 
this country, " -wrote George Rose, "to drive them 
out'suddenly would be inhuman, but I sincerely wish 
we, may. -get rid of them; they are almost all bad'in 
one way or another; -I speak fromýpersonal, communi- 
cation with a great many of. themg-their folly and-'their 
wickedness, is-not to be conceivedg - the first 
almost as mischievous as theýlast- 11(2) 
,: -. -,, 
Rose's comments-broughtlout theimore alarming 
ýfactors,, behind the emigre'problem; he-was not an'- 
. 
immoderate man-but heýhad been. thoroughly unnerved 
by his contact. with., Frenchmen. -The'royalists were 
an inconveniencef but. tbLe-. influx,. of. those-whose 
opinions could, not-be! -readily, answered. for-was-an 
urgent-menace. -It was-suspectedthat,, many of those_- 
who: had-recently-crossed the Channel, -held subversive 
and,: treasonable opinionsq, ýand had. come-to England to 
(1) Jam es Bland Burges to Aucklandq September 14th, 
op-cit. P. P. 442 3. 
(2) Rose', to Aucklandg-October lst-, Add. LISS. 349445. ''-- 
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spread their gospel on apparently fertile soil, Far 
from being dispirited or silenced by the'turn of dev- 
elopments in France, these largely anonymous men and 
women had penetrated into coffee houses and inns 
throughout the British Isles', disturbing the lower 
orders with their wild talk and threatening widespread 
confusionýif their schemes could be brought to 
fruition. No time was lost in considering means- of 
dealing with the emigre problem. Dundas'-'enquiries 
of Lords Kenyon and Loughborough foreshadowed the 
Alien ýý11-'of December "I would-wish'to know whether 
I 
there occurs to you-any means-competent to be, exercised 
-- the by, the Executive"'govern; aent, ý'eitherýfor preventingl 
residence of foreigners in'ýthis country, or fok cýLlling 
upon them, under the special'circumstances of the 
moment-to'give security forýtheir peacable'*and--in- 
offensive conduct. I will'not-, disguise from, you that 
my anxiety on this subject is c'onsiderabl , y-incr-eased-- 
by the knowledge'vvhich my - official duty le ads me -to 
collect-'of, the so ciety whi I ch many -1 ofýthe foreigners 
already in'this country'fre-quent and the seditious 
and inflammatory language'they'are accustomed to hold. "(') 
From-'this time forwardýDundas"and Nepeang-the Home- 
Office-under-s'ecretary-were particularly vigilant, 
encouraging letterszwhichý-gave, dese, riptions of those 
coming from Prance and all cther information which might 
(1) Dundas'to Kenyon and Loughborought September-12th., 
H-0,43/4 
f 
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have bearing on French agents resident in Great 
Britain. Burges. 's assertion that "the late horrors , 
, in France have at least been attended with one good 
cqnsequ encet for they have turned the tide of general 
opinions here very suddenly, 11. 
(l) 
was misleadingi for 
although-it was true that revulsion against France 
was more widespread; after the September Massacres, 
this was offset by the, -_conviction 
that renewed,, agit- 
ation, for reform could be directly French-inspired. 
Thereality of the threat, posed by this, -suppose- 
dely-wicked and determined group is not easily,. decided. 
Contemporaries, though far from explicitq were at 
pains. -to 
look for facts and namesq even if the, -, search 
wasIlargely, unavailing. At the end-of October-, the 
Home Office possessed a list of suspected Jacobin 
emissariesq-one of whomg--Rotondo, was described as 
"more sanguinary than MaraVI and had the improbable 
(2) 
alias of Smith. One regular-source of-information 
qn, dangerous Frenchmen came from., the-emigre, communityq 
though both the Home and Foreign. Office-, were on their 
guard agatinst notoriously, -, unreliable, toyalist. inform- 
ants. One-stri -not. pass the king, aspept, 
, 
which did 
notice of ministersq, was theýease withtwhich anyone 
could come, and go across the Channel..,., Almost all of 
(1) 'Burge's to iucklan'a, 2'1st S'eptember'p 
-Auckland op. cit 
POP. 445-60 
(2) HSO*`- 1/1 
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the. reports which found their way into official 5 
correspondence seemed ludicrous, either because they 
were embarassingýy vague or because they were choked 
with improbable details. Among the major cause, of 
British fears vvere. the men who haa been prominent in 
the early days-of the Revolution some ofwhom had, sat 
in-the Constituent Assembly. Though-now cast out--in 
their turn, it was naturally difficult for themmot 
to-talk about France. The, government's uneasiness . 
was--strengthened by the multitude of Prenchmen of. 
unofficial missions from Parist whose true, purposes 
could not readily be determined. -The-problem, of the 
suspects in their midst hadý, cast, an early shadow on ýw 
British views of the future, of, their relationship-, 
with the unknown forces across the Channel, 
The unrest-in. Britaing tbmgh capable-, of, aggravatioh 
by-' I outside forces and the'renewal of'a domestic radical 
movement, was frequently associated, with the-demand 
for,, higher, "wages. A number of landowners-were aware 
of-'the hardship caused by the rise, in the, price of 
bread and the existing heavy, taxation of-goods such- 
as-salt and-candlesg'but-. the. steps which they. could 
take as individuals'-, were little'more thanýan example. 
Disorder began t'o spread in the'developing-industrial 
ýLreas. At the very, beginning of October a disturbance 
among, the colliers at Wigan prompted Dundas to write 
, to the Lord Mayor of Liverpool "These combinations 
have of late become so frequent that it requires a 
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more than, ordinary exertion of the civil powers', to 
repress theme"(') Later on'iA'the month-there were 
riots at Leicester and Yarmouth. The gover=ent 
dealt with these outbreaks by sending military assist- 
ance when it was requested. 
These occurrences vvere'regarded as troublesome, 
but not unusual. "-'Much more -serious'was the-contin- 
uation of difficulties in Scotland. ý"Early in-October 
the situation was considered grave enough to warrant 
Dundas's personal'presence-in'Edinburghe '-The Home, --- 
Secretary . was alarmed by his first impressions of, '-the 
Scottish situation and-wished to convey, -his: feelings" 
as strongly as possible'- "I am more- - andliore-satisfied 
that unless something effectual can'be-d6ne: by Parliament 
to check the indiscriminate-'practice-ofAE; s6ciation 
'country tOý`, - they will spread the fermentation. -of the 
such a heightýit will be impossible to-restrain the 
effects of them. They'stop at'nothing. ----It would appear 
they either wished to'ýmurder'myselfýor, to"burn'my 
house, for I was'not, twodays arrived, beforeýnotifi- 
cation of it was giv , en'In a very. 'suspicious mode. Some 
boy's were-detect-e"d'at-midnight-'p'utting -up billets of 
enclosed tenor on the corners of the-different streets 
of-Edinburgh... The magistrates and gentlementin 
Dundas-to the'Lo. ýd Mayor ofýLiverpool'j 3rd October, 
H. O. 43/4 
(2)' Dundas to"Nepeang Octoberý14th,, H. O. 102/6. 
1 
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the. larger Scottish towns were very, -worried, bythe 
growth of the movement for reform---andDundas-quickly 
took. steps to gain inf6rmation, on the, disposition of 
manufacturers in the Scottish centres, and of,, the, --. 
numbers and, occupation of. the membership pf-, -t. 
he 
associations themselves. 
ýThe government were also concerned-, about Ireland. 
Pitt admitted in,,, the-middle of October that he,, felt.. 
thatthe position there was very far,.,, f, 7om, paýtisfactory. 
(l) 
In government circles there were. several_men,. whc',, had, - 
first-hand knowledge-of Irish affairs... Theyadvice-ý 
which-they gave, contrasted strongly,, with, the linethqt 
administration was influenced to, adopt with respect to 
Scotland. The, ineffectiveness ofthe Dublin. govern- 
ment vas acknowledged,, but attempts at, direct inter- 
vention were-discouraged. 
1 
Buckingham, had. a,, particularly 
lo, w. opinion of the, Irish government-, andýfeltsure!, that 
they. would refuse,, toýmeetany, Catholic demands, even 
at the risk of civil iwar., -! do not., expect -1 that the 
government of. -Irelandwill-abandon the,. question, -with- 
out, a struggle, -or that, they, qpuld, -be induced by, -any 
recommendations from. -henceýto relax or-to, negotiate 
(1) Pitt to Dundasp October 14th "You will receive 
from Nepean the last accounts from Ireland, which are 
far from being sufficiently particular, but which I 
ýthink look very unfavourable. ý"Pitt - Papers II, 
University, O'f Michiganý'Libraryq Ann Arborl Michigan. 
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with the Catholics. I know-that their two. Houses 
will not hear. of, any other language. than that which 
their. fathers have heldq with, the purse and army of 
England at their backs. -IBut I must ever deprecate 
with the most earnest and anxious solicitude, any 
encouragement to them. to hope for assistance from 
this country ...... and in a, struggle 
in-which-(so long 
as. it can be kept separate from French politics and 
connexion)_we have nothing to fear and nothing-to 
gain from-the result-"(') Buckingham was very_gloomy 
about the, outcome of an armed struggleg saying that 
there was not enough armed force ihjreland to, prevent 
the Protestants being driven back into the sea-fr9m 
r corners. of the island. The reaction-of the. fou - 
France and the influence of, the-Revolution,. was a 
curious contrast to the growing fear of France in the 
mainlandp which, despite its difficultiesq was not so 
ripe, for exploitation as Ireland. The'government 
apparently accepted the view that,, Irish. difficul, ties 
were at-root a. religious grievance III-scribble 
these few lines-to set you rightý as-. to, Irish. affairs. 
The troubles of the-world are, amply-sufficient and 
I-have no reason, to believe that there, is any present 
danger. of. their extending_, toýIreland_., The Jacobin 
faction in Ireland, isýthus-far ridiculous and insignificant. "(2) 
, 
(l)ý Buckingham to-Grenvilleg October 14th, H. 14*-Cel 
Fortescue MSSe op. cit- Po322. 
(2) Auckland-. to Sir, -Morton Edens October 19th,,, Auckland--$" 
, 
op. cit. p-457- 
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Domestic pre-occupation and a belief that there 
Would be a lull in developments on the continent , 
obscured from British eyes a hardening in the French 
attitude which was perceptible in the tone of des- 
patches both, from Paris-to Portman Square and the 
French agerifs to Lebrun. This shift in approach 
appears to have been produced by contradictions in 
the situation of France* In Europe the Franch were 
suddenly free from the prospect of annihilation by 
counter-revolutionary forces. They had even been in 
a position to discuss terms with Prussia. The real- 
ization grew that it was necessary in terms of the- 
republic's future in Europe and for the strengthening 
of national opinion at home to take a more positive 
position. Formal recognition seemed. desirable. ' 
The adoption of an increasingly aggressive stance in. ý, 
diplomatic relationst though graduall corresponded 
with-the growth of disorder and disagreement in the 
Convention. The Brissotins attacked Paris-relent-, - 
lessly and they. attempted to dismantle the provisional 
and extraordinary measures which had, contributed to 
the. survival of France in September.. A less hesitant 
foreign policy might be hoped to balance the effects 
of dissension. The abandonment of the visionary 
scheme of union coincided with the reception of the 
news that the French West, Indian, islandsg always a 
source of temptation to the British were in full 
revoltg-having refused to permit ships carrying- 
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commissioners of the-republican'government to put 
into, port. 
(1) 
The general change of temper was-. matched 
by-a-firmer, less conciliatory tone by the--French.,, agents 
in. -Britain, though they had not altogether dismissed 
thetidea of direct talks-vith Piýtls administration. 
It is unlikely., that. Prench-agents, -i=ediately,, -- 
sensed the drift. of, eventsýin-Parid.. The--newspapers 
were at their disposal-but'. the'Foreign,, Ministry seldom 
provided them with, concrete,, details, -of internal'devel- 
opments. Chauvelin, and,, No'el responded,, to-the generalý- 
awareness of resurgence of. interest-, in. France and the 
renewed discussion of-parliamentary reform., '--Theyýwere 
not, slow to pass their-, feelings-back*-'to,, France; it 
was'natural that their. own experience would: lead them, *-t 
to. -, seize, on signs of; agitation'-. but. -it-twas-alsol'to their 
advantage to-deal in, possibilities of, this nature. 9 
-observers . 
thus. rendering'. their continuedipresence': as, 
in, Great Britain indispensable; -ýo, 
-signs of-a firmer:, attitudecame almost -The: first 
simultaneously'- from Chaiývelin,, and Togl. ý. -, On, October ; 21st. 
the:, ambassador suggested thatý'moves'should-nowl-bemade, 
to-get his credentials,, as Ministeý_of the'. Republic 
re - cognized, by Britain.. I'Chauvelin, -based-thisi-on 
two- 
major arguments;,,, the.. fi'rst, was that he, considered the 
French republic to,, be-'-the-most-solidly,. established 
government in the wholeof-Europe; '-'the, second*was, that. - 
(1) The, British: described--these incidents on October, Bth. 
C-00 , -152/72. 
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the British peoplev as opposed to the British govern- 
mentq had shown signs. of supporting Franceg a circum- 
-ì 
stance which would, in itselfq give the. administration 
pause, for thought "Je ne dois pas vous chcher., que,,, 
toutes les societea patriotiques formees-en-Angleterre 
I 
I acquiýerefit chaque jour, de-nouveaux membresq. qulil-se- 
redige dans plusieurs de, celles qui sont etablies a 
I 
Londres des adresses. pour la Convention. hationale-11(l) 
No'elts; despatch,, written,. the following dayq,, contained 
moreýýextreme.,. statements. ý--At, thisýpointp-Noglý-seems-to 
have become,, seized, by-the, possibility of, war. -In 
such-. an eventualityv-ýwhat. were. the, motives whichmight. 
restrain. Britain? Ireland_, was., -likely,, toweigh heavily. - 
in,,, British considerationso as,, was. the_advance of Pranch 
principles--in-Great., Britiin., -The.,, 
number, of.,,, -those,, so 
far,, interestedz, in the, new ideas-wasg,: howeyprgý, still, -ý..,. 
restricted -,, "Les. principes patriotiques,,, circulent 
surtout, a-l'aide-de. 1a. maconnerieg confinýe'lci dans 
la,, classe des artisans, de manufacture. -de-quelques 
citoyens, plus,, aises,,, Celle des tisserands,.. entrý-autres, 
composee-en ,; 
rancais, 
_grande: 
partie-de_deseendantý,,, des. 
refugies, est. tres nombreuse-et tres patriote. ",, 11n view 
of-, these development s,,: Noý'1,, considered-that, thetime 
had, come. to-demand Alidefinite statementýof, the British 
position "On se tromperait beaucoup si 1"on attendais 
quelque chose'de'grýnd'et-deý'noble de ce gouvern'ement.... -' " 
Chauvelin to'Lebrunq_? ist. October, A. A. E., C. p., 
Angleterre 583. 
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113ýe nous convient pluý dlacheter"la-'neutralite'- 
aü-'prix de la moindre ý cession. '. ". He'was 'alwäys 
keen-to'impress on his-superiors that, -his wide cirdle 
ofýcontacts put him in a'un que i,, _ ', position-with regard--ý* 
tolthe most reliable information -ý"'Une', 'perre contre 
la'France entiamerai 
.t 
peut4tre le, renve rI bement du-trone 
Britannique. Des les premiers", paB: 'quq, 'ferait-le 
miniotreL1es, fonds' tomberaient"dé1O%. .... nous 
aurions', dans ce moment-sur les anglais les"avantages 
qulun-peuple pauvre, et, courageux a-sur un-peuple riche... "(') 
, ý'I'ý''-T: ýe'-advice'from-England probably arrived-too-late 
iý view', of týie-slowness"of-co=unicationev to, influence 
the Minister and the. Council; '-in The"decision 'which they 
had`alreieýdy taken -by-th6"Iend-6f ý"the month's Theyý- 
believed there would beýa-change-'iný_the fortunes-of-- 
France". and'of'the"outlook of"Great Britain-with'respect 
to'Europe. " It was, not--realistic., to"think in terms-of 
an alliance-, --", "clest uneýgrand6-et, ýbelle"idee-sansz 
doute'-que, celle dlune`, alliance'., qili unirait_cette""-tk--- 
n fiýtion'avec la-Republique, lmais nous-ne-partageonszýpas 
les-*esperances-de ceux qui pe'uvent croire, a--sa'possibi- 
lite. "t 
(2) 
Long-standing'suspicions"of the effects'Yof 
Britain's'insular outlook-werelcoming once - more-tolthe 
surface of-the consciousness'-of French policy-makers. 
(1) Noýl to Lebrunt two despatches written on October 21st. 
A. A. E. 9 C. P. Angleterre, '58ý-, 
(2) Lebrun'to Noglt,, 30th. October, A. A. E., CP Angleterre, 
583. 
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England's chief desire was, to observe increasing 
disturbance in France, while she remained, peaceful 
and grew rich.. There was. no conception of the-store., - 
Britain set on the sanctity of treaties-or. -the European 
balance of power.,,. It now seemed that. Britain's own 
position was far-from, 
_secure 
and might provide a dis- 
traction-which would prevent her from commencing 
hostilities - I'Llesprit-de domination. qui, caracterize 
l'Angleterre pourrait la determiner peut-etre, a 
slelever oontre nous dans le cas ou elle nous verrait 
prendre un, essor,, rapide et capable, deýlui donnerýde 
llombrage,, et sous, ce rapport tout,, ce.. quii, tiendrait, a 
lui donner de lloccupýLtion chez, ellej-, co=e. les-- -_ 
pretensions des-Irlandais-dont vous parlert. ainsi que 
la, lutte parlem6ntairedans la question. de, la.. repres- 
"A 
entation nationale; 
-,, 
tout. cela est. dlun grand inte. ret 
pour-nous; " The. French however were only_interested 
in British internal developments-, as a, diversion for 
the British governmentwhich. would distract her atten- 
tions from France. There is no indication that the 
French government believed that a revolution was about 
to overtake'Britaint neither were they particularly 
interested in fomenting trouble. Their owh interests 
and hopes were pinned elsewhere in Europe and it waB 
here that British reaction should be carefully observed. 
Dumouriez was about to enter Belgium, an event which 
would probably be followed by an insurrection against 
the Austrians - "il fau0a present songer a lleffet 
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que produirait cette nouvelle revolution tant en 
Hollande quIen Angleterre. 11 Typicallyq French 
thinking was charact eri'Zed by a mixture'-of perception 
and-delusion. The'republic, had, renounced all conquests 
so there was unlikely to be governmental alarm on 
that score, but the Dutch would undoubtedly be worried 
by proximity to a democratic republic'O'-Despite the 
fact-thýt these considerations we-rehypotheticalp it 
was "ry important to know how British"dispositions 
towards Prance might alter. 
Thus two months after the suspension of'Louis XVI 
both. 'o'-France and Great Britaint -increasingly disturbed 
by domestic, tension, ' had reluctantly, accepted'oertain 
basic facts-about each ; other. The French-knew'that 
-the noble and liberating-alliance-with England, was a 
dream-and Britain. realized, that, the French experiment 
in'-republican rule was likely to survive for'several 
months'* -Neither society was in any way prepared for 
the moment6iis, changei3-. -of---November. 
(1) ibid. 
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The Turning Point 
The major European capitals in November 1792 
provided telling glimpses into the, state of inter- 
national affairs and the emotions which move men. 
In'remote St. Petersburg, Catherine II heard with 
satisfaction details of the confusion caused by the 
unexpected resistance of France. In Vienna and Berlin 
there-, was suspicion and resentmentg the Austrians 
looking for a way to terminate their disastrous 
involvement in Franceq the Prussians smarting still 
from'Brunswick's retr4at, determined to pressurize 
their allies into continuing the campaign., In Brussels 
the court of the Austrian regentp. Marie-4hristine, 
had"fled ignominiously, leaving the population to-, 
greet the-advancing troops under general Dumouriez. 
At-the-Hagueg-the Stadtholder lived in a state of fear 
and'indecision and his more able wife and chief 
minist, ers were similarly uncertain, of. -the-security of 
the Dutch provinces in the eyent'of an insurrection. 
by', the Patriot party or the more awesome prospect 
of-invasion by-the French armies., ý", In--. Londoný-. -there 
was, uneasiness. and. tension-as-Pitt and his. colleagues 
worked through the, night on the apparently converging 
-flood-'of-rising internal discontent'and disorder and 
'the sildden changes on the map'of Europe* 
*In 
Paris 
there-was jubilation at French military successes 
but'-there was also deep differencesof opinion as the 
pI ower struggleýof Brissot and his friends and the- 
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emerging ideology of the Montagnards clashed. 
-, 
This was a period when, foreign and internal 
affairs acted and re-aoted on one anothery until it 
was scarcely possible to separate issuest., a develop- 
ment, plainly visible,, by, the time,, the-British, Parlia- 
ment met in the, middle, of December.? At the centre 
A, 
of this vortex of threatened disorders,. and wildly- 
divergent emotions was. the progress,, even-, the. survival 
of-the Revolution and, of the French republic. However 
unwillingly, the, politicians of, Europe,, began to view 
the crisis, and,., through it, their, own. difficulties 
in a wider context. 
., The general, panorama of north-western Europep, 
of the low, Countries, as well,, as. of, France and Great, 
Britaing afforded nothing but uneasiness-to, those 
who upheld the-estab'lished-order.. The, spread of., 
French arms-, and. ideasýcombined with, general-social 
problems to produce. a dangerously, volatile public 
opinion, in Britain, and led. to, a. crisis of_gqyernment 
"confidence-Phich-lost nothing in"intensity, for--being 
1_arge. 1y. self-induced. French successes placed, a-,,, 
qubstion mark over', the future. ol society., Despite., 
t, he, 
" 
fe elling of fea, r, and, amazement which, communicates 
itself. across the oenturies, the uncertainty was 
b. alanced by, the' apparent realities of the situation. 
Financiallyý militarilyp even morallyv., the British, 
bellieved. themselves to--be-superior to, the French. 
The depth of animosity in the, Convention eng, ouraged 
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f0reign'observers to hope that. before many months 
had Dassedg France would destroy herself. 
For the revolutionaries, ' the autumn of 1792 
brought a further triumph for the people in arms. 
Ifter the invasion of Belgium the world had to admit 
reliictantl: y-that the'French armies were, noi ludicrous 
but formidable. The'swift change in military fortunes 
would safeguard the future of the republic for the 
winter of 1792-3 at least'. The establie4ment of a 
hold, dn Europe encouraged the propaganda of the'revol- 
ution so that'what had once been almost a, form of 
escapismt an abstract weapon to threaten an over- 
confident enemy now seemed to have been transformed 
into. re'ality. Yet it is possible to be misled by the 
intransigent tone of the, decrees and official reports 
relating to French foreign policy. They contrast 
markedly with the daily debates in. the Convention, 
where many questions which were only indirectly 
connected with the European drama were examined by 
impa6sioned speakers. Behind the vindictiveness of 
these exchanges there is an impression that the deputies 
feared that the reality of their situation and of their 
prospects of survival was more immediately connected 
with the fate of Louis XVI in the Temple than with 
Dumouriez in Brussels. The king's overthrow may have 
beena. predictable outcome of the German interventionp 
rather as his, death was thesignal for wavering govern- 
ments to sever themselves from Francep but many French- 
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men could not consider their country secure until 
Louis had been-removed. 
November was a month of glory. and of. -anguish, 
of panic and bravadog of passion-and oppression. 
Spurred on by the desperate. realization that, France 
must_fight or die the Revolutiong, arm edývith pikes 
and principles now faced the traditional- order. It 
was above all a time when the, personalities of the- 
many men, politicians, ambassadors. and spies, -played 
an,, increasingly- important part in, the ýshpping -. -of, events. 
The full force of the sweep of, developmentsand of- 
their effect on the future of Great. Britain and- 
France can only-be felt by studying. the details of.,,,. 
thp. E_uFopeah pýanorama. _In Francej_in Belgiump, in 
Holland and, in. Britain the-wider. implications of, the 
state. o. f, Europe inýluenced politicians,, towards an 
enfor, ced re-assessment of their country, 's attitudes., 
Iha, pter 6 
France in November :' vict6i7 and division. 
Voici le moment de crise-arrive..... ". Lebrun to 
Noel, llth November. 
On November 6th'Dumouriez's forces defeated the, 
_,,,,. _, 
Austrians at Jemappes, near Mons. -, During the follow- 
ing week the newsof this unexpected.. victory-, rever: - 
berated through Europe. 'It, was known;, -in 
England-, 9n 
iheevening_of November'9th; 'here-the potential-, I.. ý 
th: reat-ýo the stability-of Hollandýmomentarily switched 
government'attention-from-the spread of, sedition., and 
necessitated-the immediate recall of the,, Cabineto 
several of whom were, still relaxing in their, country 
seats. - In'Belgium"however; all-was. -action. -Dumouriez 
hadd''suc'cessfully followed the course, he had,, deter- 
mined on after'Valmy-. -On November 14th he'lentered 
B, russels, in triumph.. ',, His declaration, to'thez. Belgians 
w, as"a documen t typical of the'rhetoric'of, the-republic 
and 0; -the''mixture, of, delusionahd-genuine sentiment 
which were-soon toýpose one-of'. the major-problems for 
the victors"in the Austrian. -Netherlands, -, "nous 
en , trons in ; 6issemment, sur votre-territoire;, nous y 
entrons'pour vous aider a planter-l'arbre de-la-liberte, 
sans nous meler en rien-a--la', constitution que vous 
, voudrezladoptero*ooo nous respecterons vos proprietes 
et vos, lois. '. La-plus exacte 'di-ý'ci'pfin-e7 -regnera"' dans 
-les armees francai s I, -)-, ..;, ,, - 1> 
(1) Published in Le Moniteurv vol. xivo P-367 
11. -11 
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ýThis statement anticipated the, verý, great diffi- 
culties which were to follow forýPrance and for Europe 
once the Austrian domination of'Belgiumý. had beexi- 
broken. The Belgians, with a recent history of 
revolution and dissension among, themselvesjýwereunlikely 
to-accept any kind of-unity imposed-from, outside. 
The-French themselves, despite the warmth of., their; 
initial, protestations of non-interference,. quickly- 
realized that the republic's-security and. even the 
survival of lier economyg was, 'inextricably connected 
with maintaining ýL_firm. presence in-Belgium., -Beyond 
these, general-issuesg the occupation added, a new 
dimension to the deepening feuds of, thp, Convention. 
Manymen, were suspicious of-Dumouriezls-ýintentionsp 
as Cambon-pointed out, -.: I,, Vous devezIsentir-combien 
I-, ' I-- 1ý serait illusoire la responsabilit. e d1un general 
entoure I'll de toute la-force d1opinion que lui-auraient. 
donnee, ses viotories.... plus un, general, a, de succesq, 
Plus-il a de, preponderance dans_lIopinionj, -et-plus-7. 
il est, important,, qulil-, nlait point'de maniement-de-, 
finances.... "M With'a victorious army behind him 
and a province at his. feet he might be tempted to 
pursue, his own course-rather than one directed by the 
French government. The general's difficulties were 
Quoted. in . 'S., -Tassierg, 
Histoire dd-la Belgique 
Bous lloccupation francaise. en 1792 et 1793, Biussels, 
1934, P-155., ý-,, ý, q-, , ý, ý11. 
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-not easy to assess from Paris and his. high-handed 
manner in correspondence with Pacheq. the WarIlinistert 
did not calm the fears of men who remembered Lafayette 
only too clearly. 
, 
Despite the,., tensiong France was a country 0ý; 
many moods in November 1792. The revolutionaries 
perceived that they had shaken Europe and, were keen to 
know British reaction., -They, -ýad 
sensed immediately 
after the Revolution of August, 10th.,, tlqat the future 
04, the two countries was linked. Their, legislator's, - 
however, unwittingly jeopardized the maintenance, of 
British neutrality ýy passing the November decreesq 
'opening 
the Scheldt and declaring, fraternity ýýd-,, ---, ý 
assistance to oppressed peoples. other countryp 
'however scornful*of 
French stabilityp could be expected 
to dismiss such direct blows to. the, status quo. 
Yetq almost paradoxically, the, ýiinisters. 'and 
politi- 
. cians of Prance were acutely aware, of the precarious 
. 
state of the, republic and, of the devastating effect-, 
of violent language. and, violent emotion on,, emerging- 
W- On November-23rd'Lebrun-: instructed-Ch6uvelin to 
reportýin detail on'the'British reactioii-t6 the'op-ening 
of the-Scheldt; the same day Grenville"wrote-to Auckland 
at, the Hague,, "I am strongly"incline'd to believ6 that 
it iS"theýpreý'sen't'int'ention'ýof he prevailing party in 
France to, respect-the'rights'of thi's'country and of 
The'Republic ..... F. Os' 37/41 
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national consciousness and co=itment to the Revolution@ 
If-their military success was not to be hollow and -"' 
their propaganda empty noisev they must resolve the 
differences within France-so'that, the repubfic could', 
face', the consequences of European reaction-without 
disintegration. 
The fall'of: Belgium-to the Prench armies was 
unexpected bec; aidse neither the allied, ýGerman, poivers--- 
nor the rest of Europe had fully-considered the poss- 
ibilitýy,, that'Brunswickls retriýat, might'n'ot'be the end 
of, theýseasonls campaigning. The cold'and wet-Low 
Countries were not a promising area'for'any army-to 
marchýthrdugh, but Dumourieg had'every reason to'abandon 
the t. raditional concepts'of warfare and to rely 
instead on the likelihood-th - at his superior numbers 
would-put him in Brussels'by the middle of the'month. 
There were a number of'contributory factors which'-ý' 
assisted him in the successful'conclusio'n: of'this, "', ' 
manoeuvre. ýýThe courag'e, of-'his sans. ýculottes volunteers 
was supported, by-, well-ý-trainedýand disciplined, troops, 
of-theýformer,. royal-army'., TheýAustrians under 
Clerfayt found"a resourceful enemy confronting'themýat' 
Jemappes. --Even, more significant than the comparative 
strength of-the armies was the'state of the-Austrian 
Netherlands themselves. The ill-feeling against the 
Imperial government P', dating, back to the' reforms-of 
Joseph II'in,,, the 1780/, s -had produced, an atmosphere 
whichiwas'very'muchýýto the-French advantage. '-The-' 
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history of revolt in Belgium did not, howevergindicate 
that harmony between the inhabitants, and their, liber-. - 
ators would be long-lasting. In 17899 two. groups 
had'resisted Austria. The-StatiStB were-a "conservative" 
party, opposed to Austrian reformsq who wanted to 
uphold the privileges of the clergy and nobility. 
The,. V ckistsý(so called after one-of their. leaders) 
, ýere mbued with the more liberal ideas-of-the French 
Third-Estate. They wished to reduce'the-povver-of--the 
privileged groups, - in an independent Belgium., -In, 
17_90 the Statists triumphed, over, their opponentsq 
many I of whom fled to France. -'-Austrian predominance 
was restored'early in 1794-afterwhich aýnumberof 
prominent Statists came to'England. 
The problem which-faced Francep. andpýmost immed- 
iatelyl' Dumouriez', in, mid-Novemb6r, 'vvasý how - to- guide,,. 
these parties, whoseýviews clashed-strongly, -towards 
.8 me' measure of'- - agr'e'e'ment. With I out,, this, O there could 
be no hopecf speedy adaptation, I to, their new, situation 
for the'Belgians'and France could: consequ. ently be 
faced wIiI th I playing a direct role . in establishing, 
equani mity. ' The-greatest - anxiety-was that the, Belgians 
would turn against the French army, 
_, 
thus making-the 
occ upation im po I ssible--"to-justify in the'eyes of the 
rest of ' 
the. vyorld and accentuating, military difficulties 
when hostilities recommenced. in the spring.. The French,, 
, government 
had already been warned that the population 
was-anti-Austrian rather than pro-French. "Il faut 
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e 'Ntre abuse soi r 
reý 
., e re ou vouloir, ega er 11opinion 
publique pour ret dre qi; ýe o!, est par amour,., pour, notre 
revolution que ce peuple nous app, 911e; -il ne veut de-, -, 
nous que pour briseTýes, fers et, a l1exception-de 
, 
quelques chefs du parti,, tres'peu, n /ýbreuxý., 
des, Vonckisbes,,,, 
nous, n1avons pas de vd-ritables-amis ;, la-, superstition 
et, l! ignorance nous font_regarder, par,, 
_la 
majorite,,,, - 
co=e. des novateurs dangereux. 11(ý?,. -, There, wereýmen-who 
were, willing to-conform, to.. Prench guidanceý-whatever 
the_, cost to indepýndenceq, -but.., it soon becamý.,, Obvious 
that, the'disputes., between the4two, -leading, ýýelgian 
groups, would lead onlyto obstruction of-the. Prench 
"'Vous aveg appris avec.. peine, -, mais, '. sans-surpriset-, 
ministre citoyen, que. les' Belgesrparaissaient'vouloir 
(2) 
rejetter, le, present que, hous leur offrons. ',,,,, -, 
_. 
The difficulty lay, inýfinding-, -the mostl, effective 
means, of. dealing with. this situation. Lebrun, had, *- 
first7hand knowledge. of, the, Austrian Netherlands 
N fFým,, the, years he had spent, in Liege,, a-bishopric-ý, ý, 
independent of the Emperor, and, it is-probable, that-, 1\- 
the, Council were influencedby, his-advice. It was 
hoped',, to',,, av'ert pos, sible Bel. gian: resentment, at. --the', 
beginning of the occupation-by. -re-opening the-river 
Scheldt. A month later,. -it-was evident. that more 
(1) Quoted in Tasgier, "opo cit. P-59. 
(2) Deshaquets'to' Lebrun, -''i8'th- Nove I mber, A*A*E4. 
-C. P. Pa s Bas 18 y 
189 
li6avi-handed treatment was' neces'sary. -The war'had 
cost-Prance immense sums 6f"m'oney'-and it-vvas'unr . eal- 
istic for neighbouring-peoplesg, liberated'from oppress-,. 
ion'-by the Fren'ch armles, to'expect that no financial 
contribution would'be required of'them'. ' Once' estab- 
lislied 'in Belgium,,, the French ;ý reali - zed'-that swe . eping 
measu , res wo . uld have to be: taken'ý_'c'ov6ring' every '-aspect 
of-administration, ''and, monet, ary legislation was'very 
Prýominent-in their'considerations; --General"la'-4'- 
Bourdonnayev-Dum0Urfe'zIi assistantg'had anticipated---, 
th'e "dev ,e, lopment of Prench'poli I cy by , issui ng' a pi&cýlam- 
atiOn'relative-to taxation -"'Iles revenus'-percus"-au 
. nom*du ci-devant souverain continueraient-a', lletreg-i 
mais au'profit de ! a: Republique, francaise. 11(l) This 
announcement_angered*thý6 Belgians"and infuriated' 
DumoujýJ6'z, '-vvho was attemptin .g, to avoi ,d provae'ative- 
statements. "The deteriorýtion of-relations'througliou 
It 
the month"'of-November reinforcedthe-view'that'a, ' 
comprehensive law covering the treatment'of occupied- 
territories should, be-passed. - The December 15th. " 
decree; which provide'd-for the, conýiscation of prope'rty 
of'. Opýonents of the' people'(a measure aimed at-the 
c4urch)"and'for-ced, the Belgians`toý acc ept--assignats, 
was-an, important's-tep'-tov4ar, ds annexation* 
Thestate, of Belgium presented the French with a 
difficult'and"delicate problem at a time, _whjbn-theý 
(1 Quoted in-Tassier, op. cit. p. log. 
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other European countries were anxiously watching 
every move of the revolutionaries. The. republic might 
have_dealt more effectively, with the unfortunate 
reaction of the population had it not been for one 
ultimately. insurmountable complication. This'ivas the 
character and ambition of General-Dumouriez himself. 
After. the battle of Jemappes Dumouriez. occupied a, 
position of extreme-. importance. Yet for Dumouriez, 
as for many, other figures in, the-limelight in, the 
; kutumn of-1792, the very, successes of the war,,, were-to 
bring. gteater difficulties., The pressure was cease- 
less and the criticism. 'fierce and unyielding. 
_-, 
The 
ambitions of the individual were quickly suffocated 
by the-confusions which followed on the-events. in 
which they, had themselves participated.. - 
Dumouriez, 
-, 
was to experience much-of the, bitterness which marks 
the existence-of, a man. who had held,., high. office and 
who had known, wide. acclaim, for_. the, ser-yices, -he had 
performed for his, country. In. the, collapse, of. his 
own viewson the. -course of the Revolution, -and,. his 
place in it he, permanently forfei - 
ted the, esteem of his 
countrymen and condemned himself-, to a long, exile. 
Whe4 Dumouriez entered Brussels victorious on 
N vembeý, 14th,, 1792p. he was-at the heigh . týof his career. 
A soldier and a diplomatist, he was now 53 years old. 
The ýime'seemed"ripe to'leave, his mark on the revol- 
ution which had afforded opportunity of 
advancement* 'Before'1789'Dumouriez had been unable. 
/ 
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to break into the tight burrier of privilege and 
intrit: uo. Discontented with his situation and reaent- 
ful of the nurrownean of the oxistins eyate. -., Du--ouriez 
Occupied the Foot of military co=zandant at Cherbourg 
when tho revolution boj: un. He wag not, howevert 
lockine. in calf-confidance or in Ability. Using hie 
t4lunto to their mmxi=um arfecto D-=ouriez had advanced 
far by the ti-wo he bucu=o PorciCn Rinister in Llarchp 
1792. Tallayrund, who wan aimilurly oy; ortunictic 
but a j; rout dual =oro flaxiblog rogarded hie now super- 
ior with condancensions co-zontine, that the written 
style Of hie ddoyutchuo loft -. uch to bo douired. 
(1) 
DuZouriazle %or= in office wan ohortj for# with the 
uppronahing overthrow of the conurchyp he decided to 
concentrate his onori; Lea on Assisting in the militurY 
survival of rrunce. It was in his capacity so general 
Of the Arzy or the north that Du=ouriez de=onstrated-' 
his groutoot ability. IN was a bold ranural, not 
Afraid to take risks. In confronting the'strictly- 
trained troops of the D-jko of Brunewick, whose 
forzuli%y could reault in an ovor-rigid Approach, ' 
such qunlitice wore extra--aly useful. Nors eignifi- 
Oknt even than zilitary nnd tactical experience was 
Duzouriocia ydroonality in the campa. Although a 
., 0' #*- (1) Cuotod in A, Uorels folin Sonoral diplo=ato au 
R, ' 1,4týon-ý Revue den deux 
315. 
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soldier of the ancie n( regi,, Ieg Dumouriez, could gauge 
expertly the type of direct approach welcomed by the, 
inexperienced volunteers. The loyalties of such men 
were not easily won, nort as the occupation. of 
Belgium was to demonstrate, were they easily kept. 
The general was,, however, extremely popular duting 
the Valmy campaign. - I'M. Dumouriezq ne cessep jour 
et nuit de travailler; il est impossible de, prendre 
A plus a coeur les interets de la patriep, dlavoir plus 
d, e talents. militaires, et d, letre imbu de meilleurs 
principes que se. general ...... Dumouriez a 'fait A 
renaitre la confiance. Chaque jour il va'd1un camp 
, 
a-l_lautre et parle au soldat, sloccupe de, leurs, 
besoins, organise lletat major et l1armee et se 
prepare au combat. "(') There was something, compell- 
ing in Dumouriez's bearing "un petit. corps rable 
pt nerveux; figure commune, presque laideq physionomie 
agreable;, oeil petit, mais, vif. et-hardi; bouche., grande, 
mais. douce. et riante, quelquefois-fine et dedaigneuse... 
&,, ton net,, et,, fermeg des-mani*eres brusques sans etre 
rudes et. vivesq, et en. mehme, temps, retenues, sans e"tre 
11(2) emportees ..... 
Wý Westermann. to Dantonj-'. 10th September, 17929 quoted 
in"Carong P. Les Missions du Conseil'Executif Proii6oire 
et dýýla"Commune de Paris dans 1'Est et le Nord. 
Parisp, 1953, P-55. 
(2) Roederer, Portraitsq quoted. in A. Sorel, Un 
diplomate au temps de la Revolution, OP- Cit. P-3090 
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The combination of soldierly skills'and rapport 
with. his troops had greatly'assisted Dumouriez, inýhis 
assault on the Austrian Netfierlands. The side of his 
character which became visible in his political career 
illustrates the eventual failure of his attempt-to 
remain at the crest of the revolutionary wave. - ' 
There were indications before his arrival in Brussels 
that although Dumouriez was'capable-of envisaging 
grand schemes he lacked both the depth'6f'character 
and the necessary adaptability to circUMstances'to, 
carry them through. He told Gensonne thatý-he'had 
resigned on June 15th. as Minister-for Foreign Affairs 
as a result of Guadet's motion that he should'*present 
a rigorous account of the expenses-of his department. 
(') 
His fellow-generals and also'the Ministers were,, well 
aware of his extreme sensitivity. "' After the battle 
of Valmy there had been ill-feelingýbetween Dumouriez 
and Kellerman-'--, the latter-had cliimedg''With-much 
Justificationg that the experience-of'his'troops had 
decided the victory. Lebrun at, thi's'point-attempted 
to appease Dumouriez's. wounded. pride by writing 
I'Songez, mon general-, que la-France entieTe vous 
regarde coMMe son heros, que vous, avez-llestimel la 
confiance du Conseil, tous mes'-sentiments particuliers 
que votre destine est clair. 11(2)'ý 
Dumour'iez to Gensonnel-June 17929 B. N. -n. a. f. 3534. 
(2) -Lebrun to Dumouriez, 7th October, B. N. n. a. f. 3534. 
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1. . -Dumouriez enjoyed the role- of, hero-, andhe ý had far- 
reaching plans for, the accomplishment of. his destiny. 
The i: nvasion of Belgium opened up the. -prospect of 
establishing-. a, kind of buffer-state in, the Low Countries, 
which France-. would-protect but notannex.., The-, peril- 
ous'position of the-Stadtholderin Holland,, would 
facili'tate the-early fall of those provinces to. his 
troops. 
- He-may-have considered handing back, the United 
PrJ2vinces to-, the: House of Orange in return-for the . 
recognition*of Belgiumq. thus enabling-him to act. as 
virtual, dictator,, -independent of anything other, 
than, - 
general--political'., guidance-from Paris. 
(l), 
The-scheme 
was --a -, bold, one -but it. illustrated very -clearly. how 
little, Dumouriez understood, the forces of the Revolution 
or-the character. and opinions of many-ýof, theýdeputies 
who approved'of the militaryýsuccesses-which-hadý, 
restored, the Republic's credibilityl. but were also- 
profoundly. suspicious of the general's own, motives. 
Dumouriez's, conduci, marks the behaviour of. a-man who 
had. welcomed the Revolution merely'as a disruptive 
weapon--to be manipulated for his own profit without 
ever. atýtempting, to understand'some of. the major 
principles, behind it., -, Theyituperation of-his, critics 
in Parisincensed him, His reluctance to follow up 
the defeat-of, the., Prussianj'.., -displeased a,, number of 
(1) See R. R. Palmerg The Age of the Democratic 
Revolution,. P. P.,,, 73-775. 
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commentatorsq but it was his owh intentionsp-, and 
his connections with the-Brissotinst-. that gave, rise 
to the most farthright, condemnation - IlTu nous -, , 
promets la conquete. des Pays-Bas et tu ne veux pas., 
chasser-, llennemi-de notre territoire. - 
Tu quittes,. -. 
ton, poste dans le-moment du dangerg et pour quoi-, 
faire? - 2our. venir denoneer deux bataillons. composes 
des plus braves sans-culottes, de Paris. Clest ainsi .... 
que lafayette. charchait, des-poux a tous. les patriotes 
clest. Briesot qui, tlavait-fait ministre ..... clest 
. 111. pour servir sea complots que. tu nous as fait declarer 
la guerre a 1! Autriche. Aansýun-temps. ou nous n1avions 
ni argento, lni armes-ni-armees..., -9". 
(l), Hebert had'. - 
, seized on every significant aspect of, Dumouriez's 
past, ýconduct and, present. -situation. whichýalarmed his- 
opponents., -Under, such circumstances, -Dumouriez's 
self-righteousness', increased, -, "_Citoyen President"., 
he wrote to-the, ýConvention. shortly,, after Jemappes - 
"plus'j, lai de succes contreles. ennemis, exterieurs--,, 
Plus. 1a, colonne de, mes--ennemis-interieurs 
grossir.. La. meorfiance. est la, pierre dlachoppement 
des-re'p-ubliques, -et plus-, un-citoyen. est en evidence, 
plus'. ses, sentiments, ses-opinions: et sa conduite 
doivený eýte connus 
I 
ý-'de, t. ous ses, con I citoyens. - 
-i, -. l, --: -En,. consequenceq, 
je crois devoir-4vous,. envoyer 
et vous prier de communiquer llextrait d1une lettre 
(1), He(bertj Le Pere Duchesne., no.,, 179. 
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que aJ( ite le, 30 octobre aucitoy, en ministr, e 
de la guerre. Cette lettre, ma conduite soutenue, * 
, e, 
t les, servil Pes que Je. rendrai ti la, republique servi- 
ront de reponse a toutes les. - quIon debite 
et debitera sur mon compte. Je vous prie de croire 
que J! ai cru cette demarche necessaire pour Ia tranq- 
uillite""de, ma patrie et pour mon bonheur. Ainsip 
J'attache le plus grand prix a, sa publiciteo est 
cl 
. 
est 1-a ýeule recompense que, je,, s 
I 
ollicite. 
It'was against this, background-of mixed acclam- 
ation and ill-concealed hostility that Dumouriez 
began his troubled months as, commandant of the French 
forces in the former Austrian Netherlands. The situ- 
a, tion heightened his negative qualities., His imper- 
iousness, his sensitivity increased. The seeds-of his 
defection were sown in. thieuneasy. period. The 
problems might well have been beyond the scope-even 
_ýOf. a man fully c ommitted to the Conventiong 
for it 
would have, required remarkable insight to deal justly 
and firmly wi. th. the Belgians and to'placate, the deputies 
in Paris. Dumouriez had, howeverg totally failed to 
appreciate the implication of his schemes on the 
complex 
' 
network of international relations. The arrange- 
ment, * which he had in mind was unthinkable in all the 
major European capitals. 
1 
The BritiBh government in 
(1)'-'Dumouriez'to the President of the Convention, 
November'9thp Le Iloniteurg, 14. 
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particular held very definite views on the balance of 
power in North-Western Europe; tý6ir'reasons for 
upholding the Dutch -*Stadtholder were strategic as 
well as political. The establishment of Dumouriezlsý,.,, ` 
stateg whether independent of Prance or not, would 
threaten British dontrol-loftthe North Sea end of the 
Channel. Furthermore, Dumouriezq like many other 
Frenchmeng was unable to conceive in his own"mind 
the fiercely defensive reaction of neighbouring 
Countries to the prospect of infiltration of French 
ideas, 
Within a few weeks the general realized that his 
position would be assailed by the French governmentq 
by the Belgians whom he was trying to reconcilet and 
very probablyby the Dutch'-an'd'British governments. 
He needed to revise'all his' original planst' or at 
least make provision for their alteration. Some 
semblance of independence would be exercised by the 
Belgians in the local elections at the end of November, 
but 'the domination of the - small number of men wanting 
to support France at any price would finally impose 
order Ld direction'-in the' country's affairs. 
Dumouriez had hoped to support his army financially 
without heavy taxation or confiscation of supplies 
from the population but-the clergy proved to be reti' 
cent in co-operation. with loans. - Even more importantý., 
_,, --_, ý, 
for the i=ediate future of, the general, 's plans. 
_was 
,. 
the, -need to make arrangements for iMproving, the supplies 
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of the French soldiers themselves. Although hailed 
as heroes the meh were not properly shod, fed or clothed, 
nor did they have adequate medical facilited. In his 
determination to exercise control over this vital 
aspect-of his army Dumouriez had made a number of 
hasty and unwise deals with 
These meng who included the 
(2 
abbe d'Espagnac,, 
) 
had made 
held to be directly respons 
unscrupulous suppliers. 
Simon brothers(l) and the 
large profits and were 
d ible for the harphip 0 
the common soldier. Despised for their greed-and. ' 
cynicism with regard to human sufferings such men 
were involved in the. bitter quarrel between Dumouriez 
and Pache. -The, War Minister hoped, that his centrally- 
supervised commission, -which had charge of the pur- 
chasing of arms and supplies, would be more efficient 
and waste-less money. -,. In-practice the bureau des 
_achats 
did not meet these expectationsp but it was 
the-principle, which infuriated Dumouriez. He considered 
the responsibility for such arrangements to, be entirely 
the-province of the commanding officer. At the back 
of his mind. 
-may 
have been the fear that his men would- 
be, hard enough to discipline without'having his good 
faith and, competence questioned from Paris. 
ýAO his difficulties multiplied and the ill-f eeling 
deepened, the general's disillusion with, the French 
See A. Matthiez, Autour de Dantong Paris, 1926, Chapter 9 
(2) Espagnac had also purchase'd arms in the United. ý 
Provinces;, he was guillotined with Danton in 1794. 
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governmentýgreiv. Yet Dumouriez, was. not the man to 
face the prospect of permanent disgrace without- 
considering alternatives. Well-versed-in the diplo- 
macy of the'ancien regimeg-he decided, to encourage 
the interest first demonstrated,., in mid-November, by 
the Dutch Grand Pensionary in exploratory, discussions 
, which might resolve. the ambiguous, positiOn-Of the 
French armies, in Belgium. -ýand 
their. intentions towards 
the, Dutche(l) The'general-, -had been made aware of the 
Dutch, viewpoint by de-l-Ilaulde, -the rebellious'French 
ambassador to-the Hague rho-regarded himself as 
Dumouriez's dependant., In, following this-opening, ---, 
Dumouriez had-, tof"exhibit, caution-I andllinitially aý, 
reasonable degreeýof-: detachment. ý*He. co. uld not-be-, 
certain of, -the-, best courseý"to.. take. until-he"-assessed 
hisý_Position with regard to the neutral pow I era. 
The Dutch moves, would be monitoredq if not-, directed, 
by--the, -British,. -goverriment., -- 
Simildr. lyp -Dumouriez z 
could-not., but. -fail to-consider, the-attitude of poli- 
ticians'lin-Paris.. The confusion which; had followed 
on his, -apparently brilliant-success increased-his, bitt- 
erness. --, The mixed. reaction. ýand-. unpredictable behaviour 
of-theý-Convention. bevvildered4, a'nd-angered him.. At 
the beginning of the 19th, century-he-described-to 
Napoleon, "ýa'general. vvhoseý'success far. outmatched, -, his, 
own, the tribulations and'uncertainties of the autumn 
(1)-ý-, The--first contact., was, on Novembe- r 17th,, see below,,,, 
unapTer 
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"of 1792 - "Dans le temps ou, je fue, charge, par'le 
gouvernement qui existait en France, ' du co=andement 
d1une partie des armees Fiancaises'je', vis-tous'les 
nuages de la revolution que moi-meme-j'avais provoaue 
I 
slaccumuler sur un atmosphere qui tanto4t ne me laissait 
entrevoir que la plus profonde obscurite'ý'- 
I. " /I., 
N- 
Quel etait le parti que J'avais a prendre au, 
milieu. des differentes-faotions qui sans cesse etaient 
renaissantes,. ou 11homme craignaitý'de se rendre compte 
\1 A, 
,a lui-meme-de sa, fagon de, penseret d'agirp'dans'-un. 
temps. -ou-1e, crime servait de base 
O-\a 
toutes-les, - 
actions et'ou,, -Je*voyais sousle,. pettchant de'saýruina, 
'ýun gouvernement. dont-j'etais de. bo e, ý o\ts l1ami et 
, que-je. voulais'sokteni dans--: ses droit e 'ses int, t 
. -I /, -ý 
zz. 
I'-- 
e 
en epargnant le-sang, des defenseu u mletait 
conf ies. 
Dumouriez. -could only. have been the friend of--a 
government-1which either genuinely supported his own 
Policies'or-left him enough freedom to attemptýtheir 
, completion., -Decisions on foreign affairs were taken 
ý, at Paris-against the background of clamour and accus- 
, -ationga', situation which hindered Dumouriez's aims, 
-The-divisions in', the Convention tended to increase 
. the vigilance of. the Montagnard deputies who were 
ýalarmed_, at thiý, prospebt of allowing much independence 
Dumouriez to the First con'sulo 3rd Novem'ber, 1800, 
quoted in Annales Historiques de la Re'v-olution Francaise, 1151. 
r 
of .. action to a man with an, army at his -back. -, - The,,, 
Conseil-Executif and, the Convention knew, that, the 
conquest. of ýelgium was-a decisiye-. step but while,,,,.. 
European, and enpecially7British, reaction, was unknown 
and. 
-while, 
the, pressure of_, internal affairs multiplied 
one of, the-victory's most,, important_effects was, -to: 
restore. mor_ale and, preatige. -, _It. 
is in the.. 
_light,, 
ofý_ 
these ambivalent emotions-that, the November.. dec)ýees 
have to be viewed., Tb,, ýobservers the fall. of,. the, 
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Austrian Netherlands and the November decreesýacquired 
an, overall significance which contributed-, greatly,. to 
the fear of the remorseless progress.,, of,, the Revolution. 
This impression was. false, -. for many. Frenchmen. -had_, z -- 
criticized_Dumouriezls, determination, -, to_-enter, Belgium. _ 
Moreovero the two-, pieces, of,, liýgislation,, whichý_. appeare ,d 
tO-follow on, hisvictory came-from different., sources 
and,, were, the-products of different., responses., within.,., 
French government to the_, turning-point, -in_French-fortunes. 
November, 16th. decree opening, the*river,,, 
Scheldt-Icame, from the'Conseil, Exe'Cutifq apparently.,,,, j'-, ' 
,, 
The on thexecommendation: of Lebrun. _opening 
of--, the., -, 
river, closed by,, the-Treaty of Munster-, in 16489-might 
be expected: to have two positiveýeffects-'- It-. was, very 
much, in line. -with, -revolutionary., propaganda. that--a,,,, 
waterway, a natural. feature,., which-, continued, ýto flow 
despite man-made restrictionso should be declared free 
for navigation. Not only would this demonstrate to 
those'in doubt aboatthe Revolution's principles t. hat 
I- 
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I 
Frahce would take every-opportunity to break down 
, past 
by barriers raised in the- -the self-interest of 
the great powers, but it would also appeal to many 
deputies in the-, Convention. The Brissotins were 
great believers, in the usefulness of propaganda and 
many Montagnards were unlikely to oppose a measure 
0. 
which would bring benefits to long-oppressed peoples. 
This second aspect, of-the opening of the. Scheldt 
was of more immediate, significance to the Conseill- 
Executif. Lebrun sensedý, thafif France was to estab- 
lish'a, lasting-hold, on,, Belgium, without ill-fe. eling 
it was, necessary to make. a-, gesture of this kind. 
The resumption of shipping on-the. river would restore 
to., Antwerp some, of the. commercial-importance of which 
she had been deprived. for., over_a oentury - "J'ai cru 
quliLserait sdge-de se concilier la ville d'Anvers 
JuECquIa present, la plus opposee, aux, principes demQ- 
craticlues il-,, mla paru quIon y. reuisairait si llon 
pouvait tourner vers de-plus grands interets tel que 
le', co=erceq'; les, esprits superstitieux des Anversois. "(1) 
The opening-of the Scheldtq hovve, ýerj was unlikely 
to. be viewed-with approval by the British and Dutch 
governments. - This was not because of any real threat 
to, the commerce of Amsterdamt whose trade had been 
safeguarded in 1648. The general opinion on the river 
(1) 
-Lebrun. to the, Belges et Lie$gois Unis, 18th Novemberp 
ý792,, A-N- Ije 9 30,1. Quoted in Tassier, p. 118. 
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was swomed up by Lord Auckland - "I do not believe 
,, that-, the navigation contended for is a point of much 
realýi'mportance; the channel of the river has long 
been bad for navigation and it is secretly supposed 
that the republic. (the United Pr6V'inces), could at 
any, -, #te totally spoil The main anxiety of 
-.,. the neutral powers. vvas the attitude', -behind such a 
-total disregard of-Treaty: Rights and-international 
practice in the unilateral, action of France. '' On the 
SCheldt,. issue. tb: e-, Coneeil Exe'c'utifmaintained right 
up. till.. the outbreak-'of war that thisýwas entirely 
a Belgian matter which cI ould in no - real way-affect 
Holland. or Great Britain. -The natural rights theory 
fwas-develoýedýin a-suitably flower'y style.: - Lebrun" 
: and his-collea&es had. -unfortunately underestimated 
the adverse reaction, of'the'British government, 
-perhaps-becausý to-them'the decree of l6th'November 
`was, io'evidentlý'a'piece of legislation'calculat. ed 
-: for its effect-on: the-new-area of French influence. 
'ýOnly. after the outbreak of war was it possible to 
. lookýback and attack the wisdom of this measure. The 
-'disastrous-long-term significance of the decree was 
leve 1 at Lebrun-at-hi's trial - "Que-le manifes'te 
2pub ie- ur l'ouverture et la libre navigation - de 
,. l'Escaitt; immediatement apres 11invasion'des troupes 
(1) Auckland to Grenville, November 28th., H. M. C. 
'lFortescue MSS, " -OP-cit. P-346 
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ýfranqaiees dansla Belgique, fut. -, pluE3-particulierement 
il"ouvrage de, Lebrun, que de-tout-autredt; deposera,, 
, eternellement.,. des,, intelligences avec, Pitt9--. en,. effet, 
sans,. ce manifeete, Pitt marquait,, absolumentýde, pretextes 
, colories pour armer contre,, 
la, republiqueo-.. -... mais une 
-provocation faite a, la Hollande legitimait les arme- 
ments, de l'Angleterre, obligee des lors,. pour son,,,,. - 
,. 
ho, nne-ur 
. 
e. t . sa, gloire soutenir un,. allid et ces, 
armemente. devaient a leur tour, devenir 11, occasion 
une, .., rupltur. e plus -, d. ire, c. te,, avlec ýla -Republique.., 
Within a, year.,. the Prench, had, swung-, from., under-, %, 
stressing-to over-stressing, -: the, importance of 
the 
. 
Scheldt, as, a major. factor in,, the deterioration, of.: ý 
Anglo-Prench, relatiohs.. At the. timeg.. the_second, decree 
of November, 19th, caused more anxiety. _Thislýdecree, 
came notfrom the council; but- -tli& Convention. The- 
circumstances of, its introduction and acceptance were 
themselves., significant for alfull-. appreciatio n, of, the 
m? ntality,, of. the Convention, lat the., tim. e. ', 
The deputies-, 
had, received the news of, Jemappes on November. 10th, -. 
amid-universal, rejoicing.,, Yet, the'decree offering--, 
fraternity. and'. assistance to oppressed. peoples came.,,, 
over a week later and though undoubtedly intended as a 
challenging'assertion, O'f. Prance's new position'and'-'""'"' 
confidence was not"properly'. the result, - of an atmosphere 
o'f-eupýoria'. In th e. 'nine'days betw-een the new I s'of the 
(1)") Trialipf, 
' 
Lebrun, A. N.., W.. 305. 
t 
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fall of. ý3elgium. and the passing of the 19th, November 
de cree. 
-the,, 
C_onvention,. wasp in, factq d, evoting attention 
tol,, entirely. different business. 
- 
The deputies heard 
a. number of detailed, and clýosely-reasoned speeches 
connec. ted--with. the, issues of. the trial and, form-of 
judgement ofý. Louis XVI. 
The Convention wad first moved back to a, con- 
pidýeration of, the implications of the fall of Belgium 
by, 
_Gregoire. 
on, November 15th , -. 
"Je-demande que la, 
Convention charge s on, - comite de legis lation de lui 
faire-un rapport sur la maniere dont la nation fran aise 
doit acc6rder,. sa, protection-aux peuples qui la re 
clament. "(. 'ý- Four days-laterg-amidst a var - iety of 
t9picsp Larevllli"e"re7Lepeaux, proposed a, decree on 
this,,. subject. 
_- 
', 'La., Conyention. nationale de I clar, -"9' au 
nom de-la nation francaisev I quIelle accordera fraternite 
et, secours-'ý, tcus, lee peuples qui-voudront recouvrer 
leur, liberte et charge, le, pouvoir executif de dgnner_ 
aux,,, generauxýles. ordres--np'cessaires pour porter secours 
, a, aes-peuples,, et defendre lee citoyens qui auraient 
ete, vexes,, ou qui. pourraient lletre, pour la cause de 
la.,; liberte. 1, I'Dans le decret ........ il. y--a-de___quoi 
(1) -Le'lloniteuri 14, -pfWI-Further pressure for the decree 
came from the deputations from Savoy, Nice and the 
Rhineland who appeared afthe bar of the Convention 
around that time. 
ý2) Le-Moniteur, 149 P-517. 
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ýbouleverser 1'Europel" wrote. Camille Desmoulins. 
The*Conseilýmade no initial comment on the 19th November 
decree in the diplomatic correspondenceg though it was 
only to be expected that such a piece of, legislation, ' 
however vague in wordingg would excite comment'and' 
concern. Lebrun did not mention the 19th November 
decree to Chauvelin-until 9th December. This failure 
to sense the damaging effect of, their pr 
- 
opaganda 
pr6ved to be one, of the most disastrous of the'miS-' 
calculations and underestimations of French foreign-- 
Policy. Viewed realisticallyq the decree threatened! 
much without having any solid practicall*basis. -'It 
almost appears as-6 belated justification of the 
invasion of Belgium., None of'the' generals was in a 
stFong enough situation to give military assistance 
-to_peoples struggling to throw off the chains of 
tyranny. The Dutch patriots could legitimately expect J'' 
concrete aid to replace the token supportq which had 
caused them to hang on to French promises since 1786. 
Yet_'they applied in vain for Dumouriez to take his 
forces into Zealand and only a month previously Lebrun 
(2) had virtually disallowed them. - 
The-French'berhaps 
. 
felt that the action they had taken and-the principles 
which they professed, were explanation enough for the 
decree. The justification which Lebrun eventually 
Quoted'in Tassier., op. cit'. p. 2370'--- 
2ee 'above, Chapter 5. 
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offered in a letter to Chauvelin on December 9th, 
was rather more specific than the original document - 
"Sur le decret du 19th hovembre on ne peut slallarmer 
que. faute dlen comprendre le veritable 
_sens. 
Loreque 
nous promettons fraternite et assistance aux peuples 
qu eulent secoizer le joug des princes avec lesquels 
nous sommes en guerre il nly'a nulle difficulte et le 
decret slapplique a ce_--cas dans d& plus grande latitude 
sans qulaucune puissance etrangere puisse le tro er 
mauvaist, Par rapport, aux pays qui appartienne 
ct)a 
des puissances absolument neutres la crainte que nous 
ne cherchions. a y exciter et fomenter des mouvements 
seditieux a pu, seule egarer les esprits dans 11interpret- 
ation du decret ...... This statement came too lat4',, 
for the British government to put much crediýnce in it. 
Lebrun had failed to realize-that other governments- 
would view-those struggling for liberty as rebellious 
subjects. 
The November decrees, appeared as the summit of 
France's new assertiveness. The reality of, the 
Revolution's potential as a proselyýizing force was 
irreversibly underlined in the minds, of politicians 
throughout the continent. Yet the reali-ty behind, this, 
most formidable of French arms was the insecure 
political situation within the country itself. 
(1).. -,, -Lebrun, to Chauvelin, 9th December. 
C. P. Angleterre, 584. 
A. A. B. 
208 
Oc-t, ob-e`r,,, a, nd Novemberýwere months'-of bitter recrimina- 
tion'within the-Convention. The confusion spread 
among'st -, the" - clubs int6-the-"sections and was echoed 
with'vehemence-by-the press. 'Hebert enjoined his 
sans-oulottes'readers*,. -. '.. "Il faut en convenir 
nous ne savons pas nous governer. -. -O.. nos armees font' 
de'merveilies'e't'nous dans llinterieur nous perdons 
.. tout-le fruit"de'nos victoires.. '... Hommes du 10 aout, 
reveillez-vous. -. '.. ý. 11(1) -Issues which merited close 
enquiry wer ,e, submerged in - polem .i cs. -''No, ne-of the deput- 
ies denied that the confusion-of their proceedings 
-was i dam"agi'ng't'o"the'wider"nee*ds of'-the republic$ but 
the response of those'most-immediately involved in the 
bitter'exchanges was, 'to'-blame, their'opponents. ' Anything 
whichýresembled faction or"'party'was the target for 
8 earing critici: sm. ' 'There were no parties as we under- 
stand"themin"the'Convention but the atmosphere in 
which"such terms"were exchanged as insults is of Big-' 
nificance. - Thetensions themselves. became a-force. ' 
Through'-constant'repetition"-of the idea the name of''- 
'Paris*'began"to 
conjure'up'visions'of mob violence and 
ruthless determination to dominate the rest of-the 
country'at all costs. Wherever there were'disturbances 
as"in'the Eure and other'districts- wh'ere there was a 
shortage of available grain, Paris was evoked as the, 
source'of-disorder. Yet there undoubtedly weresub-' 
(; ),,,,, ýHebertq_Le-Pere Duchesne no. 191, 
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sistance difficulties--in-a*-number of-areas and on-'this 
question the people-gave voic'e to their displeasure 
bothýphysically'and'ýin writing. -The demand. for - 
economic-controle-opened up an early difference between 
the-'Montagnarde, and their supporters outside-the 
, Conv6ntion. -Amidst the increasing--controversy among 
. _the-: politicians9-'pres6 commentary, further enflamed 
tempers. -ý-'S6meýlmen'beli'eved"that theýsolution lay in 
a-concentration on the aspects'of France's domestic 
andl. foreign-, concerns--which were being neglect, ed by the 
wranglings. ý Others thought-that the-only fihal 
answer, waitoýcrush th ose, who threatened, -unity. 
Theattack, on Paris'was-predictable in view of 
the"circumsiances surroundi'n'g' the*overthrow of the king. 
ýhe'- 'ielentle'es"criticism did'muchýdamage to the harmony 
of-the, C6nvention within days -of its opening.: Whether 
theýBrissotins liked-it or notp the citizens-of Paris- 
had"done'- invaluable'-service-to the Revolutiong and the 
.: onslaught'ýof"Barbaroux, Louvet and-6thers increased the 
determination'of their. opponents for concerted action. 
The zectionsg-, too";, contained-many, men who would not 
I quietly--rýpond'to condemnation of their actions and 
opini6ne., The state'of Paris'was a subject of argument-'-' 
between-the"city's'defenders and its critics but there 
was ground_for some alarm.,, Unemployment in the city 
had risen as. had the price of bread. Roland and the 
Brissotins sensed that here was a situation which could 
, easily, 
be exploited by Robespierre and his allies 
within the-, Commune, and sections.... There, were elements 
9;,,. pplitical manoeuvring in their, sweeping condemnations 
and-,, alarmist reportsto, theýprovincessbut Roland-. seems 
to.., havelbeen,, genuinely nervous. -at 
the,, lac-k_of, security__ý' 
within the_capital., --At the-end of-October, he, wrote to- 
jacheg his former,, protege, - "Je suis, Anforme..., qu"il 
existe. encore dans Parisýune fermentation sourde. que 
des, malveillants entretiennent dans., llesprit. du, peupleg 
_jp, 
sais qiýe,,, si elle4eclataito, il resulterait, necess- 
airement de's. troublee. qui, exposeraient la, tranquilliteý 
publique.... -, vous., savez.. ýq4lune 
loi particuliere vous, a 
donne la. -faculte. dlemployerý. 
immediatement la force, armee 
1 
11 
, 
4a; is,. ý, la_, _capital. ý. 1,.,,, 
et je pense que vous pourriez faire 
un usage utile, de cette faculte'*. 
'", (, '),,,, The, previous day 
iI 
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(October, 29th. ). R61and-had pFýsented-his report, on the 
state of, Paris to, the, Convention; - the,, picture was-that 
of-, a citywhere forces of, law and order were danger- ee e'. 
')nent sage, mais peu puissant;,.,,, ouslyz, weak- 'CDep)ate, 
commune., active et despots; peuple excellentq mais dont 
une, partie.., saine est intimidee ou contrainteg tandis 
que., llautre,, est, travaillee par des, flatteurs et enflamee 
par la,,, catomnie; 
. 
-confusion des-pouvoirsp, mepris-des, 
autorites-,,.. force publique,,. faible. ou, nulle"par un mauvais 
commandement,, ývoila Par Roland'-S'-findingswere 
(1) Roland'to'Pacheq 30th October, Le P oce6 
ýe'_. 
P6che', 
ed. A. Seeq Paris 19119- P. 18. 'ý_' 
(2) Report. read. to,, the,, Conventionj 29th Octoberý 
Le Moniteurp 149 P-433. 
211 
supported, by otherst who were--ldeeply-committed-to resist- 
ing-. Robespierre., This, broughtýinto play, the emotions 
engendered,. during the. disputes-over the, formation of 
a-departmental-guard. -- Barbarouxp-in a powerfully. argued 
speech, on October, 318t-sýattacked,., those whoý, had; accused 
men: of hisýmind,, as desiring afederal-. -. republic---,, "les, -ý- 
habitants, du Midi-a quilion, suppose,, le-Projet,. de 
federalisme. nous. ont, precisement, -donne des mandats 
contrairesýet-, nous, oht faitýsigneeque nous, voterions-., 
pour ýune, republique'. unique. z, These tactics were,,. --,, - 
designed, -as, a,. -smokescreen,. ý-... What--was imperative., was-, the 
speedytre-establishmant-of-. ordet. and-. inýthis respect 
Paris ý-, was -- an obstacle 
Whateverý--the truth of the Brissot--Roland groUp's 
allegationsi the-, Comite3de--Sureteý'. Ge-nýe'r'ale"wasýinstructed 
to-present itsý, own: reportý. tothe Convention . 
In this 
Bazire, defended,, the Parisians. The., deputieB: began to 
accuse! each. ýother'of capitalizing onýthe tense. atmos-,,,,,,., 
Phere-of Paris-to further-their-own-ends. In-these. - 
'the bitter. -weeks, the Brissotinst, -dramatization of, ' 
intricate'balance-of--problem and emotion overshadowed-, -Z, ý, 
N 
thesober. voices such, as-Barerelso, trying to-make-them- 
selves, heard-- "Terminons, enfins, ces. duelB PdlitiqU6SO 
ces-, combate, singuliers, de, la, vanitL< et de-la haine... 
vous,, avez-de. 
, 
grands. travaux A-faire surýla. surete. generalef 
sur lee coloniesp sur 11instruction publiqueli sur la 
(1) Speech; of Barbarouxl-31st October, in B. N. *L-&38 series. 
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constitution;. voila, ce qui doit attirer vos regards et 
''Journaliere. 
votre sollicitude There was much 
talk, of public opinion as the final arbiter of the 
Convention;,, but these men, were conscious of the fact 
that, they could influence. the direction of public opinion 
-in their speeches and writings. The struggle 
fox power 
had, many,, dimensions which, were incomprehensible to 
European observers, although, from time to time the, 
representatives-were, reminded of the-potential size of 
their. audience -,. 'Citbyens, faisoneq nousq une conjuration 
contre les perturbateurs, de cette. aseemblee. Il faut 
que, nous nous penetrions de cette veritev ou que nous 
renoncions a remplir le devoir. qui nous est impose`ýpar 
1'Europe-, entiere. Il faut que nous fassions des lois 
qui assurent latranquillite. publique; car, il set des 
hommes qui, se tiennent caches et qui nous observent. 
Le sortq je ne die pas des-25 millions. d1hommes de la, , 
republique francaise, mais. des 100 millions qui habitent 
l'Europe, ddp"end de la, conduite q_ue nous allons tenir-11 
(2) 
_Howeverq 
it. was their own countrymen'that. the 
deputies, had first to convince. -Their-public proceedings 
were. scrutinlized, in. the. press,, which. echoed the contro- 
versies raging. in, the governmento for many members of the 
Convention edited, or contributed to popular journals. 
A few papers, such as le Moniteurg confined themselves 
arere B' 9-5th Novemberg Le Moniteur, 149 P-3960* 
lst November, Le Moni teur, 14? 
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almo8t, entirely to'straight-reporting of-news from Europe 
andlýof`the previous'day's debatesO The majority howeverg 
tended-to-side-either with Robespierre or with the anti- 
Montagnard"views, of-'Briesot. ýThe-Girondins, heaped, scorn 
onltheirýopponents', I hoping-to make them appear foolish 
ind, 'ý` kbecause*'ofl; their rashnessg-dangerous. There were 
exceptioný-'no . tably', Brissot's tribute'll -Just's 9 ýto St'. 
maiden"speech.. TheMontagnard press was-chiefly rep- 
resented by. 'Robeepierre"himself in his I'Lettres a ses 
commettansl, '-ý detailed'; and literary pieces"which-would 
probably not-havelbeen of-, great-: interestý'to a-wide 
_ieotioný*ofzthe population". tionr ": --Prudhomme's'. "Les Revolu 
de'-IParie"-'_:: were more-overtly-radical, but'still'they 
lacked'-the-feeling of-being'at one with'the aspirations 
and"reactioiýs of'the'ordinary man at'his workbench or 
, in, ',, the, wineshops of the'laubourg-St'o-Antoinee 
ý-Maratq-the'Friend of. the Peoplet had already'tapped 
this ý: rea, of-Sans culotte consciousness-, He. had. also 
brought'uponhimself'the-'wrath'of the moderates'byýhis 
outspoken criticisms, his: part in the, September'Massacres 
an-d'hisbehaviour in'the: 'Convention. -Marat seldom 
spoke'-without becoming abusive , -'and, receiving insults 
iný: hie turn. - Butýhe. made few, major contributions'to, ". 5, 
debatesuntil, -, Decemb er when he spoke, on the 
trial'o-"-Some of: the deputies evidently regarded,. himaas 
little 'better thanýtheir-resident trouble-maker., -Marat-p7, 
working within the Convention as well as through his 
journaliemp was, only one of a number of men who sought 
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tolýmaintain the, awareness of-the people, of, Parls. ',,. This 
world was also-the target,, of,,. the Parisian city, officialp 
Jacques-Rene , Hebert. 
In-his vivid,, writingsq:, Helýert was not attempting-ý 
a,. late-18th. -century, equivalent:. of, ýgutter-journalism. 
The,,, directlieE3s, of: his, language-, and literary-approach 
seems, to have, been, intended-Ito f. ulfill two, functions., 
The first: ofýtheseý, was to, give, -expressiont. in-language 
which the,, men, themselves would readily comprehendp-to 
sane-culotte aspirations.,, Toýachieve-, thist-Hebert--ý- 
created,, thetarchetypal sane-culotte, figure,, le Pere-,. 
-. Duchesnet with. his,, moustachep. his-cap, of-liberty, andýhis 
pipeg. a. figure. who4sa, w,, things.. in-black_and white., to whom 
bluntness was. a, virtue-and-suavityý-a crime. Heýert him- 
selfýmay. well have ý hoped -. 
that -ý hi s, _. 
journal would remind 
the-quarrelsome and-. incompetent-representatives-that they,,, 
had-atduty tothe menýwho, had, helped_them to_powerg and 
that-they-would. abdicate; these. responsibilities, at their; 
own peril-, -7.,,, "vous semblez, oublier que. votre plus, beau 
titre-,, est: celui de, sans. -ýculottesq que - sans lea sans-, 
culottes vous ne's'e'riez-. rien et--que.. vous ne-pouvez-etre 
rienleans eux. 11(ll, 
)-.,., Afraid that, the-people might, be 
lulled, into a false, sense-of'security after August, 10th, 
in the early-autumn Hebert decided. to'remind_ýthis audience 
-that'noise was no substitute-for-. orderly government 
"Ce nlest. pas assez devoUoir e'tre libres il faut savoir 
(1) Le Pere Duchesne no. 182. 
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lietre'. -, Il ne suffit, past-pour, leýdeveniro'de"-hECir"'lei3 
ty"i-ans"'e't les trattrest de'fair6 bejje's"motjons'P'ýtriOt- 
iei de ýonner a la nation-ses: 'boucleep-ses moxtres, ' 
et'-d6"voler-a"'llennemi; -tout-'cela est bel et bon, mais 
"la`prýdence, it sans sans, tout': oe'que-nous 
feronst'-s'eqira . en , eau de boudin, Un-peu moins de 
poussAreý mes , amisq mais plus d1ordre'dans nos demarches.... 
cleit-'a Pairis-'suir tout'qulil-faut maintenir 1fordre et 
-I SA 
,, 
X (1) 
ý1-. -I r- a ureteo"I 
'-Le e e'Ducheene's gentle guidance of'the people 
was in, --marked contrast with'his---growing disgust at the, 
inabilitýj 6f, the, Convenii*on-to resolve its difficulties" 
and'govern-Fr'an6e'in what'he 6ons'idered to be a just and 
firm fashion. "- His proposed vi6it'to the Convention was 
6ne-6f tlieýmost effeetivý'^of. -hiE'3'-descriptions'of the'' 
A 
iagiiificentý di'sdain'6f this awesome figure'. "Je paraitrai 
seul- '-; -guard"on-me verraq mes-sour'il''noirsp mes 
.1 larges moustachesg, -ma-taille carree; ma voix 
de tonnerre 
feroht'palir-tous-les., Jeaii-foutr'e's"'qui'mettent de batons 
daiiB les"roue's pour empec-her'la'machine'de marcher.,, 
(2) 
Hebert's disgust"it what he, c'on sidered to be the absurd 
-posturings in the Convention increased*' He captured the 
aýxietie . s'an'dVewild6rment Of tIie, p6'ople*of the'sections 
inýýhi's-a6count, of. a walk through the-Paubourg St. -Antoine. 
He`re"ýeopl'e-, ý, asied him for news Of'the armie's'g" demanded 
(1),, Le P'e're Duche8ne, no. 170. 
(2) Le-Pere Duchesne no. 182. 
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explanations of the inactivity of the Convention. - Why, 
whený, the armies met-with'such'stunning success was the 
interior, -of France subject to petty, bickering? - "Pere 
Duchesne, -est-ce, 4ulil faut'encore, une revolution? " 
The, probable'outcome-'of continued chaos within French 
government was., thus clearly: indicated. 
J-', Apart, from his repeatedýpre-occupation with the, 
contrast between*French victory and French division, 
ý- 
Hebertle'. Journal was primarily concerned I with the issue 
of the. king' s -fate. Sensing ý that: his audience would not 
be-interested-An the detailed, arguments on. the judgement, 
that---they., would not catch'the theory-or the eloquence of 
a-St., Just, Hebert attacked, ýthe, royal-family-themselves, 
playing, on-.. 'the weakiiesseii. 'Ofýtheir-personality and even. ' 
their-'physiognomy* -Hebert. was unmerciful to, thoee whom 
he-'regarded, as-theýemblems,. zoflthe, ancien, regime and'he 
extended,, his venom-to Rolandp Brissot and others who 
had*,. betrayed. -the', people-, ý-There-is, something, distasWful 
about-his, sustained attack on--Louis XVI9 yet he revealed 
that,. he, wasýnot. " -bloodshed. The ,a man. who gloried in 
thought'. of-thevictims of the war, he saidq made his,. ' 
hair stand-on end. The iý`ere Duchesne was merciful to the 
weak-'and-oppressed-and remorseless against those whose' 
pursUit'-of personal power was at the, root of France's 
internal strife. His journalg with its "grande oleres" 
and, 11grandes joies" was-a vocal witness of the troubled 
autumn and winter of 179ý-3- 
Hebert's example moved, others to protest that the 
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deputies!., arguments were obscuring the problems. of the_, 
moment. Anomyrpus, sans-cul. otte pamphlets assailed the 
Conventioný, for its, refusal. to-restrict th e movement of. 
grains andits. -failure'to, impose-price-controls- Here 
there. was aýýfundamental difference, of opinion, for very-, 
few. of. the, deputies were., prepared to-abandon the concept 
of free trade, An_corn.,,, St. Just said, at the end of 
November that. a--positive, law on'. subsistances would never 
work. -,, -The, solution-lay, in, the establishment of a firm 
government,., with wise, lawsg since notamporary expedients 
would,,, be of value. in-the-anarchic: situation, which then' 
prevailed. 
(', )..,, This. attitudeýwas of. small'comfort for the 
general-, Population: of-France. They-were convinced that 
abundant: grain-. lay hoarded-, by farmers-who were, 't00 greedy 
to part'ýwith-it'at a, just price "forcek-done .9 par, un 
decret, 
-, rigoreux, --les., gros proprietaires, lee gros fermiers 
et-,,, tous,, ceux.. qui,, tiennent, des-magasins-de cette denree de 
premiere. necessite d'amener leur ble"au marche. -Taxez-en 
le-prix*su-ivant, les differentes qualite"s- et mettez-le dans 
les, vmagasine,. qui, seront sous votre, surveillance di'recte.,, 
(2) 
On November 14th.: 36, sections demanded. a law on, subsist- 
ances'e. 7-ýIhe ministersq howeverp preferred the traditional 
methodvof'purchasing at other European markets-to make up 
the: deficiency. The. Parisian sans-culottes claimed that the 
(1) Speech of St. Just, 29th. November, Le Moniteur, 14. . eta 
(2) Adresse des Braves Sans-Culottes aaLa-Convention 
nationaleg., 28 Novembre, 1792., 80--L641, 
. 
203. (B. N. ) 
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harvest-of 1792 had, beenýabundantq' but'the Conseil Executif 
were not confident. ' As, early'; as 19th-September Lebrun 
had-tried, to buy from the rich'American markets, ' writing 
to-%the minister at Philadelphia, -, "La circonstance ou 
nous nous'trouvons.... par-leidefaht des subsistances de 
premiere', necessiteýdans plusieurs departements de llEmpire 
francais: -rehd-indispensables des mesures de prGs"voyance 
les'plus-activeso"'(1) The despatchýwent'on'to expl_ain 
that'. Roland had-been-advised by agentB-in'London to look 
for'; ýgrain'in, NorthýAmerica.,, The Council, continued their 
attempts. -to-buy: in-Hamburgt'London and, Amsterdam; other- 
European-governments realized, that, to deprive France of 
, wheatlmight also-entailfurther disorder for-the Prench 
government.. ' On iovember, 13th.,, the British issued an Order 
in"bouncil-forbidding. '. the, export of,. any further-grain. 
Suchl'actions., were-. not merbly-polltibal7manoeuvres for- 
theigrain,, situation, vias. ýnot-good,, in Englandq and the I 
government had: no'l. wish to feed the French at the risk of 
irritating, theirt,, o, wnýpopulation- The-Prench, were-angered 
y. e,. and, made several protests through b -the,: British-attitud 
Chauvelin. -. -Mey believed. 'that-the, British*were 
lifting 
the embargo for countries such as Spain and Portugal-and 
applying-it-rigidly-to, Prance'alone- "Le, gouvernement 
uvent anglais--, connait-les funestes consequences qui pe 
ený7resulter pour notre repoe interieureg et clest tree 
certainement contre nos approvif3ionnements de bouche et 
(1). Lebrun-to Ternantq A. A. E., C. P. Etats-Unis-,. 36'-, " 
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N.. de guerre quli-1 dirige see premieres attaques*"(') 
I The contradictions at the base of France's situa- 
tion in November were thoseýof a nation successful in 
warýbut without, an established government qapable of 
ensuring, that victory was, anythingl. other-than ephemeral., 
The'capture of, Belgiumq despiýe the ensuing problems of 
managementv--, came. at an opportune. moment for the morale 
of; a, country.. -disturbed, by the battle within, the political 
arena. -.,, These disputes threatened, to. become more, desperate 
with the trial of the king to crystallize the differences. 
Briesot's"friends werev by, the end of Novemberp temporarily 
_on 
the defensive afterthe-discoveryof. Louis XVI-Is 
, secret correspondence in the'iron, chest, which, Roland had 
unwisely-ý(or, perhaps, deliberately) opened, without witnesses. 
The-emotions"engendered by-the factions partially clouded 
France! s appreciation'ofýEuropean reaction to the upheaval 
in, the Low'Countries. Politicians were certainly aware 
thatýthere would have to be-hasty, re-assessmentst espec- 
ially in'countries such-as Great. Britaing'but they did not 
envisageýany-dangerous alteration of policy'by the 
-neutral, natione. -They were-also aware that. the British 
and Dutch-governments had their own problemsq but there 
was'no way"of', sensing how British views of the inter- 
action ofl-domestic and foreign troubles. would affect 
the, policies-'of Piit's administration. '' 
(1) Chauvelin. to*L 
* 
ebrun'q January 3rd. 'p 1793, A. A. E. 9 
C. P. Angleterre 580. (the letter is wrongly dated 1792. ) 
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-Chapter 
The, Threat4to Holland'. 
"There-is-really-such a brutish insensibility, 
a base selfishness in the-conduct-of this people,. 
so far as-I, have had'an opportunity of knowing'itj 
that-I, 'cannot, but think, 'that nothing will have any 
effectq-but a: direct, menaceýto,, abandonýthem totheir 
fate. *.. -*'whatever they, can hope toýgetýdone by. ' 
another'ý:, they', are perfectly certain notýto do them- 
selves... *",. ', -William, Windham, writing'-of-the Dutch:, to 
William Pitt, September-116th... ' 1794 
-ý-, -ý. "'The: country-most-i=ediately-, threatened-by the. - 
occupation-of-Ithez. Frenchýarmies in--Belgium'. was, the 
United-Trovinces, Once Brussels had fallen European 
eyee'turned tovvtirds. the, Hague. -, -', "VOUE3 me dites dans- 
votre,, lettre de-'vous'-marquer, ý-quelles"sont, les'ýeens-ý' 
ationspolitiques*que llon, 'ressend'-ici; ---elles sont 
vives'-mais-'dans une-, 'sens contraires a'-celles queýllon 
I', ' -Dans, cette-derniýere ville llentre"'e" eprouve-a la--Haye.. i- 
de'Inos arme"es-dans le, Brabantýa-glasse dleffroi'les 
plus--zeles: partisans du, despotismeýStadhouderien.... 
Une de'olaration"quevient*de donner llambassadeur-- 
d'Angleterre, les. 'rassure'un peu_-et llinsolence' 
'tenait dans leurs: propos., La-France, disent-ils, 
n! osera-jamais attaquerýla Hollande puis quIalors elle 
aurait a faire aveo l'Angleterre. ".. - 
At Amsterdam, the 
effect was rather different I'depuis l1entree de 
ýumouriez 
a Bruxelles tous les patriotes' slattendent 
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a, lquelque-message interessante-de-'sa part aux',, eý`ats. ll 
In-London there: was-evidently. -consternation - 'Iles. - 
fonds, Anglais ont-baisse. de cinqpourcent, -Je, ne p9is 
par., vous-assurer, ce fait comme certaing-, mais. ce qutil 
1), y,. a de sur. clest-ýqulil y, aýquelque c4ose ..... it 
(ý 
Boyer-Ponfredeli3,, correspondento in, describingthe 
state--of, Hollandg had introduced as a.. matter,, of course 
that, countryl, s. -relationship withýBritainq the effect 
ofzýcontinental, developments on, the British-Islesq 
and,. thec. triangular,, interac, tion-of-BrJ-taing-. Holland and 
France. on, oneý. another. ý, -, The-,. United, Provinces-, were 
small but-,, their. strategic, and commercial'significance 
was crucial. totheý-established-European balance. of - 
power which, -France-seemed.: 
determined to-disrupt. 
"Six: years'previously, the. ýBritish: had--won-ýa. protracted 
struggle-. forinfluence-over, the-Dutchp, '. and, had-firmly 
maintained:, the-advantages-of, senior-partner-, in-the- ýýt 
alliance-, brilliantly forged-by Sir. James. Harris. ý, 
Frederick-, -William, II of,, Prussiag though'connected with 
Holland. ýand Great Britain by'. -the.. Triple--Alliance had 
chosen,! to--concentrate his'attentione-first on Poland, 
and Eastern Europe and later on. France. The French had 
lost. -allhopes of dominating by, the overthrow of the 
rulingýparty but they.. remained the protectors by word, 
if not-, -by action, of the Patriotmovements Though 
(1) Letter written to Boyer-Ponfredeq 19th. Novembert 
1192, 'in papers of Boyer-Ponfrledej A. N., W. 292. 
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many, -, 
Patriots had fled-to the Austrian Netherlands 
after the, collapse-of the, 1787 revoltq feeling still 
ranAhigh inýAmsterdam andother towns. With-Dumouriez's 
-forces so-close'., the'possibility-of disturbances lead- 
ing, to,. insurrection, was very-'real.. -French protesta- 
tions-. that no.,, aggression against'-the Stadtholder was 
contemplated. -were'viewedý-with, bcepticism in England 
but. this.. wasinot-the only, cause for concern. In 
November.,, andi'the-,, succeeding'monthsýit--became apparent 
thatO.. despite-, the-prese=6 of an able ambassador at I\ 
the', Hague',, ", the7Angloý-Dutchýý-relati-onship, was by no 
means, -. mutually satisfactory*-, -IThe-Conf3eil Executif. ý, 
though--ýa, ware', ýofýthe"uneasy situation-in Hollandq, did 
not,, Isufficiently--trust, --Dumouriez to, authorize 
him to 
exploitýý,, it-. nor, -,, would. they-'take, the-irrevocable'step- 
of'-invasion of-, the-, Dutch, provinces, until Britain's 
position"and"Antentions became clearer., The future of 
the-. United, 
-Provinces, was. extremely. 
important for both 
Pranceýand-ýGreat-Britainq-for although internal prob- 
lemsýloomed-, large, in, the'outlook, of policy-makersý. on 
both-sides'. of the,, Channelg.:, Holland: becameg, in effect, 
the testing-ground. forý, British'and French, foreign- 
policy, andIplayed'an: important role in the development 
of,, Anglo-French relations. 
1 -1 L, - -, -. Apart"from these broad considerationsl, the, Hague 
was a scene of intense interest and activity at the 
turn of the year 1792-3. Men and, women of varying 
a tatiii6 a nd ability played a part in the uncertain 
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atmosphere of the times. The Dutch government was 
composed in the, main, of the-same politicians who, had 
figured in-the, drama-of-1786-ý-7. The'Princese'of 
Orange's strength, of character and powers of decision 
eased, Lord -Auckland Ia task of influencing the policies 
of. the,., House-ýof, -Orange. The Stadtholder had not 
acquired more., vigour:, in, -the. years of comparative calm - 
"Hisý-Serene, Highnessýpossesses so little energy and 
steadiness of mind, that-it is-impossible to rely on 
himAn-any measure from-one day, to another. a. "(1) 
Fortunately for Dutch interes, ts-the Stadtholderl. s 
indecision. was more than, matched, by thib experience'and 
talents of, the Pensionary., Van de Spiegel'had lived 
through-difficult years. Inýthe-great'crisis`vvhich 
hisicountryýwas-about to, face he, exhibi-ted much thought- 
fulness-fo .r its best interests, His greatest strength 
lay., in-his ability-to'handle men.. He was a fitting 
ally-for;. Aucklandi., who respepted-his polit, ical, flair. 
Auckland-'himself, though with many years in the 
diplomatic-servico and the prestige-of having negot 
iated-,. the commercial treaty of 1786 behind himg, found 
the-pressures of the deteriorating European situation 
increasingly bewildering. -The ambassa d. or was. a: loyal 
servant, of his government . p-anxious to maintain its 
pre-eminence in the Unit'ed Provinces but also alarmed 
(1)"Auckland to Grenville, 
Fortescue XSS, op. Cit. 
May 15th. 1792p 
P. P. 269-270. 
H. M. C. ', ' 
I 
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at-the-reports which reached him of unrest in Britain. 
Inclined to., be convinced of his. own. rectitudeg Auckland 4- 
did not easily make adjustments.. in his-, approach 
appropriate to the difficulties which, his task entailed. 
This was evident in his early reluctance to encourage 
unofficial links. with General Dumouriez. He was, 
howeverg. deeply committed. to. the prevention of war. - 
while any, means, 6f averting it remained open., _ 
In contrast. with, the experience, and, iknowledged 
'wilinese. of, the, Grand, Pensionary, and the British 
ambassadorg. the French embassy at, the Hague. pr, espnted_ 
a. picture-of disarray notunlike-its counterpart, in 
London.. The United Provinces had. -become a 
fertile 
bre'eding-ground, for all kinds of secret-agentsp arras- 
suppliers, and adventurers.,,, The French embassy spied, 
... -on 
the. speculators in guns and horses while all parties 
exused,, themselves to Lebrun., - An exaggerated appearance 
of republican fervour and zeal for-equality was 
paradedtin'the streets by Frenchmen'competitively 
ýý 1. --It --! -, an ious for'a'goodý'reputation*at-home. Yet, while 
insults were-frequently offered to the'Orange Party, 
this motley collection, 'of meng amongst whom were 
Beaumar c the autho r, and t he' 'abbe -. 
1 d'Espagnac 
(2) 
(1) BEAUMARCHAIS, Pierre Augustin Caron det'732-1799. Clock. 
maker, musiciang play-wright. Often embroiled in intrigue, 
he supplied guns 
_to 
the revolutionary armies in the 
autumn of 1792. 
(2) dIESPAGNACy M-R Sahuguet 1753-93. Forced to enter 
the priesthood by his father. but 
- 
Chose to enter the world 
T of finance. SUPYG"ýof weapons to the revolutionary armies. executed Aprij, 'ý179V 
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munitions-dealerv maligned each other constantly. 
The'confusions of the Prench, in-, the,. United, -,,. 
Provinces were typified. byl, the eccentric person.., and 
ambiguous position-of the ambai3sador, tothe-Haguet,.,,,,,, 
Emmanuel deýMaulde(. ')... He had been-appointed to the 
Hague'post'through-the influenceýof Dumouriezg, whose 
friendship heconstantly relied on in,, the, winter, of. 
1792. Dumouriezlsýinstructions-had outlined the need 
for'tact, cunningg, prudence and patriotism. in, the 
difficult situation'of the-Unite, d Provinces-but. un-, 
happily de-Maulde"lacked allr: of, these qualities. The 
only'cunning which. he exhibited arose out of a kind of 
de, speration. ---,, Him dilemma-vvas. typical, of, that oflnumer- 
ous other men:. of-his stamp., ý-The Revolution,. h4d, pro7- 
vided them with an ideal means., of, advancement-but-it 
required-unusualýrestraint-'-and-, political acumen to 
survive-and'to.: prosper, in'thei, shifts of, fortune-, and 
MAULDE, Emmanuel de, the 
fate of de Maulde are obscure. 
Convention written from prison 
he, was arrested by order of th 
dateg place of birth and 
In a letter to the 
he refers to the fact that 
e departement of Seine--ýet-Oise 
on April 8th. (presumably 1793) A. N. 9 F, 7,4434- 
There are indi ations-that he-was over 40 and possibly, -j 
over 50 years old; in a'further'justification, of his 
innocýenc'e he stated that he had not been to London since 
1769. '-ý`-'A. N. j F 79 4774. 
L 
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. -tituation, 
de Maulde, did. not-know the meaning of,,. - 
restraint. ,. He, had, some, conception of the problems 
likely,, to face-him in his ambaseadorial: post-but he 
could. -not. -find even,, a-moderately succesful way, ofýdeal- 
ing-with them. He. complainedg andtalkedi too, -much; 
even in: prison-during the year-II his-self-justifi- 
cation-was not-silenced-(l)- When he first arrived at 
the Hague he., had presented himself as a-'thorough'-ý 
revolutionary and, friend of. the Dutch Patriots. 
Auqkland suspected him of purveying sedition and-ex- 
pressed the,, hope that hewould-be recalled-, -, -ý, -The 
British ambassadorg'and indeed many of, de Ilaulde! s"-- 
fellow-. countrymen. regarded. him-las incompetent and 
faintly ludicrous,,. -,.!! Je. ýýne-,, puie-meme vous-cacher que 
leB,, de'donciations contre lui: se multiplient-tous-les 
j9urs ..... il-y, avait., longtemps, que J'avais concu, 
des-so a sur sa conduite., 0 _,, 
Thereý. were'accus 
ations at de Maulde had been using the money supplied 
io him'ýfo'r, ihe purchase*-of arms to line, 'his own pockets. 
His, chi6f'failure"was "son inactivite absolue dans le 
principal'objet de sa missionq'ý-clest(fa)itela politique. " 
This wasýthe man who'had written of Lord Auckland, 
De Maulde's letters while in prison are to be found 
in A. N. F79 4774 39 and, F 7,4434 (Papiere. saisis 
chez Danton. ) 
(2) Lebrun to Thainville, 26th Novemberg A., A-E-q 
C. P. Hollande 584. 
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"llambassadeur d'An gletOrre qu: ýe--doit'son I e&ýýtion 
quia see connaissances mercantiles et a la'-corruption 
'de"'notr'e" anc-ien' gouverneme . nt, es . Vtout I de I compose de 
sea erreurs diplomatiques. Sous4ce, dernier rapport 
ce nlest qu'un-charlatan fastueux-11(l ,. Auckland.. 
privately regardeddeýMauldeýas a'-'sorry, contrast to- 
ha own'diplomatic abilities., 
e Maulde may have dbýe little to further the"'_'. 
official'aims of his mission, -but'lie'was very far-from 
inactive The pressures of finan'cial embarassmentp 
brought about, he, claimedl by personal losses in conn- 
, eýqýt, ion, with, commissions to, buy horses and weapons 
for 
the French armies, encouraged him in the pursuit of 
., _1_11ý -IIVj. ". Iý-ý, ,ý. ýiIIIýI-P 
furtive, diplomatic goals. even. beyond, the outbreak of 
(2 
-, war., The fact that he defied Lebrun's, official. letter 
-of, recall on October 19th, until 
Januaryq_17939 is 
, ýplling evidence of, the Ministry, of 
Foreign Affairs' 
(1) De Maulde to lebrung lst. Novemberg A. A. E.,, 
C. P. Hollande, 584. 
(2) In the months of August and September most of 'the' 
letters sent by Lebrun to de Maulde deal with the' 
, 
purchase of arms., De Maulde said on December 7th. 
ihat he 'could not leave Holland until outstanding 
financial-questions were settled. A. A. E. C. P. 
Hollandeg' 584. 
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(1) inability to, deal with a: r-ecal. citrant. diplomat 
De Maulde remained. in, the Low Countries, --ýpsed on--the 
Hague but. pas. sing, to and. frolto.. Dum. ouriez, in Antwerp. 
. His shield was Dumouriez. The Dutch Patriots dis. -! 
trusted himg Thainvilleg. the young, and inexperienced 
army " officer, sent, as chargeý. 
Alaffaires could not-by- 
p' ass him. No'elgrho., arrived, to. take-things, -iný, hand 1. "'A 1, -1 -,. ý- %_''. " ý. ý 1ý 14-I ýý" I. I 
in January, 1793, found. de Maulde's lack of-co-operation 
infuriating., Numbers of men seem, to-have-been, 
(3) 
r, epell 
- 
ed by his self-importance, 
(1)ýý Lebrun to''de'Maulde, -'October"19th. - 17929 A*A*Eo'g 
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C. P. *'Hollande'-'584'. "De*Maulde made endless excuses to 
justify his-stay. On , Nov'ember'20't'ý. ' hýe`ase'erte'd'ý'tih'a't 
13ýe'hýd, "only recently received his-'l'etters , of Ir ec all 
In - Decimb'er h'e""'an'; d februn I 'h a d" , an an -g ry -, ex 
, change in which 
de-kaulde el'ý: i'med-, that"theDutch'Estates-General had 
not been--notified officially'of his recall. 
(2), '"No; l"to Lebrunt Febru6: ry"12tho"1793 -, "Mo Mauldý 
nla"daignee-'-'. -. ý avoir aucune coimunication'avec mo, i* 
'Aie4"que'soit'la-discretion en diplomatie, quelque-, necessa 
AA 
J- e crois' as-qulell dut etrepoussee jusqu a ce point 
avec"ioiý" A. A. Beq '-C. 1P-, 'Hollande, 
', ' 585*_ 
(3)'ý"'Haut*et"ýýuissant"seigneur, son . excellence Maulde, 
C ar clest'lainsi-qulil slannonce'. 'oo'ee" 'Anonymous letter 
to'ýtýe, `Ministryý"of Foreign, Affairsp-''February 21'st. '1793"g 
in A. A. B., Memoires et, Documentag France 322. 
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De Maulde's connections 'with the victorious gen- 
eral in Belgium and his discontent with his superiors 
in Paris pre-disposed him to play the dangerous game 
of-undercover diplomacy. He'was not, howpverv alone 
in-this' field, Van de Spiegel, the Dutch Pensionary, 
apparently-liked a diversity*of sources'and so he 
kept up communication also with a Dutch lady whose 
exp'*eii-enc'e''g'ave--h-'er'ý'aý-, certain finesse. Etta Palmp'also 
known-'as Madame'd'Aelders was an-adventuress born in 
the province of Groenigen in-about 1752. Some years 
before-, the ou tbreak of the-ReVolution she had travelled 
to France where her activities on the fringes'of dip- 
lomacy earfied-hei the, "enmit'y of'Breteitil. She seems 
to have travelled frequently between the Dutch provinces 
and Fraýiceq-since-the Pensiohary-had made use 'of her 
Vefore the"'aiitumn-of 1792. In Paris she had become 
in-ýolvid 'w-ith the women of the'salons, of 1791. Her 
motives-for-leaving in Octoberg'17929 are-hot cleart 
th ough 8h-eI -undoubtedly hoped to profit from. sending 
iiiformýti - 6n-back to Lebrun, by whom she was notp tech- 
nicallyP authorized before her journey. The French 
Minister though demonstrating some chagrin at the bold- 
ness of-Madame's tactics for remuneration, was never- 
, 
thelessimpressed enough by the information and sharp 
analysis of her letters to agree to payment for regular 
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99rrespondence. He wanted the official French 
polio. -t to reach. the Dutcht and, through themt the 
British.,, On November 26th. he wrote "Je desire 
que, dana. vos-converf3ations aveo le grand personnage 
que_ývous connaisseFp vous lui dolLez des assurances 
4es,. dispositions pacifiques de la Republique a llegard 
des, puissancee-qui garderont la neutralite. Vous lui, 
ajouterez, aussiv-Madame, que hous, nlagirons jamais 
offensivement. contre aucune-puissance que-lo. rsque nous 
aurons, eu la conviction d'une malveillance-bien 
marquýd,,, ou, dlun, projetforme el de nous attaquer. 11(2) 
,, ý-,,, -: The, Frencliýgovernment were aware-that 
Pitt and his 
ministers would. observe their, conduct towards Holland 
yery, lelosely. ., 
They had, -_no, intention of giving any 
ground. for-complaintpýthough naturallyq 'their view 
of-wha't, might;. - 6jn-stitute-a legitimate grievance did 
not., 
-correspond. 
with, English views on the security of 
the Dutchlrepublic.. -ILebrun was also acting on 
the 
belief that-concernýfor their, Dutch ally would be off- 
se, t-if not-actually overshadowed by Britain's internal 
(ij The outbreak'of warl in February-, 17931 forced Madame 
dlAel'deýs-to' remain at the'Hague.. After the French in- 
vasion-of 1794 she was imprisoned in the same fortress 
aýi Van de, Spiegel.,.., She- was releasedýin 1798. Gedenki§tukken 
der Algme'e'ne Geschiedenis van Nederland, vol. i. 
ý'2)ý-Lebrun to Madame dlAeldereq 26th* Novemberp 1793. 
Gedenkstukken der Algmeene, i, op. 
_cit. 
p. p. 193-4. 
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difficulties. --The minister intended that it should 
be made abundantly clear to Britain that France did 
not threaten Holland. His view was seconded by the 
outlook of Frenchmen in Englandt particularly Chauveling 
whose. assessment of the place of-Ho lland. in future 
Anglo-French relations was extremely over7-simplified 
"Puis'qulil est decide dans le Conseil de la Republique 
que nous. respecterons la Hollande, vous'pouvez compter 
aujourd! hui, citoyeng sur 11inaction ent: ýere du 
gouvernement'anglais et me6e sur la dis - position favorable 
a, notre egard, auxquelleg, il sera reduit par les cir- 
constancesg-, co=e-sur ' une des bases les plus solides 
de-toutes vos-combinaisons politiques"(1)'- He-further 
reported. that, he had'made--known a detailed I description 
of Prench intentions-towards Belgium, which had. duly 
got back. -. to-Pitt -"Ielles, m'oVt-paru eclaircir bien des 
doutes. et--cklmer bien'ýdes inquietudes. " At the end of 
November Chauvelin-was able to-present the official 
policy of"his'goverzment, in person to Grenvilleg for, 
despite his apparent complacency in his despatches to 
I'll the Conseil Executif the French ambassador was aware 
of the, value of a direct approach to the British-govern- 
mentý*on a question which was so closely connected with 
the-entire framework of Britain's European diplomacy. 
fell to the-young ambassador, rather than any- 
ofI7, the unofficial agents present in Great Britaing to 
(1) Chauvelin to, Lebrung 14th Novemberg A. A. E. - :; ', 
COP, Angleterre 583. 
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attend the,., meeting with Lord Grenville on November 
29th., in which the recent developments on theýcontinent 
were discussed., The interview is of interest. not 
merely., for the assurances given by Chauveling and., the 
I,, --, "- 1 .1ýI 
different emphases placed by both men onthe signifi- 
canoe of, the. opinionsexchanged.,, It was the first 
direct. contact since the revolution of August 10th. 
and. at a, time when Pitt's government was striving to 
regý4n, its equilibrium in the conduct of domestic 
policy* Grenville's remoteness was clearly'evident. 
The, inierview had taken over a week to arrange and 
Chauvelin. hadq meanwhileg been placed-in the awkward 
position, of not exactly kndwing his country's intent- 
ions with, regdra-to Holland, which was the main object 
of. the meeting. - "M. Chauvelin told meq in substance, " 
wrote Grenville, "that circumstances changed so 
rapidly in France that he could only say now thatp at 
the... time-when he wrote the note to desire to see me, 
he, 'was-authorized to contradict the . reports which he 
observed-, to prevail in. London, of an, intention on the 
part of-France to attack Hollan'd; '. that on the contrary 
he could. have renewed the assurances which he had before 
given of-their disposition to respect the neutral 
powers.... "10' He spoke always of the opening of the 
Scheldt'as a. thing determined uponj saying that it was 
aý'natural 'right 
(1) Grenville's minute of his meeting with Chauvelin, 
November, F. O. 27/40. 
:IIý 
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Both"Cýa'uvelin and Lebrun drew conclusions on 
British intentions towards France from the exchange 
views at-this late November meeting, which were'con- 
a, iderable'misrepresentations of'Gr, envillels'guarded 
statements. The ambassador wrote-that he did not- 
think-the-British government were-prepared'to refuse 
recogniiion'-of the-Republic., -'His, comment wasp in 
itself, negative# but'the general'tone of Chauvelin's 
report onth6, -meeting was, so'optimistic that the 
F6reign-Minister aI pparently didý'not read between the 
lineB'*'(1) The'Briti'sh king. and his ministers were 
very'sensitive on'the issue'of recognition of the 
revbliitionary-gover=ent in. France and did not regard 
it"as, -a" m_iý'or'point. 
(2) Lebrun was'wrong wheng, res- 
ponding, to'Chauvelin on December 5th. p he wrote, 
"nous-voyons ..... que les difficultes seraient 
bientot 
ýeve I es'e. '. il-nl, eýait plus 'questionque d'amener-la, 
cour de'Londre's a la reconnaissance formelle de la 
. 
ýepublique.. 
e 
-.,,,,,,, On,, the 
issue. of, the inviolability. of Hollandt 
Chauvelin's confidence was not even shared by other 
Frenchmen, who exhibited anxiety over Dumouriez's 
next move. Noe"l was not the, man to leave Englandq 
(1) -Chauvelin to Lebrun, November 29th. 1792t-, -'- 
ý. k*E- --C. P. Angleterret 583. 
(2) See Below, ý-, 
'(3)': Lebrun to Chauvelin, December 5th. 1792. 
A. A. E. C. P. Angleterreý 584. 
'V 
1 / 
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where;, he'thought-he-had.. important contactso without 
g9oýd(. cause. 
-,. -Helbelieved 
that British alarm over the 
, safety. of Holland. warranted immediate consultation 
with, -Dumouriez. - On November 24. th. he informed 
Lebrun that he was leaving for Belgium the next day. 
-, He, remained there for over two weeksq returning on 
, December. l2th. During his absencep. Maret gained the 
. much, sought-for-interview with Pitt and No'el himself, 
ironicallyqýwas directeýd by Lebrun, on December 7th. 
to leave . -England 
for the Hague. 
Hugues7Bernard Maret, premier commis 'of the-first 
. (ýorrpsponde ' 
nee bureau of-the Minist'ere des Affairs - a- 
,, 
Etrange. res. had arrived in England on November 10the 
u1sly spent some the Austrian , 
4aving previo time in, 
(2) 
The ostensible reason-for his arrival Netherlands. 
, 
in England was to bring the Duke of Orleans' daughter, 
, her. governess, Madame de Silleryq and, the children of 
general BroglieqO) back to France. He proposed to 
Letters' from' Noel to Lebrung .. No - vember 24th., 
December 13th., * and from Lebrun to Noglý December 7th., 
1792, in A. A. E., C. P. Angleterre, 584. 
(2)'-H'ugu`es-Be: ýnard Maret,, ' 
'senior 
official 
of the Ministere des Affaires Etrangeres, took part'in 
the peace'negotiations of 1786-7; created Due d'Otranto 
by Napoleon. 
; 1(3. 
) -Maret to-Lebrun, November 10th. and 17th. 1792. 
A. A. E. 9 C. P* Angleterre, 583. 
I 
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visit-Dumouriez after crossing the'Channel, - "Il ne 
sera point. inutile que je. cause'avec le, ge'n--eral de. la 
mesure dans laquelle vous avez, autorise 11 Noel-. eý 
Chauvelin a dire ioi que vous vouliez vous tenir a 
llegard dela Hollande.,, Si*Dumouriez attaquaitý- 
Maestricht, comme il ml. a dit-qulil en avait le, projet 
les. -assurances, donnees parnos agents sembleraient 
av. ed.. raison-un-procede.,. b. eaucoup_trop royal. 
Justified in their. --, Maret and Noýl were anxiety 
over,, Dumouriez! s, future plans. _It -was not 
immediately 
obvious. after the occupation that although-the general 
might make threatening noiseslis freedom of action was, 
in-fac. tg constricted... His own. views on Holland would 
not have soothed the British government's na ; Zý-Lly 1 
ýý'ýtion dubious reaction to French assurances -I'lle pe(d 
serait si-vite faite que l'Angleterre nla: urait pas, le 
A 
ýem-p-1,3-de sly reconnaitre. D'ailleurs'la Prance la, 
(me-'hace ait 6t la serduirait a la fois; elle, la mettrait c 
em meuie de chbisir entre une. guerre maritime et 
1U=ense-benefice que lui., donnerait ltaffranchiBse- 
ment des colonies eBpagnoles. 11 -If England did not 
respond to-this exchange of interests9 France still had 
nothing to fear I'Maitres de--la marine' hollandaiseq 
nous-, serions, assez forts pourecraser'l'Angleterreg., 
surtout en. interessant les Etats-Unis d'Amerique, au 
(1).., 
-Maret 
to Lebrun, November 24tht l792. 
A. -A. E. -C . 
19. Angleterre , 583. 
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soutien de nos colonies. *0611"(1). The scheme was 
evidently totally unrealistic, but in the tense at- 
mosphere, of late November sober judgements were not 
always made. 
It was not only Dumouriez's unpredictability 
, which gave rise to differences in the French view of 
Holland. Lebrun knew that detMauldeg the French 
ambassador at the Hagueq- was an unreliable man whose, 
efficiency and-patriotism I were , -'-suspect. 'In view of 
the Anglo-Diitch--'allianceý, and-the-enhanced-. importance 
of the Hague, as'"a'diplo'matic*centre the-Prench govern- 
ment A6eded a well-organized legation in the United 
Provinces'as much-as in'London. -In-Hollandq toopit 
became apparent that'the-revolutionaries had few men 
whoseý'loy_alty'_was beyond reproach and-whose abilities 
in any way--matdied those-of, the seasoned diplomats, of 
other`pow'er6. ý Plans'-were afoot to send Genetv-then 
at St. Petersburg, -with credentials, which would be, --ý, 
presented"'to the-Dutch tatate8ebut by Decemberg in a_ 
switch indicative of the way'-French policy towards- 
Great Britain-and the, war was shaping he was, sent to 
Philadelphiaýin'an attempt to influence the United 
Stat'es'. -' At a critical-poin't'in. Anglo-French relations 
there was no-one, at the Dutch caji-tal whose-abilities 
(1) Dumouriez to Lebrung 30th. November, quoted in- 
Sor 
I 
el A. 
IDumouriez9 
un General Diplomate, Revue des 
Deux Mondes, op. cit. p. p. 801-802* 
ýk 
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were in any way, the equal, of Lord Auckland's., The 
French certainly, received--a'quantity of-unofficial 
information but the sources were irregular'.,. Lebrun 
was furnished with frequent reports; characterized by 
a fair degree. -ofw-impartiality by Madame-d'Aelders. 
The letters sent, by Madame to Lebruný-painted-a vivid 
picture of, the tensions at the, Hague and could not 
have left him, in any. -doubts about. the disarray of the 
French legation.. 'She continually pointed,, out, -that 
de Mauldeq Beaumarchais and several un-named-bankers 
were,, representing-, the Convention as-being-without 
authority. "I-. II 
-. French protestations, whether delivered directly 
by Chauvelin-or indirectly by the instructions Lebrun 
gave to French-, agentes were intended to calm British-, 'ý 
1-1 fears. ý'The Conseil Exe - cutif wished-to-avoid'ýthe' poss- 
ibility that'a. defensive reaction', from Britain would 
resultAn a-departure frommeutrality., -They were not, 
howeverv'fully aware of the British view-of the Anglo- 
Duteli, *, relationship. - The importance of-Holland as-a 
major fact'ortin-the. breakdown of relations, between. 
Great Britain and France in the months before-the out- 
break, of war has'been both misunderstood and, exagger- 
ated. -ýIt, is'gen'erally assumed that once the Scheldt, ` 
was'declared open'Briýish obligations to uphold, their 
treaty with the Dutch caused such an immediate polar- 
ization of'relations between England and Prance that 
war e came virt ual ly unavoida ble. 'This is a gross 
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over-simplificatiQnj, -sincelt ignore's'comp3: etely the 
iniricateýinterplay-'Of, foreign', -and'domestic'pre- 
ocoupaiiOnsland, the tensions-between Britain-and-the 
Dutchq- vvhich. grew, in the last months -of 1792; ` 'The 
British gOvernment"found themselves'contemplating-- 
war-ýagainstýPrance, with'the I 'disquieting knowledge'-that, * 
the Dutch werealmost totally, . unprepared militarily-, and 
by. nolme ans'dependable politically. 
ýPittlsýadministration had'failed; to appreciate 
the'strainsAnherent in, ýan, *alliance whichývýirtually 
amounted*, to-, English'dominati6ii-. -of"every-aspect of Dutch 
politics. ' , The-advýantage whiclý, Britain'expected to', '. 
derive from'interference in Holland iný1786-7 was 
clear as soon'-as, order had been restored there 
"It was-not'necess6ry--for us to trouble, ourselves with 
definitions-, of*. the-'legality of the government of this 
or that-c6untryg-or-the'strict construction'of-the-- 
constitution; -ý but'it was-. enough if we, saw an-opportun-, 
ity-. of. 'restoringý, that party to power, which was-, most 
likely'. to.! prove' a valuable friend to Great Britain"i'n 
the. day, of future difficulty-"(') The words were-, ',,,.. 
Burkels,,, spoken in the House-of Co=ons in. -1787 but'--,, - 
they-were an early indication of the-drawbacksýof, -ý- 
such'aýone--; sided partnershipf When-the day-of future 
difficulty, did arriveg Great Britain had'cause to, 
(1) Burke in the House of Co=onsq-quoted. in A. Cobbang 
Ambassadors and Secret Agents, p. 204. 
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wonder about the value of the friendship of the- 
United Provinces-* Solidarity of'approach and-joint 
neutrality had always been impressed on the Dutch as 
the only proper; course which they andý., Britain -could 
follow. 
-Any 
inclination on the part of Dutch-politi- 
cians-, to depart-from this.. line,. was countered by quoting 
0 
the terms of-Ithe Treaty. In'adhering rigidly to this 
approachqýwithout stopping to assess the wider impli- 
cations of continental developments the British govern- 
ment was laying up, unwittinglyt a store of trouble. 
The geographical-situation of Holland was such that 
it was difficult'for. -the provinces'to remain neutral 
duringý_a-lEuropean conflict. - The position of England 
was very-, different; she could declare herself neutral 
and remain, ', so until circumstances or inclination 
brought about, -Ia decisive change of po licyo 
The-difficulties extended beyond the major issues 
into--the, roote of the alliance., The Dutch were generally 
resentful of, heavy-handed British. control. Even the 
more, -placid'and cautious officials such as the Grand 
Pensionary'smarted under, continued British dictation. 
At 
, 
the, -turn of the year 1791-29 when Lord Auckland was 
on leave in Englandq there was a minor crisis as'the 
Austrians tried to pressurize the Dutch to ally with 
them in a joint bid to stamp out dissension in the 
Low Countries. The British considered that such action 
would be foolhardy and firmly vetoed the idea "we 
are-determined at all hazards to abide by our decision 
.! )ILn ýr--Tv 
andý, to claim. from the Republic-the right we have to 
insist, upon their not departing from the Convention 
to which we are joint parties. "(') 
The. most severe blow to the harmony of the alliance 
had not come from its political but its commercial 
aspect.., -In order to participate fully with the British. 
the Dutch. -felt that their economic recovery must be 
effectively. 'guaranteed and that the most satisfactory 
methodýof achieving this would be to reach an agreement 
on'theýEastern trade and on neutral shipping rights. 
PittP--Grenville and Dundas, who between them drew up 
a, (variety-'of modified schemes as a basisfor a treaty 
were. -Icertainly hoping-to settle the matterg but-they 
did. not share-Sir James Harris's conviction that 
111f, thd alliance-failsv the influence we have recovered 
here will, very soon drop and the system we have taken 
11(2) such pains to restore be eclipsed at its d awn. 
By. the-time negotiations finally came to a haltj Lord 
Aucklandg, Harrials successorg was thoroughly alarmed 
III; am convinced that we cannot now abandon the negot 
iation', without abandoning, every advantage of cordial 
friendship and concertýwith the United Provinces in 
(1) Grenville to Aucklando December 17th, 1791,. 1 H. M. C 
Fortesque MSS. op. cit. P. 240. 
(2) Harris to Leeds, February 22nd. 1788, F. O. 37/219' 
cited in Harlowq 
Vqý The Founding of the Second British 
Empire -vol. ii P-390. 
2 41 
time of-peace and without leaving the two countries 
in a more'dangerous predicament respecting each other 
in time-of war-"(') 
The failure to set the alliance on the basis of 
genuine co-op , eration was comprehensible in-view of 
the, Stadtholder's known. weakness and the fact that the 
-ruling party had practically lost control of the sit- 
uation in-1786-7. It-wast-, howeverg to lead to'mutual 
suspicionsý. and, recriminations when a difference of 
interest--emerge'd'in the. face of possible hostilities 
against the French. After Jemappes the British 
government,. i=ediately ýrealizee that a gesture of 
support-to"the Dutch was required. Both Pitt and 
Grewille, Qoweverq were very far from happy that-. much 
a public pronouncement might embroil Great Britain 
in'-the-., European upheaval against her-own interests. 
On November 13th., Pitt wrote to the Earl of Stafford 
"Thea'strange, and unfortunate events which have, followed 
one-another soýrapidly on. the continent are in many 
views-a'matter of serious and anxious consideration. - 
That which presses-the most relates to the situation 
I 
of Holland..... as must indeed be the case in conseq- 
uence of the events in Flanders. However unfortunate 
it would be to find this coanuxy in. any shape committed, 
it seems-'absolutely impossible to hesitate as to 
(1) Auckland to Grenville, January 3rd. 1792, Add. 
- 
MSS. 3494419 quoted in Harlowq OP. cit. P-415. 
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supporting our ally in case of necessity and the, 
explicit, declaration of our sentiments is-the most- 
likely way', to prevent the case occurring. "(') 
Similar, views were, expressed by Lord_-Grenvilleg, who 
wrote to Auckland. on the same day "I trust the 
declaration to the states will produce its effect 
both-in Holland. and in France., If not, we-are comm-, 
i tted, andLmust make the best of it. 11(2) 
The. allied powers, sensing that Dutch security 
was an issueg,. through, which, theymight,, at-last draw 
Britain. into continental troublesg--. found, that British 
reservations were still very. strong. --On 
November 27th. 
Baron,, Jacobi -the Prussian ambassador, in London, '_-., 
. asked 
Grenville what measures would. be, taken_ýto safe- 
guardtthe internal.. tranquillity of Holland - "Pour. ce 
qýii_regarde. -. llinterieur des Provinces le roi-ne doit 
z4 pFendre ni-memeconcerter des, mesures a cet egard, 
que. 
-dapres, 
la'. requisition expresse, du gouvernement---,, --. 
hollandais,, qui est-seul-a portee d1approrc-ler le, danger 
e_t,,, d1. indiquer_les,, moyens les plus-efficaces, 
_dly 
remedier. #, 
(3) 
. ý.. 
The_-declaration of which Pitt-and-Grenville had. -- 
M- 'Pitt to Stafford, November, 
_13th.. 
Ge'Rose, ", Diaries 
and Correspondenceg Vol. it P. P. 
(2) "Grenville to, Aucklandy November 13th. - H. M. C. Fortescue 
MSSIG op'-ý cit. p*332* 
qrenyýllels reply, to Stadion,, November 27th. 
F. O. 7.355/39. Jackson Papers. 
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spoken was the official statement made on. November 13th, 
of, British isupport, for., the, Dutch in the event-of a 
threat to the territory of the United Provinces., --, --- - 
Commentingýonýthe combination of staitling events over 
recent months, the Foreign Secretary continued 
"In this situationg however, HisýlMajesty could not 
but-feel--that, the only, -probable, means. of averting the 
danger is to. meet: it with firmness. And deeply as the 
king'. would lament on every account the necessity of 
giving. -any interruption to, that state of external 
tranquilliiy-from-which his subjects derive'so many 
advantagesp-Hia Majesty's regard to his engagements 
as well, as his sense, of the. real, andý, permanent interest 
of. his people, would.. leave him no hesitation. as, to the 
propriety-of, his. assisting the Dutch republic as'. -, 
circumstances. might, -require against, any attempt made 
on the'part of-any, other power. to invade its dominions- 
or-to disturb, its government. ",,,: Auckland was instructed 
to, publish, this statement without loss of, time. 
(1), 
T4e-, British ministere. considered, thatýit, had'much 
wider implications than a mere re-assurance to the Dutch, 
-"part of the effect to be expectedýfrom it must depend 
on its - being known as early - as, possible, both at Paris 
11(2) and-at, the headquarters of the French army. -The 
British, government felt misgivings thatthey might be 
(1) Grenville to Aupklandt, November 13th. P. O. 37/41. 
, _(2) -, --ibid. 
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committing. themselves to-involvement in Europe and 
hoped that a'public statement of intent to Holland 
would have, a'real influence on the direction of French 
policy.. Burgesq the Under-Secretary, even considered 
that an, unaceredited, person should have. been sent to 
Paris-at the same time in order to reach a more definite 
understanding. 
(') 
Surprisinglyt howeverg the French 
showed tery little immediaýe-reaction to the declar- 
ationýý-The d: ecree opening the Scheldt was presumably 
decided*on, before news of the declaration reached Paris. 
Very. little wýLs. made of, it until Chauvelin first ment- 
ioned it during the November'29th. interview. 
,; 'The-threat to Holland and the unpredictability of 
France7had'compelled Britian to renew her interest in 
European developments. Though loathe to depart from 
policies which had resulted in peace and prosperity, 
the British ministers sincerely, hoped that adopting a 
firm tone-against a country-generally known to-be far 
from*. secure in the functioning of its internal govern- 
mentýmight'produce'a more moýerate a'pproach-from France. 
The-government realizedqýhowever, -that events warranted 
approaches"to the Austrians and Prussians. 
.. 
There were risks in remaining ignorant and isolated 
at such-a time. Consequently-the British government 
had to swallow its pride (less than a week earlier 
(1), -,. Burgefj to Auckland, November 13th. 'Auckland, 
Journals and Correspondenceg vol. ii, P-P. 467-468. 
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Grenville had-been congratulating himself on the 
wisdom of Britain's lack of involvement in Europe)(') 
and express their desire to enter into communication 
with the Courts of Vienna and Berlin. Sir Morton Eden, 
Auckland! s-. brother and ambassador. to Prussiag was 
informed, on, November 13th. of the change of policy 
and, -the influence of the unexpected events in Flanders 
on the decision to seek contact - "you are not ignorant 
that His Majesty has from. the. beginning remained in 
a considerable degree uninformed of the nature ofIthe 
plan which. has been acted,, upon. by the Courts of Vienna 
and Berlin. relative, to. the, affairs of France and of 
the, views. entertained by those, courts with, respect to 
theýtermination of the war. His Majesty having so 
repeatedly-declined to make himself-a party to that 
e. nterprizeq forbore, to urge for, any more distinct 
explanation with respect to-it receiving also the 
intimation, of his own sentiments till circumstances 
should-'arise which might call for a mutual communi- 
cation, on,. the subject. The unforeseen events which 
have arisenand most particularly the success of the 
French. arms in Flanders have now brought forward 
considerations in which the common interests and 
engagements-of His Majesty and the King of Prussia 
(1)"- Letter to Buckinghamg November 7th. ', Buckingham, 
Memoirs'of the Courts and Cabinets of'George'ljj9-'voj-. ii, 
p-op*'223-225. See, Chapter-8. 
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are deeply co ncerned. 11(l) Eden was ordered,. to present' 
a copy I of-the declaration to the Dutch-and told, 11you 
will-add that His Majesty feels the present crisis 
too'important"to the general interests of-Europe, and 
particularly to those 9f his allies not, to be anxious 
to be"MUch more particularly 'acquainted thanhe now - 
is, with-the situation and views of the Court of 
Berlin; ".. '. '. '. " In a private accompanying despatch 
Eden'was'warned that he was not to comment on any 
sýe'cific-'suggestions-for'ending the'conflict which the 
Prussians might put-forwardt,. neither was he. to press 
for discussions if the government in Berlin seemed 
unwilling. '- The allies, offended-by earlier British 
conducto made no definite response for two, months.. 
These, 'fi'rst moves for wider co-operation wer. e followed 
by. 'a'more detailed plan suggested to the Prussians on 
December 29th. -9 which sought European agreement, on a- 
form of mediation to end the war and the peace to be 
1 (2) 
imposed on'France. Though as yet-largely'unaware 
(1) 'arenville to Edeng November 13th. P. O. 64/26i 
(2)""Grenville toýWhitworthp Devember 29th. P. O. '65/23. 
S6e'Chapter 10o In'this plang which is discussed-in more 
detail-in Chaýter 109 the British wanted general agreement 
r- eached - on terms of peace with Franceg the withdrawal of 
French'ý'armies into France, 'thýe, abandonment of conquests, 
the repeal of acts threatening the. sovereignty of other 
nations-and a declaration not to foment discontent in other 
nations. In return the hostile powers must not interfere 
in France's internal affairs. 
I 
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of the republic of Holland's inability to defend it- 
self, the need to demonstrate to France that the United 
Provinces could not be overriden with impunity had 
caused the British government to extend its horizons 
beyond the comfortable but negative policy, of neutrality. 
The third element in the situation of Hollandp 
which both the British and the French did not always 
keep in the forefront of their considerations, was the 
Dutch. government's own view of its affairs. Madame 
A 
dlAelders kept Lebrun--i-ifformed on the attitudes that 
she perceived and Aucklandq toog tried to bring. home 
to Grenville that a monolithic pblitical. approacht, 
particularly in the uncertain military circumstancesq 
was not always tactful or realistic.. Replying to a 
letter in which the Foreign Secretary had suggested 
that measures for the ensuring of internal and European 
peace were identical for Britain and Holland, Auckland 
wrote "What you have said, however, respecting the 
same system-being applicable to the two countries, 
notwithstanding the diversity of their positions, will 
be contested by my friend the Pensionary, and perhaps 
f 
with some force under the new circumstances, which have 
taken place. ***. "(') The Pensionary was afraid that 
the fate'of his small country might be decided before 
Britain could step in to do anything to helpt rather 
, -- -: k. 64. (1), Auc 
, 
kland to Grenvillet November gth. Fortescue 
MSSI op. Cit. P-329. 
_ 
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as Dumouriez had reasoned in the letter to Lebrun 
on November 30th. 
(l) 
His method of handling the Prench 
agents over the distinct possibility of invasion was 
masterly. Both Madame and de Maulde noted that the 
Dutch'were uneasy at the proximity of French troops, 
but instead of threatening France with the wrath of 
Britain'in the event of territorial infringementep 
Van de Spiegel cleverly shifted the onus of responsibility 
squarely on Franceg by crediting her with the highest 
A 
motives - I'Le magistrat ministre me dit en meme temps 
de vous assurer, citoyen, qulil a trop de confiance 
et dlestime dans le gouvernement, et le ministýer, e de 
France pour avoir la moindre inquietude Such wa's 
Van de Spiegel's reaction to the opening of the Scheldt. 
(2) 
The Pensionary never admitted that he feared an in- 
vasion. -his anxiety-was, he told de Mauldeq that 
French troops might accidentally stray across the 
frontier*' To avoid difficulties in thesecircumstances 
he suggested a proclamation which would provide for 
týe'restitution of land. 
(3) 
These ideas were not the 
result of consultations with the British government. 
They were mentioned in the course of discussions which 
(1) See abovet Dumouriez to Lebrunt November 30th. 
(2). Madame dlAelders to Lebrun, 20th. November, 
Gedenkstukken der Algmeeneg-'op. cit. - p. p. '191-192. 
bi 1--De Maulde to Lebrung November. 17thq Gedenkstukken 
der Algmeene, op. cit. p. p. 221-222. 
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the. Pensionary held on his own initiative. -Unlike, 
Pitt.. and Grenville, - Van de Spiegel had always realized, 
and acted on, the necessity of finding out as much-'as 
possible about the situation, of France; this inform- 
ation was vital to the way in which he dealt with 
French agents.. Madame dIAelders was surprised at the 
intelligence-of senior 
tres--longue confer"'ence 
I 
lee ai, trouve"moderEs 
. 01, arrives en'France. le 2 
Dutch officials - "Pai eu une 
avec' le, pouvoir executif. Je 
sur les erven-ements dits funestes 
%II 
septembre et singulierement 
instruits-sur-toute la constitution, et non seulement 
citant,, les principaux orateursq. mais encore les 
morceaux les'plus interessants.. de leurs discours. "(1) 
Prom. hiibccontacts vvith. Madame dl. Aelders, and the , 
evident, bickering, between, Frenchmen, at theýHaguet-Van 
de, Spiegel would-have-gleaned-some idea'of the diss- 
ensions within French government'-and'diplomacy. - He 
wasýnot the man-to fail to manipulate these tensions 
to DutchtinterestsO It was the combination-of Van de 
Spiegells'independent views and'his ability to play 
the, intricacies of the diplomatic game which led'to 
the establishment of a channel through which. general 
Dumouriez could, be, contacted. 
... The unofficial'contacts with General Dumouriez, 
though failing to produce any positive result, 
(1) Madame d'Aelders to Lebrun, November 9th., 
Gedenkstukken der Algmeene, op. cit. P-188. 
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demonstrated, the different interests and emphasis of 
-1 the British and Dutch governmentst, the Conseil, Executif 
and'lits agents and. generals. The negotiationg which 
began, in,, mid-November carried on, until. after the. out- 
break;, of, wars', At; every stage it illuminated, -, the,, tens- 
ions, of-the-, wider-aphere of suspicion. and conflict in 
k 
which its, participants acted. It,,. was born in-lHolland 
through, the an ieties of the Dutch Grand Pensionary 
and the'bitternese, of the French-ex-ambaseador and it 
was. in Hollandq despite Lord Aucklandf. s 'genuine attempts 
to salvage something -from, the outbreak, of warg that it 
finally-, faded.,., During-the course. of the-intrigue-, the 
men most, directly involved learnt a great, deal, about 
the dangers of-over-rigid. opinions and the abstract 
justificatibna-which their governments were toýadopt 
in, defence, of a dreaded conflict. Auckland with his 
disdain-, and-hauteur and de Maulde with his self-,... 
assured bravadog, were fitting representatives of the, -- 
two, -societies which-were moving closer,, to hostilities. 
Despite their mutual disliýe, their contact was not 
unfruitful. The forces which they sought to influence 
and diiý6ct-were'too gr eat for them. It is to the 
credit of, both men, but especially Auckland, a diplomat 
of well-established views, that they came'to recog- 
nize 
Emmanuel de Maulde was in every way a contrast to 
the Englishman's national pride and the Dutchman's 
8. tuýied urbanity , 
251 
. -, By, the time that Van de Spiegel decided to assess 
the Frenchmants usefulneesq de Maulde-waa suspected 
by his own government and regarded as almost entirely 
untrustworthy by the, British ambassador. De Maulde 
told, Van de Spiegel that he would denounce the Conseil 
Executif at the bar of the Conventiong but still he 
wrote to'Pariezurging an attack on Holland. There 
wastonly one constant in de Maulde's behaviourt but for 
Van'de Spiegel's purposes this was sufficient. De 
Maulde did not waver in his-support of Dumouriez* 
It was predictable that'on November 17th. he would 
cover*himself, by,. giving Lebrun'details of his convers- 
ations'with Van de Spiegel and-Aucklandg'but Dumouriez 
had an army and Van de Spiegel, with-de-Mauldeg 
believed that this"army might be the key to the future 
of Holland. 
--The secret negotiations which at one stage raised 
hope. s7', ofý'a, meeting between Lord Auckland. and Dumouriez 
began,. vvith, an7, aD, Darently. casual exchange between,., the, 
(1) De Mauldeýto Lebrun, November 30th., 
Gedenkstuk, ken der Algmeene,, iq op. cit. p-240 
(2) Van de Spiegel noticed that De Maulde had chosen 
to emphasiBe the potentially decisive role of the army 
"Enfin dans les petites, choses comme dans lee grandes ..... 
ý., ýia'tournure'de--noe-affairesg ce sera-laýforce%armee 
qui, en-decidera; "Pe seront ces-gardes pretoriennes. "-ý-, 
Auckland'to-Grenvilleg, 19th Novemberg F. O. 37/41 
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Grand Pensionary and de-Maulde on November 17th. 
Van de Spiegelg-anxious about Dutch security and more 
aware than Auckland of the extreme'slowness of naval 
and'military preparations', had chosen his'moment well. 
R=ours were-circulating that de Maulde was financially 
embarassed. The Pensionary and Auckland did not seem 
to know that de'Maulde's recall was a month old and 
that he, had'disobeyed Lebrun's"commands to returh to 
Paris. 'Van de Spiegel saw'de Maulde alone; ' he evid- 
ently regarded"'the-interview as preliminaryp a means 
of sounding out the Frenchman., De-Maulde's sense of 
'6e and his-grievances were'played uponO--- sýlf-impo'rtan 
The ambassador expressed the-fear''that his-recall 
would have deprived him of the opportunity of seeing 
Dut6h, officials"-""Pourquo. i cela? " replied Van'de 
Spiegel-. ým "nous vous aurions reou comme un homme de 
votre'naissance a. droit de slattendre, je crois meme 
que le Prince--vous aurait recu soks ce titre, et ne 
sly'refusera pasýencore quand--vous I vous presenterez. 11(l) 
ii, 'ry, e-n6oureged de-Mauld - els smouldering: The'Pen ona 
resentment'-against the-Paris government, and having 
expressedg, almQst-incidentallyg--some'concern'lest-, '-'-' 
French troops should stray across the border, brought- 
forth from-de Maulde the admission-, that he would 
(1) "Pre'cie, dlune conversation entre M; 6deaMaulde et 
moi, 17 novembre. 11 --by Van de Spiegel in Gedenkstukken 
de Algmeene, P. P. 229-231. 
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discuse, such matters with his friend Dumouriez, and, 
inform the Pensionary of the General's views. At the' 
end of the discussion Van de Spiegel found a sure way, 
of retaining de Mauldels interest. The mention of 
A 
Genet's proposed arrival had brought forth comment on 
the reception of his letters of credende. Van de 
Spiegellwas careful notto commit himself beyond the 
limits prescribed by England on this-question but he 
let de Maulde know that the Dutch retained an open 
mind. on the question, of recognition. of the French 
republic.. Both Holland and Great Britaing he affirmed 
ardently,, desired, peace-in Europe - 'let quant a, moi en 
mon particulier (je, vous parle toujours avec confiance) 
si la base de la reconnaissance de votre, Republique 
pouvait y con, tribuerg je llenvisagerais-c9mme un , 
bien pour 11humanite.. 
Two days-after the first meeting,, 9n 19th November, 
Van. de-Spiegel saw. de Maulde again. _He 
realized that 
he, had aroused the Frenchman's interest and decided, 
that now was the, time,., to make his move. The mention 
of a. European pacification had provided an ideal 
opening. Great Britain and Holland both wanted peace 
and, it"wasnot to Francel, s interest to pursue the war.,, 
What,, then, was the. best way to open an exchange of 
views I'Devinerez-vous la reponseq Monsieurg clest 
voust'ouig il nly aI que vous qui puies'iez en faire lea 
premi"e'r'es ouvertures confidentielles et la'seule 
personne a qui vous pourriez VOUB ouvrir eat le general 
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Dumouriez. 11 Van de Spiegel recognised the necessity 
to flatter Dumouriez's vanity as well as de Maulde's. 
The general was already covered in laurels. He would 
be at the height of his success if he could exercise- 
his influence for-peace. Dumouriez and de Maulde 
would receive lasting acclaim in France and more solid 
recognition from Great Brit&in, and Holland - "Clest 
ainsi que M. Dumouriez et'vousq Monsieur, vous vous 
acquerriez un droit eternel a la gratitude de votre 
nation qui vous devra l1affermissement de'la liberte; 
et en meme temps jtose vous'assurer tant aulgene*r-al 
N,, I--- quta vous que l'Angleterre et . la Republique se--- 
chargeront aved plaisir de la reconnaissance reelle- 
du bienfdit que vous aurez rendu a 11humanite.... " 
De - Maulhe replied that he would pass these ideas o-n, 
to Dumouriezv''whose influence had great weight on the 
, Conseil Executif. He went on to say that France did 
possess i=ense resources and expressed the view that 
the'neutral powers-were-afraid of the spread of French 
ideas. The Pensionary, hI owever, did not tbIe offence 
at these statements- "Je dois cependant la justice 
a M. de,, Maulde que ces propos ne, sont pas alles 
N ý' ý-1, I's ý- -11 -I'I 
I-, " % 
jusqula llexces; qulil a parlCdans llesprit du temps, 
mais avec moderation ...... 
(1)'. 
-IlConvereation-entre M. -de Maulde'etýMoillj, 19th. November, 
Gedenkstukken der Algmeene, p. p. ' 233-235. - 
F 
The British ambassador hadq initially, a more 
limited view of the place of these contacts in inter- 
national relations. His opinion of de Maulde was 
such that it seemed to him unlikely-that any progress 
of major significance would be made. He was aware 
that both Dumouriez and de Maulde would have to be 
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_, 
offered money and this principally occupied his thoughts 
in connection with the intrigue. 
('ý 
The chief advan- 
tages of the link established-between the-Hagup and 
Dumouriez's., camp at Antwerp w0rej, -so-farýas he could 
see,, that, the. generalls intentiýns towards, Holland, could 
be more readily assessed, and-a variety.. pf, interestingg 
if, not-altogether vital intelligence would-be obtained. 
It is, significant for Auckland's general view of-the 
negotiation, in its early stages, that he was delighted 
by. the,! Icapturell of de Mauldels'instru6tions on his 
appointment to the Hagueq-then. 'some eight months out 
of datef-ýEnsuing hauls_provided him with-numerous, - 
ill-assorted itemaq including a Latin ode to Dumouriez 
'(2) 
, written-by-a Dutch Patriot. 
(1) On November 23rd. 9, Auckland wrotea curiously veiled 
letter to de Maulde, on the question of financial compen- 
sation, in which he referred to Dumouriez as I'Le Heros", 
but stated that-he had absolutely'no, authorizatione 
Gedenkstukken der Algmeene, op. cit. 
_, 
P. 237. 
(2) Despatch and enclosuresl December 13tho, ý'Auckland-ý, 
to-Grenvilleg F. O. 37 41-', - 
A 
\ 
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If. Auckland was scepticalp the, British government 
were even more guarded and they remained so through- 
out the course of the contact. Grenville did not 
intend to prohibit any exchange which held the promise 
of providing intelligence. On November 25th. he put 
before George III the proposal that an initial sum 
of money should be placed at Auckland's disposal. 
The king in his reply voiced the kind of doubts about 
ýhe overall value of dealing, with Dumouriez which grew 
in, ýBritish, ciroles - "I feel the advantage of a general 
peace, if it. can be effected to the real satisfaction 
of. the, various, parties concernedt but at the same time 
not, less forcibly a disinclination to Prance gaining 
her point and perhaps laying a foundation to encourage 
other countries. to attempt the same game; for it is 
peace-'alone,, that can, place the French Revolution on 
a, permanent-grqundq asqthenq all the European states 
.. must acknowledge this new republic. " He had no objec- 
tions, to financing the link but acknowledged that he 
was, ", far frqm sanguine either that the Prench general 
will venture. to-speak out, or-that,. if he wouldo we 
can manage. -the business in a manner to satisfy the 
various, courte, concerned or even to escape blame,. from 
an appearance of being the. first to acknowledge the 
French Revolution-"(') 
(1)"'George'III to Lord Grenvilleg November'25th. - 
Fortescue- MSSq' op. ' cit. P. 339. 
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The king's words gave some indication of the 
perplexities of the European'situation at the time. 
The Dutch9n most immediately threatened by French 
troops, seized at a possibility of warding off in- 
vasiong if only temporarily. Dumouriez's difficulties 
in Belgium and his increasing isolation from the 
government of France made the dialogue with the neutral 
powers seem attractive. In Paris Van de Spiegel's 
words on the possibility of mediation and recognition 
were read with great interest. Lebrun communicated 
them very accurately to Chauvelin on November 30th. 
"Je vous transmetsq citoyenq sous le plus grand secret 
les termes de 11ouverture' confidentielle faite par 
M- de Maulde. Je vous parleg dit-il, au nom de oet 
etat et de l'Angleterreg vos vrais amisq qui vous 
Presentent une x, honorabläet eure-, Consentez a 
notre Commure m&(d ation. resente'z les basesq jten 
n ný vOis une la r' nnaissance-ee--v6tre nouvelle consti- n 
A tut'on; c_Ommeýmg'diateurs nous'la reconnaitronst que 
voulez-VOUB de Plus?. Ne voulant-pas de conquetesq 
vous serez et dans ce cas nous sommes les ennemis de 
ceux,, qui sly refuseraient. " Lebrun was impressed by 
this development but he was not entirely satisfied 
that the'British government was itself fully apprized 
of what had been said "je deeirerais'cependant- 
savoir si elle a 'ete faitede llaveu'et dIu consentement 
du Cabinet de St. James et si Lord Auckland dont nous 
connaissons depuis longtemps les ruses-politiques a 
recu des instructions alcet-egard. Nous le soup- 
connons dle 'tre concerN avec le Grand Pensionnaire 
dans la vue de pe"netrer-nos projets r6lativementrau--- 
voisinage de notre, arm6e-de la Hollande. 11(l) 'The -' 
Foreign Minister was-wise-to question'the extent-of the 
British government's involvement in-developments in 
Holland, but, his ambassador,. Chauvelint had gleaned 
nothingzfrom-Grenville! s-, carefully,, worded'official' 
statements--on-. Holland-Auring the-November, 29tho meeting. 
Grenville, gave no assurance-that Britain, conourred- 
with FrenchIclaims on, -the'lopening of the'Scheldt, and 
said, that,, Britain would remain neutral. if the rights 
of. her allies were'not violated. - At the same-timeg a -, 
movement. had taken place in England which led to, an'-, - 
even'greater--division in outlook between the'British 
and--the French governments. -Despite continued, interest 
in-theýinternal'concerns'of Britaing, the French, had 
no. way of1foreseeing or'cOmprehending the shift-in'- 
thinking which'had affected, the', *governing classes of 
England'during, -the crisis.. of, ', confidence in November. -, A', x 
(1) Lebrun to Chauveling 30th Nov-emberq A. A. -E. 
C. P. Angleterrep 583. Van de Spiegel's words are 
exactly as they appear in de Maulde's report to Lebrun 
of 21st November in Gedenkstukken der Algmeene, op. cit. 
P. 233. 
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Chapter 8 
The November Crisis in Great Britain. 
"So, sure as we have an existence, if these things 
should go on in France ..... in the ripeness of their 
timep the same tragedies will be acted in England 11 
Burke to Grenvillep 18th Augusto 1792. 
In-mid-Novemberf 17929 a-startling and unexpected 
conjunction of. -. internal-problems-andý'developments on the 
European continent produced in-Great,, Britain such a 
variety and vehemence of general r. eaction that informed 
menp both within and outside the governmentp were"thoro- 
'the-volatility--of ughly alarmed by the implications-of., 
public opinion. "A universal change is preparing in the 
opinions# manners and custoMs'of'men.. -.. . "('), Here was a 
crisis of. confidence and of coneci6ýsnees which illumin- 
ateslthe-day-to-day. background of . wider diplomatic-con- 
siderations'such., as-,. the, -, -inviolability ofýHolland and 
the 
t 's opening of theýriver-Scheldt-. ', -',, Ind: Lvidual-members of Pitt 
governmentl--not-uEsually, noted for emotional responses to 
difficultiesq'were th . emselves--sensibleý. of theýuniqueness 
of the tensions-which gripped Great, Britýin. The, 
country gentlemeng- bewildared, --and fearfull were seized 
by-ýthe-necessity*for. 
-vigilance'. -In the-spring they had 
responded with a, flurry of pomposity'- to, the irrever- 
ence of Thomas, Paine. The man himself was now a 
(1)"'W. A. Mile a-to, Ld. For te e-cuep: 'November 12th, 1792 
Mifes, Co'rrejsýpondence on theýFren-ch-Rev'olutiont iq 
P- P'O' 346-7. 
f 
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deputy for the Pas-de-Calais in the French Convention, 
the very body responsible for the direction of the 
troops who had overrun the Austrian Netherlands and 
the governance of revolutionaryFrance. The Eng lish 
squire, unaware that Paine was ill at ease in the 
rowdy debates, that he could speak almost no Frenchq 
saw only the enormous mischief which thisInean-looking 
--niarill could do in 
the circumstances of November. All 
over the countryp it was said that men were reading 
Paine; he had even been translated into Erse. 
Who were his audience "little tradesmen who have 
large families and, pay, great taxesq j ourneymenj arti- 
ficers. and poor day labourers to farmers and also- 
jj(2) bad-7minded people who have nothing to lose. -ov 
The, writer might also haveadded militiamenj even 
regular soldierso as, well as, the hundreds of. arti , 
sans, 
shop-keepers"and the like who flocked weekly to join 
the London. Corresponding. Society, and similar., organi- 
zations in Norwich, Sheffield. and Edinburgh. 
The. 
-situation caught 
Pitt's government unawares. 
In. the first ten days of November Pitt himself had 
decided to take, definite steps to curb, the spread of 
sedition. He knew that certain areas were experien- 
cing economic. difficulties and he was,, uneasy about 
111-1-17 
(1)'-"Lord'Henýy-Spencer'to*Lord'Aucklandp November 26th, 
Auckland, Journals and -Corresp iidenice " op. Cit"P. P. 468-9. 
(2) Letter, from"c'orrespondenýýin-'Readin'g'to Lord" 
Liverpoolo'December 12thp Add. -. MSS., - 38,228. 
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Ireland and Scotland, thoughýDundas was-attempting to 
restore'the equilibrium--north*of the border. -The-1-- 
situation., on the continentq so Grenville believed, 
had-resolved, itself into stalemate until thespring 
campaign. 7, British neutrality had evidently been 
extremely wise, -The news-of the fall of Belgium and 
the, panic which-'ensued put the government in an awk- 
ward-ýpredicament;, - The sheer volume of, work. which 
piled up daily,., became-exhausting. How,. could one, take 
important decisions when-the next dayýs-news brought 
fresh developments, to be considered?,, - Influential 
members of the. 'Opposition began,, to-press for vigor- 
ousaactiony to-restore morale and forestall, the threat 
of, disorder: and insurrection. Voices began to-Adentify 
British-difficulties directlytwithitheýFrench Revolu- 
tiong. -'whose agents had poured in after Augus t-10th. 
and Septemberl-2nd. and,, whose-pernicious doctrines were 
choking-the'air. ýof. English liberty. - In, these, weeks 
the'government's outlooký-on, France. -was-transformdd. 
Where-before'-. there had been-lack--of-interestj both of 
a,, sense-of securityq', ýthere was not suspicionand fear* 
France's own actionsý-in, Europe'provided-ample proof 
of her pervbrsity. The November crisis in Britain 
brought home to many Englishmen that revolutionary 
France was a threat to their ehtiie way of lifee 
One of the more curious aspects of the wide- 
spread feeling of insecurity ih Britain in November 
was that it was noticed by French agents in London 
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and commented on by Lebrun in Paris., No instructions 
were given, and no obvious attempt madev to exploit 
the government's embarrassment to French advantage. 
French instructions do not bear out the viewg which 
has frequently been expressed, that the revolution- 
aries had brought upon themselves Bpitish wrath by 
their persistence_in spreading discord in Great 
(1) 
Britain. It is true that at the beginning of 
_December 
Peyrera was told to spre'ad-discord, if he 
could, in the British navyq but this move would appear 
to have been'prompted. by knowledge of antagonism to 
the press and fear of the British navy's ability to 
prepare for war almost immediately. 
(2)The French agents 
were not nearly well'organized enough to do, much 
practical damagev though doubts and uncertainties 
caused the, British government to react very strongly 
to their presence. The French were not slow to' 
perceive British fears but they made a very serious error 
in assessing the effect these would have on Franco- 
British-relations. The British government's fear of 
propaganda could, according to Lebrunis despatch of 
November-11tho', be easily'countered; it would 
(1)_ Particularly representative of the French attitude 
are Lebrun's two despatches to Ch 
(A elin of November llth., 
A. A_. E. 9 C,. P. Angleterre 583. 
(2) Undated instructions (probably early December) 
to Feyrera, A. A. E. C. P. Angleterrep Suppl"' ement 29. 
263 
evidently, be. =ntradictory to, interfere in British 
domestic concerns when France made it, -clear, 
that she 
would brook no meddling in, her own. Convincing the 
British government of France's good, faith on this 
issue was entirely another matter. In general, how- 
ever,, Lebrun foresaw only indirect benefits to'France 
from therpresent state ofýaffairs across the Channel 
"Au. reste, A1--nIest pas malheulý-ýdux que dans une, 
circonstance aussi delicate, -ýýil se prepare dans,, les 
trois, -royaumes-, 
des evenemente, caDables. dloccuper lee 
Anglais-chez eux et de lewlempecher de porter... ýoute 'I 
leur attention sur, nous*"(') This: ingenuous attitude 
is-the key. -to understanding French policy towards-1- 
Britain, in.. Novemberland the--early part, of December... 
It should be, rememberedg toog, that France had many 
more immediate. interests; few concerns were,, so vital 
as the approaching, 'trial of the king. Despite a 
better, grasp of theýneed. for -information on all 
aspects of ýhe.. other country's lifeg the revolutionaries 
had--no common bond of experiences no common outlooks 
which would have enabledýlthem, to comprehend. the, 
reactions of an, English. squire to, the spectreof', 
murder and anarchy which he-: associated with, the French 
Revolution.,. The. French were well-informed-on: the 
state'of England. in, November-ýbut-they were. -totally 
unprepared for the repressive measures taken to maintain 
Lebrun'to Chauvelint llth-Novem'berg A. A. E., 
C. P. Angleterrep 583. 
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a stability which might be conveniently strained by, 
dissension but which was not, in theireyes, on the 
verge of complete collapse. 
From the viewpoint of Pitt's Administrationg the 
state of Scotland, though becoming more alarming in 
Novemberg had long been a-source of disquiet. 
(') 
Public order had been a problem since the King's 
Birthday Riots in June. Troops had quelled these 
disturbances but they could not control the spread of 
serious discontent buth economic and political. _ 
The 
economic grievances were brought about by a food- 
shortage and the enclosure of large areas of the z 
Highlands for sheep-farming., A free-holder of-Ross- 
shire outlined his predicament to Robert Dundasqýthe 
Lord Advocatet "The Sheriff will explainito your 
Lordship that we are at present so completely under 
the heel of the populace-that, ' should they come to 
burn our houses or destroy our property. in anyway 
their caprice may lead them 
-top 
re are incapable of 
resistance. 11(2 This was written on the last day -of 
July. By early October it was the extent of political 
reform associations which was seriously disturbing 
Henry Dundas.. * Scottish politics were based on-a 
complex of family influence and local curruption The 
agitation for reform of the burghs where self-electing 
(1) See Chap'teF 
(2) Hugh Monrp. to Robert Dundasq JulY. 31st, H. O. 102/5 
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and self-perpetuating'-town councils misruled and, mis----- 
appropriated had merged with the demands, for better 
patliamentary representation. 
(') 
The associations 
were strong'in the emerging industrial areas; places; 
mentionednwere: Dundeeq Montrose, Aberdeeng Paisleyq 
Perth and-Edinburgh. Ever-resourceful. and well- 
versed in the'less respectable practices of government 
activity,. -Dundas, had already sent spies to infiltrate 
association"meetings in August. The situationg un- 
fortunatelyq had,. 'deteriorated, in October. Despite the 
fact that his prolonged absence from'. London was giving 
rise-to-critical comment in government circlesp Dundas 
was not-prepared to leave Scotland until he-felt more 
happy about*, the situation. --. He stressed'his 
fears, to 
Pitt "The contest here is with the lower orders of 
the people whose-minds'are poisoned'up to the. point 
of Libertyq-Equalityýand-an Agrarian law. ", 
(2 Dundas' 
skill'as'-a , political manager was particularly useful 
in-such circumstafices. --'. Iný a, move", strikingly similar 
to-that-employed only. a. week or so later by those, 
initiating the English, Loyalist Associationsq he 
informed Pitt'on November-12th. -that he'intended, 
to- 
enlist-the: support of prominent citizens and the church. 
This was an important stepq but, the most urgent, need 
W For the general situation in Scotland, s'ee H. W. Meiklej 
Scotland end the French Revolution, Glasgow, 1912. 
(2) Dundas. to Pittq November 12th,. P. R. O. 30/8/157. 
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was to rectify the lamentable state of military defence 
in Scotland. --He wrote to Pitt - "it is my duty to 
state to youy without, the'least reservet-Ithat the' 
force is very-inadequate indeed and howev. erýunpleasant 
the communication may be-to you it is necessary for 
you to make'up your mind'to a greater Military Estab- 
lishment so long as the present fermentationýin the 
people's-minde, exists. I suspect that this holds 
with respect to England as well as Scotland. "(') 
Two guard', ships for the Firths-of Forthýand'. Clyde 
would also be useful. - Dundas remained-in Scotland 
until early December exchanging a stream', of letters 
with Pitt. His reports were digebted'andý-acted upon, 
forming a crucial element in the'government's approach 
tto-the problem of general and widespread disaffection. 
-One of -'the - most-, distinctive f eýLture's of the 
Scottish situation, was, that-economic-and'political' 
grievances hadýbegun to merge into one, body of agit- 
ation-'--In_En'gland. at*Ithe beginningýof November the 
t'Wo"vvere'still more distinct but"the 'overall'impression 
of-une -One-aipectof-economic'dis- asiness remained*eý 
content'was clearly'viSible in'-the troubles on-Tyneside. 
During, the f irst. -, two'weeks - of IllovejAber*- the, 
authorities-found'it, necessary to"assist, the local'' 
magistrates to'suppress an, outbreak of 'rioting among 
the seamen, 'at'South, Shields. --, The trouble arose after 
(1) Dundas to Pittp"November 12theq -P. R. O. 30/8/157. 
an easterly wind had kept a large number, of ships in 
port. When the wind changed the seamen "assembled in 
great, n=bers in. different parts. of the townEi, of North 
> 
and South Shields and in boate. upon the river Tyne, 
insisting that-the masters of all ships, -, should pay 
four guineas wages for the voyage. "('). The owners--,. 
were eventuallyforced to comply-with. this demandq 
though the normal wage-for voyages had previously been 
only fifty-Ishillings.. 
_--To, put an end-to_the, 
disorders 
the-government sent--three, sloope'to-South-Shields on 
November 5th and a fourthýon. November, 13th. --On, the 
7th. the Iniskillen. dragoons were ordered to. march - 
from York.,, After about,, ten days. the,, disturbances 
ceased. The dispute. itself--had no. thing, to do, with the 
spread. of revolutionary principles. and was not un- 
usual for Tyneside where-there-. had-, last been diffi--. 
culty in September, 1791ý_, In_-any other-year_ýhe riots 
might, well. have been regardedýas, -atroublesome but, 
not altogether, surprising, occurrence. - In November, 
1792, however,, they had more. -, serious. overtones. -The 
central government. realized,, withe-concern that local-, 
magistrateB were ill-prepared to deal with organized 
crowds. The demonstration that-available. forcesýof-- 
law and order were often of'little use in an-emergency 
might have far-reaching ramifications if similar 
trouble grew on a national scale. 
(1) Let, ter, from, North Shields to Pittq November 3rd, 
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The government-though, naturally concerned, about 
the Prevalence ofýriots-'On. the-Tyneside, modelgýwere 
primarily involved in the first two weeks, ofýNovember 
with the fight to control a more pernicious and . ý. 
diffuse*menac. e; namely,, the, spread-of seditious,, liter- 
ature-'ý_-'The Marquis of Buckinghamt Grenville's brother, 
believed-thatfirm action oxi-this'score was imperative 
and'taýxed the-government with what', he held, to. be lack 
of ývigour in their 'approach" -_. "I: -think ýyou will, find', 
Yý6urselves muchý', _charged -with ýneglect -or.. with, a mis- 
t'aken-line of conduct1n, sufferingý. these various. and 
outrageous publications-and'. overtýacts. to remain, un- 
punisýed, -which'. 'certainly have called loudly--for-the, 
1- 1-- M" attention'and: exertions of the. Crown, servants. 11- 
Grenville'seems to have been somewhat-, irritatediýby- 
this"'advices' -Everyone, 'he saidg vias-willing. "to, ýsound 
the`alarm; ýbut no-one bothered-. to, send him-, any, specific 
proofl'-without which-the*Attorney-General, could-not 
prosecute'. ' 'The-process, of the,,. law-had,.,, to. ý-, be-l-observed: 
"Nothing'that"-I'-know, zof. "lhas'been, neglected that. 3could, - 
tend 'to-put, the., law-in, force--against them", -(ptLrveyors; j,,, 
6ditiousýliterature. )(2) of 8 
--William Pitt sliared, -BuckinghamIE3-concern-, over-.. the 
Buckingham to Grenville, November 8th,, Portescue MSS 
71ý 
4. cit. P. '327. 
(2) Grenville to Buckingham, November 14th. Buckingham, 
opo cit'. -, - p". p'9'226-228., -z 
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menace of sedition. His--letters to Dundas-made, it 
clear that he was,, determined to take action, but he 
was still considering the alternatives a: qd had, not 
decided which scheme. to adopt. -One possibility,,. he 
wrote on November 8th., was to make the penalty for 
publishing seditious libels much more severe, perhaps- 
classing continued publication, as a felony., -Equally 
effective might-. be registration-of all printersp who 
would haveto,.. proitide securitywhich theyýwould forfeit 
if government foundl; it necessary to,. take legal pro- 
ceedings against,. them;, Iý'l-These, ideaS., were. scattered 
and semi-developed.. - They-, give the reader. -the impress- 
ion'of-some degree, of urgency in-the minister-le-mind. 
"I am strongly persudded., of, the-, absolute necessity of 
taking: some effectual'; measures to: prevent whatlwill- 
otherwise be every-day. Ancreasing upon,. us.,, --, Itris-so - 
material. for-us, to-be as well prepared, as'we. cang. and 
from. -the impression. which I, find is arising', everywhere, 
it becomes so importantvin point-of, appearanceg,. to--- 
shovv-that, we areýattending to-themi that I--cannot help 
anxiously, wishing you here again. -... ' -I am veryýsanguine 
in, thinking that vvith, -exertion we still 
have,, in. our 
islands, the means of. preventing-any,. serious,, interr- 
uption to the, prosperity; of the, -countryl"but with. -, all 
the undoubted, industry, which-ýappeare. now-tol-be used to 
produce mischief, it is not possible to feel at ease. "(') 
(1), -Pitt to-Dundas,, November Sthl Pitt-Tapers, vol. ii, 
University of Michigan Library. 
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Pitt was certainly disturbed by the widespread diss- 
emination of subversive literature, but he"still, saw 
this as an entirely domestic problem. The, direct, 
link between internal discontent and revolutionary 
Prance had not yet been. established in his mind, 
Dundas in Scotland and Pitt in Whitehall believed 
there was need for vigilance but t"y disliked the 
obvious and heavy-handed measures suggested by, men 
such as Buckingham. Grenville, too, as he had told 
Buckingham on November 8th, still firmly, supported 
the view that the situation required only "watching 
much at home but doing very little indeed. " This 
negative approach was equally applicable to, international 
affairs "All my ambition is that I. may, at, some. time 
hereafter when I am freed from all active concern in 
such a scene as this isq have the inexpressible, eatis- 
faction of being able to look back upon itp, and to tell 
myself that I have contributed to keep my own country,,. 
at least a little longer from sharing in. all the evils 
o, f ever ,y, so , rt 
_ that surround us. "M Unknown to 
Grenville,, the-battle of Jemappes, fought the day, 
before he confided hisýmusings to his. brother, -had 
dissolved these dreams. The. implications for.. European 
peace, particularly the safe-guarding of Holland were 
grave. Infinitely more alarmingg howeverg for men 
(1) Grenville-to Buckingham,, November 7thqýBucýkjngham, 
Memoirs of the Courts and Cabinets of George 111, yol. ii, 
p. p. 223-225. 
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who shared Grenville's reasonably moderate outlook 
was to witness the catalytic effect filtering 'through 
the great lords to the humble workmen of the sudden 
intrusion of French victory on English consciousness. 
Perhaps before mid-November no-one had ever really-ý, - 
taken the French revolution'very seriously. Evidently 
there was as yet no military-'or naval-threat to'-Britain. 
It was the collapse'of all 're'straint, of wildly-' 
contrasting public recqptib4`of the continental news 
and its 8Lpplic ation in the" , po tentiallyý un s table c ircum- 
stances of England which so shocked the government. ' 
The news of the French success was 'clearlyýan 
inspirationgto many men. -The London Corresponding" 
Society's numbers had been climbing during October)- 
after news of Brunswickýs_` retreat, but'in No'v*ember' 
men were joining in their hundreds each week. 
These ment shoeý-makersj' clock makerst carpentersq-, "- 
were almost entirely drawn from the artisans of London. 
Their secret , ary, 'Thomas Hardy, had himself described- 
the social composition of-the' L. C. S. as''Itradesmen, 
cs and shop-keepers"" Amidst the pandemonium- mechani, 
and exhilaraiion-of theircrowdbd meetingsp these men 
of the., 12. ower orderslq'-'i. iýnt addresses, 'of, congratulation 
toýrepublican France and delegations, to-, deliver them 
(1) "Se-e'J. Walvin, English Democratic Societies and 
Popular Radicalismq 1791'-1800"(PartII'l The Emergence-, 
of I? opuiar'R'adi-calisia)g-York-D. -Phil*, Thesis, 1969. 
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to the Convention. Their own movement sprang from 
fundamentally, different roots and experiences. They 
could not in any real sense copy thePrench or apply 
their forms, of action to the English situation. 
They hadl. neverthelesel received a spurlto their cru- 
sadev realizing that they now stood on the threshold 
of participation in political, life. Like Paineq they 
sensed that. t'he climate. had changed, so, they told their 
French brothers "Though we appear comparatively so 
few. at presentg, be assured, Frenchmen, that, our number 
increases. daily...., men# now ask. each other, what, is 
freedom? What are. our, rights? "(') In other areas of 
Englandg, toop the Corresponding Societies attracted 
more members. "I have been staying some time with my 
relation Lord Walpole, " wrote. Captain Horatio Nelson, 
"near Norvvich,. at, vvhich place and near. it the Clubs 
are, supported-by members-of,, the Corporation and they 
avovv-that., till some of the, nobles and, others in 
Parliament are sdrved as. they were in France they will 
not be. able. to,. get, their rights.. "(2) In Sheffield 
a. prooession celebrating the, French victories, depicted 
Dundas as half., mang, half, ass.,. On the last day of the 
(1)' Address of the London'Corr espondin g Society to 
the'Conventiong Novemýer. 1792*9'in the-Annual Register 
for 1792. 
'. 
ý2)_ Nelson'to the Duke of Clarence, 3rd November 1792, 
in Nicolasq N. H., ed. Nelson's Despatchesq vol. J, 
p. p., 292-293. 
273 
month the Home'Office was warned "in future"the, public 
opinioh must'always count for something. 
In November 1792, it was hard for the ma. jority 
of men to accept such'statements. 'For the-gove'rning 
classes-had I 'alsoýreacte_d animatedly to French' 
victories'andý'theirjalpable effect on public'opinion 
at home. ' - -Unable to keep apace"of-the'tide of-events, 
they suffered'-what'-can only be described'as I a-'psycho- 
10gical-crisis. I '' Their I letters_anddiýAesq-, the I -very" 
int . ens'ity'-'o'f-'the'ir response to"thietthre , at to, - stability, 
betrayed their anguish. "France is drawing her nets 
I, ýA. 1, ,ý 
ý1_ 4ýI 
round'us on every"side; and'she hasZa-party-to-destroy 
us within the'toilsý- As to the, growth'Of this-contagion 
wiihin-our"walls, as"a mere domestic-evil and'un-' 
connected with a'dangerous foreign'power, -I'have ever 
had little'comparative apprehension.  But'combined 
with the -foreign-foree -a there* danger. 11(2) 
Burke'voiced a, general fear. "Suddenly"the', mutteringSý-' 
, of-illý-fed labourers, ' 'and underpaid seamen assumed 
menacing proportionsg"for these'men - were easy-prey to 
'of sediti" '' 1ý I the-maxims ous-literature and the, persuasive- 
ness-of-ubi4iiitous"Jacobin agents. - The government'' 
fe4r*ed-a'direct attack, on-public'order'and an indirect 
attack on the,, basisof. the only form of society they 
(i).. 
-. Ben'jamin Vaughan to, the Home 0, ffice, November 30th, 
H. O. 42/22. 
(2) '-Burke, -, to'Fitzwil3: iamq November 29th,, Burke 
OP- cit. P. 317. 
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had ever known. When, -they looked at Englandv,. what 
did they see.... -Ilpitmen, keelmeng cloth-dressers, 
cutlers: not nnly the weavers and labourers of 
Wapping and-Spitalfieldevýwhose., colourful and rowdy 
demonstrations hadýoften come out,. in support of Wilkes, 
but working men, in,. villages andý, _towns over 
the-whole 
country claiming-general. rights for themselves*"(') 
The evidence of., their own eyes now, seemed to substan- 
tiate'the-belief. that there was-a direct link-between 
revolutionary France-and domestic--, discord. Lord 
Grenvillej himself. betraying less-. anxieýy than the- 
majority-of. his. acquaintances9-, graspedýperfectly. the 
country's mood at-Ithe-time. ý-.. "Quietly. reprimanding 
his brother's acceptance of. every. taleýof riot-and 
seditious, assembly he commented . "It, -is, not unnatural, 
norisýit an-unfavourable symptomp, that-, people who 
are thoroughly-, frightened, as the body-of landed; 
gentlemen in'this country areq*-should exaggerate'these 
btories, ýs'. they pass. from one-. mouth. tothe,. other; but 
you, whoAnow the course'of this-sort of. repor'te, 
2). 
ought-not too hgatily to-givet*credit, to, them. ý' 
Suddenlyq. public opihion, had, become dangerously', volatile. 
There-wereqý-. howeverq-those who'still believed that 
(1) E. P. Thompsonin The Making of the English Working 
ClýLss, (Pelicang 1968)" P-113--- 
(2), ', Grenville, to -Buckinghamg November-_1ý4thq 
-'Buckingh=, 
op. cit. P. P. 226-228. 
ell 
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swift and'organized action was all that'was needed to 
restore order, "not Justýin the countryside but in 
men's generally'disordered minds. On November 20th- 
an organization was formed, to. realize this aim,, under 
the title of the Association for--the Preservation of 
Liberty and Property against Republicans and Levellers. 
The man behind the Association-was John Reeves, 
a lawyeiý, who had-returned from Newfoundlandg-vvhere he 
had been chief justiceo: in the spring of 1792. 'After 
his return-he had been granted the post-of Receiver 
of the Public Offices, in which, capacity he assisted 
in the re-organization of-London's police-system. 
(') 
Reeves was not a man'-who s'ought personal,, publicity, 
but William Cobbett left aýremarkable description*, of 
him -ý "a really learned, -l-awyero and, -, --politics aside, - 
as, goodý-aýman as. ever lived. 'A. clever manj, a head as 
clear as sptingl, wAter;. considerate; mild, humane;, 
'made Wnatiire-, to be an"English-'Judge. ---I didýnotý-break 
with, him", on"account of politics. "Ile--said, nothing- 
I 
about them-for-yearsýI Always-had. theýgreatest regard 
11(2) for hime.. .,, Reeves, had, made'it plain'to, -Cobbett 
that in 
I 
his estimation the only way for men like 
themselves to get anywhere in life was to toe the 
government. line. The A. P. L. -P. 9 with all its outward 
(l)-- The rie-organization was. -done, -under,. the Middlesex 
Justices Act,, 1792. See R. R. Nelson, The Home Office, 
1782-1801. 
(2) W. C. obbettv The-Progress of a Plough-boy. p. p. 92-3. 
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show of spontaneity and national popularity was 
essentially the brain-child of this clever and 
cynical man, who had hit upon a simple and effective 
expedient for turning floating public opinion back 
towards Loyalism and Anti-Gallicanism. 
The origins of the Association were never revealed, 
no doubt because Reeves was more concerned with estab- 
lis#ing the movement than with answering potentially 
awkward ques . tions. 
(l) 
A small group of people did meet 
in the'Crown and Anchor Tavern on November 20thp where 
they agreed to appoint a committee, and issue an 
advertisement giving information of-their intentions. 
Reeves had already prepared the resolutions so there 
was little, if any discussiong even at the Association's 
inception. Its course had already. been decided. The 
watchword was to discourage "in every way that lies in, 
our power the progress of such_, nefarious designs as 
are meditated by the wicked and senseless reformers 
of the present time. " The Association's. objects were 
the suppression of seditious. publications, support 
of the laws, prevention of riots and the circulation 
(1), '-On the'Association movement see E. C. Black, The 
Associationg-Harvard University Press, 1963, A. Mitchell, 
The Association Movement pf-l79 Historical Journal, 
19619 and'D. Ginter The. Loyalist'Association Movement'O 
HistoricdJournal, 1966. 
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of tracts and publications of a suitable loyalist tone, 
among thellower orders. " 
Its aims published'i the Association set about 
ensuring that the "ways" which lay in its power would 
be many and effective. First it had to perfect its 
own organization in London. On November 20th. a 
committee was nominated on which government supporters 
were str+ represented. Among those named'were John 
Bowles, a Loyalist pamphleteer and Chatles Yorkeg 
M. P. for Cambridgeg a mah who had already made un- 
pleasant. the lives of dissenters in his constituency. 
.1 
London was only a beginning; Reeves wanted to foster 
a national Loyalist movement and he wanted results 
ýuicklyp within a matter of two weeks if possible-. 
In'the provinces his task was relatively easy, thanks 
I 
to the state of mind of Grenville's frightened country 
Ig; entiem'en. There., was no difficulty in finding men 
willing to take the lead-or. -form co=ittees. All-that 
was necessary was some general administrative guidance 
and a little advance publicityq in the'form of re- 
p- rints of the Association's inaugural 'declaration, 
published in favourable provincial newspapers. Reeves 
had the not-inconsiderable resources of government at 
his'disposal. The Post Officep engaged in preventing 
the spread of seditious, pamphletsp gladly distributed 
Reeve@""Itractsp and those hewspapers subsidized by 
gover, nment, gave Reeves prominent display. The net 
, ppread wider and wider. Early in December, printed 
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letters'were sent to known ministerialists, and, at' 
the suggestion of the Times, to vicars, and to deans 
and-chapters in cathedral towns. Circulated with the 
letter was a document with-"a plan recommended-to the 
inhabitants of country townsq villages etc. where it 
is proposed to institute societies similar to that 
held at'the Crown and An'chor. 11(l) The plan included 
a model, declaration'and instructions 
an associationg organize a committee 
subscription. "-The committee was the 
organization. `IýIt ought to be "small 
for the-despatch of business, for it 
bered that'these are not open societ 
on how to form 
and raise a-: 
crux of Asbociation 
as better adapted 
should be'remem- 
ies for talk and 
debate, -but for private consultation and real business., 1(2) 
The quorum was frequently extremely small in relation 
to'-the Bize of the committee, so that, as-'Reeves- 
desiriaidg, ''the*whole of this'-largev "bopularllp Loyalist 
movement-was in reality-, manipulated by a very small 
number of men. ' The-. chairman-was', nearly always a 
respected figUre iii the locality, a magistrateg member 
of pýarliament, or leading merchant. The provincial 
associations'seldom had to worry-; about'-fundsý as their' 
prominent-membeis could easily, meet the expenses - of 
,a small'co=ittee. The original Crown and Anchor 
(1) See A. Mitchell,. The Association Movement-of 1792-3, 
Historical Journal, 19619 p. 61. 
(2) B. M. Add. MSS. 16p'glg. Cited in E. C. Black, 
The Association. 
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Association, however, had, more definite need-for con- 
tributions if it was to fulfill. its progra=e of 
Loyalist; publications. - 
-. The. Associationts attempt, at literary, persuasion 
is-one, 'of the most striking, aspects of the entire 
movementp-, mainly. for what it-reveals of the mentality 
behind, -Loyalism.,. Large numbexsof pamphletsl, spe'eches 
and-sermons. vverel, published-. and posted in taverns-and 
coffee-houses. -, Another group of publications was 
aimed', at'directly at the_. 'Ilower, orders.! ý-The style 
and'ýthe: content, of-these didacticýworks, illustrates_ 
that, Reeves-and his supporters,, worked: from stereotypa, -ý 
images, of'. the character and the,. intelligence. 'of: those 
they. wanted-to persuade. If these,,, ludicrous-aýid 
pathetic works accurately reflected-ithe,, governing 
classl. s, picture, ofzthe, labouring, -sectors, -of. ýthe., pop- 
ulation, 'ýthen,, we, are, left with, _littleýalternative 
than 
to presume, that-manyýmen really did h; ýVe. a-ý, picture;. of 
pitoh-fork carryingj-. slow-speaking yokels-, contemplating 
the-"Ri: ghts' of, 'ManIIýin; '_the-, shade of, --a-., hay-rick. Yet 
the, Countess'ofIlalmesbury found, loyalist, writings 
very cl ever-and4the-, -Bishoptof, ýLondon was full of. praise 
for'Hannah; Morels', -". VillagePolitics. 11 It. w*asp-he, said, 
11 
1 
universally e"xtoll 
- 
ed, it has been read and greatly 
admired at Windsorg and its fame is spreading over all 
parts of_'_t'he"'iingdom. I gave one to the Attorney- 
general, -who has recommended it to the Association at 
the Crown and Anchorg whi'c'Ii_wi1'1"disp; ýerse it through 
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the, country-11(l) The work_'was written in the form-. 
of a dialogue between Tom Hodgthe masont who had. been. 
-: -, 
seduced, -by, subversive 
ideas., and Jack Anvilf the stout- 
hearted blacksmith who succeeded-in demonstrating-to 
his unfortunate friend the. folly, of his, new ideas. 
The contrast in style and. effectiveness with Hebert's 
"Le, Pere-Duchesneg'..., also aimed at influencing a largely 
uneducated area of.,, the,, pppulation in-Franceg is stark. 
(2) 
The, pr9pagation of these. pastoral interludes was 
perhaps less-harmful, than, some of. the'Association 
movement's, other achievements.,, -. Reeves and his support- 
ere-had,,, rallied, to-the-need: for, presenting, an-effective 
front. ofýLoyalism-to,, suppress seditions and-decide 
the. raverers. They. were not very particularlýlhow these 
ends. were met. 
committee--of, t] 
received, about 
I"ý 10- -ý, --1. 
in.; the, form of 
Almost all the information. which, the 
he, original Crown, and Anchor-Association 
pe, ople, vvhose, beliefs vvere,. suspect-. came, 
anonymous letters.... Reeves. výas, quite 
prepared, to use, these withoutIfurther enquiry. 
handling of anonymous, accusations so, shocked Thomas 
Law one: c, ommittee... member, that,,. he . -took 
the matter up 
with Reeves. The. chairmanp howeverp, did not. appreciate 
criticiSm'of hip., running of the aocietyý-and-Lavv was 
(1), BishoP of london'to Hannah Mdre, -(n. d. "11'emoirs 
of the Life and Corresjýondence of Mrs. Hannah More, 
ed. - We' Robertst, "'N'. 'Y. 1835, io- p-414. 
(2)-''See Re bb Th6l3rit' ish Working Class Reader, 
London'9' 1955. 
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forced to resign. In Januaryq 1793, he-exposed this 
aspect of the-Association, 's work to the Morning Chronicle. 
Denunciation was one way of intimidating,, those 
who appeared-less thaneentliusiastic about the-Loyal- 
ist upsurge., Another wasýpressure, more or-less subtle, 
as in--the, boycotting of shops whose-owners wereýsus, 
pected of Painite, sympathies. A'certain amount of 
physical violence was-also pqrmissible, so, this body 
of meng. always eager to condemn r, ioting, sat back while 
a mob, attacked Thomas, Walker's-house, in Manchester and 
gave. direct encouragement, often in the form of ale, - 
to. anyone. who, -, would burn. effigies of. Tom Paine. ., 
The 
Association'. s activities also had the unpleasant 
effect of bringing ancient antipathies to the, surface 
once, more. The dissenterso especiallyt suffered, 
many, correspondents linking dissent and, dedition in 
their information. -, In, the space of a few,, weeks-, Reeves 
had, admirably succeeded in, stifling aý,, great. deal of 
disaffected sentiment. It would be difficult to fault 
the thoroughness of Reeves' organization or to deny 
that the Association movement acted as a brake on 
the'iadicalse'-'Men'of powerl''influence and determin- 
ation'were-n6t 'easily defied. But Reeve s had not 
succeeded in creating a national popular movement. 
He had only. defined more clearly the-interests of one 
group, the placemen who had been nominated to the first 
committee and the, gentry and-wealthy manuf acfiir_eii-_ 
rho formed the backbone of the national movement. 
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In describing-the Loyalist reaction to the 
November. crisis we speak of Reeves, but his name con- 
ceals the activities of others. The part played by 
the government in the Loyalist movement is far from 
clear. It-is fairly evident that, Reeves could'not 
have developed his plans without, some measure of 
ministerial approval and assistance. Hei-served the 
government; he,,, knew Evan, Nepean(. 
'), 
-the Home! Office 
Under-Secretaryt Chamberlayne and White, the Treasury 
Solicitors. and, John Heriot, whose newspapersy-the 
Sun. and the Truelriton-. had,. been, created with, govern- 
ment backing, 'on October jstý2) Yet, 'Reeves maintained, 
both iný1792 and laterg. that-his action,, vvas_independent- 
"None-of the King's ministers, knew or heard of-, this 
.1,, I 
association till they saw the, first-advertisement in - 
the, -public-lprints. It-wasýplanned 'withQut their know- 
ledgeýand., has been conducted to-the-present moment. - 
without their aid.,, 
(3).. 
Yet_ýas early,, as November-17th. 
(1) Nepean, Evan (1751-1822). As'youth, entered navy as 
a clerk. 1782. Und-er-Secretary of State in Shelburne's 
administration. 1784. Commissioner of the Privy Seal. 
Able second-in-command to Dundas at the-., HoiAe Office. 
17ý4. 'Under-Secretary for War. In 1812 became Governor 
of Bombay. 
(2) See, letter, of, John Taylor to Lord Liverpooll 31st. 
August, 1619,, quoted-in Aspinallt. --A. Politids. and-the Pressq 
'I ^AM 
1+ 
Association Papers, Preface ivv quoted in Mitchellg_ 
op. cit. P-59. 
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the Home Office had in-Ats possession a form, of a 
declaration for just such an Association as Reeves'. 
(') 
,, It"-is.. -impossible to prove direct connivance,, at-- 
least at the-ministerial levelg-before'November 20th. 
The gover=ent was following, a. policy of. delibýrate . 
inscrutability, during the worst days of the crisis. 
Pitt, and his-colleagues had-worries beyond, the, "i=- 
ediate'effecte. of. the general anxiety. Uncertainty- 
,- 
hadýled. -to. an alarming drop in the funds. On the -, - 
l6th--November,, theldorning Chronicle reported"Our. funds 
have. ýhadja'fall of,, 3% within these two days ...... 
This was at first ascribed to government inactiong 
but. within a week a, further fallwas-said to be. the 
result, of, "the. panic of ministerso, whop now trembling, 
for their own indiscretioneg-communicate, their fears 
by.,, sympathy. to-. all around them. 11(2) --The., truth would 
seem'to be that--in. --so swift-changing: a... situationTPitt 
did not,. reach-. any,, -definite conclusions on 
the best, -- 
way. -to. -proceed-untilý, about-, November 25th. --, 
The cumu- 
lative, effect, of. -the-. troubles in England and the in- 
trusion. of. Prench. vict. ory i urope-vvas.. described, by 
Noel - "Chacuneg--prise isýleme t peut paraltre lege're. 
Mais. 'reunie-en masse:, elles, ý, portent. un, cbLractereýtres- 
3 
allarmant pour-le gouvernement'. -, - 
Pitt! s-indeoision 
(1) H. O. 42/22. 
(2) Thellorning Chronicl2j November 16th. (B. 1 A. Burney 
Collection) 
Noel to Lebrun, 22nd. Novemberg A. A. E., C. P. Angleterre 
583. 
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and anxiety are evident from his correspondence with 
Djindase(l) These are the letters of a man under. con- 
siderable strain, conscious that something must speed- 
ily. be done to restore equilibriuml'but uncertain of 
the most effective means of achieving this goal. 
The tensions of the time are clearly brought out in 
the impression that Pitt was almost thinking aloud. 
Reeves' Association was to provide him with an unex- 
pectedly straight-forward solution to the problems of 
public order and confidence which were at the root 
, -of Britain's internal difficulties. 
On November 25th, Pitt wrote to Dundas on the 
action he was 
; 
contemplating to ensure the country's 
internal stability. Here he mentioned the Association 
for the first time - "A printed paper appeared a few 
days ago.... which I like in everthing but its having 
adopted the objectionable term of Association. It 
has produced a great impressiong which shows that there 
is a spirit and disposition to activity whichq if we 
give it in the outset a right directionj may be 
improved upon to very important purposes. With-this 
view-we have privately prepared a form of a declaration 
founded on the same principles as those stated in'the 
printed paper but more carefully and'precisely defining 
the object to1which we think every measure of this sort-,, 
ought to be confined. We mean not-to let it be known 
(1) In the Pitt Papers,., A_f_-Jý cit. 
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that. 'it comes from un but are privately taking steps 
which I have no'doubt will be effectual to procure 
public meetings at which'thia paper may be approvedý' 
and signed by no =any'respectable names as can be 
collected in Lcndonq Weatmincter and the Borough. 
Our idea then is to procure doclarationo of the'sama 
nature and perhapa in'tho'came words in all the counties 
and grout towns of England. " Wo'mean'to endeavour to 
confine any'ecnorul-moetinga hold for thie, purpose 
solely to eignIng'such a'declýrationj raising oubscrip- 
tione and electing a small committee to superintend 
the munagament of the fund and the detail'ofýprose- 
cution and of circulating useful writings., The meetings 
might then adjourn from time to"ti=e at long Intervals, 
to receive the report of their oo=mitteet paaa the 
accounts and renew# if neceauary their oubscriptions 
to the fund. In thio way we hope to avoid, the in- 
cOnVOniunco-of =uoh'public diecusaion at numerous 
mOutinea and yet-to have tho'impreacion and effect of 
nu=baru on our aide. "(') The"wr'iter of this piece, 
might eaoily have b. sen John-'Reeves hi=aelfp so, clearly 
had Pitt'describud the organization and aims of the 
Loyalist movement. The letter does -itself'provide 
I 
very apecific proof, of the directiona being. given to 
Reevoo. -, On thelprevioua., day, November 24th, the Crown 
, and Anchor. Acaociationg had unnounced ito Intention, 
, of aotting up. 
brunchoa in the nume areae mentioned by 
ritt to Dundaeg 'November 25th. ritt rapera, ii, op. cit. 
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Pitto Londono Westminster and, the Borough of Southwark. 
Impressed by the immediate response to Reaves' first 
advertisement the government had deoided that Reaves 
was an, ideal front for a oampaign of repression. 
The sudden upsurge of loyal, sentiments would appear 
to be the genuine expression of a national feeling. 
Control of the movement from the-centre need, never 
be known because, the extensive response would mask 
it. For Pitt and his colleagues the Associationt 
despite the unfortunate connotations of Lord George 
I 
Gordon's Protentant. Association and the-riots of 
17809 provided an ideal solution to the problem of- 
steadyingýpublic opinion. When Dundan-received a 
copy of the Crown and Anchor advertisement he commented 
"I daresay the measure if followed-throughýwith 
perseverance may have good effects, when Xr. -Pitt has 
chalked out, to them their. line. "(1) The, Opposition 
berated, Pitt's apparent complacency-without ever 
realizing the extent of his work behind, the'scones. 
Indeed# the rush, of Opposition activity wasin 
marked contrast to the government's more cautious 
approach, The crisis in November led to a deep and 
irrope-irable split-in the ranks of the Whigs. Burke , 
Dundas to Nepeang November 25tho H. O,, 102/69' An 
interesting letter in which Dundas made it clear that he 
did not think that the Associationg or other supporters 
of governments would gain anything by attacking Prance . 
or French politics verbally. 
287 
had long foreseen a disaster on the home front and 
now he found other men to join him in his crusade 
against Jaoobinism. On November 13. th. he and William 
Windham took the unusual atop of calling on Pitt and 
Grenville in person# "Within these two days, " Pitt 
wrote to Dundang Other@ in again an appearance that 
the leaders of the Opposition feel the, criain as they 
ought.. 9. Wyndham and Burke oame, jointly to Grenville 
and myself to profess their strong. belief, (though not 
speaking from%diroot authority) that. thers would be. a. 
determination in the principal friends to give a 
complete support to any vigorous measures at home or 
abroadg and to do this thoroughly without looking to., 
any arrangement of office. "(') On November l7thq 
Chauvelin reported that the progress of Prenoh ideas 
was PlaYing havoo with the Opposition.. Even such. a 
stalwart supporter an Perryt editor of, the Morning 
Chronicle had been very reluctant to include in his 
paper an article written by Chauvolin, exp; aining the 
motives behind the Belgian invasion. --The real cause 
of'Opposition fears layt howeverg. in, the. state of 
domestic affairs - "un. evsnlýlt, qui n1a gue're zoins 
contribug quo la prias do Mons a mettre pluaiers 
mombree de l'Opposition* 
ý la diapo>eition du Souverne- 
momtg co nont Ion adrenaen energiquen envoyoen a ja 
Conyontion p&r Ion nocieten patriotiquen, - le style 
(1) Pitt to Dundael November 15th, Pitt Papers, ii, op. cit. 
iý8 
I, -, ' A I-- --- des, adresses, -les a, effrayes-p-, at, parait avoir-docide 
I-- le Minist'S""re a""'essayer do resister par.:, la,, forea'au 
torrent de llopinion, qui-sS, forme en-"notrerfaveur. ft(l) 
Welcome'though Burkels', move was, it did placeýfurther 
pressure on--the government to, take a firmIine, -though 
their-concernýwasýwell-concealed'fromý'the-two-*Whigag- 
llthey-'ý(Pitfand Granville) were not'very,. explicit with 
regard-*to, the"vigour of, any measures which,., theymight 
pursue. as, ýto-linterior-or'. exterior objects--but, they 
-that such, might, "be necessary. ý(ý)'-ýWhen, did,. not', 'dony, 
-Pittýdiscovered'that--ýsome, of'thellother Oprincipal"Whige 
in'partioularg' the Duke-, of. Portland, were: not, prepared 
to followýýBurkelscline and, 'abandon, Foxq,, he was, ', displeased. 
yabout, vigor- The ministry were not -very e: jýplicit. 
ous measure . s-because in mid-November, they lacked the 
spur of-Reeves.. -, Even so, 'there"was another area which 
could not-be, -overlooked-inýsafeguardin'g, theýsecurity 
of the realm, Of more itmediate, significancel, while-' 
the, sittiation'remained--so--tenseg"was, the preparation 
and arming of a-force ofmen--. to keep-, the, peadi in-the 
. -In the development of Pitt's ideas, on'the country. '- 
militia-the'an i etie s 'ok -the las t-we ek of - November 
and-of-the oppressiveness of'decision-making are- 
(1) Chauvelin to Lebrun, 17th November A. 'A. E. 
clp. ý Angleterre 583. 
(2) Burke to'Fitzwilliam'g'November 29th: 9 
- *'Cit. " Burke ,0P., 
p 317. 
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clearly visible, On November, 25th. he acknowledged 
that Dundas''exhortations from Scotland had played 
a major, part iný-crystallizing, hisýown. views - "Your 
statement.: ýespecting, the military-force will, enable 
me-to take steps. for preparing the'army estimates. lý 
with a'view to the necessary augmentationg which I-. 
will do without, loss: of. time.. *.., my, idea isý-that 
in'Englandt, the Lord'Lieutenants of-counties shouldt 
i -case, -of riot, be enabled to. - n add.. to, any-extentý 
. voluteer, companieeg under'. officers properly qualified, - 
to-, the, presen-t, militiag and, to grantý, COMMiSBions.. -for 
2this., purpose. ý"(')-: The,, advantage"lof, this--, scheme, was 
that the, extent of such. 'a-force"could-be easily ascer- 
tained., ". Only. two. days; lateri'on, November 27th. -'Pitt 
hadichanged his mind., - The state,. o. f. Scotland, and"-the 
wildýrumours-eirculatingý-in. -England., of unidentified', 
French-inspired--groups attacking the-Tower-and'-trying 
o,, t -, raise revolt'Anthe-capital had-left no,, -alternative 
but--to, ---"oall-, out-. thez, whole, v*-or some,, part--ofýthe 
"(2) militia, very', speedily, ý, -The 
government's'. belief 
thaV. there. wae an.. --absolute-necessity-for. an: armed',. I-_ 
forae--had-outweighl the knowledget, -plentifully--oupplied 
by, Buckinghamp-that the militia was'sadly, lackingt. in:,, - 
training,, and, weapons. -and,, that several cs 9ý'in, 
particular the Duke, -of Norfolk'sq were tainted by 
(1) Pittý', tOý-Dundaist'liovember, 27th't'-Pitt'-Paperstýii'to'pe Cit* 
(2)ýcPitt-_'toI.: 
_Dundasq 
November 29th9_'Pitt, Papersjii9oý*e cit. 
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subversive principles by-the "little-boo. kall-which 
they possessed'ý_ 
Despite the'fear, expressed by both Pitt-and 
Grenville, that,. attempts to create serious trouble 
would be made before the measures in contemplation'. -ý-- 
had. been brought. to fruition, the government was notV 
well on the road to regaining complete control of-, 
the country. -The calling out of the militia, was, ''_. 
justified on the grounds of a state of insurrection. 
, 
By-lawt, Parliament was required to., meet, withina'fort- 
night of such'ýa proclamation. Even, those"members'of 
the Oppositiont-including Sir, Gilbert Elliott'who 
were inclined to support ministerial-actions-, to. ýend 
the crisis were, --dismayed 
by-the means employed to 
achieve calm. 
(2) 
, They,, argued'that'-. theýmilitia was - 
merely a pretext and that the governmentq-, soý. alarmed 
by-, -the, situation which they,. hadtdriftWinto through 
apparent. inconclusivenesi3t-had, felt,, the'necessity for 
. "other-way, immediate. legislative measuresýanChad'no 
6f re-assembling Parliamentt which had,, 'been-_p; orogued 
until Januaryt-1793*'ý. -Pittle'emphasis on, the militia 
does, not. altogether'-bear, -'out-this view. -- He was"so'-, 
anxiousýto assemble, -the militia that he-had even-thought 
(1)"Buckingham to'Grenvillet'*November 27thq Fortescue MSS, 
op. - - cit* pop. 
-, 
345-60' 
(2)"'' Sir_ Gilbert-, Elliot -. to Lady., Ellio't*; De cember 13th' 
Elliot, 'Letterep ad. 'Countess of Mintog-ji-, p. p. 80-82 
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of resorting to-, commissione-of, array. ---But he was I 
also'fully aware.,, that the recall' o. f. -parliament 'would 
enable him to take a number*of-important legislative- 
steps., On November, 28th he wrote that-he was contem- 
plating suspending Habeas-Corpus and that he intended 
bringing in an Aliens Bill. 
(l)- 
-Their minds. made, upg, Pitt and his cabinet. 1pressed 
ahead with the-, implementation o'f.. their policy.,,.. The 
Association movementg gaining-4'aily in numbers and: -, 
effectivenessvwasýunder their, -guidance. --Thefive 
thousand men of-thezilitiag embodied by Royal-proc- 
lamation on December-let. were guarding Londonp--the., 
Home Counties andthe-east coast.,, Parliament, was. 
ready., to, meet again onTecember 13th. 
't"The crisis'situation-in November-had, very grave-i-.. 
implications for, the. future. . The news 
Mom-then! ý-- 
continent had'eaused the propertied, classe. sto, fear,.. 
that'disturbances in Britain might get-out. of,, control. 
They, -had no, way of assessing the. effedt:, of. -, seditious 
literature other, than by the stateýof public. opinion,,;,.,, ý, -, _ 
Never-ýbefore, had turbulence seemed,, 6osinister,,, and 
threatening.,. In this situation, "., when balanced reactions 
were strikingly scarcep, William Pitt and. his-advisers 
decided that the. only. safe course., wasto-suipmon up. the 
banner of-Kingg Country'and Constitution. -, 
More,, than 
this, it was widely accepted that revolutionary France 
had intruded into every issue of poli6y., Pitt himself 
Pitt to Dundast November 28thq-Pitt Papers, Jig opq cit. 
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was b, eginning to think, that the necessity of taking 
strong measurealhad not proved without advantage., _. - 
Speaking of the issue. of. supporting. Hollandg he said-, 
"I do hot know whether I flatter myself but I begin 
, to be persuaded that the necessity_will lead to 
measures which are on the whole the, beet for-the. 
internal situation of the country., ", 
('). 
-,, 
This-, thinking 
had alsobegun-'to,, influence British. policy towards 
France. On November, 26th. Grenville wrote ý---"If the 
'French-- 
are de 
, 
termihed to fo, rce,, 
-us. -to. -, 
a rupture 
seems. of. little moment, what is. the. particular. occasion 
'that is,, to be, taken. for. it except, with a view.. to. the 
benefit of standizig-, on, the-most advantage. ous. groundt_ 
with respect,, -to-the. publicopinion in the. es... V(2) -two, countri 
The Minii3tryq,,, tooj had, accepted. the.. existence of. public 
. -. opinion 
by the. end', -. of, 
'INbvemberO and realized that it 
-could be a double-edged weapon.. Few peopleg howeverp 
as the Parliamentary debates were to revealq could 
forget the atmosphere of mid-Novemberg vividly re- 
I 
captured by Windham in his s peech defending the Ministry's 
actions - "It was his belief, however, that there 
were serious and well-founded alarmaq from the conduct, 
not of the officers of government, but from those who 
had sworn-an enmity tolall--'government; ý. Did-not-the 
whole'ýcountry, feel:, ', -it? --; Waý'not. -every, --. towni',, village- 
(1) Pitt to - Dun"si-q' November 27th, Pitt 'Papers. 
(2) Grenville to Auckland, November 26th. F. O. 37/41. 
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or hamlet filled with appreheiýsion? Could a man 
enter into his'own-housel'or couldlie walk in a field 
without observing-that it occupied the whole attention 
of all ranks and descriptions'of people. "(') The 
November crisio'had'led, to a general hardening of the 
ministerial attitude which did not'augur. 'well for'--'- 
those concerned to preserve . peace'and persuadeý. the--_ 
government to''introduce"reforms into the parliamentary 
system-----'"The-, true', reason, of, the pretendedýlalarm- 
will^so6n'-appear; I'and it will-, be-found'that, 'the-'only, - 
personsýwholýhave'-really cause forýapprehension are 
thellanded'i the monied'-and, 'the"leading interest'-of 
England... "o'. ' but the-true meaning of-all'-this alarm.... 
is"'that'it i-s-the preface to-a foreign-war. . The---- 
. public mind-is'-put into this ferment 
to prepare us 
(2) 
, 
for the'encountere 
(1), zWindham in the debates on., the King's, Speech,,, - 
December 13thl,, 17929. Cobbett, 
-Parliamentary History. 
, 
(2) The Morning Chronicleg December, 10th. 
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Chapter 9 
The Trial of Louis XVI 
Si,, le-. roi estýinnocentp- le-peuple est coupable. " 
St.: Just. 
ý-_', -:. There was. -one-striking similarity between the, --, -,. 
situations-of France'and Great-Britainýat, the beginning 
of Decemberg, 1792, a similarity which wasg paradoxically, 
a vital unseen factor, in,, the-collapse,, of. Anglo-Prench 
relationso, 'The. introsp6ation-of both countries'had 
a'. potent influence on'international develoýments-'-The 
bases of,, the, British attitudeq lying deep in, the'.., 
comfortable'policy of neutrality'were brought-to-'i 
crescendo by. the domestic and-European crisis of-'-- 
November. The roote, ofý-Francels. pre-occupation were 
in., the Revolution'of August'10th. 
- 
ý;.,, -, -The-trial and. execution of Louis XVI. have--some- 
times-been seenýas little more than an episodeýin, the 
development of political rivalry-in1heýConvention. ý 
In the'course of. Anglo-French relations thetrialýseems 
almost_Arrelevant. ý, Yet it-is. -ýmpossible! to understand 
the motives-and-pre-occupati, on-''of the men w4o-directed 
policy and the formulation 01f decision in France, 
whether domestic or European without cohsidering the 
significance of the. king's trial. ' Only then can the 
startling disparity of outlook and pre-occupation on 
.j either, side of the Channelbe fully appreciated. 
The war in Europe had reached an enforced halt, 
brought about by the onset of winterl at the beginning 
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of December 1792. --This, uneaBy situation afforded-none 
of the-Interested partieso whether. actively engaged-- 
in, the,, struggle or anxious spectatorsq, much, satis- 
faction. 
-The 
Prussians had succeeded, in-bringing, 
sufficient-pressure-to bear on the reluctant, Austrians 
to ensure-, the resumption of hostilities against. Franoe 
in, the-spring. 
(l) The-neutral powers. were now: i3o--- 
acutely aware of the strength and unpredictability., 
of the Revolution in arms that none of, them could- 
view the situation with much confidence'. The Spanish, 
still-attempting to ensure, their-own inviolability 
by political manoeuvringg, were, nevertheless afraid of 
anýattack across the Pyrenees. The, Stadtholder of-theý 
United. Provinces alarmed Lord;, Aucklandq-the Bri'tish 
ambassador, by telling him-that-he., feared,, imminent 
ý2) 
insurrection by Prench sympathizersp the-Patriots. 7- 
The British-government faced December, with reasonable 
assurance, that-the extensive measures, -, which they_, had 
, 
taken-, to calm,, and direct public, opinion would quickly 
make. their,, beneficial-, effect, apparent., --Pitt-himi3elf 
was-st_ill some way from admitting'that. this tacilt. -Iý, 
(1) The-British, howeverg-were, kept waiting for any 
ýdefinite 
Information or. -comment,. on 
their proposals of 
November 13thg' untilýJanuary'1793- See Chapter 7. 
ý(2)_ Auckland, to-Grenvillev, -December 20tho F. O. 37/420 
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recognition ofýthe,, pervasiveness of-the French-threat- 
to, stability'in'the western'-European continent, `Iwould, "Iý 
lead toý'bpen'conflict'within a shortýtime'betw 4en` 
England-'and, Frances', ". TheýFrench themselvesq . however', '-- 
had-many'and-increasing troubles. Dumouriez's ý' 
discontentýýgrew. dailyin Belgium. -Prench diplomatic 
representatives-, in-, London and atýtheýHague persisted 
-interests before' in-putting', 'their'own -thoseýof France. 
Even-the, magnificent men of France; ýthe`yolunteers 
whol'had;, in popular opinion;, saved*their"countryp 
appeared'to be-living under delusions. - 'Camus'and'-' 
Goesuinp-, "two of the-deputies sent to report on the 
state oVthe armies in Belgiumq wroteon December 4th - 
IlNous,. avons' trouves dans presque'tout'notre voyage- 
les routes couvertes de volontaires , qui'revenaientý'', -', 
versiParis avec armesýet-bagages;. il, nous paraissait 
inconcevable, que des'Frangaist-deelooldats 
-libert4q. reviftssentý rr 'en ýei"gran'de' n6mb 'e da s leu's 
foyere-avant: que la--guerre, fut terminee , NOU13 avions 
decouvert _la, caudi --de e6tte. 'es'p*ec`e"de' Aesertionqui 
degarnit lea campeýet pourrait diminuer notablement 
e neoessaire a nos armees. On a repandu parmi Ia forc 
1 es troupes ..... la supposition d'un. de"cretque la 
-patrie-nle I tait plus en danger'. 
The isolation of the soldiers in Belgium reflected 
(1); ', Camus. andýGoesuin-to, the'Pre'sident Of the Convention 
4th, -Decamberg', - Le Moniteurg"vol. 14,0? 3. -7 
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the growing contradiction of the Revolution's apparent 
strengths,, and real reaknesses. The republic was about 
to undergo. its first crisis. of identity, on an issue 
of inescaj? able importance. In, the. middle-of November, 
after, much preliminary.. obstruction by. Briesot and, 
some. of his friendso ýthe first debates on-the form 
of trial and judgement, of, the king. focused attention 
on Louis XVI once more. The. trial was to, pasethrough 
three. major_stagýs. Firstly, in Novemberg,, there-were, 
discussions on the methods-and legality. -of-trying 
Louis. These received further impetus., with thedis- 
covery of the incriminating iron box in the-TuilerieB 
on November 20th. On December 3rd. -the trial, was-,, 
decreed and Louis formally, indicted on December 11th., 
The second', stage began, late in-November. when, -, the king 
appeared, before the bar to*hear his defence, radd.,., 
There, follo, wed, a number of-extremel-y-importantopeeches 
, 
, 
'b, n. the question, of, referring-the--kingls,,,. ý, J, 4dgement, -ý, 
to 
the people in primary, assemblies.., Finallyp in, mid- 
ýanuary. the deputiesvoted individually on Louisle..,, - 
judgement. and sentence.. 
(1)-'-Theýspeechesg'ý'debates and*voting-on the'kinig's 
trialýcan-be followed'from mid-N6vember 1792 t6 mid- 
-. January, 17939''-in the, Journal "de s'- De'-bat s 
"'of 'theConvention 
and in Le Moniteurt vols-'-15'&'16. ` Introduction to' the 
probleme'surrounding, the'kingt_s. trial and exiciipts 
from. relevant documents' may ale'o"be found"in'the more 
convenient edition drawn'to'eilier-bi 9yA. Soboult le Proces 
de Louis XVI, Paris, 1966. 
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unless one attempts to arrive at, some-under--- 
standing'of the issues caught up in th-e-trial'of the 
king and of'the development of the debate'which ensuedt 
it isýimpossible to realize the'depth of feeling 
". II. ---zII involved-, amongst all shades of opinion within and 
outside'the Conventiong'or to place the arguments and 
emotions in-the context'of France's situationlat the 
turn of the year 1792-3. The trial was not merely,, an 
oc , casion fo , r-the intensification of the power-'struggle 
within'the Convention. ' The person and fate, of-the 
king were so'inextricably connected, --in the minds of 
ýhe'ýo'rdinalry 
citizens, as well'as'politiciansp with- 
the"Revolution of August 10th-'and its-"implicationag 
,, that the"trial inevitably absorbedeinterest. ýandnatten-,, - 
tion-t6'aýdegree that could not-be comprehended-by 
ýbiiýemporaries--* This I was'-certainly the issue'which 
crystallis ed. 'differences - within-the Conventiong but in 
a senseq-the differences were themselves a-sign that 
no-lasting or , 'satisfactory , -settlement haa*emerged--. - 
after lugust 10th. " Little, had-been- don'6, towards the 
_drawing up of -a new constitutiong-the', war 
had, -taken 
on_ýre'ater`proportions and victory had brought added 
.. responsibilitiee. -,, There -was no-newp* systematic-govern- 
ment functioning 'and, yet :, the., syi; bol- of oppress- 
ion andtreachery lived on' iii -th"e 'person -of ýLouis XVI. 
For"some, perhaps a smallýii'nori tyo`the'ýproblems were 
clear-cutP' and ý the "Bioluiion, simple; ' -St. just knew - 
that no-one'could*reign-J. =ocentl'y. - It followed, -, that 
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the-king must die; * ý'_ while -he' lived'' there' c 6ulenever 
be'-strong lawag or unity and without these the word 
republiC had'ofily a hollow sound. " But"for others-the 
situation was aýgreat deal more-complex , . -"There were 
those "who believed that k ingship wa-s''a"'crime -but 1, 
still thought of'Louis as, victim-rather than'-criminal 
and, 'who would have"saved his lite because"of this 
weakness. -Briisot'wid-hii"associatesý, were; split*'by 
un6ertainty'in whichýthere . was more than . "an ele I meni' 
of self-interesto', '-ý-Tliis-, rai, -presentl' 'toog the'con- 
aI iderations of Robespierre's followersq'but, -the"_ 
Montagnards had one significant-advantage"over I Brissot, 
they"were beginning-to formulate an idealogy'and'to 
represent, how"ever vag 
. ýelyýý-the A. nteres of týe. p ýe. ople'. 
The -, so-called' Girondins -we're' -- dis-so4l-ving"bao'k ýinto* 
individualism. "' Their attack iicke'd, overall `-doh'eýicn 
for'-this reason. Debates on the trial produced the 
ae en'in 'the C onvent ion most vivid explosion "-'s6, 'far 
Moderation'was'ma'de'ev'en more-diff icult the presence 
-whose n, _ of-the far"from apathetic people'ý6f Paris- 
sP'oke'smeng whether Hebert-or-. -anonymous pamphleteers, 
were drawing- -"par llels in thepopular-mind'ý'etween 
J 
the'Coniention's inconclusiveness'and''in'creasing' 
ec'on'omic'hardship. `-The trial'alsoýadded'another dimen- 
sion'to'-thi'di'spuýte'l whiclý -6en-Cied''On theý im'po'jtaýjce-ý 
of Pari7s "and'its reliitiOxis Iiip 'with the'-pro'vinces'. ' 
The" Se'ctions mi'ght demand Lo''uis-I s AeEýth'v` bu't 'outside, 
Pari's opinion 'was" "iiieline'd toý be more 'm6de`r*ate*_q and 
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some areasq for axample Rouen,, 
-. 
were still-strongýy 
ihfluenced by, royalists. 
_ . 1,4 
1 
The Convention's dile=a contrasts strongly with 
the. orderly, discussions of the English House of, 
Co=ons. Here, the'venom, againat revolutionary-France 
wae,. increasingg, but the speakers, whatever, their 
convictions, -were seldom, anything other,,, 
than, correct 
in-their appearance and speech. , 
The. most, violent., 
I, I, 
act,, they could manage was Burke's theatrical gesture. 
of throwing, a supposedly republican. dagger on the 
floorý whichIs said to have brough forth-only, muffled 
laughter. The British Parliamentp, alarmed by. -signs, of 
discontentat home and amazed by,,, the. extent,, _qf 
French 
success in, Europeand the, gravity,, Of, 'the warg neverthe- 
less had no, way-of understanding, that, -the,, 
trial,, of 
th. e.. king was crucial, to the, future, of,, the. revolution 
, itself. 
examination of, the. trial, of''Louis-XVI involves 
separate consideration of, a number-of points,. which 
were. connected in, the mentality,, of the, _, 
times. Firstly, 
'there, are theliesues, which. the, trial raised, and, the,,, 
dilemma which, resulted in*the, Convention. -,., However 
abstract a number of the., points, on inviolability, _' 
sovereignty. of. the people and obligations of the, 
representative Peem at first readingo it. soon becomes 
evidentIthat the personalities, of those involýýd,,, of 
the, king and-of-his accusersl, were, themselves,, signifi- I. -1 ", 1 11 1 1 -1 -1-4- -ý I_; - 1-4, '--_ -, -- 
cant. 
'I, The, situation in which-the ideas of. these men 
I 
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were developing needa'als 0 tlý, be explore -, a -It i's , necessary 
to' bear in mind not merely the" e'xploitation of - the 
-dispute between-Paris and the--pr6vincesq_býut-also_the 
ý _. fIAý-, . effect'whic popular opinion', in genera , was havi'ng"on, 
eýre'nts. Extreme elements"outaide -the Convýetntion, 
que s', Roux such-as Jean Varlet-and the'ex-priest'Jac k 
wer'e'exhorting the" pe" op'le', to-týie'iiote, of ý'th'e` Convention' a 
tardiness in tI rying-Louis XVI. I- 'Hebert conýinue-d^ hi-s' 
efforts to educate the sane-culottes into consciousness 
of th I eir role in enforcing rec*ogniti 11 on of the" importance 
d 'wage ajjjer`. I"_-'Barerei- in- an of the small, craftsiýan; an -e 
effort: ', to'., bring 'the, 'f iero 6- _intio-, ` about-'a, weakening of,, 
spection of theýConventiong-had-warned the : deýputiels', - 
0 that the eýesý, of, Euroipe"weri on'Frin e"' Many members y 
were-more ii6ediately, aware that'the trial-of-the'ý-"- 
p pub ic: king was being taken u'--by'a-growing-body of 1, 
opinion iii'the'dapitalan Id that', this'-'inv i, 4ible". force 
cI oul d no 1, longer be" discýbunted. -The ý-, 'Bri'sIs_6t`ins "" even- 
acknowle'dged'public'. opinion-i. " thýojjgjj, in 'i: "somewhat forced 
and roundabout way*,,, when`_th'ey_ mano'eiýver`ed- for" theý adop- 
tion--Of'th'e', appeal, to the'p'eople"for 'their ver "d, ict" on 
Louis Is -sentence. ' Despiti all'these" inf luences 
pulling it in, a-number'of diff6rent-directionsp-the 
Convention'neve rthless'found"a''soluti6-n `t'o, 'its p'ro'blems. 
Al Thi', death', of Louis XVI was,, jvot6d! by- a'roll-call'pro'- 
ce dur e- known as the appel n'ýomipa-i 71. an"ýxhausting*and 
emot ionall'ýdraining 'ii6tho'd, I wher e by 
-Y 
every singli'de'puty 
was', re, quire d vo't e "almid. -The I Ainglsýex . ecuti'on, on 
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January 21stt,, 17939 brought-the French. Revolution, -. 
decisively and inescapably face-to. face-with: the 
neutral powers anLparticularly England;,, Pitt,, and,, 
, 
go-vernment, had no way of graspingý-the_,. impqrtance 
of Loui sIs trial', and death f or Frenchmen; to them, --*, '' 
it 
, 
reprýesented the most I extreme example of . 
the 
virulence of:, the revolution and thegreat, difference 
I 
which had developed in the, eqnsciousness of their two 
societies. 
ýIt became evident during-, the earliest discussions 
of the, f'orm of the king's-trial. that. herewas, the issue 
which would touch the essence ofý, the, nationls existiance. 
The tutureq indeed,, the-very natureýof. ýthe Revolution 
were, central. to, the points,. raised ln, ý, theý Convention -'i, 
and, the welter ofopinions, expressed in. the Parisian--iý 
sections and in the provinces-of, France. A definite 
and Anherentýin final pronouncement; ofithe-, king was. 
the-, Revolution of., August, 10th- -, In, the. first. t, womonthe 
afterthe insurrectionfrus_tration, had; grown,,, amohget, 
all areas of political-opinion, ýint, the, Prench capital. 
Th, e,., Conventiong. -plagued-. by-the antagonisms, -of-ita-most 
gifted,, meng had: failed signally; to- provide --the , systematic 
lead,, which_the-supporters,,,. of,, the overthrow of the king 
had, expected. ýý, No-one,.: could-, -think-about louiO,, ýýtrial 
without going back, to.., Augustý, 10th. ý-and the reasons for 
suspending t4e king., ý, -Theýsupporters'of'-the second 
revolution-, had, overthrown,, Louis-XVI forýa-variety--of 
reasons, many of which were, stilltuppermost-intheir 
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minds in December. Above allq the king's accusers, 
shared the conviction that Louis would have been the 
instrument of bringing the Prussians into Paris and 
that he was not merely a traitor but a murderer - 
"you caused the blood of ? renchmen to flowp" asserted 
article 12, , of Louis's indictment. The combination of 
factors which had led to August 10th. included other 
potent recollections. -During 
the, siimmer of 17929 
Louis had revealed his complete intractabili, tY.,, The 
war had given many ordinary men, a sense, of, id, entity 
and a sense of purpose. The realization of their 
political significance was perhaps not ýrery 
. 
sophisti- 
catedq and certainly Hebert for one seems to have, 
believed that it needed guidance and mouldingg but it 
was born-in-times of unusual crisis and national tension 
and the atmosphere of the autizmn of 1792p with, the 
grain. shortage and growing feeling that Europe was 
closing in on the Revolutiong-tended to heighten the 
awareness of the hitherto. inartioulate groups of, the 
population. To them the Revolution 01 August loth. 
had been an act in which they had demonstrated their,, 
force. The continued existence of the king, even-as 
a closely-guarded prisoner in the Templeg seemed a, 
reproach to those who had perpetrated the second'., 
, revolution. Robespierre was 
later to ask whether the 
people or the king were on trial. Castingdoubts on 
the justifiability of August loth. seemed to. 
-some 
men a foolhardy and dangerous act., If Louis were, not 
3Q4 
tried then there could be no proper basis for their 
actions and theyq the very men who had saved France, 
stood condemned. 
With-his clear grasp of issuesq Robespierre 
early put, the problem in its basic'-form It 
seemed to him that the deputies weie'u'nwilling to face 
the logic behind"the overthrow of'the king'- "Ci, ýoyens, 
vouliez-vous"'une revolution sane-'revolution? " The 
fact was that the Convention as''a body had no clear 
idea of what type of system would'be, instituted after 
the second revolution. The Brissotins merely felt 
that as far as reliance on popular'-support and the 
introduction of the people in'political'life was con- 
cernedg"the revolution'had gone far'enough. " The 
Montagnards were 'only'beginning-to formulate their' 
views on'the'pre-requisites'of successful republican 
government and these took the form of'abstract 
theo, rizing rather than a carefully'expounded"programmeo 
Probably the majority of"the'ý"C-onvýentio In had no real 
perception of anything other'than the increasing chaos 
9f their I situation'until they'came'under'tlie'influence 
ýof'BarerO. s eloquence I and clarity , of thought*"' The 
trialýof thý'king'served'as a":, fo, , rcefulzBminder that 
further evasion of, questions. 'left uziainswered"aftier 
Augusi'10t'h'. 'would-jeop'ardize i the 
A 
attainment of 
t 
e7ery 
prinoiple-for which the revolutionaries had-fought 
and, suffired since the summer 0; '1789'. ' It-was not, 
however$ only a question of principles, theories and 
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rights. To their'developing ideologyt Robespierre's 
1. supporters added a firig grasp of. politicall, realities. 
They knew that it was vitally necessaryt for, -the surviv- 
al-of France in, Europe as well as their own position 
in the, Convention that questions of monarchy, and. - 
republicaniemp traason and libertyp should beýfocused -., - 
on the king's trial, and', speedily decided, so thatthe: -- 
damaging effects of indecision might be lessened. 
These were the issues at., the-root of what, might 
almost be, termed France's moralagony, after August. -10th. 
The trial of Louis XVI also raised--other-more, immediate 
problems which, were'to intensify-the-differences 
between-the opposing groups in the. Convention. --, -Initially 
a majority of members-1were-uncertain of whether the. - 
king-could-be-judged formallyq how he should be chargedp 
what, provisions should be made for-his. defence-and., what 
body should actually-judge him. 
_, ---There 
were--disputes 
over Louis', inviolability, supposedly containedýwithin 
the second-article., of. the-third-chapter-of--the 1791-- 
constitutionl, -, and', about,, vvhether. *he,., should be-charged 
", as citizen or, 7as, -Kin'. -. of. the, Prench.,. -'-TheBa-various--ý 
uncertainties- were-listed by-the, -de uty, Mailhe--.,. in 
the-report-which the Comite de_Legislation presented- 
on*-November-7th. "Louis XVI . -est,. * I il- Jugeable pour---., -,, - 
lee-or-imes qulon-lui'impute, d! a''v'oir-commis-sur le.,., -- 
trone-constitutionnel? - : Par, ýqui doitril-etre juge? -,. 
--Sera-t-ilýtraduit devantý-lesýtribunaux-ordinaires, -- 
comme tout. autre_-'citoy, en. 
-accuse'deo'crimes 
d'Etat. 
3Q6 
Deleguerez-vous le droit de le juger a un tribunal 
forme par lea assemblees electorales des 83 departe-. 
ments. Nlest-il plus natural que la Convent. 9ion ,. 
nationale le juge elle-meme? Est-il nelcessaire ou , 
convenable do soumettre le jugement'a la ratification 
de tous lea membres de . 
la republique 9, reunis -en assemblees 
de. communes ou en assemblees primaires?. ". 
(') N6stspeople 
agreed that no existing tribunal- was adequate -to the 
gravity of the-situation, There-was no precendent for 
trying a monarch in Prance and the trial of Charles I' 
seventeenth-century England did, not seem particularly 
instructive. The committee of. twenty-four had been 
gathering and processing informationg-denunciations, 
and other evidence relative to the trial-since September, 
but the Committee, headed by Barbarouxg, was largely-,. - 
composed_of men of Brissot's acquaintance and seems to 
have shrunk fromk'overall implications of its task when 
it came topresenting a report on findings and pro-. _, 
cedure to the Convention. 
- 
Valazils reportlwas. an. -in- 
conclusive document. which did further damage-to the_tzý, 
reputation of--the loose-knit Brissotin- group. There 
was genuine uncertainty among, some" 'deputies, 
many of 
whom were acutely conscious-of, -the 
great and irrevers- 
ible decisions which they_would. be called upon--to., make. 
Doubts were raised'whether the Convention, as a body, 
or. the individual deputies possessed the responsibility 
to try the king. ? rom this there arose., general die-, -- 
(1) Mailhe a report, -Novembe-r-7th, Le -Moniteur', Vol. A 14, 
p. 414. 
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putes'over the functions of the Convention, and the- 
duties of the-representativeýwhich revealed sogie very 
deep differences-of opinion and'oontributed-towards. -- 
the-more'explicit formulation of*certain aspects of, ---'" 
thbi"Montagnard i platform. '- From-these-discussions', ', 
Briesot"and his-colleagues formed in their turn-ý*a, - 
counter-argument-on the relationship -between the--`, '- 
s6verýijhty, '6fthe-people and the powersol'of-the repre- 
sentative ýhich-was-to-lead to, much discussion, -, ---as to'., 
nt - should be whether Loixis e sentence'- and -Jxid&me' 
refeired`tb the"people', for", rýtificati'on.., The appeal- 
It10 tha 7peopli'-was not Bugg I este -d- 
butý, it" `produced. the'mo'st', highly'developed. 'argumenti"ý,, ýý 
16f, the ýtrial`, and'thue; provides of the`entire period 
ma4y'inei'ghts into beliefs'of'the--Convention,. F--.,, --Most 
promineit Imen. 
--However impoitant'th -a issues, one--should'not lose 
sijht"of 'the-men who, "-prin'cip'ally participated'in the 
dab ates I and whose'developingviýwý- were-influenced by-ý 
the-protra .ct, ad natuie_-o If- thbý t'riaf 'and the'-'s'pectacle 
'shouting and' abuse--'in- the"'ConVention- whi'ch became 
'130 common -In', 'the, controverýy, 'ovir, the" emergence of 
, "party" in thes'e month 9'q--_tIýe'- indi'vi duiLl'-7appro ach of'. - 
the men- 'who ma j or "sp a eche a, a an 'become, iiibmerged, 
`Tfiýa_ Bifs'sotina held ýin 'commoný; ý but did", 
'not act with any co-ordinationý. `, tobeipierrel a 
. as iiit - : '6ft'ein'used-the 'Ja ' a, as cobin's club -as-'C'sounding- 
V6'ar'd "f or d eiv a1 opment of'a united *, front j'_I but''the 
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speeches on the king's judgement-and, fate, 'were, made 
by, the-. deputies as individuals. 
Theone person easily overlookedamidet, the-, tur 
moil of,, the, trialis,, the,, king himselfg,. perhaps-in, part 
because some of the, deputieeg notably, St.., Justand,,, 
Robeepierreg. wished, to remove, the focus, of, attention 
from, the,: king-himself-to.. the, idea-of,, kings, h. ipýýe. such. 
In,, the, uncertain state of public opinionAn-the 
provinces it-, was, obviouslyunwise,. tOýconduct,, the trial 
with more emphasis on Louis, than. on, his. c, r, imý.,,, 
-The 
king,, onlyappeai-ed, twice atthe, bar, of the., Convention 
uring-, his, trial, on. December llth., to, hear,, his,,, indict- 
mentp, and., on. December. 26th.,,, to: be cross-examined, after 
hisýdefence had been read. -, 
On. 
-both. 
these. occasions-, rz-, -, 
ýut. especially the, latterg_the-deputies,, aýiq; other 
observers intthe Convention,. wereý, a_ffo, r, ded,, "ple,, proo, f 
of the king's. inability to. answer-, qýýBtions,, withmue, h, 
convictiong-but of-, -the, effectiveness,, of,, 
hiE3_. genera, l,,,,. 
deportment. Louis, as a form, of-defenceg had-retreated 
into. something, approaching, divine inscrutability...,,,, -. 
He, either refused to, answer, questionsg. or cited the-, 
". I---11, -- 'ý I... -_- -- ýý I-1ý "I ý- 
1791 constitution, as-proof of hisinviolability. 
ýurtherq he, challenged. the, -legality-., ofthe Convention 
to try, him at all. -He 
had not.. been., outaide the'Templ. e. -, 
since his imprisonment in August and the eight of the 
aseembl 7eI d'deputies seems only'to have'* incre'as-e d hi's 
ýet'erminati'6n to -asmonstrate"th'at , he I was'-superi I or to 
the-manoeuvres of'a"body", of-misguided men. He 
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'indignantXy,. denied. the last-of-'the charges, against 
himg that he had. caused the-blood of-Frenchmen to 
n flow, yet this was merely a, si3mmi'g-up--of'the'-contents 
of. the,, document of-accusation--which had been brought 
against, him. The charges sought to demonstrate his 
continuing and cumulative perfidy; They, began, with-, 
his, actions, in relation to, the estates generalf the'-: -- 
Bastille and continued-on to. the Chhmps de Mare and 
., the. flight to-Varennes. In appointingýuntrustworthy 
ministers Louis had, sabotaged the functioning -of 
government-and, undermined-the defences-of France.;.,, 
His, actions, it was contendedqýhad'only intensified-: ' 
the spirit, of uncertainty, and ferment in Prance. 
ý; ) 
Louis XVI'reacted. to: this recital, of, 'his-sins'with very 
little emotion. -, Nothing demonstrated. to him-that he 
had behaved. inýa-, manner. detrimental, -to his cOuntrY's 
overall interests-or-in--a, spirit-* whichý'was unequal-to 
the, great. responi3ibilities'which-he. believed, he-'held. 
His-two, appearances-in theConventionp, -contrasted with 
the-general. feelings oftumult, doubt,,, and-hatred seem 
Rlmost--irrelevant. 1 Rather--, like Charles'Ip;. Louis, XVI- 
knew instinctively-what kind-of-dignity, was--'expected 
of him -and, maintained it until the end. -., - , 'I, ýý - 
-Louie,, stood. accused by, men ofý: varying temperaments, 
(1) Tht'. Indictment. of Louis_XVI, P-P. 386-3919 in 
J. H. Stewartq, A Documentary Survey Of the French 
Revolution. 'Now York, 1951 
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but: ýamong the most consistent and convinced of his. 
opponents were Robespierre and'hisýassociates. 
thesel Robespierre himself and Saint-Just were the., 
main exponents, The BrissotinB suffered greatly in 
comparison, with, this, small group of meng whose percep- 
tion of, the overall dilemma of'the, Convention, and -the 
Revolutionjkr, outmatched-Briesot'Ei increasingly contra- 
dictory. and vacillating, positions. But it was not 
merely. a. question, of, realization of the defensiveness 
of the Brissotin attitude-which, enhanced the signifi- 
cance of-the, Robespierrist,, contribution to, the-king's 
trial. 
-. -Early in, the. ýdiscussions of,,, the, 
form-of. accus- 
ation and judgementp in mid-Novemberp there emerged 
one of, the most, remarkable., of the-Revolutionle-figures. 
Antoine. de Saint-Just was. the, youngest: deputyieleated 
to--the Conventiong being1then-just a-few monthsover 
25 yearsýold. The-, undirected-indolence of-this-young 
mang-endowed with, unusual. -intellectual. ýgiftst-,. had,.:,,, 
-.. given-way, lin-the first-years.. of the. Revolution to, a 
fierce. belief, in-,, the. necessity, -'and justification of 
-the Revolutiong, ýand, an. interest,. in developing, his own 
_ýHe, was-an, early. admirer political, philosophy. ýý.; -of 
'Robespierre and one. of-, his, ldearest-wishes had--been 
fulfilled when.,, he entered. -. the., Convention. ".,,. The, first 
months, of feuding and indecision had powerfully 
affected him. Although he entered-polýtics with-his 
own views on the most beneficial arrangements for' 
in societyp partially developedi his application of 
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ýt-D40ý ýj 
theory to the future shape of_the-Revolution_seems, ý_to 
have crystallized-as he observed, the, heat-, of discussion 
and the-Antrusion of self-interest obscure. -, -. the working 
of-; the. Convention and threaten theýsurvival., Iofrthe 
W_ Revolutiontin France. . ;, -- - 
.! -. 
", 
--. -In 
the speeches of late -1792 and-early-, 
1793 he 
demonstrated how-hiB views were'kformingin,. response 
to --the --political'. situation. of, the country., -, The 
spectacle of, disunity appalled him. Hecdid--not, believe 
that, any durable basis'or framework for: -republican- 
government could-be. laidý, down-, until"the-,, disorders 
wh ichýplagued the,, Convention'and., divided J! tance were 
overcome. The-Ifabric-of a-, new, type of--society"in- 
habited. 
-by-a, new-, type of mang consumed his-interests. 
The wranglings over, -, the kingle, trial, Beemed-mere., - 
preliminaries. The, republic. could not'be--achieved 
withoutý, Unity and', without strong1laws. -,. Thereýwaeno 
hope: forLthe'attainment, of either of-, these goals while 
the king-, lived; ' he was-a-,, focus of-'discontentV., the-, 
epitome,, of, the, counter-revolution. ý,, -The,, habits, of-., - 
thought of. -the ancien. regime'latill, -lingeredýon--as-aý 
greaVbarrier, to, justice --, "Les memes, hommes: qui-vont- 
juger-, Louis ont, -une republique-a 
fonder:, -,,: ceux: qui-, ý,, ", ---: - 
attachent,, quelquel--importance-. au, juste,,, chatiment d1un 
(1) To. -understand St. JU. St'B: background, and the develop- 
ment of,, his, ideas itis necessary to look at "Llesprit 
de, lla'-Revolution"(1791). and---, "De'ýla-nature ..... it a 
fragment, probably: written before August, 1792. 
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roi ne'fonderont jamais une"republiqueo'" Parmi-nouB, 
la finesse'des esprits'et. -des-earacteres, "est"un*,, grand 
obstai'c'i'e` ai "la liberte/.. -, It'ý'was 'this"-kind'of 
thinking-which -lay, behind-'Saint-JustleýruthleE3i3lyý, ýýýý, '- 
logical approach to-, the ýroblemis-, ofthe, trial-Vand 
judg'e'menfof'iýe king'a"The're- a'r'e-ýperhaps`tw'o general 
points'worth-noting,, the'-first being that-Saint-Just 
continued to re'-iýs'rate`his views"on'the-needfor-unity 
and strong laws'as aýneceE3saryframeivork, for-aýviable 
repubilc'aý f6im'until'Th6rmidor', ý 1794-andý the second-_; 
b'ein'g`tha't he" di6d''without 'any such ey'stemi being'',, 
8 ti sfactorily put into practice. 
Saint-Just was an i'ous', * 'vvhen he"'made his -first,. 
carefully pr I epared'spee I cho 4 on" November 13th, "-'tO make 
a- sting-impression, andýtoý'clear the airof many, 
problems-raised in, the first, weeksý-ofýNoi6mber whi, ch 
'h e"co nsidered to'be I ima I ginary ' 
(2), 
ý-'The first-reports 
ha dwelt ''in' "'some "length '6n", -the rpoint -of -whether-, Louis 
'Should'be,, Judged"as"i'citiiený', ýý'SaintLiust-held that 
the-o*nlyýcateg6ij"Lou-is X. VI: -legitimately, filled- was 
hat ofýenemy. '"'He"follo, ýed, ýtlýisstýtement with'ýsome 
detailed,: argumentýon th'-e-'n'atu: &e-of--the--sooial, compact. 
e"believ6d- -that IL - OUS cOuld'ýnotl, 'be'-Judged-as'a'. citizen 
becia use'he"', was outside'th'e, 'pact'_qý'an agreement'. whibh 
., 
(l)- Spe, ech on the. judgement of the kingl November 13th. 
Le Moniteurg 106t 
(2) Brissot"commented--fav6urýbly, on, -the speech'An 
'Le, Patriote-franqais. " 
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Saint-Just believed was made, only, -ýy the-citizens. 
between themselves -, "Le. pacte, est un contrati-entre 
les citoyens, et nonpoint avec le gouvernement:, on 
nlest pour rien dans un contrat ou Von ne, slest, point 
oblige. Consequemment, Louis, quýneý, st_., etait pas 
ne peut pas e"tre, juge I- civilement. 11(l) 
Having. disposed. of this difficultyp Saint-Just went 
on to give his definition of-the. powers-afid. duties, of 
the. representative of, the people in, such, a-case. - 
His 
ownviews contrasted very. strongly,, with., those,! expreased 
by some of 
'the 
Briesotinst-andv in,. partioular, those- 
expressed, by Vergniaud.,. -, - 
The question. of obligations, of, the, representative 
was intimately_connected, withýthe sensitive'.. issue,,, of 
sovereignty, of, the pp9ple. , It.. was, one of the more 
ourious_anomalies of,, the,, trial-of Louis, XVI,, -that-, the_. 
Brissotinsq, in theirattempte to, ensure personal 
surviyalg managed,,, to invest. the concept of popular, 
sovereignty,, with, a more. immediate, and apparently, more 
democratic interpretation,. than.,, did. theýMontagnards. -- 
Saint-Just'had, early realized, that the, more: hesitant 
or,, more,, opportunistic-members-of-, the, Convention., would 
find-, the, 
'implicationi3, -of, 
the_judgement. -a-useful, ploy. 
He believedt,, howevert : ýYat the iessentially 
one of common sense and that th. e., fo. 11y, -_of , revealing 
to the peoplethe uncertainty, pý,. their, own-represent- 
-(l) Speech on the judgement of the kingg November 13th. 
Le Moniteu 
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atives over constitutional procedure m igh t well bý 
irreparable "On VOUB dira que le jugement sera" 
ratifie par le peuple. Maio si le peuple'ratifie le 
jugement pourquoi ne jugeiýit-il pas? "Si nous ne 
. seli. 
tions point tous le _'faible de'ces iide`sýp '4ueiqueý 
- forme de gouvernement que nous adoptassi'onsp nous 
serions esclaves; -le souverain nly"serait'jamais a 
aa place, ni le magistrat'a-la sienneg-et le peuple 
serait sane garantie contre-ltoppression-l' As far 
as Saint-Just was concerned the Convention was'not 
only able but obliged to judge Louis. In addressing 
his colleagues he produced an interýsting progression 
of ideas -_11Citoyensq le I tribunal qui-doit'juger-, 
Lo U, is e -a t p'-o,, in' tu ný tribunal judiciairei"c' ,ea t' un 
conseilq clest le peupleg clest'vous-tt(l) 
-S 'aint-Justso '. argument -a wer e' r ebut ted"-towards the 
end of-December by Ver gniaud. " His"own -views wereq at 
first sightq'eq'ually straight-f 6'rward ý_and- logical 
but'they never came near to'answering some of the 
difficulties ra iae d' by, Saint , -Ju , at. - Vergniaud'was*at, 
pains to connect the king's trial with1public tranquill- 
ity and national glory; the Brissotins"were always 
more 'iýindful -of overseas.. reaction' to "the kihgls'fate 
than the Robespierriste. He, continued by allowing to 
the, people a much. greater practical'and immediate 
participation in theact'ual processes'of government 
(i) ibid. : 
315 
than, was ever admitted by.. -the, Montagnardi3l. whoý. believed 
., 
that the applic4tion of suchýideas would lead"'to. 
, cotplete, 
disruption.. To, deny, this rightv Vergniaud 
assertedl. would be, a criminal. usurpation... -. The. diffi- 
culty, of explaining why every single measure-was'not 
refeirred, to the, people. was explained through, the 
somewhat arbittary distinction made between constitu- 
, tional and legislative actsq. the latter being onlye 
. 
tacitly ratified bythepeople. 
_, _Vergniaud's arguments 
left ample scopefor,; - 
. criticism., 
The Brissotins were. notnoted-farýtheir 
faith in, the people as-a separate entity'and had 
backed, away, from the., spectacle-of., this, entity--thin)c-- 
ing and acting for. itself., ý Theyýseemed to,. be-, indulg- 
ing in-_abstractioni; 
-aEs-a-meanE3, 
of gaining, favour. It 
was Marato the_, Friend. ofý, the People himselft'who--l-, 
pointed out the. -dangers, behind referring the 
last-, '-- 
word on-judgement andýsentence toýFrance, -as a-whole. 
ýNon seulement llappel au peuple-est une-, mesure, 
6-1 impolitiqueg ridiculeg, -ineenseeg elle nlest-pas'moine 
.. perfideq funeste et, desastrueuse.. De, quelsýdangereq 
49 quels orAges- de quels. malheurs no serait-elle 
pas suivieq'aujourdlhiA'q'ue la nationg si peu instruite 
encore , at si peu'regeneree 'eat remplie de suppots 
de llancien'regimeg. livree aux entreprisee des I ennemis 
_ 
de la'liVerte'et'en, proie aux fureurs des pretres 
fanatiques; aujourd'hui que llopinion publiqueg travaillee 
en'tout aenst par des ecrits serviles, eat complettement 
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e-11,1-1 egaree ..... The peopleg in other wordsg, were, still 
rn6t sufficiently educated in the ways of, republicanism 
.: -. to. exercise their rights, fullyq 
Between, the,., early discussions there was, a gap" 
while the. charges against-Louis, were drawn up, questions 
of, subsistances., were. discussed,, and, the Brissotins 
continued, in their delaying. tactics. During. these_ 
inconclusive first weeks of, December the French news- 
papers began to refer, more andmore,, frequently, to. the 
increase in British naval preparations'. ' The trial- 
proper began, at Christmas. In, the speeches made after 
Louis' defence was: read on December,, 26th. there, were 
revealed further-, contrasts between, leading-members-,, of 
-the 
Convention* 'These were, especially-noticeable in 
thecontributions of Robespierre and Gonso=e. _, - 
Robespierre had-spoken at lengthon the king's trial 
early_in December in the Jacobins., Like Saint-Just 
he. treated, the, trial as an, event, which wasq at,. basep 
IiIýIý, ý4 Ir .ýII-., ý, 1. . '. ý -;., - ýV 
unnecessary., There., seemed... to. -, him-p-, to, have arisen 
a'basic misunderstanding.. of. the unique situation of_.. 
France --"vous confondez. encore. 1a. situation dlun 
I-I,, -ý -1 1--, -0 38 (1) Marat's sp'eech-on the king's judgemento B. Ný 8 '-1'6 
(2)''In-mid December I the'Brissotin I s, had'introduced a 
diversionary. attack,, on, Philippe, Bgaliteg the former 
duc d'Orleans, in an attempt to discredit the Montagnards, 
among whose ranks Egalite'satp, by accusing them of 
royalism. -. 
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I'll peuple en, revolution avec celle dlun peuple"dont le-4 
gouvernement est-affermi; vous confondez'une nation 
un, fonctionnaire publieg en conservantl-la-- 
. 111' forme-du gouvernement--eti, celle qui detrUit'le gouverne- 
ment lui-meme. 11(l) Like Saint--Justg toog: Robespierre 
felt that-in the present'disastrous'-state: of Francev 
the"realization, ofýthe, hopes with which-the republic 
was born was quite unattainable. Theýgreat barrier5', -,,, 
was the king and in thefarguments over his fate there 
had developed dissensions which threatened, to, oplit 
, ---the, countryAnto civil, war-- I'vous-avey-pro4me, la. 
1-11 1-11 republiqueg mais nous l1avez-vous donnee?, -Kous n1avons 
point encore-fait-une seuleloi qui justifie-ce nom; 
nous nlavons pas, encore, reforme une seul'loiiqui 
justifie ce nom; ýnous nlavons pas. encore-"reforme un" 
seul, abus; de despotisme. ý'Otez les noms;, nous avons, 
encorela, tyrannie, toute entiereg etl'-deiplusq des 
factions, plus vilesl: et. des-charlatane-plus'immorauxv 
avec de nouveaux serments de troubles, et: de guerreý. - 
civile. -. La, Republiquel *et'Louis vit, encore. '' Et vous, ---- 
t 
placezýencore-la personne du i, entre nous et la libertg-ýn(2) 0 
Robespierrele. views, on: these points. were represent- 
ative 'of those of a number. of his, colleagues. - He 
(1) Robespierre's speech to theJacobinel December 5th. 
AN. AD. 1/104 
, 
(2) Robespierre's speech to the JacobinB, December 5th. 
AN - AD. 1/10 4 
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I 
differed%most fundamentally from the. Brisso. tineq and, 
particularly. 'Gensonne., on the question, of, the'appeal 
toýthe. people. This suggestion had, become inextric- 
ably. connected with certain other. issues which had, --,. 
long, been troubling the Convention.,,, 
_The 
Mantagnards 
attacked, it' as being 
-,. 
potentially,,, divisive playing, 
into. the-hands of royalists and. being-subversiye of 
national unity.,, The Brissotins replied that, the, peýople 
was-fully Justified in expecting tolratify such. a-, 
momentous, decision, and., that--failure totake,. such. la 
step would, further. illustrate,. the. almost-, tyrannical 
pre-eminence of-Paris. 
- 
Robespierrels arguments to.,, 
h prove,,. the, futility,, of. theýappeal tended to followt e 
,, 
lines of, tlie"modern-concept, -of..,, the silent, ýUiajority. 
The masgs "of -the -people., did-, indeed -want,,, 
Louis ý -, _death 
and had demonstrated this on August 10th. Beyond thisq 
howeverg, -they', lacked, the-i3ophistication,. and, the. ý' 
educationz-, both practical,. and, political, -,, togive 
expression-_toý_such feelings., -. ýInany,, eventf- they. _had- 
more pressing-. responsibilities..., They. were:., good citizens 
and, ezpected-, their, representatives, to, c4rry out-, t#eir,, 
will ý- "Cette majorite ýa exprime. son, voeu . -, au imoment 
owelle secouja le joug de votre, ci-devant roi elle 
a-commenoep'elle a soutenu la, revolution; -,, elle a des 
moeurs; cette. majoritegelle., a-. du, couragel-mais elle 
a. ni, finesseq ni elogLuenceq, elle foudroye Ifes tyrans; 
mais elle. est souvent. la dupe des frippons. Cette 
majorite ne doit point etre fatiguee par des assemblees 
Izi 0 . ol -A- .7 
continuelleag-ou . une minorite intrigante domihe'troi'ý' 
fjouvent'. -, ', Elle ne, peut, gtre dans -Voe as'semýlees 
-ses ateliers; elleýýne politiquesýquand'elle est'dans 
peut-juger, Louis XVI-quand elle-n&ar'rit-a la . sueur-de, - 
sonfronVles robustesý. citoyens quIelle-donne a, la 
'This kind'ýoVargumentq'if'generally aýpliedq pitrie. 11(l) 
-ý6uld have supposed that'the7people'. took-no, direct 
part in-any of the major, controversies`bfýthe Revolu- 
A 
tion'. - a nd the corres- In-factl , the'-- s60ti6iýSl-izi, Pari 
ponding-societies-, through6ut. France-'weieý-hý, ýing'so 
muchetosay. 'on thelmPlications and the-`importance'k*of 
the"trial*of, '-Louis'XVI': that, theý'we're'-demonE3trating-- 
how-significant,, public opinion could-be, *, at the very 
., time', 'that-Rob4E3pierre.. was-. assuring'the', 
Brisootilis 
thatnthe people'were too'ocCupied-to paiticipateýýin--'-'ý 
debate.,, 
n 'Gensonnels: epeech was not., only an attack"o -the 
basesýof-the'Montagnard positiong 'but--a revealing 
explanationg"in somiei-parts, `-of the'sense , of-grievanceg 
-xintellectual'isolation'of a'talented provincial'. --"- even 
lawyer-who, was increasingly ungble to adapt: hi*self to 
the direction which-the Revolution appeared tolbe', 'ýý 
takingO-- There. was more, to., Gensonnele, speech-than a 
justif ication - of : a'manoeuvre 
'inspired in part- by, 'ý 
,, 
dubious politicil'moýiveE3. -., -, -Genso'nne argued essentially 
December . 'Robespierrele'speech t6ýtlie Conventiont" ý27th- 
AN. -AD. -1/103 
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that-the appeal to the peopleof, Prance was destructive 
of faction and the most sure wayof preventing civil 
war. He, violently attacked the view, that,, by consider- 
ing__the opinions of the prqvinces,. his,. fellow-sympathizers 
ýwere. attempting to belittle, the Convention in the. eyes 
of the., rest of. France or-to remove-it outside-Paris - 
.. -_. 'IVous_, savez., bien. que, ce systeme de. federalisme, que 
vous. attribuez aux deputes,, de departements vIeut uhe 
republique uniqueq, mais, quIil. veut. que la volonte . 
generale, y, fasse la loiq que-votre faction ne slen 
rende pas-lunique. inte 
( 
re te*, 
(1), 
-So-called-lovers 
of_libertyq who were real nothing. more, than political 
opportunistsg,. could. be easily recognized. ---. -Gensonne. 8 
descriptionýof such, men-, wasýperhaps. 
'revealing 
of, the 
defensivenese, of. the, Briesotin-, outlook, -by., the,. -turn. of 
., the -V , 
year-l792T1793;,, r_'IOn, les reconnalt,, a - 
leur-, haine 
. -.,, pour, la philosophie et-loo, lumiere. E30, -a-leur. adresse 
a. caresser les prejuges et les. passions,, du,. peuple qulils 
veulent. trozaper.:,, Ils,, se van t. avec, -,, effronteriet 
I ils, parlent sans cesse de leur-, zele.. -. o, Ltun E3e, prOC_lame 
du peupleq, -1-1, autre, le defenseur, incorruptible, ami 
desýdroits. '.. P-Many people might saygýwho, were, thes. e 
self-seeking. hypocriteal what. were. thexe--methods,,.,,,,. ý,,. 
., where, 
lay. -their, strength. -,, "Leuri3. -ýmoyenel, olest-_llopinion, 
et Oest par,, elle-qulon, peut avoir-et: l'armee, IetI-le: -. 
Gensonne's speech to the Conventiong'"Dec'ember 28th. 
AN' AD. ' -"-1/103. 
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peuple lui-meme. 11 Alreadythey ha&sent agents-in*t"o 
the departments and the armies - "pour assurer la 
liberte aux autres, vous voulez etablir votre despo- 
ýtisme. ll Gensonne finished by reminding his audience, 
"that until a-new constitution was -promulgatedg all 
powers were, provisional - "il n1existe plus d1autre 
autoritef"que'oe'lle du 'peupl'e .... * -que veut-oii done en 
-parlant sans cesse'dlinsurrecti de revolution 
noUVelle? 'Contre' qui peut-elleýet dirigeeq si-ce' 
nIa st - pas" contr'e- la nation I elle-memeO"(l) Al 
In some, ý'sens'es-, Gensonnelsappea1for caution in 
the face of the Re'volu'timils'passing Iiiio"rival and' 
more extreme hands was-the cry of the Brissotin group. 
' i: 'g This_e'men'we'r_e` unhappy aVout"'the tria -'of'the'kih 
the"kind of arguments. -which-', their opponents were using. 
They''had'hoped to enli IsI t- - the_ý supjbr'tý 'of" -the 81 till I un- 
-decided majority of the Convention,. in'defeating their 
speration and' 'bpponentat bUiitýhnadý. 'xhibit'ed only'de 
naive i: ally ema*kabl: e in politica ite. ' te. ' This was eg ec r 
s 
ms Briesot him--- f Brissot suggested-, that the neutral nserif 
powers would be--less likely-to declare war'on France 
if'the kingle, death was _'-seenýto-b , e-the- sentence of the 
entire French nationg an'attitude whi chq, if h. e- 'genuinely 
b"elieved itq serves I only to, illustrate more fully his 
total lac, k of understanding of foreign affairs and'his 
dilemma. (2), desperate-search'for'a way out of the 
(1) ibid. 
'(2) Brissot's speech to the Conventiong December 28th. 
AN. AD. 1410 3. 
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There is a marked difference*between Brissot's--atti- 
tude latAin December and his bellicose speeches of_ 
January 12th. and February lst. He subsequently 
explained this as being a distinction between personal 
opinion and that of-the Comite'ýDiplomatique-- However 
obscure-the workings ofthe Comite andtthe outlook, of 
its members, in the last_days-of Januaryq 17939 it is 
difficult to believe that BriSBOt was not acquainted - 
with-the general tone of reports coming in from Britaing 
_both as'. politician and journalist. -, The Foreign Ministry 
knew of the''domestic repression of Pitt's government 
and-the press carried information on armament and on 
Ip arliamentary procedings. If Brissot-genuinely believed, 
despite reports of the British attitude-toward_s, Fran. ceg 
that the-results of the appeal to the people would- - 
influence foreign reactiong, he, wai3, demonstrating-very. -, 
clearly-. the desperation of the--Briesotin6!,. 
-search 
for 
.., a-way. out-of, the-dilemma and the psychological chasm 
'which now separated men of, government in--France and 
Britain. 
ý--Neverthelessq Brissot had-introduced a-consider- 
ation-which was exercising the minds of his -own 
countrymen. It would be unrealistic to suggest that 
all the'deputies who, voted the kiz)gs -death -did -so 
without having searched'for alternatives. The--case of 
Dantong-. ', who. had, passed during the-l-ast months-of-1792-.., 
intoýmore.. open support, of'Robespierre's groupp-demon- 
strates the hesitancy of one of the'-Revolutionts-, -, - 
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, 
leading figures. 
-at, 
this..,: time..,, ýPew. would challenge 
the. invaluable effect of Dantonts courageous persOnni- 
fication. of-Prench defiance Of the invader in the 
autiimn of, 1792., Yet, ýhis same manv,,, who seems to have 
.,, continued,, to,, exeraii3econsiderable 
influence over 
Yrance's diplomatic relations with Europe even after 
he resignedýfrom the Conseil Executif was., uneasy at 
, 
the thought of killing the, king. , The,, obscure. -epis'ode 
. of 
Danton', s supposed demand for, twoýmillion'livreB,. '- 
from'Pitt, "s,, government'in return-for his, undertaking 
. ýto_ensure-the passage of a, 
decree,, which I . would 
have, 
saved, Louisq butýbanished all'. the Bourbonsq: has. never 
been'. satisfactorily explained.,,,. ý,, Theodore--deýLameth! s, 'ý 
account, asserted that-Danton, hadý. expressed, ýa, willing- 
ness-to spare the king, at the end of Octoberg-'. but-not 
at, the risk of, his. own ruin. _, 
It has also., been-suggested 
that Danton-tried to, make-some accomodation, with, --the 
Brissotin leaders as late-aa, November, 30th-9 an-inter- 
view-at, which he prophesied. their, downfall. ý, -His, ý..,. -,,, -, - 
connection with the-attempt-, to, interest-, the British 
As complicated. by in-contributing-ýo Louist, l-,, 
freedom, 
the schemes, for bribery which, theý, Spanish attempted to 
put into, practice at, theend, of--1792.., The. Spanish 
ambassador in Paris, 
_9carizq 
apparently had. a., sumin 
excess of two million livres at his. disposalg' but 
ach ie4ed no7 concrete' result. The, agent Talong examined 
y't e Consulate"nearly ten years after the'events of 
this, 'chapter9"'implicated Danton in, moves'which were 
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made, to obtain the assistance of British ministers. 
The request for 2 million livres almost certainly never 
went beyond the'ubiquitous-W. A. Miles. Pitt did not 
deny the request, it never reached, him. It is quite 
possible, however, that Danton had set a-monetary 
price on his efforts. 
(') 
While Danton and others wrestled with the ir 
consciences and the difficulties of the ever-changing 
political situationg a provincial deputy-without any 
definite loyalties to any. group of the Convention was 
working towards-the formulation-of his ideas relating 
to the king's trial and its place in the, Revolution. 
His exposition of these ideas. at. -the. beginning of 1793 
was to prove a turning point, since it convinced the-- 
large'majority of puzzled and uncertain men of, the'ý' 
Plaing the middle groupýof the Conventiong that the 
Brissotins delaying tactics were*damaging and under---'- 
mining the state. Bertrand Barere, emerged during the 
months of November 1792 February 1793 as-the spokes- 
. -man for. the majority of uncommitted deputies. -The 
vacillation, of the'Briesotine, had finally, convinced 
,. him of the need for the Con-vention, to-take a final '- 
and swift decision on. the fate of the king. ---. Early, in 
November-he'had remarked'on the necessity of recog- 
(1) Albert Mathiez, "Danton mort du roig d'apres 
un-document inedit. "., Annale Revo utionnaires, 1922. 
Seelalso A-. -Sob, oul, Le PrýLes)de Louis XvIg, op. cit. 
p. p. 24-259 198-204. 
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nizing-that revolutionary, ýPranceý, was-being. observed 
by-. the'rest,, of, Europe,. in, an,, attempt, to,. remind the-; ý, 
E3 thattotal mental isolationcould"be damaging. 
ýaajr\e'r 
-had, become-convincedg, -, 
by, January.. 17939"that there 
was, a,, dangerous. -body of, counter-revolutýon, both, *out- 
side and, withint-Pranceýandýthat, (tot,, weaken'theý, ýconstit- 
uted, powers, of Ahe --Convention -by -ý abdicating 
decisive role-he, -felt. -it, --should,,, 
take-,, inissuessuch-'as,, 
Louisl-,,., trialwould, be, ýto play, intolthe-hands-, of men 
who viere ýent,! on,, the,: destructionýýloflthe, -republic. -, IfHis 
arguments were powerful'. Ienoughto strike-home, toT, 
numbrous. deputiesiwhoý: had found, little, to impressýthem 
in the abusive-exchanges, of, the,, Montagnards-', and,,, 'ý,, ý,, t_lýý, -- 
Briesotine.,,, Barere-was, adamantý-that, -, the idewof con- 
sulting,, the., people-in-, suchý, a, case,, was-, subversJ-veý, of, "ý., ý, ' 
the fabriciofigovernment -, ýýRenvoyerýau-pýuple, ýle4, -Iýl; 
jugement d'une, affaire: partiouliereg.: ct, est detruire 
la nature du corps conatituant; -- clest alterer-les 
principes du gouvernement representatifq otest reporter 
'au souverain as que le'souverain vouslia charges de 
. 
faire.... oui, d1apres votre caractere_,, conventionnel 
je soutý, enBj qque le renvoi-, a1a ratification du peuple 
ta 0 u-n ato ement dan clest une provocation 
v 
pusillanimeq clest depou llement, infideleg clest 
re mibsi''' un affaiblissement de I re on It should be 
(1)-. -'Barerels speech to the Conventiont January 4thp 
1793, Le Moniteurg-, 151.,, P-53. 
I"oý -1- ý-. 
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remembered,, when assessing the, overall, effect of-, 
Barere!, s speech in the protracted, discussions over,, 
Louis' judgement that by early January, 1793 there., 
was growing tension in Parisq that the system of 
government-had... reached.. such a, height,, of. uncertainty., 
-that it was about. to be bolstered, upby the Clomite 
de Defense Generale,.,,. and. that Dumouriez had returned 
to,, Paris,, breithing, recrimination, against the, Convention 
and reminding many. people of France'sincreasing-_1 
difficulties-in her-relatione, with the neutral powers 
(2) 
9;,, Europe... 
., 
Indeedq however., important, it may, be. to 
attempt,, to, grasp the issues. which. were, at., the heart'l... - 
of, the-king's trial and: the divisions and personalities 
within-. the Conventiong. the, episode-only-_ýýquires'', -, -, 
ý. ]Rroper. significance-when, viewedýwithin, the context, of 
t#e,,,, general situation, of France and, particularly the 
state, of, public opinion,, in. the.. country.,,.,.,. 
The Comite'de Def-ense'Generalet which'was announced 
on January.. lst. in Ke I rsaintýs speech to the'Convention, 
first met'on Januýry'5the' 
(2)' Kersaint's speech, mentioned in the footnote abovep 
had been a reminder of the' deterioration of'relations 
. with*" England Dumouriez Is' presence in Paris ange . red many 
Robespierrists who'suspe6ted'him of., -trying to sway the 
Conseil EX C tif to restrain the Convention over the 
king's trial. 
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-. -It is by no means easyg howeverg to'assess-. the 
state of public-opinion throughout the provinces. -of, 
France. To'do so would require much research in,, local, 
archives. --, It would seem probablet, howeverg judging 
by, 'the pamphlet-literature which abounded at the time, 
that thereýwas considerable uncertainty-, throughout 
France, The Brissotins had'an active system Of 
communications with-their departments and. -sent 
inform- 
ation, back-to their constituencies; this'presented- 
the"Montagnardaiin a very unfavour-able-light and only 
blurred the issues which were-most closely, connected 
with. the trial of Louis, XVI., - There was. talk of-sending 
armed. battalions to, Parie. to, free, the Convention., from 
the despotism of a min , ority., Royali at counter- revol- 
utionary agents capitalized on. the general atmosphere 
ofý, insecurity and many pamphlets were,. published in 
Louis'., defence. The Bris'sotins attempted. to focus 
departmental attention on, their, political, opponents. 
Their, language, became muchý. more extreme-as the-trial-, 
progressed-Anto its final phase-"P', with--Ihints of deeper-- 
--his--friends in ation., ý In mid-January Salle wroteý, to' 
the Meurthe, -, "Vous dormez elt la chose_-, -pýublique eat 
peril. q, etý, siltous lea departements-ne-se levent a I" en L. 
la. - foist elle--est'pe I rdue. ý'Vigilanc el-'ýil-, est temps111(l) 
The, letter provides evidence of, the-unwillingness, or 
(1) Salle to the departement, of, the Neurtheq: January 15th, 
quoted in A. S6boul', -ed., Le Proces, de. Loui6 XVI, P-174. 
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failure, of the provinces to take any direct'action- 
in "influencing affair's in- I 'Pari I s. When . the Iy examined 
their consciences many men may-have felt that"Louis XVI 
haý done wr ong and should be"punished, even'if they 
were not prepýred to say howe 
'jiovi I noes a'p' n In marked contrast to- the p are'ii 
reluctance to take any positive p"art in'the"trial'6f 
the king was the growing radicalism of expression and 
outlook in the French capital. The'Convention's'daily' 
meetings took place against the background of a rising 
clamour of anti-monarchical-sentýiment in the see'tion' 
meetings'and the"publications of the press. However 
abstract some-of the theorizing on the-sovereignty of' 
-the people may have been, here was a simultaneous 
indication of the potential, forces of the people when 
they believed that their interests were tied to-a 
specific event'or cause. In the. first two'months'-of 
the, C8nvention there wasq even within Paris, q*a'-sig- 
nificant amount of undecided opinion in the'more--' 
conservative areas. As the autumn progressedg shortage 
Of food and'rising unemployment became more, and more 
connected in-the popularýmind_with the king's''trial. 
There were obvious i9purs towards., this'development'. ' 
The, relative weakness of the Convention, enhanced the 
SCUS sions in the sectional groups, importance of he di 
whereýincreasing wi mbersý. of ordinary, meng'despite 
Robespierre's explanationstl--were'g in. factq,, makingýtheir 
opinions felt. The more articulate members of these 
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aseembliesp perhaps influenced by what they.. had heard 
from the priestf Jacques Roux, and readg, in the Pere 
Duchesneq believed-that all the evils would continue 
/-the - 
living symbol of the corruption 'while the kýng, 
of'the ancien gg e survived. This was a-. f-. more. direct 
interprietatiýn an similar statements by Saint-Just, 
for these ment though committed to a republican and 
'democratic system, were also intent on keeping staple 
foods in good supply at reasonable priceep safeguarding 
their, threaten"'ed wages and simply being recognized 
as the possessors of basic human rights. The fate of 
the king, had very immediate implications for them 
since they suffered while there was general uncertainty 
in the entire political, fabric of France. In the 
writings of anonymous sansý-culottes pamphleteers one 
can d ect . Cý 1. aims that wer e voiced mo 
I 
re loudly in 1793-4 
-and which 'were, at this earlier stage, entirely un- 
acceptable to the Montagnards. 
(l), The realization 
týaý'theýParisian populace might be swayed, by agitators 
towari'more"'e'xtreme expression o, f their discontent, 
appalled the Brissotins. Again and again they warned, 
the provinces of discontent in Paris and though 
Santerreq commandant of the national guard, frequently 
informed the Convention.. that Paris was tranquil, this 
w as not, a feeling which communicated itself 
'' 
with any 
(1) 
-Adresse 
des braves Sane-Culo*tteeQ(Na la-Convention 
N, ationaleg 28 novembre, 1792.8 
0L6 203 
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degree of*assurance'll, So'great was the p roble I M'Of"-' 
tension in the city'that the Conseil Executif*was 
instructed, to'present a'report, on'-the '-iiats"of Paris 
on"January '5th', 17'93. 
By mi Novemberg '1792 it -was evident 'that. 'th6 
problem, of"subSiBtancesg, 'and'the'Convent n's *conBiStIMt io 
n- de ý'Iwi h i'albility'to al t this question'in"a manner-satis 
factory'to-the inhabitants of Parisp-was, becoming a 
source of'dangerous-division. "-'On, 16the Novemberp', 
urgent 36 of'the'48'section a presen 
m. e, asur , esto , 'be t ak'' 'e'n , 
'o 
ver sub's is tano j 
culottes'hatred'and"fear of hoardersýwas very'stroxig'"'', 
' 
and'would intensify'with-'time-', T#9 Parisians were 
`to_ý of the- unhappy - o" re tho'-'deputies' only ady'to'remind 
"On,.: vous prýecedents'of the'-'si'tuati6n of-the-capital 
is et, - dit ýue_Paris-nla'pas de', , provisions, pour un'3ýO 
vous, charger vous'r'este'r dans 'Qui, avez "llinaction. 
t 'grside Villet de"pouvoi'r a la'subsistance'de, c, et'e' 
"'cOnjointement des boulangers, 
-des mis'erables, 
'quit 
epouvantable avec'Nocker' ont". su'scite une fam ne 
6' dan" 
t Uve d_exemp , jamais, ro en 1789 dont nous'ýnlavons` 
T- his amphietp-a' 11hi-Stoire d1aucun peuple 
as written at'the flor 1, t, hri gh .t demand for strong a0 tio 
ing of Decemberg 
At the begirm end of Novemb 
L 
er, '1792. ' 
'--de 1,110be 
teI rv 
. ato - ire 
Jacýues Roux, speaking'to the- section 
in, the context, Of, 
the 
placed Louis XVI'sjudgement, 
c op. cit. Culotteep (1) -'Adre'see' des Biaves"SaLa07 
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general economic and political crisis. To.., himg, -the, 
moment was one of-inescapable_import. ance, - "il eat 
tempsýdlapprendre aux peuples de'la, terre que lee 
nations ne sont plus-la propriete-des,, rois, qua la 
vertu seule rend llhomme. inviolable-et, que 1'e. crime 
condui lea tyrans 
\a 
llec I hafaud.,,, La li4erte'lesera- 
" I -I .'. -IýJ el qulun-, vain, fart6meg lorsque us ne ferez pas,, eclater 
V 
........... 
ýo 
la foudre de llegalite sur un monstre,, detrone.,,. - 
Roux, was. convinced that, the only. way tostifle the 
conspiracy, which'then threatened. France was to. -remove,, 
kingg. -the, figure-; -head, of. the counter-revolution. 
The following day, as. if, to underline Roux", s, pleadingst 
delagates from all 48 sections-of Paris, came.,, to-', the. _,,, 
-Convention, to petition for action, to-be., taken over, 
the 
king', s trial I'Depositaires*de la-vengeance. nationalep:, 
que. tarde. encore votre bras? "., To end, the-inefficiency 
and-uncertainty of the Convention's. proceedingeýthe,,., 
sections proposed a'simple, solution Poser lla--,,.,,. 
question comme elle le devrai 4tre. -Louisg, ci-devant 
roi des Francais, eat-il d ne de mort?, , 
Est-il I-ant- 
eux puV, i q'U sur lechafaud? " ageux a Republique de le faire, 
( 
st I'l i 
ARe' 
Thisq.,, it: was.. suggestedg.,, would be. t. 8 topic or 
per, week. -The 
. petitioncended,. with-the solemn warning -, 
"Souvenez- 
vous que clest par le, peuple_, et par.. le peuple seul que 
(1), Jacques Roux to, the section 
'de 
1, 'ObBervatolire, 
lot Decemberv quoted in Soboul, op. cit. P. P. 88-90., 
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vous, ýte. e. appeles., concelrtrez-vous, dansývotre'mission; 
11 e mattreý, ýest, sur. t. toute, vosý, actionel, et 0- 
. 1.1 n 
(1), 
---t,,, les, p4e u poids de- son utilite., E3 
AnParis-grew., ýthroughout the ional-feeling; 4, 
month, of December.,,. --, The, continued'indecision', of, -the 
Convention in the-face, of re.; iterated sans-culotteý 
appeals for_ýdefinite legislation to-easeýthe economic 
situation, to, ýput, a, swift,,, end, to--, doubts,. over, the'. 
ýingls. judgement and, ýsentence-, seemed; likely to endlin 
a, serious-. crisis.., Atý-, the-end", of'])ec*ember-the sections 
of-Marseille and, Luxembourg had, declared themselves 
tolý. be.. inýýia, tatate, of.; insurrection. -. -, -*, Thisýwasidefined aa 
(2) 
surveillanceg-, de sollicitude patriotiqueý -,; 
-', Some' 
-sections. were, also trying 
to arm,,. an, action*which, ý-Pacheq 
the War Minister, did not, view unfavourably. There 
J 
--were continued, rumours,., of. ý. 
theý, raising, ofarmed, forces 
in., 
-the,, provinces.,.,, 
On January', lith.. -Couthon remarked 
I! ce- ., est, etonnantq.,, c! est'-, que 
les, directoires-des--- qui, 
departementE3., i3e-soientý,. crus autorises, 'dIarreter-la: 
levee;, dIunC-force, armee. Celuiýqui, ýa,, dit. ". queý-les 
directoiresý, de, departemente-deviendr it -zpar,, '. 
1,! autorite, -. i=ense dont, 'ilszetaient, -. evet s,, `les, ý. - 
enemis. -, dangereux, de-laýliberte-;, -celui-ýla, -a--dit une 
3S 
grande verite. 11. uch developments explain the 
(1), r, -Petition,. -of-. the'48 sectionsi', December-2ndl. ýSoboul, op. cit, 
p. p. 87-88. 
(2)-`Soboulq'op-'oit. P P. - '191--ý-193- 
(3) Couth, on to the Convention, January 11thq Le Moniteur 
Vol. 15, j, P- 112s 
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growing panic of the Brissotins'l but, it should-. be 
ieco'gnize'd, tha't, M'ontagnard standing was' also threat-ý. -, 
ene'd'bi the emergence of strong popular feelingga 
fe'eling. whi'ch connected hardship'withý, the hesitation 
-J of thi people s representatives and the 'continued 
ex, ist a0 ouis XV 
We'ne'ed to' havein 'mind the, -pres'sure of, these 
circumstances in order to-grasp-the'atmosphere which 
pieiiiled'in the'Convention'-'an'dthe. streeis of-Paris. 
-, _.:. D18cusj3, ione-on the"Judgeme'nt, of, the'lking-, wereieventually 
re-opened on January 14th. ---From--'-January', 15th-lgthg, 
with breaks caused'only, by, tlie-'need"to, restp the,.,,, 
deputies discussed the. wording "I of the'variOUB questions 
which they would, be"required to. answer publiclyg on 
the judgement' the-appeil' to'the '-peopleg, the-4entence 
and th: 6 reprieve., "' 
Th`e-ýnglis 1 4-, 1 government-and'peopleg'*pr'e-occupied 
'with perfecting-their military'arrangementS-had no 
compr"ehe"n'sio'n 'of 'the'. atm'o sipliere-In-_ France' at this-time. 
Their only''direct source'of information was'Michael 
. an Irish pri , es , t'l, whole 'own 'situation,,. was 
extr'em'ely 'difficult. -- Somers wa -8 -knowzi'to Burke -and. f 
11so to Monro. 'It. 'was'Somers who'had, pr'evailed, upon 
the British agent'to leave Paris in mid-December. - 
, 
(l),,., By, the,. end of, December Britain 
I 
had retreated into 
, a,, growing. qefensivenese, and,. isolationl_evident in the 
debates on the Alien Bill. See belowg Chapter 10. 
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Monrple. departurep coinciding the. lae, t, days of 
LMAB XVI's. trial came-. at a crucial, point, for, Br-itish 
intelligenceg and Somers took it, upon, himself-to., fill 
in-the. gap. some, of-his letters in-French 
and others in, English, the priest, was at, pa, ýnsj initially, 
to demonstrate his,, willingnese, to provide., information. 
Before longg however, he was, asking, for,, -money,, 
to,, ý_ýý, --- 
cover his efforts,, continuing his-reports into the'-, - 
first months 'of 1793. 
(1) 
-The British-parliament, 
had. 
succeeded in convincing-themselves of French. -iniquity. ;, -', -, ý. ý, ,, ý, ý- .- 111. --: ', -"YI- .1 
Their counterparts in France were, about toundergo, ýa 
thoroughly,, unnerving and, dramatic experience, in!, which 
personal, political survival and the,, futureof the-,, 
Revolution were. intertwined...... 
. -, 
The,. solution. to the, Conventiont, s impasse had 
been, suggested on. December 27th,, when, Saint-7Just prop- 
osed that each member j3hould mount the tribune and 
, publicly: declare his opinion. on. Louisý, guilt. ý, This 
syst. em was finally,. adopted-on, Januaryll4th. -- The. Yot e a,, 
, were recorded with. aB much thoroughness as p ossible, 
-indeed, the burden, on the secretaries was very great. 
A number of deputiest who-. had, seldomp-if,, everg, _spoken--,,,. 
in debates now f ound themselves required - t, o make 
important pronouncements in front, of-the. assembled, 
Convention and audience of, citizens . .,.., On the first 
. question, 
"Louis Capetv ci-devant roi des Francais, 
eie't'il'-'coupable de-6"o'n-'spiration contre'la liberte-et 
(1) Somers to Burgeal January and February, 17939 F. O. 27/43 
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ý', at. tentatlcontre la sÜrete-generale-de, 1'Etat? ",,, - 
638deputies, voted"yea". l out ý, 
of- &total, of . 720. 
Ths, %-, second : question , 
dealt. with -the -, much-7di, scussed 
question of_popular. ratification.., Vpting-on this,,, 
question. was-425, againat and. 286 forg,, with nine'lab-, ----,, 
stentions.,,,, The, vdting-,, on th e: penalty-began-on January 
16th., and, c. ontinued-, for 24, hours. 7387, deputies voted 
for-deathq but. -_of theseq-26:, declared. ýthatý. they supported 
Mailhe's motion-which, would have-provided for4examin- 
ation. of:: the question, of, a, reprieve. Those voting-- 
against. death numbered-, 334.,,, There,, were 7,21 members-. 
present., The-possibilityýqf a-, reprieve--causeduproar,.. 
amongqt.., the. Montagnards, 9 who-were sternly reproved, 
by 
Lalfevelliere-Le'p-auxt. who had voted Louis'.., death, but 
did*not., like., the unseemly. haste of. Bome-deputies'ýwhen, --, 
the, President-declared the session-closedgfseveral-, 
hundred membersstayed behind to protest until Legendreq 
pointing out that the citizen spectators mus, t. be 
alarmed at such disorderg,, brougbt. about an adjournment. 
.. Noting the next day,, on the, reprieve produced a total 
of 380 against and 310 for. - 
Santerre continued. to reportg-as did other observ- 
ers in'Parisq that, the town7was calmO After the judge- 
ment and. sentence had been, formally pronounced the 
capital. awaited the execution quietlyq though the 
(1) The voting figures are in M. J. -Sydenham, The 
GirondinBg(London, 1960) p. p. 229-230. 
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assassination of the Jacobin Lepelletier St. Fargeau 
outraged Montagnard'opinion-, and-seemed evidence of 
dark royalist plots. The manner in which-Loui's'die'd', - 
his'last words muffled-ýy. thýe'b'eating drums would- 
seem^to suggest an un I dercurr I ent - of anxiety on the par: t-, --7 
of the authorities. Whatýis more-certain is that the 
death of, the'king appears to have marked'an'end'to; *- 
restraint. - Crime figures for Paris rose-markedly in-'-, - 
the*weeks, following Louis'- death. ''-The economic- 
sitýatibn'of Paris worsened until Ma h, -1793, ''when 
there was rioting in the streets"and muchlllý-feeling" 
against, the Convention. --, By'this timeq howevert"France 
had other 'ýreat problems to, face'o- of 
the king may have been a'-nec-essary -process -'for' the 
safety and'unity of therepublic but withina. fortnight 
týe`French found themselves contemplatin I g-open-ýwar-: -' 
fare7with England. 
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Chapter ý 10 
Great Britain Mobilizes. 
strongly inclined to believe that itis-. the 
present-intention of, the prevailing partylin Prance to 
respect the'rights of this country and of, the republic... " 
Grenvilleýto Auckland, ' November'23rd. -l792. -'--, - 
"In addition to. -all., this we have seen a ýcode'-of 
laws-adopted in France, hostile-to every other,, govern- 
mento a'system-ofý, anarchy and ambitiong-,,, setting 
defiance-all regular authority and treating-as unlaw- 
ful': -everything which'has, been-sanctioned, ý-bythe Laws. " 
William. 'Pitt in the House, of-Commons# : December-21st. 1792. 
The: developments,, of*the. month of December,, 1792 
in-, Great, Britain were'in strong,. contraBt to-. those. of', 
France. ', *While-it is'perhapE3;: an - over-statement-, to'. *say-, 
that, bytheýend of. the month Pitt's.,. administration 
were, fully-'preparedý'for-warg--ýthereý, 'was'a-. general, 'con-. '-,,: 
sensusýof, -opiniong''", both-within and outside, Parliamentg 
that-war-betweenýEnglanU. and France-was an, eventuality 
which would"come-sooner'rather thanlater. --Theýdegree 
of mobilization -seems'to- have I been great er lin'. the-'ý, ýý, ", 
psychologicalýsphere-than in the military. Indeedq 
--there are; certain'inconsistencies"and'hesitancies: evident 
in the'approach, of theýBritish-government, 'evmas latei. 
as-February lst. týý1793. ý*, But-a'ýstudy of the'. 1ast, two- 
months. oý peace willýreveal'that it, is-idle toýsuppose 
thgt Pitt--and his" colleagues'were: upright innocents--un-, 
justly set-upon-by the revolutionaries^", Pittý-and 
338 
I 
Grenville wereg in factq-to, demonstrate considerable 
skill*in-the manipulation, of that double-edged weapon, 
public opinion. '-There may even have been an: element' 
of self-persuasion-in'the, 'line that-they began-to, - - 
adopt'-ýtowards France. -'As-their-tone, hardenedl-so'their 
v-ision, apparently'narrowedg'untilv, in,, the"specific', 
instanoe'ý'of the advantages o. f'gaining'the'-French, West 
Indiesq-traditional concepts of an 18th. century 
struggle between". France-, and, England'. returned', to occupy 
British-consider4tionsG- The an important'place: in" 
Frenchl'unlike the. "-B'ritish,, had, some glimmeri . ngs-of 
th6ýtenormity of-the, aýproaching--war; 'ýsuch'lessons-,,, 
Britain learned only over-a period of, -yearsl'O-Thý`, ý 
Britishý'approach toýwarq which-begins, in"Decemberl isý'- 
a striking mixtureof the haphazard'-and-. -the calculated. 
-, be --'s e en by" The'developments of, 'December can best 
eiamining a number. -of in_ter-related'aspects", -of'domestic 
and'European pre-oocupations: ' the'exchanges_', betw6en_, 
iand minist6rag Britain'B . 
British, and'French'diplomats. 
views towards Holland and the-WeBt Indies, and the two 
prongs of'mobilization, - of opinion"in Parliament, -and', -I'ý 
ofarms`in-theý*forces. - 
'In" the sphere'of Anglo-French--relations the'month 
produced some--, interesting differences in outlookq-above 
all't, in-the ýttitudes, expressed-by some of the French 
diplomats-in Britaine"I'The hardening of the British 
, 
line seems. -at last-to have convinced them-of, the reality 
of the situation. The Britishl howeverg obsessed by 
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the-end of the,, month with, thefear that all, kinds. of 
contact with Prance were potentially, disruptive of-.,, 
national equilibrium, drew back-from, exchanges, which 
had, apparently, he; d thepromise of greater. understand- 
ing between the two couhtries.,, A closer. look at the 
interview which particularly, misled them. will, demon- 
strate, the extent to which French optimism was-ill- 
founded. 
. _., 
The_vigour with which Pitt! s administration had 
countered the threat. of the supposed menace to law and 
order was,., not paralleled immediately. in, the, foreign 
PZLA--ý 
sphere. On December let. the, king had-called out the 
militia, and summoned Parliament to., meet on. the, 
_13th. 9 
but--on December 2nd., 
_in 
an-uncharacteristic movep Pitt 
agreed, to have an interview with. the French agentq 
Maret. The. -mere fact that. such-an-interview 
did, take 
place was a. considerable-personal, 
_, 
triumph for, Maret; 
Chauveling., the,, ambaseadorg. ha. d, only-succeeded,., and that 
with some., difficulty,, in, seeing-Grenville.. 
, The: exchanges, and. -discussions. wich 
formed, 
-tb: e-,, 
_, background to the Pitt-Maret conference-. -are, 
by no'means 
clearp., since they. involved individuals., on, the, fringes., - 
of, politics and diplomacy, whose activities, are-not 
directly relevant to the wider sweep of Anglo-French 
relations., Maret was thoroughly-questioned"by*the 
radical member of Parliament William Smithq an acquaint- 
ance of"both Pitt and the'Prenchmang before the 
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interview was permitted. 
(') 
It is impossible to say, 
whether the hope of an interview with Pitt had always 
been in the back'of Maret's mind. On his way to 
England from Parisq Maret had consulted Dumouriez in 
Belgium; what passed between them is not known. ' All 
that can be stated with certainty is that during the 
third week of NI ove , mb 
-erI Mare-t hýa succe , eded in pI ersuad- 
ing Madame de Sillery and her'pupilq Mademoiselle 
d'Orleans to go back to France. 
(2)ý 
At the same timej another Englishmang who also 
knew Maret but who had not apparently considered him 
as an ideal choice for an interview with Pitt, was 
attempting to arrange a. meeting, foi, the mini. ster with 
S6ipion Morgue,. under-secretary to the French., legation, 
in,, London. The Englishmant, William Augustus Miles 
had been employed. with, Hugh Elliot. on-., intelligence 
activities, in Paris, in 1790-, -at the', Itimeýof-. the Nootka, -_,, -,.... 
S 'iind Crisis, 0(3)- Miles%, was:, a, man of great self-import-- 0 
ance and ill-judgement.; -'Believing. that, his-influenoe,. -,,, 
greater than, it actually, wasg. Miles. probably was, not 
in-the, confidence of-Pittýor, hjs. -, closeýadvisers and 
I so would not have'knownof"-the administration1s, reasons 
for accepting'theýidew, of an informal'ýexchange. of-,; --, 
(1) Maret to Lqb'r"u'n-j-Dec'emb-er 2nd. 1.17929 A. A. E., 
0'P. Angleter. re 58'4., 
(2) See above, Chapter 7- 
See above, Chapter 1. 
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views. 
The, most. -plauslible, -, explanation.. for, why., Pitt. chose 
tollse'e Maret was, one -. that,., c_ould, not have,,. 
been. known 
to the French. either, Maret's proposals came, at an 
opportune time., Despite, their,. professions of reluct-, 
ance-to-make, any move whichwould,, appear,,. to',, acknowlledge 
the poE3sibility. of-official-. links. between. the,,, French 
republic and Britaing.. 
')? 
itt's.. government had considered 
the possibility, 
'of 
sending, a, man, to-, Paris', to assess 
the-. situation-there at, first hand.; Rumours,, to., this,. 
effect7vvere, eirculating. in the radical,, press in-, the 
last-week-of November and even. reached,.: týe, the-United--_ 
Provincee,, -thoug4,, they, were stronglyýqýniedý. 
by,, Grenville. (2) 
(1)ý'Miles revealed his'absence"of-understandin g the 
. 
ch61ce of the'unreliable'Morgue-for the proje'ct'ed inter- 
. view. 
Morguele, personal-reports, to Lebrun,, (A. A. E. p, C. P., - 
Angleterre, Supple'ment-29), are full, of,, bias and,,. inaccuracy. 
Miles doesp however, seem to have. be en. gýnuinely, alarmed 
-at,, _. 
the, collapse, of society w)2ich, he. considered inevitable 
should, 'England and France go, to--, war. He continued to. 
bombard Pitt with notes and advice until he was forbidden, - 
to correspond-further in,. 1795. (P. Rob. -%ý30/8/159)- 
(2) The rumours,, appeared in. the. Morning-Chronicleýand, 
were repeated in Le, Moniteur. It was-on November-26th. 
that Grenville informed Auckland. that. such rumours were 
untrue. S, eeF. O. 
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The'Foreign Secretary may well'haveýbeen annoyed by' 
this type-of speculation at a-time when, he was pre- 
paring'to see the-Frenchýambassador. ` The man who- 
might, have, I -gone wastEdward I Longq), &Trea - sury-unqer- 
secretary*(l), -A detailed-set of, instruction 8A intended 
for'Long were written - '-some"time atlthe-end of November. 
These reveal -especially',, British interest, in the- 
stability of, ýithe, regime', in, Parii"and'-in'the"Prench 
economy'-*and-Prench',,, militýry eparati6'ns T 
possibility'ýof . 'Pitt I ý-himself, 'ýrepresenting the'-British 
viewpoint, and'souýding'-'outiýaý: prench'-di'plomat seemed 
to'obviate Long's-mission'. '-'The British government'-was 
alwaye'very sensitive to'ýthe possibility'2 f"c&mp mising 'o 
itself. '"-'Mar-e"t's presence _ in"'England-provided them'with 
--Btit--Maretv'ý, tli6ugii'-a"ý", ý' a-convenientýýalternative'(3), ýI 
Edward Long, Lord Farnboroug-ho"' 
_,,. 7,. 
ClOsely connected 
with, the administration at this time he was. already in-, 
volved., with the. Foreign Office, Under,. Secretaryp James 
Bland. Burges, in the financial, backing, of-the,, government, 
newspaperp The, Sun. See A. Aspinallp Politics andthe 
Press 
, P.. 
78 
(? )''The instructions, 
-, 
are in, -F., 
O,. 27/40. 
. 
(3),, 
_., 
Geor, ge III in particular-was aware of thisj,,, 1,1itkeepE3 
the staff in our-hands instead of (in), a degree pla6ing 
it in their hands. " George III'to Lord Grenville, 
December 3rd., "1792, H-M*C--- Fortes6ue`'MSq-- op*, cit. ii, 
P '351. 
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senior. official'in, theýMinis-ýýere. -des-Affaires Etrang- 
k- 
eres-. had been; out of France for some time, and since 
the ostensible, *purpose. of-his mission was to, return, ý 
Mademoiselle, d'Orleans-to. -Franceg--he, may'not 
havebeen 
entirely-pertain ofthe French--government's viewpoint.. 
Consequently there was a, certain, vagueness inýhis,, _, I 
statements. f', -ýThe-, main,,, points of., the, conversation dwelt 
on-the-possibility. of future, -exchanges-and-on, 
the. -; 
chief4grievances of-Ahe British--gover=ent, Holland 
and the. 19ýh., November-dearee.,,, Pittýwas firm and,,,,, -, 
throughout, the, 
-, interview 
Idaret--found-himself on: the. 
defensiveý Pitt-made.: it clear thatýthe declaration, 
to-'open,. the, Scheldt was-. seen,,, as aý. serious-, infraotion 
on*the, -rights, of Holland., - I'we., wereýfully-determinedpý- 
ifithenaseiarose9vto give our utmosCeupportnto, our 
ally. ",, --Maret, sought,, to'be. re.; ýassuring --Ilit-was-very 
-ongood, -, much-the. -wish of. the Prench, government,, 
tobe 
terms with, this country; "". that-, these., were, 'the, 'ýeentiments 
of, -M., -LeýýBruný, when he. -left Paris about. three. weeks, ago; 
that-, he', believedi, they continued, to be7: those. of, General 
Dumouriez;, ý. and that,, from the despatches of, 14onsieur 
Chauvelinýý.,.... 'ýoo, he, ýbelieved*they7, continued'totbe 
those-ofý-the Conseil. Execiztif. "-(_'),... Maret, tried--to,. 
--, 
-presentt. the, situation,. as one-of. miuýual, misunderstanding, 
but.. he. ýhad-. to, '. admit. ýthat, pubýic-ýopinion-atlhome, ýnow 
(1) The text of the discussion is in the A uckland 
Papers, BM Add ýMSS 34t, 4'i5'. 
ý 
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so, sensitive. of,, national. prideg might, preclude un- 
official talks. -,;, ý 1(-1 4-, 
PittIs. emphasisq howeverg, was, on, one particular 
item -!. "Maret, " he said,, 11must have,. seen the. impression 
, 
by the_ made here decree. in, France. avowing a-design of. 
endeavouring to extend theirprinciples of. government.,,. 
by. raisi ng disturbances in other, countriesq that while 
this, was, professed, or. attempted, and,. till we had, full 
security on this pointt no explanation could. answer,, - 
its purpose and that such-a conduct must-be. -. conqi4ered 
as. an-act of hostility-to., neutral nations.! " -, 
-Maret's 
response,, wae, interesting "He answered,. thatlhe...... 
had seen the decree I mentioned, witb:, conEiternationv*,, ý, ',, 
that a, moment of ferment- , 
he. believed it passed only-in 
ation and., went-beyond. what-was, intended.... - thatihe 
believed it was not-conformable to the sentimente, of,,., 
the Conseil executif, and, that.. they"might possibly, find 
means torevise it. ", Such-a-statementp if made. with- 
genuine conviction reveals that Maret, was strikingly-,,,.,. 
oUt. of. touch, with-the general, tempeý, qf, France, Pitt 
made no, comment as to his'own, opinion, of-what-had,, 
passed between, himself. and,. the. Frenchman., i-,, British- 
ignorance of what was, actually going on in France was 
-hardly, lifted; Pi: tt seems to have been less concerned 
with probing-, than with, making, his own, government's. 
position abundantly clear. --,. 
He had, evidently-, not yet 
decided to abandon neutrality, but the fierce anti- 
French'-tonep which character'i'z-ed'many'6f th'e'speeches 
345 
after the meeting-of: Parliamentlwaitmore, likely, to- 
have-. an, effectA-on him.. than'-the, --basio, 
inconclusiveness 
of hie. interview-with Maret.,, The meeting. was virtually 
passedý, over. An 
-correspondence.,,,,. ý -British4diplomaticý 
recall of -Parliament undoubtedly strengthened 
Pitt!, s hands, but--it caused,. --consternation among, French - 
diplomats, inýBritain'., ---'. The fact that, Maret, had succeeded 
in. stealing a march,. on-'every, one,, elsecaused-, No*el,, to-,. l,,,,,,., -. 
sulk when he got-back-,, from. --, Belgium;. ý. -Chauvelin managed 
more restraint than might have., been-. expected. - 
He, --- 
like-, most, of,,, his compatriotsp, ýseems-to have been jolted 
into-a sudden, awareness', oftheýýoverall-implicatione. of 
so,, short the.,, situation. -The mere-circumstancethat-in, 
a. time'the government had. seemingly-managed an,, awesome 
control*of, public---opinion,, awakened Chauvelin, to,.. the 
nearness,: of, war.,,.,, "Tout se tai, tqll'ýhe., wrote on December 
, 7th-q-ýIles--assemblees , --deliberantes-refuge- 
des, seulB, ý 
A 
hommes-libres-de l'Angleterre-sont etre,, successivement 
fermees...... 
-L! 
Argue seule feuille, -publique-, independante 
et. vraiment-courageuse-ne-! parait'pluE3.,. '.... en, un-mot, 
le,,. gouvernement'regne'no S eulelment, ýeans. resistance, -mais 
sans. oontradiction-lf. 
(4 , The. decree-of, 19th. November, - 
-he, lconcludedg, -had, done the French'cause-in England--,:. -., 
immense-harm, 
The Prench, ministryt howeverg did not immediately 
grasp the importance of British conduct., Lebrun 
_(l)_, 
'Chauvelin to, 
_Le. 
brunt'December, 7the-1792, C. P. 
Angleterrev 
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persisted, in'believing that-England's-concern about 
her internal-situation would'actlin-France's favour. - 
Greater. -co=unication, between-the-two countries would-,. ý 
clear. up most outstanding difficulties., -It was only', 
after digesting his diplomatst-reports, and, George III's 
speech'to. the opening session,, of-Parliament on,,, --,, 
December 13th. that Lebrun, became'convinced of the--.., -*, ' 
significant change in British-. outlook..,. On December. --19th. 
at a time'when. the. Convention was awaiting the prepar- 
ation of Louis, XVI's defence,, -he made-a, report-to, the 
Convention which. brought the deputies-up, to datemith 
ýthe-current situation, of relations between, England'and 
Prance. (l) 
. 
Both'in, the presentation, of his,. speech-.., 
and-, the. ýco=ent on it which he subsequently made-iný-, -,, 
the diplomatic correspondencet Lebrun_ýseems. to have- 
felt that by. mid-December it was , impossible to' write 
dispassionately. about foreign affairs. He adoptedthe 
kind of approach which he believed-. the public, ý. temperý 
required of - him. ' , On 20th. 
' December he wrote to Noel :, z, 
_ 
"Je vous, envoie. ci-joint copie dluntrapport . -que J'ai$ 
fait hier a-la Convention nationalee, - Cette piece, vous. 
mettra au-courant, des, idees de ce pays-ci,. et, vouF3, feraý'.,, - , 
voir-que je ne suis ýresque plusle maitre de Vaffaireg 
la nation slen est en quelqueýsort emparee par la- 
(1) Report by the Ministre des-, Affaires Etrangeres to 
thel Conventiong December 19th., Reproduced'in Le Journal 
des'Debats and Le. Moniteur, Vol. 151ý-Wl 
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grande approbation-donnee a ce rapport et-son-envoi 
aux 83 departemen'te. "(1)" Here the minister, was admitt- 
that*he had been' in 'the-rhe* obliged to write'in- "torical 
tone of the Revolution and that in, -, this-re8pect-his_--_-- 
freedom'was circumseribe'd-by public opinion. '---Lebrun 
as' ,a iormer journalist was very-sensitive to-such 
difficulties. 'The report was well-received-lbecause it 
represented the'British government--as"'frightened for 
no'-good-reason; 'any*similar-'speech-would"have been---- 
wellý-received by'men whose'basic pre-occupation at that 
time lay with the'convulsions of-their-own'country. 
Yet'while Lebriaýills report may'have passedýover the''-, '' 
heads'of*most- - of the deputies it caused- , extreme*irrit- 
ation-in England. ""Speakersin4Parliament, cited it-as 
further-proof o the arr , ogance and irresponsibility 
of French'go v ern .m ent'., - particUlarl Y 
di , sliked, 
the sentence which'warned. that if it was the British 
''be 'to a"rupture'g- government's intention to'force Fran 
en France would issue,. a separate appeal'to thýe British 
nationg whose interests-surely lay elsewhere. %- 
The French ministert despite the-somewhat intimi- 
dating tone of hie'report, still saw no Immediate"threat' 
4glandwere m uch mo I re " aware of 0 ar. The'French in-E 
the'reality of-the-'situation and began t'O'iroffer 
opinions. As-early, aB December, 16th., two days after 11 11 1ý1.1 1 1, ""- -ý- %ý ýý -11 - -1 ýI; I-.. ". 
7 
'lebrun to No*el"9" December'20th. A. A. E. 
C'. P. '-An'gleterris 9 '? -584'0'"' 
I 
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a 
a. second and extremely chilly interview-with-, Pitt,,. -, 
Maret was suggesting that,, the, Convention should revoke 
the, decree opening the, Scheldt. 
(')--Chauvelin 
andýNogl 
also. put forward their,, views.. on the. means left, of,, -, avert- 
ing war. The ambassador_claimed-, that,, the,, kingl, s-trial 
was damaging the. Prench cause in England... ". 
He-was 
afraid that Louis', execution would, ibe used, as the-,, - 
signal for, an organized. outory,,, against France. -_ He, 
also felt that, to undo the, damage,, of, ýhe, 19th- November 
decree it might be salutary, to make speeches in the 
Convention stressing that. the measure, hadnot, been 
aimed at Britain., Beyond-this Chauvelin. realizedIthat 
at this critical point some kind of-, contact, must be, 
maintained "Enfing, citoyeng il me. semble queý si -le,, 
Conseil executif juge a, propos'defaire aucune tentative 
de negociationg. ce serait, bien pluto"t en Hollande, 
quIen Angleterre, qulil serait facile et profitable. -,,., -- 
Ven engager une. 11 The Dutch governmentv,. he,, thoughtt 
was more flexible than the-British. - 'let llon m1assure, _-, 
de plus que Lord Auckland ...... qui a la plus grande,,, 
influence sur le cabinet hollandais. est-entierement.., - 
Contre la, guerre et-nla cesse, dglen, -. de-, tourner,. M.. -Pitt. 
Here Chauvelin, formerlý so proud of hisýposition as 
ambassador.,, to, Englando. was virtually,, 2-4ggest. ing, that:,,,., -. -, - 
(1) -Maret-to'Leb r' 
Angleterre, C. P* 
(2),, Chauvelinýto 
CýF- Angleterreg', 
run', ' December 16th. 'q "'A. A E 
584. 
Lebrunp-118th December, A. A,, E., 
584. "'A 
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someone else would have-to, take on., -the task of averting 
war. -His views were almost prophetic', for-it, -was, in 
Holland that, the negotiation-between Dumouriez'and, 
Auakland foundered in Februaryp l793*-(l)., -The-advicen,. 
although -intelligent 9 was -not calculated -to ` comf ort 
Lebrung who had been-trying since! late October, to, *,, ý, ý- 
remove de Idaulde from,, the. Hague.. ' He-had ordered Nog! V' 
on December 7th., to. take, up, -the position of-charge"ý. 
ý 
d'affaires in the United Provincesq-, but it, was'another'-I) 
month before No9l. -arrived, there 
No'elp too, had his', ýiews, 'on'the deterioration-of 
7 
the Anglo-French relatione)2ip. The, great, change-, in 
the atmosphere of Britain'was especially obvious. to, -, -- 
him when he returned", from his visit . Ito Belgium. --It wasp 
he: saidp futile-, to expe'6t, any-kind_of revolt against-, 
the administration., *. In these circumstance's Prance 
should proceed with-extreme-, circumspectiono" 'From-mid- 
December, on he was urging-the'minister to'increase 
French naval'preparations but heý. seems'to'-have--regarded 
this as a sensible measure-rather-, than sla"aggressive_. ý- 
one. -The prospect-of British'involvement'in, the war 
"'Elle'(1W, " was, one'of, the-utmost', gravity, for France-. 
guerre) nous c9qte deja immensement*etýclest'une 
question de savoir si ios finances pourraient se'relever 
du coup'queýcette'accession dlun'ennemi,. formidable-ý- 
11 
(2) lui porterait. 
See below, 
.., 
Chapter 11. 
(2), No'el to Lebrung December 14th., A. A. E. 
C. P. Angleterre, 584. 
Zý-. The-. French, diplomate in England were in a position 
of-bewilderment and, embarrassment... The slowness of 
communication-and. the overall uncertainty of their 
own gover=entf, oopplicy-, produced.,, confusion. The irony 
ofýtheir, dilemma, lay, in, the., fact, that they, had, realized 
the. gravity of the, deterioration of. -relations, between,.,.,,, - 
England and-France', *, but--having, abandoned pettinessIfor-, 
a number-of. frank. ýand constructiye: -suggest, 
ionst, -; ound 
that-they, were-, caught,, in, theýcross-7currents. of, political 
', and public, -pressure-. -in both, countries-, -, Any,, _doubts ý 
about-the,, direction. in whichBritain, was * 
moving-, di. s- 
appeared,, with, the, introduction of-the Alien -Bill 
In 
the discussions, over, the. bill-and its gener 1,, app, lica- 
tion-to the- ench, ambassador. -all 
foreign, residents,, Fr. 
was treated with., a. flat insensitivitywhich must,, have, 
seemed-to him like calculated-, rudeness..., Hi. s initial_, _.. -'; Iý" 
reactions-: were two-fold., -., Firstlyp, ýhe wrote. to,, his 
government on December. - 24th--ý suggesting. -that 
they, -,.,,,,, 
threaten to-. terminate. the 1786 treaty. 
(')Secondly, 
he 
wrote, to Pitt-on. December 26th. -asking, for-, an interview. 
'His-language betrayed, his uneasinesslof spir, it..,., He 
wouldo he, saidg, have'awaited more-pxýecise-instructions 
from his, minister, "Imai a. le temps s e'coule. 
_et. 
seýl pe'rd 
pour., les deux pays-, en. les. laissant, 
la 
llegard,: llun. 
_ 
de, llautre dans. une. positign douteusel penible,, et, indigne 
de, tqus les, deuxt France detested the idea of, vyar-,,, 
(1)-. Chauvelin to Lebrung Delcember, 24th., A. 
IA., 
El. l 
I C. P.. Angleterre. 9 584. 
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ýith'Gieat'Britain and I wo I uld I only-acc , ept i, t-with - the 
deepest-reg'r'et after sh Ie had-'eýxliaust'ed"'all, lion-o'uiable 
means-to-avoid it. 
''French'diplomats, may have been-acute, in'their- 
assessmeni*"of*, wýat they, conside-red*'t& lie-'-*the-growing 
intýactabllity-of`Great Britain., It'ietruethat through- 
out"ýDec4mber-theire'was an increase in'-anti-French-senti- 
ment; particularly-in-Parliamenti but'the-government 
They had'ý'y*etý`to'come down squarely'on'the side of war. ' 
had ample reason'-for restraint., "Awareness-of-the in- 
sufficiency and'almostincredible slowness of Dutch'- 
preparations seems: to`hayeýcaught even Auckland by 
durprise. -.. For'-some"weeksl-toog there'liigered plans 
for mediation'and aWend, to, the, war in, 'Europe before 
its-scope-was, widened. "' These ideas wereformulated'in 
-"-. ", ,, -,, -, ,, ", 'I" "' -- (2) a'discuýsio'n"between_"_the British and Russian governments. 
The-Briti-sh; "howeverg werealways tempted to'alipw 
tr*ýditi: 'on"-al'"co'neepts-of Anglo-French warfare to-intrude 
on Z-týeiý 'consider'atio'ns. 
t was, this'moreevident than"in 
renewed'interest in the-Prench'West'Indies which-appeared 
at the-'beginning of'December.. ". "A"number of the 
Caribbean, islands had, shown signs, of hostility to the 
republic and St. Domingo had been in, revolt since the- 
end of 17911 In, October of 1792,. a number of soldiers 
and representatives sent by the-Convention were fired 
Chauvelin to Lebrun, December 26th., A. A. E. 
C. P. Angleterreo 584. 
(2) See below* 
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I 
on-. when their shipslattempted-to land on Martinique 
and Guadeloupe, and were forced to accept. -, the, protect- 
ionlof British, vesselsq who,, escorted, them-to,. the nearby 
island of St. Christopher. 
(')-,. 
The-British. were inter- 
ested-An-the islands because-of-, their resources and 
theiristrategic. importance. -., At-Ithe beginning of, I 
December, a-possibility. was, held-out,. to them that. they 
might. be, able. ýo,, deprive-the-. French ofitheir naval 
significance-inýthis'--'area'by lending: support, to-the 
I 
counter-revolutioný-onýthe,. -islands.:, On December-5th., 
Lord. Hawkeebury,,. President--ofýthe-ýBoard,, of-Tradephad-, 
an:, interview with-an official,, namedde, Curt, from the- 
(2) island', of, -,, Guadeloupe. Hawkesbury suspected that,, ' 
de Curt, '., was., as-much interested in money as in safe- 
guarding hisýisland, but--a--memoir'that de-Curt-wrote 
ar. ound-, this. time. -. reveali3, -that he, may have had other 
motives%-,:! Ile systeme rep'ublibain est-ldeýldissoudre le 
dire de chasser ou, massacrer systeme colonialqý-clest-a 
lee blancs,, pour-mettre en-place leurs. usurpateurs et 
leurs, bourreaux. 
- ,. The-administration appear 
to have 
becomeýsteadily more interested in--the, West Indies, in 
January. 
_, 
Pitt-ýspoke of themýto, Malmesbury as an,. - 
(1) The incident. is reported in CýýQ-. l52/72 (Leeward Is. ) 
See also letter from St. Luciat 3rd November A. N. DXXV9 118. 
(2) Hawkeebury's Memoir, December 5thp P. O. 27/41. 
(3) Undated Memoir in. P. O., 95/632. 
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advantage which would be derived from the war., 
(') 
The, London Times at theend of,, January-thundered loud 
on, the benefits,, o;, p9ssessing the_French West-Indies. 
Only., the Earl, of, WYcombeg. in Parliamentq raised a 
dissident voice -. 11What, could we. gain. by possessing 
ourselves of,, anyof, their West. IndiaAslands?,, On the 
contraryg, he, rather thought, it wouldbe advantageous 
to'this. country,, if, our, own,, West India, islands were,,, 
independent--of,, it. "( 
, 
2) Wycombe considered t1he'cost 
ýreat,, and the, rising, racial discontent dangerouso,, but 
his., views were. not, shared--by-the majority, of hiscont- 
-emporaries, 
in government-, and the, significance of, this 
area-of, French influenceýgrew rather, than. diminished- 
in. ýBritish minds. 
The West. Indies were a possible, bonus in the- 
,,,, 
ýome, polilticiane, we, ighing''the, a, dvantages and,,, minds of 
disadvantages, of, war.,, But there, was another, areal of 
more. immediate, importance to., the, Britishq which, could. 1, 
not-be overlooked and which did not provide tranquil 
musings. ý,, The., inherent-weakness of the Anglo-Dutch 
connexion, was-. a, fact slowly and, grudgingly realized"by.., 
the, British governmentg yet if war with Prance. was to 
be-seriously, contemplated there would-inevitably come 
in which, a-difference in outlook would. manifest 
W, See'belowg Chapter'll., 
Yh ate 2 in-' e'House'of Commons during the. deb' 
on th e, Al14, Bi'1l9, Cobbett, Parliamentary-History, 
Decemberg, 1792. - 
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itselfo-. ': Throughout: 'the-'autumn lof '1792 -'the Dutch 
adniinistration had, 'lived'in--"Continual"fear. -of, Veing 
over-run, "as, 'the--Austrian Netherlands" had,, been. ", -,. Lord 
Auckland, was"a conscie-ntiou's and hard-w'orkingl-ambass- 
adorg-who-liad-co , operated'elosely, with-Van'de Spiegel, 
the Grand, Pensionaryg'-inýý-theý-protractedinegotititions 
with'de Maulde'andrDumouriez. But even-Aucklandhad 
become aware-'tliat, his'experience, and-Btanding at the 
0 Hague-did. n't'enableýhim -Coýread the minds, of'Dutch- 
iinistirse'ý *-Auckland's superiors in(Whitehall'--Were", - 
concerned'about Holland'lon-three main, points. `-, Firstly, 
thýtýadequateldefensive; preparationeg if'suchýcould 
be-achieved-. at alli'would t'akemany,, months. *, Secondly, 
and-perýaps,, evenimore-revealinglyg Grenville-. -began-. to 
harbor, --suspicions. '-that the-Dutch, -ministers, wereýfollow- 
ing-an, independent', line-of, policy, with,. regard to'France, 
and -were hot to tb6 ý,, trusted., Lastly -the British 
seriously the threat posed' government: seem. to, 
by. the Dutch Patriots. 
-At. the-ý-beginningof,, Deoember"Grenville first,,. 
began-,, to, piese-Auckland-for, "information, on. Dutch, military 
affairs-o--Recent-ý. Frenchýactions-, seemed-. to-him. tot-imply 
a-threat-to. the. Dutch, -, - "in. these circumstances,, Great 
Britain-must be-informed, of Dutch"naval and'military--- 
'preparations. "(')Replying to. this-despaich, 'a.,, week,,, later, 
Auckland did not seem unduly alarmed. He wrote that 
Grenville to Auckland, December 4th., -F*O-'ý37 4ý1' 
. 
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, the United, Provinces. were quiet,, and, preparations were 
going ahead. 11 
The pre, seure from, the, 'Poreign. Office, 
#owe, verg caused him to make., rather, more-searching 
enquiries. which-revealed-the true. readiness''of, --the 
I)utch.,,, Orders for, theý, equipping-of,, a,. fleet-hadýto go.. 
out 
Ito 
the-requisite-. naval,. council't..,; or,, admiralties, t. ';. 
as-they-, were-calledg,,, iný, each Dutch-province.,, -There-, 
wasino national-, systemýfor. fitting out., a, navy--, 
proposition is-made,, for-the, augmentations,. mentioned 
in my last, dispatchesg,, but it,, must,, be referred--to all 
the Provinces,, before. it,. can, be carried--into. -execution 
and I, am assured-. that. -this'must'be., the, -case. even, if, 
th- the. enemy. were within the frontiers. 11,4ý,.. It, istcon- 
ceivable that. theý, Britig3h-ý-gover=ent-should have been 
I 
ignorant, 
-'of, 'one. of-the most important"aspects of. -the,, 
Dutch'constitution; ý, they.,, had. simply-. overlookedýits, ý- 
effects,, inta-, -, crisis. - Grenvillel, s'tone, becameýmore'firm 
but, there--was,. littleýwhich, couldýbe'done-at so late 
a,. stage. --, -. On" 
, December 18th. 
-heýwrote-,, 
to,, Aucklandlthat-- 
the. onlyI. possible. means of-ýdeterring` France', would be 
considerable and swift mobilization. ýHel-accompanied 
hisýofficial-despatch with a-private, ýletter: stressing 
that Dutch, preparations, should'-be kept"upt", if'only in 
appearance. The land forces of the republic were, he, 
th ought, "most miserably deficient. " Almost at 
(1),, Auckland, 'to Grenvilleg 2nd January, P. O. 37/43. 
(2) Grenville-to Aucklandt December, ', 18th. g-, H. M. C. reportq 
Fortescue. -MSS9 op. cit., jig P-P. 359 - 60 
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once, -Auckland-. pressed,. for asmall force to be-sent 
to-cruise., off. Flushingg as, he-had'firstdone on 
November 20th., adding, the. disquietingý'news, that.,. -, 
the Pensionary-believed that: Zealand, would-fall. if 
attacked at-,. that-. momentJl)ý, ýý , Finally,, on December 29th., 
the Foreign Office relented and. allowed, a. very, small 
force of frigatesq-commanded, by-Commodore Murrayg toý 
i cruise%off Flushing and. patrol-, the, coast.., Grenville. ý 
made-it clear-, that., despite-. the,. unsatisfactory-situation 
in Hollandg. the. expedition, would'be a, short one-- 
"I am, veryýuneasy. about the Republiag, from,, the impress- 
ion. that I-, have, received of its, want of preparation;,, -, --- 
especiallyýwhen I see'the, time which preparation. - 
requires here,: -, where weare-in-. the habit-of-it. Mith 
respec"tto our frigates sent, to Flushingq-. -I may say to 
youl in, confidencel,,. that we cannot press. so-effectually. 
as we ought until,, they. returng-and, that. a press may. -- 
become absolutely. necessary within,. ten days or-a,, -. - 
"(2) fortnight. Murray', s expedition only served to re- 
(3) inforce impressions, of Dutch inefficiency.,,,.,,,.. - 
,.,.. This 
lamentable-lack of defence would, have. been 
serious enough-in-, itself, but Grenville-believed he 
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had., other grounds. for complaint "From some, means of 
(1) Auck-land't"o Grenvilleg De . cember 26th., - P. O. 37/42. 
(2) Grenville to Auckland, December 29th. 9 H*M*C*.., 
Fortescue MSS9 op., cit., ýii, P. 361. 
(3) See Murray, Is_letter, of, January 10ýth. q-, 17939-, 
in P. O. 37/43. 
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information I-suspect that'*it enters into, the head of 
some-of the-Dutch ministers that--, England'can: be made 
the, principal,,, in this war and, Holland-, -the-allyp-furný- 
ishing, her, contingent and"carrying. -on, -her'co=erce with 
France. -The". extravagance of-s_uch,. Ian, 'idea can only be 
eqaalled-by itsmant of all good faith..;;.! the: g6vern- 
ment here'could. not-stand the reproach of such dupery; 
if-there"is such an idea,,: thessooner, we-, wash', our-hands 
of it, the'-better;, and-Holland-wil1 then last ýLs*a- 
country about-three weeks-more. ", 
('), 
- Grenville's', claim 
I 
was an overstatement ofthe'-Dutch'. viewpoint-,, and, -iE3 
striking. evidence-of Britishýineensitivity'to, the, peril- 
ous.,, position of, a, small nationý: whichý, could foresee 
only, -annihiliLtion., as the result"of an open conflict 
between,, -France and-Great -Britain. 
: -%-,,, -ýA 
further elementp-,. which both: British,. and Dutch 
governments perhaps-Anvested with more. ýimportanceýthan 
, was, actually,. Justifiableg was the., threat of disorder 
or insurrection posed by the Dutch patriots. On. 
December 4th. the Foreign Office-,, using military men 
as secret agents as it so often did, sent a Captain 
(2) Kempthorne to infiltrate the patriots* His findings 
do not seem to have given rise to undue alarm. In' 
v 
fact, the Patriots were in a difficult position. 
(1).,.. 
ýGrenville-to Aucklandt' December-'29th. 
Fortescue MSS9ý, Aiq--P, 361.. 'ý 
(2) Aust to Aucklandq December 4th., F. O. 37/42. 
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Their sole reliance ýas'pla , c'ed on Dumouriez*as--the 
man who would'save Hollandq as'he'had saved Belgium. 
They'weie , strong in the I ports' particularly Amsterdam, 
but"did not have the strength'to do anything other, --, -- 
than lýýrusi3'the"government. (ýl)ý-, Dumour - iez, was - 'doing- 
little more than play games with them; ý he'scarcely 
knew his own"mind at this'-p'oint and, was uncertain 
whether his army could-laýt' jthe"wint'er'in'Belgi' 
British suspicione'and alarms about"the'Dutch at 
the end of'December reflect. ', the, overýlllinconsiste'n'"c"i'eE3 
of the'governmentle'approach andýý1ýtlook. --Unsure- 
whether aggression - was*indeed I 'the best'meansof-defence 
or justified-, now"as th , e, . most realistic way to, `ýpproach 
the'-state of Anglo-Prench relatione'v'"the British- 
ministers'were still toying''with-'th'e'*hope-'that'a'last- 
minute'plan, of mediation by -the , neutral*powers-would 
avert, total war., The plan was-drawn up after, -a dis- 
cuesion'between Grenville'and Vorontsovj the'Russian" 
(1)., The Patriots seem to have becomeAncreasingly 
aware, that despite'the apparent paralysis of the'Orange 
administration, they were not in themselves a strong 
., enough, force to overthrow it. Dumouriez's reluctance 
to-give, assistanoe was. matched by. that of the French, 
embassy in the Hague;,, de Mauldet as,, ýarly'as October 29th. 
evidently became. afraid, that, 'the. Patriots were getting 
outýof hand. -See A. A. E., C. P. Hollande, 584. 
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ambassador,, in, Londong on December 29th.. The meeting 
had ranged, over a number oT-points relative to any 
proposled peace, plan and arrangements which might be 
made if war became unavoidable. The memorandum prod- 
uced. revealed 'with great clarity the restricted under- 
standing of. two'great neutral powers of the temper 
and circumstances of the French Revolution at the 
turn. of,, the year 1792-3-(1, 
) Purtherg it raises points 
about the aims of,, Catherine II herself at this time. 
British, government was still standing by the card- 
iýal_. point_s,,, of it. s, policy of neutrality; it wOul, d 
anticipate interference in' French-affaire, for, security 
when. itS political interests were endangered, but it 
would not become involved. in any-attempt to establish 
deliberatýply,, a, specific form of government in France. 
Grenvilleg-in writing to Aucklandq repeated what he 
had, said to the Russian ambassador. If a binding 
agreement could be reached there were two main points 
to be exploredg- 11-the. line of conduct to be, followed 
-previous. to, the cýo=encemient of hostilities and with 
'a. view., 
if-possiblev to, avert themg, and the'nature 
, and amount of the forces which the powers engaged in 
this concert. might be enabled to usev'supposing such "_ .-L 
, extremities-unavoidaf6e. 11, The terms of peaceq it was 
, suggýsýe4q. should include the following points:, - 
, 
French-arms should, be withdrawn'knto French territory, 
, 
(l) The, memorandum, is in P. O. 65/239 Grenville to 
Whitworthq, De6ember 29th. 
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conquests should be abandoned, acts injurious to the 
a overeignty of other'nations rescinded and a pledge 
made not to foment trouble-against other government. 
In return for tI hese co I n"ssions'from the French, the 
hostile powers must abandon all interference in French 
domestic affairs. On January-6th-'q Grenville sent a 
copy similarly wor ded to' , the Br I itish representative 
in Sardiniaq*commenting that should France accept such 
terms, it might be possible "to establish in the 
usual mode a correspandenc'e'and intercourse with such 
power in Prance with-whom-they might conclude such an 
agreement.... " But Iie*'i='ediaiely negatived this 
apparently reasonable-proposal by'adding in cypher - 
"I think it' pro"p-er'to mention to you-that'. the situation 
of affairs etween this country and France is such as 
may not improbablyýlead t10- the breaking out of imm . ed- 
iate hostilities ýeforýe any plan of concert ..... can 
be established. 
'In, factg'-the-gov . er I nment were'a I au I tious lest the 
Rtiesian, ini'tiati've mightibe no - thing I more than a man- 
oeuvre. --i It was widely'suspected that'Catherine II had 
desijins o'n-Poland'and I that'Englishýinvolvement in the 
European vv, a, -r''vvould' leave her entirely free to do as 
she-please'd-with-the unfortunate-Poles. The Empress 
had reacted almost hysterically to the French Revolution. 
Her life's w, ork of building up the Russian monarchy 
4 
(1)', Grenville to Trevor, 'January 10th., Add MSS 349446 
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inspired her detestation-ofýrevolutionary ideas. She 
saw the war in Europe as-aý diversion beneficial to 
her'own plans. Both British and French representatives 
at the Court of St. Petersburg had reported that 
communications between west and eastern Europe were so 
slow that Russian knowledge of affairs was often back- 
ward and scanty. 
(') 
Cha: 'ýles Whitworth the capable 
British envoyt believed that, there was a further explan- 
ation'for the Russian outlook. Catherine II's court 
and ministers were, he said, in general ignorant about 
the west and sometimes not, particularlyginterested in 
it. Grenville knew enough of the Russians to be only 
warily optimistic about their proposals. 
The uncertainties of the war in Europe and the 
variety of British pre-occupations in foreign relations 
contributed towards the sonewhat disordered pragmatism 
of the administration's approach to war and mediation 
in December. One should be waryt howeverg of over- 
stressing this curiously inconclusive period in foreign 
affairs. Pitt was an experieno. edg if not brilliantq 
politician. Such arrangements for the initial defence 
of the realm as were thought adVisable had been going 
forward since'mid-November. Yet Pitt was already, 
and probably despite himselfq becoming a man of the 
Report on the state of Russia from Montanier, 
November lst-, A. A. E. C. P. Russie, 136 and Whitworth 
to Grenvilleg 12th. -23rd. November, P. O. 65/23. 
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revolutionary era. The-strange and'unpredictable 
phenomenon, public opiniont: figured in. his considera- 
tions as well as those of, the men who-were soon to 
become his adversaries. The-scare in November had 
been a valuable object, lesson but for all its very 
evident success the gove rnm ent remained a little un- 
easy, as to whether the flood of loyalism would prove 
of-lasting efficacy. Any doubts which Pitt and his 
ministers may have had about the renewed vigour of 
outlook of the group inthe country on which they placed 
their greatest reliance for, supportq the landed gentry,. 
were dispelled: during,. the new session of parliament. 
The determination of-members of Parliament to make 
Britain safe against-theýFrench menaceg even if it 
meant'warg, seems to, have-fed on itself. Gone were the 
accents of bewilderment of November. War even 
began to assume, the proportions of, a Holy Crusade. 
In these, circumstances the frequently ridiculous 
remarksývyhich-were, made about France and the Revolution 
drowned, the voices of. the-handful of moderateso-some 
of,, w)2om perhaps, did not, understand the RevOlution 
itself-, but certainly hadýa vivid awareness of the, 
horrors ofýwar. 'ýIn-defence-of the form of. their society 
and government the parliamentary majority were pre- 
pared to sacrifice., some of. the. most-dearly-held pre- 
cepts of the constitution. There was some truth in 
the Oppositiong's . iis-se'rtion that the Alien Bill was 
an anticipation of the suspension of, the Habeas Corpus 
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Act. But the Opposition itself provided Pitt with 
further cause for satisfac. tion. The split which 
had developed in mid-November was unbridgeable a 
month later. A small group, ofýabout-fifty men were 
left supporting Fox. Burke, Windhamq Elliot and 
Malmesbury, supported the government'. s measures. 
Portlandq nominally head of-the Whigst wavered, but 
his personal attachment,, to. Fox proved too strong at 
this point. Supporting the., Al, iens.. Bill Burke made 
one of his most theatrical speeches; opposing it 
Fox one of his most eloquent and well-arguedg yet 
both of, these, men, were outside the mainstream of 
parliamentary sentiment, whichýput, the defence of the 
status quo in England, above, all''else. 
l., 
The government 
found that Parliament was., notperely supporting them, 
but propelling them..,., 
The government, 
-f-ound 
it necessary to make a 
lengthy, if none. too specifico Justification for the 
steps they had, recently,, -taken. In the King's speech, 
and increasingly during. thý course of debateg they 
drew-a parallel. between-trouble in, England and the 
menace, ofýthe, Revolution.. England, could not rest 
secure unless the French influence was combatted, 
(1) On the state'6f the Whig Party at this point see 
H. Butterfield" "Charles ýames Fox 
-pAd - 
theL-. Whig, Opp psition 
in 17-9ý911- Cambridge Historical Journal IX 19499 
p-. p., 292-, -7 330,, and_F-_OIGorman, The Whig Party and the 
French Revolutiont Manchester, 1967, Chapter iii, 
pt. 2, p. p. 90 - 122. 
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with whatevpr means might be necessary. The King's 
speech issued 6 sombre warning to the French govern- 
ment - "I have carefully observed a strict neutrality 
in the present war on the continent and have uniformly 
abstained from any interference with respect to the 
internal affairs of France; but it is impossible for 
me to see without the most serious uneasinessp the 
strong and increasing indýcations which have appeared 
there of an intention to excite disturbances in other 
countries, to disregard the rights of neutral nations., 
and to pursue views of, conquest and aggrandizement... 
Under all these circumstances I have felt it my indis- 
pensable duty to hhve recourse to those means of pre- 
vention and internal defence with which I am entrusted 
by law.. *,, "(') This statement, and particularly the' 
reference to the state of the country, 'was enlarged 
upon in Dundas' speech to the House of Commons, justi- 
fying government steps. He was the first of many 
spe akers to assume without any body of evidence. that 
the addresses of congratulation sent by the L. C. S. and 
similar groups to the Convention constituted a 
treaegnable connection between certain people in England 
and the French Revolution "He would first call their 
attention to our situation at home, where there was 
clearly a systematical design to overturn the Constitution. 
(1) Speech of George III at the opening session of 
Parliamentv re-printed in the Morning Chronicle for 
December 13th. 
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The proceedings of different"s"o , cietiesýafforded 
full proof of this .... the example of*France had 
been held out for imitation, not only with-regard to 
their object but likewise with regard to the means of 
attaining that object. An example had thus been held 
out of breakingdown all diBtinctionB and giving a 
blow which should at once proýe*fatal"to*the Monarchy 
and aristocracy'of thiB country. "(') ýeldom had the 
fears'of the ruling'class--i3ý late'1792 been'so clorly 
formulated. The'goverýment-managed to smooth over 
the doubts about the ill , egality of'their summoning out 
the militia and re-assembling parliament. No-one was 
very interested in'whether the letter of the law had 
been observed'or not. The-thunder of approval and the 
overwhelming defeat'of measures suggested by Poxt such 
as the sending 1. of'an" , ambassador to Pa I rieg further 
strengthened the'administration's conviction that more 
direct'measures would'be acceptable. The Opposition, 
speaking firmlyp but I- more .. and more aware that they 
ýZ were voices crying'in the wilderneseq did not oppose 
the increased'armameni disc ussed on December 20th. 
Secure-in the. spate. of anti-Gallicanism, the, govern- 
ment-did not. need,! to s'ecify-whether they intended war p 
or not., --Pitt. 
himself. saidg "On the questiong whether 
peace,, would-: or w1ould. not be preservedg he would not 
(1) 'Dundas in theýdebates on the King's speech, Cobbett, 
Parliamentary Historyq December 13th 20th. 1792. 
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give an opinion, but if. it could be preserved consist- 
ently with national hotour, consistently-with good 
faith, "consistently with our own, internal security 
and consistently with thb. safety and. interest of all 
Europe, it would not be broken. "('), 
The administration wasq in-fact, primarily con- 
cerned with getting Parliamentary agreement to a 
measure which epitomized its-outlook on the connection 
between domestic and foreign politics. This was the 
Alie 
J 
Billj, first introduced 
11 -by 
Grenville into-the 
Hous'e of Lords on December-19th.. The ideas behind 
the Aliens Bill wereý-not nevv; ý,, they'had first entered 
Dundas' head in September with the influx of'French 
(2), 
after August-10th.. - -Events of November and the fear 
inspiredýby. the, spreadý-of French: principles had fixed 
the idea-In the government mind. -Grenville w§s firm 
on the-justification for the, bill- "the, safety of the 
state was not toýbe'sacrificed-to hospitality; and 
whatever was necessary for*, that safety was not to be 
blamed.,, (3) The bill put consideiable restrictions 
on the daily life of a foreign arrival or resident. 
(1)'ýPitt in the debates on-the increase in-armamentg 
December 20th., 17929 Cobbettq op. -Cit. 
(2) See-. Chapter 5.. 
(3)- Grenville-, in the de'bates'. on the Alien Billp 
December-, 29the-9 1792. '-Cobbett, op. cit.. r 
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The names and descriptions of all newcomers were 
noted on arrival and their arms or ammunition con- 
fiscated. They were not permitted to leave their port 
of arrival until a-chief magistrate or two Justices of 
The Peace had issued them with-a passport'g- specifying 
the name of the town of their destination. For altering 
a passport or obtaining it under a false name g person 
could be banished. Any alien already suspect could be 
immediately deported. Finallyp all foreigners who 
had arrived since Januaryq 17929 apart from merchants 
and their servants, might be required to live in areas 
designated by the crowng to report to the chief magis- 
trate in their localitypand surrender all weapons. 
The act spread alarmýamong the foreign community. Few 
could readily understand the precise effects of the 
act and were uncertain about their position under it. 
To meet the flood of enquiriesq the government opened 
a new sub-departmentg the Aliens Office, in mid- 
January. William Huskisson(l) was named assenior official. 
(1) Huskisson, William,. 1770-1830. Protected by his 
great uncle, physician to British Embassy in Paris. Lived 
in France. Became Lord Gower's private secretary. Returned 
to Englandq after August 10th. 9 1792. January, 1793 
became advisor to French emigres. 1795 under-secretary- 
at-war. Resigned with Pitt, 1801, but remained in post by 
request of Lord Hobart. His support of Canning held back 
his career. 1822 President of Board of Trade. Killed 
in train accidentg 1830. 
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The bill met with general supportl even from 
government opponents like Portland. The speeches of 
approval revealed how completely the government's 
interpretation of the dangerous conjuncture of foreign 
and domestic difficulties was shared by others. The 
men who spoke were less concerned with restricting 
the freedom of movement of foreign residents than with 
stifling seditious writings and the seditious spirit 
recently so bbvious in England. The spectre of Paine 
appeared once more. Attacking the Society for Consti- 
tutional Information for recommending the second part, $ 
of the Rights of Man to its membersp Robert Jenkinson, 
the future Lord Liverpoolq said "Those ..... who circul- 
ated such a book could not have any wish for a reform- 
ationg but must aim at an overthrow of our constitution. " 
He lamented the effect such writing must have on the 
lower orders of societyg who became disaffected by 
the promise of a. more equable life and lacked the 
education to see the flaw in Painite arguments. In 
particulart the book aimed at "personsg who from not 
having property or stake in the countryv wereg or 
would be-eager in adventure and had nothing to check 
their rage of, experiment and innovation ..... He thought 
that any step. that--, tended, to the diminution of French 
influenceýin this, country was prudent. " Fox was to 
scorn the steps which the administration had taken to 
dispel sedition - "Could not ministers have prosecuted 
Paine without an army? " Pitt, when he spoke in 
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defence of the bill was adamant that the-French threat 
was now omnipresent. He ggve a short resumeof recent 
events which led him to make a direct onslaught on the 
republican regime. "We have seen a code of laws 
adopted in France, hostile to'every other governmento 
a system of anarchy and ambition-9 setting at defiance 
all regular authority and treating aS unlawful every- 
thing which has been sanctioned'by the laws of other 
countries.... as their-ambition-was 'unbounded so the 
anarchy, which-they hoped to establish was universal. 
When there were men inýthis-country connected with 
people actuated by such principl6s'At surely became a 
matter of the-most serious 6onsideratio n'011 His con- 
eluding words are vital"to our underýtanding of the 
mentality of the British, government at the end of 1792 
"It was not till'. lately that'the'danger had been brought 
near to this country and its allies. It was only the 
retreat of the Duke of Brunswick and the success of the 
French arms, with the consequences which had'followed 
events so-rapid and unexpected which it was impossible 
to foresee'and which defied'even the smallest conjecture, 
which rendered-the danger-so imminent and the necessity 
of preparations so-urge'nt'on-the part of this cc I untry. 11(l) 
The, mood-of Parliament had materially contributed 
towards't]ýe, ýpreparatio-ns, then, 'proceeding in othert more 
practical spheresq Pbychologicallyg Britain was far 
Pitt in the debates on the Aliens Bill, Cobbett op. cit. 
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on the road to mobilization when she. entered the 
year 1793. 
The governmentg howeverg was only too aware that 
determination to resist France could not alone be 
considered as an adequate preparation for war. It 
is important to trace the development and degree of 
actual mobilization in England in, the months immed- 
iately before the outbreak of warp since illumination 
of this aspect contributes towards a, greater under- 
standing of the spirit in which Britain entered the 
war and even the indecisiveness of the, earlier months 
of the conflict. Mobilizationg consistent with the 
general picture of British policytowards Francep 
which emerges in December as a., mixture of the belliger- 
ent and the uncertaing-,, was,, a, surprisingly disorganized 
affair. Strengthening., of the"fleet, always the most 
important service,, began as-a defensive measure; on 
15th. November, Pittýwrote. to Dundas, 
l, - 
"Besides aug- 
mentation on land,,, I much, fear that unless the affairs 
of the continent speedily take, a more favourable turn, 
we must also add to-our naval force, as the only way 
to ensure respect to ourselves and still more to our 
allies, the Dutch.... *"(') This essentially negative 
outlook did-not provide admiraltyq captains, crew or 
ship-builders with any clear lead. On November 3rd., 
(1) Pitt to Dundas, November 15th., Pitt Papers, vol ii, 
Ann Arborp Michigan. 
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Nelson had written to his patron the Duke of Clarence, 
sounding him out on the possibility of being given a 
ship; but this was a lean period for Nelson, who had 
fallen out-with Admiral Hood, and he spent most of his 
letter lamenting the seditious atmosphere which pre- 
vailed in Norfolk. 
(') 
Nelson might have taken some 
professional comfort from the fact that there was a 
marked increase in the attempts at recruitmentp in the 
orders issued to captains to join their ships and the 
work being carried on in the dockyards, especially 
from late November onwards. 
(2) 
But the-government was 
coping with a number of difficulties. Many ships of 
the line which constituted the backbone of the fighting 
force of the navyq wexein other parts of the world, 
the West Indies, the Mediterranean or the Indian Ocean. 
(3) 
The number of ships mustered in home waters builds con- 
siderably in the last months of 1792. On NovembOr 26th, 
1792 the total number was 42; by January 7th. it had 
risen to 71, and by February llth. it was 105. 
(4) 
Then toop before a really effective programme of mobil- 
ization could be put into practiceg the government 
(1) Nelson to the Duke of Clarenceg November 3rd. 
Nelson's Despatchesq ed. Sir N. H. NicGlasq vOl iq p. p. 292-3. 
(2) See ADM. 6/24, warrants and commissions. 
ADM. 2/123. 
(4) ADM. 7/455-457. 
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needed the monetary supplies, which, parliament alone 
could vote Increases, in, the, navy estimates were 
not voted till December-20thý 
IThe confidence which 
Pitt had sho_wn in Januaryg, -17921-when the estimates 
for both army and navy1were out back, must now have 
seemed, misplaced. Lastlyq a-familiar, problem, to 
which force was the only, solutionq began to show 
itself once more. Although bounties-to, enlisting sea- 
men were first offered on, December lst. 9 and a large 
recruiting centre-under the, direction of a Captain 
Harmood set up in Londong, the, response in the capital 
and in the provinces was light. 
('),,, 
It became-obvious 
that a press would be necessary;, but resistance to 
the press was increasingly organized and articulate, 
especially in the troublesome north-eastern ports. 
(2) 
The problems of fleet, mobilization were not merely 
domestic. The government was naturally extremely inter- 
ested in, having some means of knowing, the present 
naval strength of its rival and the extent of the 
preparations which were going, on in the French ports. 
British. naval, intelligence would appear to have been 
far from-satisfactory. As early as December 5th-t orders 
were sent-to Plymouth to observe and procure good inform- 
ation concerning the numbers, force and fitness for 
the sea of the French ships equipped, equipping or under 
(1) 
'. 
0rders. to Capt. Harry Harmood, 5th. December, Adm. 2/123. 
(2) Letters of late January and early February in H. O. 42/24. 
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orders to be equipped at that-port. (Brest)"(') 
Any squadron putting to sea was to be-followed. 
Similar orders were sent to Portsmouth to observe Le 
Havre and Cherbourg. Towards the end of the monthq 
two lieutenants were ordered-to take cutters across 
the'Channel and make their own. reports. 
(2) 
'The 
British had earlier asked for assistance in gathering 
naval intelligence from, the, Dutch butIt is clear that 
they found it difficult to gain an overall picture of, 
what was going on in, French ports which-seemed real- 
istic to them. On December, 26th., g howeverl they 
received a report of a rather different kind. An 
--- I-*- anonymous Frenchmanfýprobably an emigrev'submitted his 
observations under the heading I'de lletat actuel de 
la marine'frangaiseell . -This-provides a picture which 
should have encouraged the British governmentp though 
their reactions, are hard to assess. The writer may 
have over-stated the dubious condition of the French 
navy in order to induce-the British to fight, but there 
were important, elements-of accuracy in his assesement. 
(3) 
I 
The French did not have as many ships of the line as 
the British and a considerable number of them were 
unseaworthy. Numbrous officers had emigrated and the 
(1) ADM. 2/1344. 
(2) The instructions were given by ýhe Home Office 
under-secretaryo Evan Nepean in H. O. 42/23. The reports 
are in'W. O. 1/395. 
(3) Report in W. O. 1/395. 
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remaining crews were often unruly and untrained. 
(') 
Despite such occasional information the British 
government could not base its own mobilization of the 
fleet on any reliable estimate of French naval strength. 
The French government, however, were in an apparently 
much stronger position. Chauvelin continued to supply 
them with detailed information through his agent Vital, 
who worked under the Duke of Richmond. Vital was 
employed in the office whence originated the orders 
for provisions and armament, buth of the navy and army. 
He was one of the least known but most important agents 
then employed in London. 
(2) 
Although the government placed so much faith in 
the importance of the fleetq they could not afford to 
overlook the other branch of the serviceg the army. 
Here the situation was far from promising. 'In August, 
17N9 the regular army consisted of 139701 men. A 
c6nsiderable number Q; army'battalions'vere currently 
s6rving in the West Indies or India so that home defence 
was insubstantial. 
(3) 
The militia were expected to 
(1) On the state of the French navy at the beginning of 
the war, se'e the opening chapters of Hampson, N. 
La Marine de 1'An II' Parisp 1959. 
(2) See Letters exchanged between Chauvelin and Lebrun, 
7th. and 16th. 'November, A. A. E. C. P. Angleterre, 585 
(Supple. 1792. )' 
(3) Figures in Holland Rose, William Pitt and the Great 
War, ''pe 124. 
f 
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supplement this gap but could not be relied upon*(') 
Doubts were also raised as to disaffection in the 
j- 
army itself. 
(2) 
An increase in the, ýLrmy estimates was 
voted December 9th. but though bounties were offered 
to new recruits, the response was uneven. Just before 
Christmas the quartermaster of the, Coldetream guards 
reported that the increase. in, the number of soldiers 
was so rapid that he cc uld not find sufficient bedding. 
(3) 
Yet on December 27th. the Secretary at War wrote that 
the infantry was recruiting too slowly, a situation 
(41 
which the colonels must, remedy as soon as possible. 
At the beginning of the New Year the king issued orders 
to bring the infantry up to. full strength. 
The'developments of the mo4th, of. December provide 
little evidence that the British government had long 
concealed bellicose sentiments against Franceq but they 
do show an increase in tensiong a growth in physical 
preparations which was expanding from week to weekq and 
the absolute ; onvictionp in. the minds of the vast 
majority of, the ruling classp that the French Revolution 
was a total. -threat which must be met by total resistance. 
1 (1) See'Chapter 
(2) See letters in H. 0.42/22 and 23p written in-late 
November and early December to Evan Nepean. 
(3) W. O. 4/145. 
Secretary at War to Lord Adam Gordonp. December 27th. 
W. O. 4/145. The War Office at this time was a-lesser govern- 
ment department partly under the guidance of the Home Office. 
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Chapter 
'The- Outbreak of -War. 
Deýujs votre d6part-, de', Paris', le'si'chýoses ont- 
bien'change deýface. llý*ý-Lebrunýto; Mare I tv-', February; 2nd-., 1793. 
The_-year', 1793-*oýenedon a Europe-: full"of contra- 
dictory emotionsO Me-suspension of campaigning. in 
th6', vfar which'Prussia'and Austria, were"waging against- 
Francie ý--had'. produ-, ced', aný-uneasy"calmt--which'-politicians 
knew was-only-a'lull. -The: people-of both'ýFrance`and 
Great Britain-instinctively---sensed-the tempo of affairs 
and their-realization itself-'ac4ýaire'd'-a, force. ''-Govern- 
ment awareness of public-opinion-had-, added'a new- 
dimension"'to-ýEuropean politics in 1792. ' The, continent 
wgs', witnessing'*ýa strange-'drama'in'which two'neighbour- 
ing'coiint - ries'-were acknowledging the, veryýgreatýdiffer- 
ences! in'. outlook which. ýhaddeveloped between'. -them. - 
These- differences: hadýat first been dimly perceived, 
and for some-while'were to. -remain-intermingledýwith the 
long-standing rivalry,., between Franceýand, 'Britain when 
both had been great colonial powers. Interest and 
motivation did not change overnight; -the French, 
enmeshed in the rhetoric of new-found nationhoodg tended. 
to overstress the uniqueness of their position. Most 
of-the revolutionary'leaders at the, beginning of 1793 
were men whose inability to break withýthe political 
modes of practice'of the ancien regime'vas to destroyý'' 
I 
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thim'within aiyear, ý(l) The Britishq still uncomfort- 
able-in-, the-vo'cabulary and'outlook of'the new era, _, were 
lured'into-a, fals-e, 'sense o'f'security by the-sudden 
vision, of-'a-'. time-honoured clash with France..,, Yet-the 
very'fact that'. ýfor. Britain, a necessary prelude-to 
war had beenaconscious defining-of the, values-of, 
British'society-indicated that'this, was to, be something 
jiore-than-aý'conflict,, for territorial pre-eminence. 
"Lo'okiig -, back 'on the'year 17929- the ýstates of 
w*esterný-Europe, "'vvhose-futures were now inextricably 
6ozinectedo c6uld, have found little that'vould point 
them'with, -. certainty towards a comprehension of the 
pattern'of recent, eventB. France had won great, and'_ 
un I expected"victories in the Austrian Netherlandep but 
had-iwiftfy^--discovered the. many. administrative and 
finan'cial"'roblems, involved in the government of-their P 
new-allyý'_"Theýextension of French-influence'andýthe 
advance of, the revolutionary armies was in-extreme 
contrast', with the deep pre-occupations of domestic, --- 
Despite the, resonance of, their oratory and writing, 
this was particularly true, of Brissot, Lebrun and other 
men of their outlook. They were. used to power and 
intrigue in politics but didnot share-, the far greater 
degree of_ideological consciousnes Ia which'characýerized 
the Montagnards! opposition at', this time. The sphere 
of. diplomacy was also significantly influenced by 
ancien regime, procedure. and, patterns'of behaviourý 
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politics at the. turn, of-the year--'ý. Personal rivalries, 
developingýdifferences, in, -ideologyp'the confusion of 
the Revolution'of August-10th. had impeded-the Convention 
from'successfully'performing almost all of the necessary 
functions of government. The-trial. of the king and 
the,., future'shape, of the! republic remained fundamental 
issues which were still. without solution, at this, point. 
Austria, and-Prussia. had suffered'humiliating defeat 
-and-had fallen out: amollgst, themselvesg but were still 
deeplyý-'committed to. wat., The. United Provincesp caught 
between the, French. forces in Belgium and-the pull 
exerted by, their-British partners in. neutralityl'",, I 
viewe'd, the prospect of hostilities between France and 
Britain. with, grave-concern. ' The'British government- 
itself, had beenýsecure and-reasonably pros-perous 
twelve months, earlier; both mentally and physically 
it'had. felt-the'shock of an. inability to keep pace 
with events, inEurope since the'suspension of, Louis, XVI. 
Its',. overwhelming, response to developments precipitated 
by-the intensification of revolutionary, activity had 
'ýbeen negative;, by January 1793p"Pittle administration 
had convinced. themselves -that aggression-was'the, 
beet 
means-of defence and insulation* 
The; eense of crisis is notp. howeverla sufficiently 
cýearexplanation ofthe, ulýimate-developments which 
culminated in the outbreak of war.,,, There-ý. is-a_large 
body of. information and evidenceg-yet, most of it,. Js', _ý 
indirect In the last month of -peace the wider 
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considerations imposed on governments. by the state of 
their-countries and. the trend, of-European-polities 
., were, factors. of great. importance;. ---. -here-, some issues, 
ýthe king's trial in, France and-the spread-of dis- 
affection-in Britaing-were already reasonably well- 
defined., On a. more, i=ediate levelt-the part, played 
by, -politician6 themselves, 'in government, in: committeep 
in, diplomacyg. remains significant, It is-, only by 
sifting through a. tis*sue'. of mutuaLdistrust, and hesi- 
tancy, that. we, can attempt toýget, behind'the official 
pronouncements of policy, to a concept, of what was 
act ually_taking place., -, 
", This. -chapter will attempt 
to 
cast-, light on the; final-moves towards war, by-lapproach- 
ing, them. through. --the-interplay, of, problems, -and person- 
alities, in-, Francei iný. Britain-and'in, Holland., ' 
Almost, until, -, the-. last, week"-'of-January, 'the French 
government remained'f irm -in -its 
intention ý of -. 'convinc- 
ing the_, British-, that,. if. they would only exhibit-a 
willingness to.,, listen and to., communicate there was: - 
still genuine,. hope: ýof, -a-settlement.,, This-delusion-had 
not 9,: however, -, gone,,: soif ar as-, 
to: deprive 'theýFrench. -, -, 'z, 
administration4of any--realistio. assesement of, _their'ý- 
position. in, Europe.,, After, the de-felopments-, of November 
they, were bound to admit that the, trend of Anglo-French 
relatione-,. pointed-towards war, rather-than'continued 
peace. Accepting this fact, the French turned away 
from Europe altogether in their oearch for an ally who 
wouid s'tand by-them'and render materialv if not direct 
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assistance. in the event of war. In the first weeks 
of December Genet had been sent to the United States 
with a detailed set of instructions which provide 
insights on how the revolutionaries viewed the develop- 
t. ment of-Yrgzoo-American relationsv especially in view 
of the, prospect of hostilities with Britain and Spain. 
The basis of Genet's instructions was the negotiation 
of a new commerdial-treaty: with the Americansy but 
thisp too, had wider political implications. The pact, 
it was suggested, might be extended by freeing Louisiana 
from Spain and opening up the navigation of the 
Mississippi'to the inhabitants of Kentucky. -There 
was even talk of joining Canada to the United States. 
The French government were never entirely sure of the 
. degree of goodwill and gratitude which the Americans 
felt for them; they were afraid, that the U. S. A. was 
still very much dominated, by Great Britain. Consequently, 
Genet had been told to make certain that the Americans 
stood by the terms of the treaty of 17789 particularly 
those relative to commerce and shipping, however much 
disinclination they might-display. This was the price 
of French aid in their independence. The U. S. was to 
be discouraged strongly from, arming or supplying 
foreign vessels in her ports. Already one of the most 
crucial aspects of French policy towards the conduct 
(1, )',,, Instructione-to Genet, December 1792, A. A. E. 9 
C. P.. -,., Etats-Unis,. -., 36., 
381 . 
of war was beginning to form - "Ces articles sont d'autant 
plue, importance dans lee-conjonctures actuelles que le grand 
eloignement ou'se trouveraient les-corsaires anglais de 
leurs poýýR ýt llembarras d1approvisionnements rendraient 
leurs e)kýdjiions plue''dispendi 
. 
euse le renvoi et le vente 
A 
'des prises plus'precaires, " tandis que nos batiments usant 
leur disposition tous I. 'du droit de refresailles'auraient a 
les ports des'Etats7. Unis et les provisions dont ils 
ab lond. ýýt. fl 
(1), 
Alm ost tot ally'isolated in Europe, France 
ýas' obliged to court a'far from enthusiastic associate 
across the'Atlantic. ' Lebrun apparently had not obs"erved 
"Vergennes realistic-assessment ten, years earlier - "We have 
never'based our polidy*toward the United States upon their 
gratitude. - That sentiment is infinitely rare between 
sovereignst"and'republics know it not-l",, --ý 
Despite such initial probings by the Foreign Ministry, 
th I e'comýeliing'`interest of the majority of the deputies and 
also'. 6f*the populace lay with the problems of French govern- 
ment'in January 1793. '. Emotionally_many, p6liticians were 
preparing, themselves for. the testing-ý-time of the final stages 
of the kiýgls-trial, 'but,, more immediatelyq the necessity 
'for taking steps-to'overhaul the administration'of French 
government was'inescapable., " It wasýin these circumstances 
-that-men. broadly, favourable to Brissot's views made their 
!, laet. attempt,, to avert their. own. ruin, by re-organizing the 
-functioning of-Frenchý. government and injecting new life 
. -into, 
it. The decision, was precipitated by relentless 
-, criticism of Roland, who was still 
(1) Supplement aux instructions'q A. A. E., C. P. Etats-Unist 36. 
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regarded as the evil genius of the Conseil Executifq 
and'by the 
Eo Lýeil 
inability to'establish-itself as 
an effective force'to balance the turbulence of the 
Convention*(') Although the'Conileil-continued to 
meet and function', it was overshadowed as-an executive 
organ'after January-5th. 1793t by the creation of the 
Comite de D91"enss'Generale. It was no accident that 
the-proposition for the, creation"of this new committee 
coincided 'with a more, intransigent tone adopted by 
Kersaint'and"other Brissotin-sympathizers in their 
references to Anglo-Prencli-relations; As-its name 
implied, the committee-was set-up to co-ordinate 
action'in the-face of an'international crisis and the 
malfunctioning of the experimental stageof republican 
governmentý-in-France'. -, Its own ineffectiveness was 
almost 'inevitablei 'given"the'st ate of rivalry in the 
Convention; although dominated 'by Br issotins immed- 
iately I after' iis I inceptiong the Robespierrists were 
soon'able to, assail'It4p'----- 
The creation2ofýthe Comite'de Defense Generale 
was-'an"admission-of'a belief7'on-the-part'of-'theCon- 
vention'that-its-tensibns'had contributed towards'the 
(1), The, onslaught. on Rolandt led inýigorous-abuse. by, 
Hebert in, 'Le Pere, Duchesnel was refuted at'length. by 
the minister himself in a series of pamphlets and articles. 
His position became so invidious that he resigned on 
January 22nd., 1793. 
0. " 1 
-1 ýI. -1. -,. !: "', 
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inefficiency, of adminietration in France and that the 
present structure, was not equal-, to coping with the 
strains which would,, result-from a, broadening, of Franch 
involvement in, the, war. A', further factor may also 
have. been a, possible-breakdown of, law and-order. after 
the-, execution of-the kingp, since nobody could predict 
the national', reverberations, of, this event., 
(') 
-A 
number of-French politicians whose influence on affairs 
i3panned. both, dome, 3tic and foreign policy were acutely 
aware'. 0f-the, many, problems facing France and it is 
theiriesponse to these difficultieev varyingýand 
. sometiihassunpredictableg-, which constitutes a further 
important, elementýof, the, moves made in France on the 
eve, of war., There were-three-individuals whose powers 
ofýdecision-making were vital at this point. 
-These, were Dumouriezp Lebrun and Brissot. All- 
were, acquainted,., but none was necessarily committed to 
the-views of. the-others. Dumouriez, who had-returned 
to Paris from Brussels in the first week of Januaryp 
was a key figure. His discontent was well-known by the 
turn of the year and had earned him the suspicion of, 
more radical members of. the Convention. 'His disptLte 
with Pache, minister for warp over the organization of 
contracts to supply the army in Belgium, had undercut 
much of the initial success of the conquest. The 
Commission sent by the Convention had found ample 
evidence to support the 
See Epilogue. 
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general's contention-that'ýhis army-was-on the verge 
of complete-collapse, but this-did not necessarily 
absolve him of all blame-.. 
(') 
'Itýis clear that 
Dumouriez otill-feltabsolutely assured of his rect- 
itude-and-that'he considered the'financial losses 
whichi, he'-had himself endured asýa kind-of sacrifice - 
"Jelserais, ýlan, s'>, le', ýeas, de-beaucoup d'autres reclam- 
ations'-vi 
H" 
s-du"ministre de, la guerre, je nlose 
pas jetter: les yeux--sur4mes affaires4 personnelles, 
JIai vendug', 'jlai'ýempýunte -, je auis en dette et ruine, 
ý 
maiS. 'ce-'nlest pas le'cas de me plaindreq et ce nlest 
., \ -,, (2) pas--, a-ce-ministre'que je peux mladresser. " 
Dumouriez's--main interests, in returning to Paris 
were"not"I, however, primarily financial, Despite'the I 
dreýdý. inl*whichýhe was, held byýthe Dutch government and 
his'lown , bravadoýon', the subject, of-an, invasion-of the 
United-Provinbes; it'. is clear that he had determined 
to uselhis, ovvnýinfluence in Paris in a-last-minute 
(1) The, commissioners did not receive much assistance 
in the enquiries which they made from Dumouriez himself. 
-, ,"'; -, - "-2 1-, ,Iý1, See A. N,, D 29 1 and D 2/4-p Mission de Danton etc. en Belgie. 
(2) Dumouriez to Lebrun, Paris, 2nd- Januaryq 1793. 
A-N. DXXIII9 19 The general justified himself at 
length later in. a letter 16 Dantong. January 20th., 17939 
quoted in A. Mathiezy''Autour de Dantong Paris, 1926, p. 182. 
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attempt, to,, avert an, extension ofýthe-vyar- Convinced 
that ihe. execution: -of, Louis-_XVI, would annihilate_. the 
slender, hopes of4, a-, reoonoiliation, with Great-Britain 
he alsoýtried-, to bring pressure to -bear so, that. the 
kingld-life,, might., be, savedo , -De. Maulde had accompanied 
him-to Paris and-,; the_,, Grand, Pensionaryýof, Holland-was 
kept informed through. de-Maulde, la confidant,, -Joubert,, ý.., 
of their-combined:, efforts to-. avoid war and to bring 
the Conseil Executif,,. and, Lebrun-in-particular round 
to. theirýway. of thinking. -ý, Joubert! s,, letters-, to Van 
de, Spiegel at the, Hague. were soothingg probably, 
deceptively; so.,, On-January-19th.. he. -wrote -7 "Je vous . 
af3sure,,, que; ývous-nlaurez, point la gu. erre. -., Dumouriea sly 
oppose, lfermement.. ýDlapres, 
les propositions., a., lui. faites 
et, les-offres-, interessantes qui ntontpas manquer de 
la-cajoler, -ilavait donne, sa parole, d'honneur de faire 
une visite.. a la-Hollande pour ddf-inition de, conqugte 
-actuellement, il ne-songe plus et,. deýcampagneq, mais, 
quta-; aider. 1daulde ..... Tous,,, les membre's 
(of the-, Conseil 
Executif) ont. ýete de-, son-avis., et. veulent decidement 
conserver-la -aveC l'Angleterre-, et la Hollande, _,,, . 
paix 
afin, d! ecraser, l'Allegmagne et-, la,, Prusse,, qui se forti- 
fient tous. les jours. j, -ýNos-ýarmees, sont-devenues a 
rieng, lel-trouble sly,, mehe, lesýgeneraux se, dechirento 
elles-manquent-de toutg-alorsq. -Jeý, peux affirmativement 
dire:,, ga nI ira-, pas. 
(1) d6ub er"t'* to Van de Sp - iegel 19th 11 Jan - uary . 
'deaenstukken de Algruene Gesche , dienis, OP. cit. p. p. 258-9- 
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Joubert's-letters also told of discussions and-meet- 
inge, betweerx Dumouriez. and members of the Conseil 
Executif. Officially,, the general was examined by 
both. the, Comite. de Defense, Generale and, the Conseil 
Exercutif... Joubert. aBserted that he was receiving 
A ýt". 
substantial support.. for-his, point of. view in further', 
unofficial meetings, an assettion, which is not adequately 
Po; I 
, 
firmed by subsequent-. developments., 
When, he realized that, thi 
inevitableg and-that, itl,, would 
oppose it publicly,, puýouriez 
4ý, - '-. ýA.,, 'I ý-, II 
course which was,, -in-factf an 
a king's execution was 
be, highly impolitic-to 
embarked on another 
. 
6ff-shoot.. of the November 
I 
exchanges, between, Aucklandl, qý_Maulde and-Van de, 
ýpiegeljn, the United. Provinces. The. plan was complex 
and. never came to fruitiong but the attitudes dis- 
play 
' 
ed, by. the, various participantsýcontribute to an, 
understanding. of the considerations weighing in Prench,, 
British. and Dutch. politics at thi. s'point. Dumouriez 
hoped that his, ovyn,, presence., in,, Englandg, in a last-, - 
minute discussion, with Pitt, and Grenvilleg., might be 
sufficient, to keep,, both countries back from the brink 
of hostilities. -Both 
Dumouriez and Lebrung whose 
official blessing on, the scheme was necessary, appear 
to have believed that, the British government would be 
impressed. by. France. l. s, sincerity, in-the sending of the 
Revolution"e'most illustrious general on such a mission. 
Dumouriezq however, did not wish to go to England with- 
out some assurance that he would be received on his 
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arrival-, ConseqVentlyg. Maret-was, sent- back across 
- the M)a=el to test theýpolitical-wind in'iiritain and 
Chauvelin wasýrecalled. -, These, llast 
decisions., coin- 
cided, exactly with the, -execution of Louis XVI.. The 
general, explained the. decisions which-had been reached 
in, a, letter-to his subordinateg the, south-American 
borný. General-Miranda.,, -,. - His. version took some-, 
liberties with. the-truthp-. but-is an illuminating state- 
ment of-his own, feelings at the-time. He. began his-,,, 
letter., by saying that, he agreed that-, the plan of-an- 
attack. onýZeland should be, abolished and replaced. by 
an, invasion-, via Maestrichtt", Venloo and Nimwegen. This 
was allý*_the moreýimportant-considering-, recent develop- 
ments; in-Paris -, "Leýcataetrophe duvingt-et-un 
(the executionof-*the king)'ý--. nousdonne. vraisemblablement 
pour. 'ennemis:, tous, les pe. upleE3. -. de,, 11, Europe., ý,,, Voici ce 
qui', vient, -dl, etre. ýdecide--a, ', cet egard, au, Coneeil, Executif. 
Nous'-eo=es encore incertainsýsur. le parti, que 
prendra-, l'Angleterre, et-clest-ce parti, qui determinera 
notre. 'conduite-pourýlaýHollande. Le conseil d'apres 
le,. deeir-des-anglais,. et des hollandais a Jette lea 
yeux,, sur moi, 'pour aller-en-Angleterre. -en ambasBade-, '. 
extraordinaire'afin'ýde faire dercidercette nation- 
categoriquementg-', -pour'., la paix ou pour la guerre, En 
consequence on-a,. donne ordre, amotreýambassadeur 
Chauvelin de revenir, -On. envoie demain un agent secret 
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fo , rt connu"de M. Pi tt e-t -_ de -, M. Faux. -(sic. ) pour demander 
aux deux parties.. '.. -un'sauf conduit pour"moi.... 
cette mission'ne durera"plus que 8 joursO Je pars 
demainýla n'uit pour'Dunkerque d1ou je passerai a, 
Ostende'. '.. '. *on envoie une , personne de confiance a la 
Haye pour prevenir'Milord'Auckland et le. Grand 
P41isionnaire van de'Spiegel-pour venir'slaboucher 
avec moi"selon"leur propre demande.... "(1) The last 
sentences referred*to the'second'aspect-of Dumouriez's i 
plan which was'for him'to old'discussions'with Lotd 
Auckland sý that both'me'n. could act. as'spokesmen for 
J 
'their'resp . ec tive go' v, le r en, t, s' 
Though couching his actions, in the'guise of a 
representative of'the'French, nationt Dumouriez's schemes 
were largely his. own. ' 'Thý-ioreign'Minister who had 
acquiescedýin'the framework of, proposed arrangements 
at the time'j'carried'the responsibility of dealing 
with-theýbroader problems'of French foreign p6licy and 
was-inevitably restricted by'ýthe need to maintain a 
'dignified legitimate approach which had. been a major 
feature"of"Prench policy in the autumn*of 1792ýý 
Lebrun'was now in a difficultpposition. Though'still 
in control'of all'the diplomatic correspondence'some 
. of, 
his, area of initiative, had-been removed by the 
of, the. Comite de Defense Generaleg which 'was 
na. tura. lly,,, pcc, upying itself with 
'the 
examination of 
'(1)' Dumouriez t'o Mirandat 23rd. Januaryp_A. N. P7, -4688. 
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the of an Anglo-French war; the tone ty 
being adopted by-Brissot in the., Convention was further 
undermining Lebrun's independent position. 
'It 
is 
doubtful, toog whether Lebrun, could have. shared even 
the, cautious., optimism, still. left in Dumouriez's 
approach.,, The auti3mnfor him had_been a, time*of, ',. 
growing 
, 
tribulation. The-Conseil. Executif's early un- 
wise decision to, send numbers, of. secret agents to 
England. had been an unmitigated disaster. He did not 
have the full support of a number of, French diplomatic 
representatives, having clashed with-Bourgoing, in 
Madrid(', ) and de Maulde at the Hague;, despite'-his 
polite. re-assurances ha had never entirely trusted 
Chauvelin. The Conseil Exdbutif had continued to stand, 
fast, by_, its 
-rebuttal-of 
British grievances on the 
Scheldt and the 19th. November decree. _. 
The-. argumant 
and, phraseology of the_explanation sent-to Chauvelin 
on January 8th. were little different from their 
original justification of the natural boundaries 
philosophy in the case of the Scheldt and the outright 
. 
denial 
I of any 
intention of fomenting discontent in 
Britain in the case of the. 19th. -November decree. 
(2) 
Yet Lebrun must have been aware that this approacht 
. 
(l)., 
-''Lebr. un *t, 
o Bourgoing, 
, -, ". .-ý-,. , -, t ., -I 
CGP. 
_,,,, 
Espagne, 
'634. 
., 
Lebrun to-Chauvelint,, 
C- Angleterre 586. - 
13th-Novemberg 1792. A. A. E. 9 
8th. January, 1793, A. A. E. 9 
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--- 
however. justifiable 9 was having no positive effect 
whatsoever on-relations with Britain. 
Since, the beginning ofýJanuary, Lebrun had rec- 
eived-a steady volume of-information from his. sources 
in England'gto-, the effect, that the governmenVs' 
attitude', there vvas. hardening almost dailyýand that, 
the onlyýeensible course2eft for France was to make-, 
adequateýýpreparation in, the little time of peace that 
must-surely--be 1'e-f't. 
(') 
At a time when Dumouriez's 
associates were-'assuring. the GrandýPensionary in, 
Holland, that-the Conseil-Executif-would do, everything 
in, its'power'to,. avoid. warp, Lebrun himself, was adopting -, 
a far from. conciliatory-: tone, in'his official corres---. - 
pondence, witý Chauvelin ', "nous so=es tres presses. 
ici" dlavoir. -definitivement une, reponse de la cour de , 
Londres. 'sur. ses dispositionstsoitýpourla paixg soit-. - 
pourýla guerre., -Nous ne pouvons pas rester-plus 
longtemps dane, cet-, etat,. dl. incertitude--et nous. vaus 
reco=andons-expressement de nousýmander,., dans le, delai 
de. huit jours-au plus, tardg, quelle-est la derniere, 
-resolution de-cette cour. - La'saison-ou les hostilites., 
(1) Particularly forthright was-the co=ent df the 
agent; Pereyrap "Je, pense, que'la revolution nlaura pas 
encore-, d! effet.. ll'y. a bierý de la fermentationg mais 
ill'nlyý-a,, pas'de, genie revolutionnaire. " -to Pereyra. 
Lebrunt'i-January'let. 17939, A. A. E. 9' C*P. Angleterret 
Supplement-30. 
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commencent approche insensiblement et il serait aussi impru- 
A 
'dent qulimp6litique dIattendre qulelle_fut arrivee pour 
prendre nos me6ures de --pr(fcautions 
'This' 
note'was 
Intended-ai', V, stiff and formal communication on the part 
"'o'fý-the''Fre-nýli'-goV'er=entg but it later becomes-clear, -espec- 
ially''in'the despatches to diplomats after war had been 
, declaredg- tha .t1, Lebrun and his associates had decided that 
'British'refu I sal'to make any definite public commitment on 
the, issue of war was a policy deliberately designed to 
de . ceive-France. 
(2), 
'ý--Cliauvelin, hims I elf seems to have'been determined to 
i labbur under his difficulties until the end. At the 
beginning of January he had ignored a thinly-veiled suggest- 
, ion 'fiom''the Foreign Ministry that he, should return homeý. 
A 
Vous devez a'la dignite du caractere, dont vous etes 
revetu de ne point compromettre votre personne et nous 
Sito 
At 
vOus autorisons a retourner en France, aus que vous 
'croirez-que la prudence exigera. votre retraite.,, 
(3) 
Lik6'-d6-'Mauldeq Chauvelin, was probably anxious about 
the' , reception, he would face in Paris, since he realized 
'that'he- h'ad, been under constant scrutiny during his 
London--mission. It was probably good for his temporary 
peace of mind that he 
_(l)_, _Le, 
brun to Chauvelin, 
'10th-January, 
A. A. E. 
C.. P., Anglet errev 586. 
(2)ý Lebrun to Genet, February 3rd. 1793, A. A. E. 
C. P. Etatsv-Uniso 379 and, Lebrun to Bourgoing, 
Fe_bruary"2nd. '17939- A. A. E.. C. P. Espagne, 635. 
(3) Lebrun to Chauveling January ist. 1793P 
C. P. Angleterreo 
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wawordered-to leave Britain before'Maret arrived 
bringing: his. papers'of-recall., I-The, Consei1 Executif, 
through'Lebrung'-were'still'. attempting to, use the 
channels ofilegitimate-diplomatic approach even after 
the'execution of Louis XV_I.,,, It was not,. howevert, 
merely the; restrictions of, -British, 'outlook at this 
stage which defeated-their"efforts. 'In-France itself 
a third ,f orce had - developed in the., - area of f oreign 
affairs*, which was. to-play into, t4e. hands-of Pittts 
administration. and thus defeat both Dumouriez and the 
Conseil Executif. 'ý- 
The creation of the'Comite de Defense: Generale, - 
had thrust, Briesot back into the'limelight of foreign 
relations, During October, 1792p he had spoken on the 
issues, ofLGeneva and Savoy, ', but apart from that his-- 
major-contributions"to the. 'debates inthe Convention 
had been cone'erned*with-; the'king's, trial, and the appeal 
to the people on theýkizigls sentence. On January 12th. 
heýpresented, a rep'ort, on, behal-f of the new committee 
on the crisis, which was considered-to have developed 
in Anglo-Prench, "relations. The speech was perhaps less 
impassioned. than-'some. of Brissotlsýoratory-in 1791 
and 1792-but"it wasO. nevertheleesp sear cely calculated 
to-produce'aýmellowing`effect on the British government. 
Although part, of, Brissotts. assesement of the cause of 
British sensitivity, was perhaps more accurate than he 
realizedt his penchant for rhetorical flourishes as 
a. necessary-part, of any pronouncement in which French 
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glory-, was concerned led'him into some dangerous mis- 
representations. He, began by, defining, reaction. in, 
, 
Great Britain to-the Revolution, in, Franceg and-in 
particular, to, the, Revolution of August 10th. There 
had, -, he saidq been: -three types of response; -that of 
'. the,, nationl-which,, was, positiveýand laudatory, that 
qf-j? arliamentq-7which-, was dubious and-rather anxious, 
and that, of-, the, Court',.., which was, violently against 
. 
the republic.,, It is hard-, to credit that., Briesot 
could-himself-, have believed-these arbitrary, and in, 
accurate. distinctions.,, - The Foreign Ministry was now 
well7supplied with. information from-a number, of-. sources 
'Which, categorically, -stated that the, British,, population 
could not: be-considered-aB a, Beparateg revolutionary 
force. 'let.. 
-to annex an address , The move, on, February 
tolthe British people, to the declaration of, war was 
opposed by Billaud-Varenne-r and, MCtrat, as, futilee 
The--arrogance, and hostility, of-such'a. contention only 
increased,, the, feeling of-the British'government that 
French-,, professions on the-decree-of November 19th. 
could-not be. believed. 
ý_, -., From this. unpromising beginningg Brissot went on 
to. 
-explore 
the-development, of-tension between, the'two 
countries and, to dismiss every-British grievance. , The 
recall-. of. Lord Gower was-noto heýclaimedq, an act 
consistent with, neutralityq as had been, explained at 
(1) Speeches'in Le Mon'iteur, Bebruary lst. 
, 
ý010 XVI 0 
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tbetime. *"-The opening of the River, Scheldt and the - 
decree, offerinR fraternity and assistance were not as 
had been amply demonstratedg aggressive acts against 
the British government; there could be no-realistic 
grounds-for complaint here. - Whyv-thpng had the British 
government,, taken the extraordinary me4sures of re. 
pression and preparation at'the end of November? 
He: suggested that their main fear was of Thomas Painep 
not-France. The government had played on traditional 
emotions,. evoked by, the concept of defence of the con- 
stitution as a rallying point. The Revolution had been 
consistently. misrepresented in England as a menacing and 
evil. force. From this sweeping critiCism Of the 
obs-tructiveness of British policy-makersq Brissot 
directed hisýattention to the state of the country it- 
eelf. ý-'ýThough*frequently considered a', buoyant'and, 
prosperous nation, 'British economy was not as strong- 
as, the rest, of the world thought. Taxation was heavy 
and a-., cause of discontent. Much of BritainIs economic 
strength depended on'her overseas empire and eBpecially 
on'. India-p where her rule was tyrannical and potentially 
insecure, Having developed these underlying weak- 
nesses-at some length, Brissot finished by asserting 
thatýFrance had one great strength over Britain which, 
he"hinted, might be crucial in the event of war. The 
Revolution had produced an unrivalled supply of man- 
power, eager to serve in furthering the cause of liberty. 
(1) Brissot's speech to. the National Conventiong January 
12th. Le Moniteurg vol, xvi'. 
' 
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The aggressiveý, tone, of-, Brii3sot. 's speech can: best be 
explained, by. -his-desire. -to'cut a. convincing figure-, in, 
the, Conventionlat, a, time vyhen his stock was. very, low. 
Given. thetensions in, Parisýin-mid-January_it would- 
h-ave'-been foolhardy--to. appear-meek and apologetic,, --' 
On: a more: -levelv., Brii3sot's, ýapproachýreveals- ., 
general. 
the-, lack, of co-ordinationýbetween the variouszelements 
most-i=ediately-concerned, with, taking decisions--. 
affecting, external,. relations.,,., The French were-incapable 
of: appreciating-. thatýwhile-Maret-was, ý'shortly to be 
sent,, on-a final,, attempt-. t. o., avert-ýhostilities andý,. , 
Dumouriez-was, contacting, Aucklandý-in-ýthe United Provincesq 
Brissot's-inflemmatory styleýwas calculated to'render 
all'. such efforte'unavailing. 
o,, * ', "i, The Britain,, atýýwhich'Brissotfs eloquence had 
been,, aimed was-advancing daily. in its. -expectation, of, 
the outbraak, of, war.,.., The-first two, weeks of the month 
passed in'suspenseýand. uncertainty-- The Aliens. Act 
received-, theýroyal, -, aseent, on-January 8th.,, but despite- 
Frenchýýthreat I a-. of,. ending, the treaty of-1786p--few 
political, commentators-were quite willing to co=it 
themselvesll, solidlyýto'-the inevitability of war. The 
funds-remained, t-variable,.. a,, feflection of. the general 
feeling in the country.. Resistance. to the press 
4) 
and the recurrence of'strikes and social"disturbances 
in Scotland and elsewhere brought home, to the government 
Morning, Chronicle't. Janu'ary 15th. 
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the, precariousness of the triumph of, Loyalism. 
I'If. we were, to desist now9.11 wrote Grenville to Auckland on Jan. 
"without providing some effectual security forý. the 
future I would not, answer, for. raising again the same 
spirit, which has. enabled us. to. act, so effectually. 
The main-question now was how to absolve the govern-' 
-0 
ment of any, blame when war did break out. The govern- 
ment's public,, record of correctness. in its official- 
dealings with Chauvelin was beyond reproachq but what 
more positive, which would was needed was something_ 
represent France, as a dangerous aggressor beyond all 
reasonable doubt.., Pittle, administration had earlier 
thought to, use details of-the de Maulde-Dumouriez. 
exchanges as,, evidence of the intrinsic unreliability 
(2) 
of French protestations,, but now they had a more, 
effectiVe. weapon, -7-,, "BrisE3ot's report. seems well enoughz 
calaulatedýfor our, purposes., The, thing must now come 
to its point in a few days and we shallq I trust, 
h' 
, 
ave appeared, to, the public here to have put the French 
completely, daýs leur tort., 9(3)1' pitt, s mind was 
'Working on the same lines, though embracing broader 
considerations, of policy., The Earl'of Malmesbury noted 
in his diary on January 20th. Lord Loughboroughle 
(1) Grenville to Aucklandt- January 15th. Fortescue MSS 
OP. cit.., P. P. 366-367-ý. 
(2) Grenville, to Aucklandv December 29th, 
-F. 
O. 37/42. 
(3),,. 
ýGrenville. to. Buckingham, January 19th. 
"Buckinghaml op. cit', 
iip. z?, 7; r. 
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account of conversation with Pitt - "He told me 
de wa Ir wie* 'a - deci d *mea'sur'eý; ' that Pitt saw 'it was in- 
evitable and that. 'the sooner it wa: ibegun the better. 
That wa Might Dossess ourselves of'the French islands; 
that the nation now was-disposed-for warp which might 
not Vý the 'cas'e six weeks hence. ' That we were'in 
mucb: 'greater forw'ardness"than*the French.... that he 
had Zý mil'lic'n re'ady-and -th I at. he - trusted the surplus 
of'the permanent'revenue would be_'f, 6, OOpO, 00 a 'year*_ 
That "the "Dutch, were quite "and'in earnest; ' 
Russia was willing to''go'to all-'lengths.... 
While-uSing"the belligerence of French oratory 
as an eloquent witness of Gallic malevolencep the, 
British g'ov-ernment was-, also, -though less publicly, 
demonatiating'an-'interest -in undermining, the flimsy 
e&6nomic foundations of France. An anonymous'expert 
sub'mi , tted a- highly" secret report to Pitt in January 
on the ways. of dealing blows at the French'economy 
by v- ari . 6us'Methods of'manipulating the I rate of exchange, (2) 
Secret,, as the paper. wasp,, the French were early on their 
guard against, it, Nýqiel -'warning, 
Lebrun, '. en! 'ýZa=24thl. "Carra n1a 
pas, tout a'fait tort, quand,, il, peint. a la Convention 
ea-banquiers. e, trangere. comme, les instrumente'les plus 
l') Malm esb ur y 
ianu a ry 20th. --in, 
Malme6bury, Diaries 
and Correspondenceg vol.. ii P-P-P_601ý75020' 
_(2)-ýRepor. t in P. R. O. 30/8/3349 Chatham Papers, 
Piiblio'Record Office. 
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actives, les. plus, dangereuses de nos ennemis. 
The-British government were naturally attracted to a 
method of combatting France without recourse to arms. 
, _The 
inter. est which they exhibitedýin an underground 
economic, attack, is an important revelation of., their 
belief that revolutionary. -France was on the very brink 
of, collapse. at--the beginning of 1793.,, 
complete A mor,, e,,. immediate impetus towards a 
, 
break. occurred on January 21st. -Pitt, in the House of 
Co=ons, referred to the king's death as "that dread- 
ful-. outrýage. against every principle of religionp of. --. 
J'4stice and of1humanityp which has created onegeneral 
sentiment. of-indignation and abhorrence in every part 
11(2) 
't from'Paris of, this island. ,, -Lebrun had sent 
Mare 
two'. days after the execution of Louis XVIg-but the 
news of-Louis' death arrived late on the evening. of. 
the, 23rd. January_. An. Londong several days, in advance 
of Maret himself.. The. French, pol. iticians were evid- 
pntly, not., pr, epared, f. or. -, the-mannerý-and extent of 
British 
(1) No'el'to Lebrun-'- 24th. Januaryo A. A. E. C. 
Hollande" 585. ' Baniers'remained suspect in France 
throu&hout'the Terror''. '-A notable example is the Swiss 
bankýer'Perregauxq an acquaintance of Lord Auckland and 
of Dantonv who managed to persuade the Robespierrists 
that he had not indulged in financi. al_. intrigue of a 
ti'ait'orouý nature. 
(2) William, Pitt in, theýHouselof Commonspý February let. 
1793.,,,. Cobbettv, Parliamentary Histor 22-Z 
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reaction.. The theatres stopped playing and the 
court:, immediately assumed mourning. ' This much was 
predictable;. the-king's death undoubtedly outraged-, -, 
many, persons at court and in governmentg but. it was 
far: from unexpected. The immediate reaction of the 
administration, was to expel Chauvelin. Maret had 
been given a-number of altern I ative courses to follow 
on his arrival in Englandq depending on his assessment 
of, the situation thereq but'it seems thatthe actual 
dismissal, of the ambassador 'was not thought a serious 
possibility. - The British governmehtt. 
howeverg intended 
the-, dismissal of Chauvelin as more than a mere matter. 
of,, diplomatic form - . 
'The'bUsiness is now brought to 
its crisis*and I imagine that the next despatch to you 
or the next, but one will announce the commencement of 
hostilities ..... I do not see how we, can remain Any 
longer-les bras croise's with a great force ready for 
action-and, 'that forde avowedl ,Y meant against Prance.. 
(l) 
.. ',, 'There was also a revealing"sentence-in one of the 
few-remaining letters written by Pitt at this time, ' 
III, rather think'you ought to propose to the king to 
put. off the Drawing Room and to have a council at the 
Queen's-House for the purpose of making the. order for 
Chauvelin's departure. The King told me yesterday 
that hewould-be ready to have the Council whenever the 
news came. 
Grenville to Auckland, 24th Januaryp Forýescue MS 
0P cit. iip P-373. 
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The-search. for relieving. the. British government ofIthe 
doubtful meritiof, appearing positively to desire war-, 
was. thus easily answered,,, by,, the arrival of word of 
Louis, XVI. Isý-execution. ýCýauvelin_o, utwardly took the 
embarassment. of his expulsion surprisingly well.. He,,,, 
had. organized his-affairs and-, left. the, country before 
Maret*even landed; at Dover. 
1 11 ,II Maretle-mission,,, though closely, connected: in'lits, 
inception with French ministerial outlook at the time 
of the.. king's, death,. and, with Dumouriez's negotiations 
-in-the. -, UnitedTrovinces is perhaps. most interesti3ýg 
in what, -it., reveals, ofBritish, reaction-to 
French. -over- 
tures: atia, time-when,,, the, outbreak, of war-was expected 
almo8t-daily; hzAware-of-the: delicate nature of Maret's 
taskq- Lebrun in his. final despatch to Chauvelin had 
made-every'%effort-to, appear reasonable and conciliatory. 
The: ýambassador was, to leave a note for, Grenvillet assur- 
ing'. him'-of the--lattachment of the French nation to 
England, '-ýbut-saying that--he felt. heývvas no longer-, 
servingýa useful'purpose in England -MVous ferez. sentir 
que-si--, leýMinistere',. Britanique, rendu,, a: des sentiments., 
plus-iconvenables desirait se rapprocher. de nous il 
nous"trouverait enoore disposes, a, faire-tout ce que, 
permettrait-la dignite nationalep tout, ce que co=and- 
erait le desir de voir la bonne intelligence retablie 
entre les deux nations et la volonte dont nous avons 
ýo`nndý/d'e's preuves et ou nous avons toujoursiete de 
maintenirlIharmonie, qui regnait entre elles et de .,. 
4ol 
conserver,, la paix. 11 
(')-,,, 
'.,. The -British administration' 
,, were both, irritated and, embarrassed by such professions 
of rationality and goodwillp whichýseemed so much at 
odde, with the belligerýenc, e of 
_Brissot 
Is oratory in 
, Ithe Convention. It is-hardly surprising that Pitt and 
., 
Grenville, wondered at'French inconsistency. 
Maret did. not. arxive, in-Britain until January 28th., 
His 'coming caus ed confusion in government circles; no 
'-sooner had the administration finally'rid themselves 
of Chauvelin than-another Frenchman. arrived on a 
, -mysterious and ill-defined mission. There were rumours 
. 
that. the new arrival. was Maratq an-alarming confusion 
, 
in spe'lling. 
(2)tlaret 
did not'wishlto invest himself 
. with any. -partioular,, 
function, or. office until. he received 
,! 
ý,, new. set of instructions from Lebrun. -He 
felt_that 
vagueness left, him the maximum room for manoeuvre. 
Soon after his arrival in London he saw Milest who 
foolishly encouraged. in. him an-over-optimistic estimate 
of probable. ministerial response. He also saw Lord 
Lansdowne,, but apart, from this remained virtually in- 
communicado.,, Grenville, writing to Aucklandt expressed 
foroibly,, the government's disapprobation of Maret's 
missionl. referring, to "the inconvenience which arose 
from the speculations in-our public funds occasioned 
by, the. equivocal situation and conduct of M. Maret.... I'M 
(1)''-'. Lebrun'to-Chauv eling January 22nd. 'A. A. E. 
_"C*'Po' 
'Angleterreq- 586. 
2ý,. Maret to, Lebrung January 31st. A. N. F 7,4398. 
3i ý) Grenville-, ýto-Aucklandq' February 4the F. O. 37/44. 
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The, 
_,, 
Frenchman himselfv unwilling tolmake any. definite 
moves, in; the changed: circumstances of, Englandp had to 
rely on information received. fromýfriendsl as.. to 
generalý-outlook, of Britain "La., mort, du roi a. produit 
11 eff et, que nous avions prevu; . 
1a. haine, que le 
gouvernement, avait! cherche"avee tant. de soin"a'. inspirer 
aux, Anglais contre: leýnom Francais. est-maintenant portee 
I/T 
) 
on comble. ý, La partie du Peuple_qui nlest, ni.,, - , 
commelicante ni proprietaire 9 desire et, damande, la 
guerre.,, Le-deuil ordonne. par la cour a ete pris dlune 
maniýere generale et a Londres tout homme qui avai 
ou-qui a puýse procurer un habit noirýslen'est evetu 
Cette circonstance ml, oblige, a, ne'voir. personne, car e. 
ne: serais recu nulle partg et, me force meme_a ne pas,. -,, - 
sortir. de'chez Maret's indetermination 
was-resolv . 6d: at,,, thebeginning of February by, a note 
from, Grenville-ordering-both. ýhimself andiScipion-Morguet- 
who-, had, remained, in, a. secretarial-post at, the embassy, 
-at. once. to leave, , 
the,, country, 
ý: _, _, 
Hopes of, averting-war-by,, an exchange of view-,,,,,, 
points,, had, still,, not-been, defeated-finally. - At, the,,,,., 
beginning of Februaryt-, beforeýthe declaration of war 
by, -France, was-known. in Englandp- the centre. of atten- 
tion%shifted back, once,, more. to therHag'ue., The last, 
ultimately., unsuc'cessful. phase. of., the proposed Auckland- 
Dumouriez, talks, is'extremely. valuable for-our, under- 
standihg-,. Of Dutch'and British politicsý, in the last 
(1)1"-Mýret to'Lebrunq January 31st. ý, A. N. P79 4398. 
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days of , -peace*', -,, -, It -is-; perhaps ironic', that -. the'l, emotions 
ofl, threeý-majorý_political, figuresg Lord. Auckland, -, - 
Dumouriez', and, -. Lord, Grenvilleý., were,, briefly concentrated 
_on, -a smallýcountryý.. painfullyýawareý'. 
that, it vvas-, being 
, Used: as, a-pawnýin the developiiig'l, ýAnglo7-French, struggle. 
At -,, the -end, of ý January g, replying, -, to a. memoir 
Auckland, on the.. purposetand:, -Justificationý, of-', British 
armamentl, Van de-, Spiegel, madeýhis own, feelings', quite 
NN clear..,.. '-Ijlai,, -eu,,, lthonneur-ýd! observ 
I 
e3Ga 
ýotre, 
Excellence 
-et ý. question dans toutes les que: ýJusqula, present- 'a. 
communications ree. ýiproques,, entre,, l'Angleterre-et-ýcette 
republique. que dun--systeme. deneutralite, et des - -. moyens 
deýce mettre en mesure, ýpour maintenir'ce systeme'avec 
e-fficaceq mais, que leýcontenu-de votre memoireýprdrisente 
une question. toute-, differenteý-en ce que, l'Angleterre 
I 
ayant arme-une flotte formidable et'se montrant,.,,, ýý 
disposee-a. opposer: -d! une"maniere, digne-d'elleýune-forte 
barri`eýre contre la, propagation des. -principes, francaieg 
et'lea-vues,, dlaggrandiz'ement, -, de i-cette nationo semble 
de"sirer,, que-la,, republique. prenne un'lpart active., a ces 
mesurese'.... ", The-Republici pointed: out'the Pensionary, 
could not; -. be, ýexpectedto,. prepare. with the.. speed-and, 
strength-., of Great Britain,. andhad, doubtsýas to theý-,, -,,, 
L advisability of the new-British approach 
parait, qu! une, declaration. publique', -Iet. pre ature de. '--I, 
notre concurrence a toutes lee mesures d'Ah Lets e 
seýviTait a provoquer une attaque avant que nous soyons 
en etat de nous defendre. 11 The immediate loser in 
4o4 
such a situation would ýe'not Great Britain, but the 
Un i t, e, dP i'o-v, in c" es* '-, The'c6ndi'tions which Britain req- 
uired of, France, for-peace, would-doubtleas be refusedg 
thus leading, to war--- fune,, guerre dont lee premiers 
6ýoujs'ýitombe'reni sur'notre-Republiquep tandis que'le 
j4 ouveinem'entnIa'aucune assurance expresse et_determinee 
des s6`cou'r's-quIil aurait a attendre de ses allies, 
ni vers'quels temps ces secours pourraient arriver, 
ni de'lqu-elle maniere ils-seraient autoriser a agir 
pour la'defence de la Republique. "( 
TIý6 stýate, of Dutch defence and their very' evident 
disenchantment'at the hardening of the'British line 
was a, factoi-in the minds of Lord Auckland and of 
Gr4nville`in'-ýtheir dealings with Dumouriezq though 
the"instructions eventually sent to Auckland from 
Whit6hall'Iranged overthe entire British viewpoint on 
relatiOni"with, France. Aucklandl Dumouriez-and de 
I Maulde'v-, -'-'who-were-most, directly involved in the 
negotiations, I became almost obsessed by the gravity 
of-the situation. " Grenville and Lebrun, who were on 
the*periphý4ry, remained much'more suspicious., The 
final'ýoun-d'of this'protracted-series of meetings and 
I 
discussions began when Joubertq de Maulde's confidant, 
arrived back. at the Hague, to, apprize Lord Auckland 
of de Maulde's imminent arrival. De Maulde naturally 
(1) ý'-Memoir-by Van' de Spiegel enclosed in'Auckland's 
despatch of January 29th., P. O. -37/44. 
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gloried in, his revived importance. Noýl was informed 
of his, arrival on January,, 23rd. p, but otherwise was 
not taken into, anyone's confidence... Initially, 
de Maulde found Auckland suspicious. Louis XVI's 
execution hadg, the'ambassador, saidt ended all possi- 
bility of, contact,, andp furthermoret. he did not 
believe that Dumouriez qas_, master of his own situation. 
D'e Maulde,, then, asked, if-the, ambaseador was categorically 
refusing to-ýmeet the general. Auckland replied that 
he could not'make such a. refusal on his own authority, 
but. that he would write to,. England for-instructions. 
Although Auckland admitted.., that: he felt.. -there was- 
##a 
'want-of 
discretion and,. requisite caution in the 
whole history. of such an overture.... " he was evidently- 
growing more-and more sensitive to the importance of 
the, present-. proceedinge. 
(2-)- 
De Maulde had told the 
Pensionary. that if all negotiations were rejected it 
, would, not be choice but, necessity which would compel 
Dumouriez, to-, attack Holland. Auckland was clearly 
afraid that his own government would put an abrupt end 
to, the very. slim chances of peace which, remained 
III, 
-look. with concern and solicitude 
to, the. rejection 
(1)'ý'Nolel'q-offended and bewildered,, stressed to Lebrun, 
, the 
ý: dver'se' effect. de Maulde's re-appearance had had on 
the morale and-trust of the Dutch patriots. Noel to- 
der 
, meene ýebrunq,,. Pebruary 6thq Gedens e cit. p. p.. 270-272., A OP 
(2), Auckland to Grenvilleg January 29th F. O. 37/44 
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on our part, because'. the'mind and imagination-cannot 
fix'points to, the'-po6sible 'consequences of tlýat. 
fter be ascertained that rejectiong"if-it-sh'Ould herea 
we had-the'-meansýof stoppingthe'torrent--of calamity 
which I is rushing-forwards. 11-He suggested a sum'of 
around E259000 would'be appropriate recompense for 
Dumouriezg*vvhoBe main aim-was to regain a-firm hold 
on-hi . s-army'and'use"it to restore'order to'government 
(lY in'Paris.. 
TheBritish g" overnment were not greatly, impressed 
ed bY, 'the'-details of diplomatic intrigue in the Unit, 
Pr6vifib'e s',, - but "-'acut eii, aware of the. state of Dutc# 
preparations', 'ýthey-did not wish to lose the possible 
advýantage"of-the slight delay which., might elapse while 
thet-a, lks'went'-ahead. ''--Consequentlyg Auckland, was 
iL U* 's 0 many thorize`dý to m'eet,, Dumouriezq', though with 
resirictions'on, hi's freedom of initiative'that it is 
litird''to'believe that any positive developments could 
have'a'risen had'the talke'taken-place. In the instruc . t- 
fons an I d''commentary sent- to Auckland in the'two des-" 
-. patches-o'f February'4th., there, 
is the''fullest'express- 
iong-, both''"'ffi'cialýand'unofficialy of British government 
policy immediately-before'the French'declaration of 
war wa .s- known ý 
(2 
(1) Auckland, to Grenvilleg January 29th. P. O. 37/4'4. 
(2) Two. despatches of Grenville to Aucklandq February 4th. 
P. O. 37/44. 
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At'the beginning of the first'despatch Grenville 
exp ined-the reluctance of the British government tb 
p uil. much I- reliahce on any a ssurances'coming from, Prance, ý 
at that-ti I me,. '', Not'onliý-*ýere. they-sceptica1 of the 
French'government's good faith, but they were extremely 
uncertain"'whether in the present state of'Francev 
any- s, et, z0fMI en ev . eri if they should be desirous to 
conclude a peace on reasonable terms and to maintain 
could in the smallest degree *ýith'-`g6"od' faith, ' 
answer for the-future conduct of that country. " No, 
satisfactory explanation had, been offered, to'the British 
government on any of "the-numerous groundswhich have 
arisen'of'jealousy and complaint. " The Prench must 
no expect that'discussions would in any way impede 
the progress of the armament-which-was going forward. 
Nevertheless, 'it wasIelt advisable to authorize 
Auckland'to meet, the Prench generall. This would not. 
involve the government-in any reception of appublic 
official'p"-but on the'other hand it-was'felt that 
Dumour'i'ez was -a: person who-carried. considerable influence. 
Such. 'a*. 'misapprehension was a further sign of the 
. government's, ignorance of the-complexity of 
Pranch 
politics. -The general must be informedo howeverg that 
he'British'government could not consider maintaining 
any'link"until'the'embargo on British vessels in Prench 
harbours'. ha'd'been'-lifted. 
"t' After thes-e'ýýre-l-iminaries, "Auckland was instructed 
to'presen't aý-viewpo'ini ihich was the sum of British 
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-zgrievances, against, France. -, 
The republic was spreading 
; %anarchy inýothercountries while simultaneously, 
,, exhibiting greed, 
for territorial, aggrandizement. 
ýýEvery, move taken, by France might be seen as just cause 
for4, complaint, but overall the picture, of French 
, aggression. was 
formidable. -Auckland was to express- 
genuine-desire; for. conciliationg while making it -a 
-, very,, clear that,, his,, government believedýthere were 
. many, ý, serious obstacles 
in the way, of any8settlement. 
II 
The British, administration, ýaimed, particularly at-the, 
-measures. it 'consideredý'most disruptive of 
domestic 
,. 
and. European-,,, peace. -, f"if. in,, the course, of theýconver- 
ýsationcircumstances should. lead to, a 
discussi6n, of 
-particular-terms, you are at liberty-to, express your, 
-as satis- ýOwn! opinion that nothing will, lbe c. oAsidered 
i. factory., here,,, Bhort of an, exprese, disavowal of the, 
.. offensi, ve-, decrees. 11 -It'vvas. also, suggested 
that Auckland 
,, mighý ýhrovv, in-,, as'topics'ý. for discussion the-safety'of, 
-, Marie; Antoinette", and the-, position, of-the-emigres. 
' 
ý. -, His,, basic, -p-4rposep'. however, was,, 
to'listen rather than 
, týpropose, 
This-ýofficial, 
_despatch 
for the,. ambassadorle'use 
as-, reference,, ras,, long'and. bears marks. of-having, been 
written in_some. hasteg_since'it ranges over agreat 
many points, witliout much recognizable'shape-in its 
construction* Its contents contained no surprises and 
were quite, comprehensible'in terms of the outlook of 
the British government vvhich'had been'developed'since 
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mid-November., The French Revolution was, disruptive 
of peace and stability,. , 
If war,,, was to. be avoided the 
onus. fell, equarely on, the-, Frenc)i but in the rangelof - 
c_onsiderations which. mightbe, _touched-upon 
even at this 
preliminary. stageg the November decreesq the position 
of the queen and, royal., familyp. confiscatiOn of emigre 
1ýdsp, Pittl. p administration seem-to-have, expected 
that the, Revolution, could-not merely: be haltedp but 
undone. 
ý,.,, L:,,, A. ecompanying. thii3, statement of government policy 
was. a. secret letter which, revealed, a great-deal--more 
'abp'4t, the, 
_real-_value. 
whichPitt and, Grenville hoped 
to_,, -d, erive, _from, 
the ýostponedýmeeting.,,, ýTheit, interei3t 
1ýy-in a, temPorar res-ite, which:, might, permit, the United 
.. 
y p 
. Provinces-to: reach a-greater, degree of. prepar6tion for 
war. ., Auckland was: categorically told that British- 
lanCforces were not sufficieht to render. -any, assistance 
to-the Dutch. If he could hold off Dumouriez's forces, 
vital improvements might, be made - "as the delay which 
can., be., obtained by. this discussiont-supposing it not 
to lead to, real measures of peaceq cannot be expectedý 
to, be. of,,, long duration: it becomes every'day-more and 
mo. re, 
_urgent,, 
that-nothing should be omitted which can, 
(1) An in-t'ereating'oontrast. tolthe-Grenville memoranda 
are a series of notes possibly drawn up by. the Dutch 
government under the heading "Projet pour la conf65ence 
aveo PumOuriez. 11 There isl in particular, greater flexi-. ý, - 
. -bility on Prance's internal freedom of action after peace. 
Gedenstukiýn-oj. ' ci - t. '-'-P. p'. '272-ý274'- 
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contribute to an effectual'defence of the Republic. " 
-It wasthought'prudent to point out to Auckland that--, -,, 
he should'not'make it too apparent that his government, ' 
were more interested in delaying tactics than in 
conciliation. ' 
Before Auckland received his instruetions it' 
Ve'dam'e clear that'a substantial difference in outlook 
was developing'between'him and his superiors. He 
continued to think it unlik'eiy that his meeting with 
Dumouriez would ever take placep mainly because of 
the'dangers to the general himself;, the temper of his 
troops was'ugly. This did not prevent the ambassador 
fiOM'delivering. a. thinly-veiled attack on Foreign 
Office"procrastination-and suspicion. Auckland felt'-' 
thýt'Dumouriezls attempts at contact were genuine 
"In-the''meantime I have every reason to believe that 
he is sincere in the propositions nor can I. attribute 
to it'any notion-of finesse or deceit for. the purpose 
-of'gaining time to prepare his attack-on these 
provinces'. *... 'the advantakpof General Dumouriez (and 
I'know-that he"was fully aware of it) would have been- 
better secured by arrivlngýsuddenly'with his reinforce- 
ments'at Antwerp and by marching forward immediately. ' 
I have thought proper to make this remark-because I, 
believe it to be solid and unanswerable and it seems 
to'have escaped-the attention of many intelligent 
ýerso'nsq who repeat that General Dumouriez's propositions 
a r'e I mere finesse for purposes of, delay. 11(l) Auckland 
(1) Auckland to Grenville, VebruarY 5th., P. O. 37/44. 
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, 
ýwas, not a diplomat who minced, wordsp nor was he afraid 
., 
Of putting, his-own-views on r, ec. ord. He had learnt 
, much-during his,. time at the Hagueq particularly in 
, 
his judgement, of men. He, noW had. to admit a certain 
-respect for. de Maulde's consistency in a-dangerous 
, 
situation. His fears of the spread of revolutionary 
-ideas. and discontent in England were just as marked 
,, as 
those. ofhis contemporaries but-his acute awareness 
of-the, benefits-of peace was perhaps even more devel- 
because ofthe experience of. his. years on, the 
continent, of,, Europe. 
Though a meeting,, at, sea, off the Dutch coast, was 
fixed for, Februs, 3ýy, 15th. all the efforts of-, Auckland, 
Dumouriez. and de. Maulde were shattered, by the French 
declaration. of war*., The reasons-behind thisl-decidion, 
taken', in the ten, days,, after the execution of the king, 
have.. been-obscured, by the, inconsistencies of French 
Politics. The,, Coneeil'Executif maintained a stubborn- 
belief -until,, the,. expulsion-of, Chauveling that some- 
thing, might, still, be done toavert-war. The banish7 
ment of the, ambassador was-an insult to French national, ' 
pride-at a. very sensitive'point in the Revolution. Yet 
balancing, this continued optimism was, an evident, if 
reluctant, acceptance, of.. the fact, -that-. Britain was 
already committedto war. - Such a realization was sur-' 
. facing even in, December in the instructions given to, 
Genet. , Lac, k, of,,. cohesion in the, direction, of foreign 
affairso, partioularly,, obvious in the earlier part of,. 
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Jan_, ýary,, ` "only contributed to the confusion. On the 
day'of-the king's execution, the Comite de Defense 
Generaleg was considering the type of war which might' 
most favourably be waged in present circumstances. 
It is-perhaps no coincidence that the tone of lebrunts- 
despatches' became firmer as soon as Dumouriez had 
left-Paris, for the Belgian front. '-Chauvelin's sudden 
re-appearance in-Paris confirmed thoughts which had 
for some weeks, been at. the back of, the minds of. French 
P61iticianiý-' There could. be no compromise_with the 
British, go'vernmento who were completely untrustworthy. 
Pitt'and-ý_Grenville were using the last-v, estiges of' 
French'good-will to delay the commencement of war to 
the max'imum", British advantage. The French government 
appear'to have decided to call the British bluff and 
t6"de'r`ive-'s'om'e benefit from the element of surprise. ' 
Aware that their own military preparations and'strength 
could nott'match those of. Bgitaing the French were. 
compelled*-tb'ýresort. to unorthodox-means of combatp 
cofi6entrating'especially on fitting out privateers to 
prey-on British'commerce. 
The formal announcement was not made until 
February: lst'. ' when Brissot'informed the deputies of 
tý67-ýConven'tion that they were at war' with Great Britain 
and the United Provinces., --The decision, had actually 
been made several days beforehand. ' Lebrun, in a- post- 
script to Bourgoing, the ambassador to Madridq wrote 
on January. 29th. I'Dans le moment ou Je faisais former 
(1) Aulardy ed. Receuil des Actes du COmite de Salut 
Publicq vol. il P. 499. 
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cette lettre,: on est venu m1annoncer l1arrivee du 
, 
citoyen Chauvelint': notre--ministre a Londres; vous- 
saurez apprecier le motif de-ce dep rt et juger 
actuellement, de notreýposition, vis aý-w is l'Angleterre. 
La! guerre', estý The formal announcements of 
the--outbreak of war, sent, by-Lebrun to overseas members 
of the, diplomatic-, staff,, read very much the samet but 
there was'-greater detail and more justification in 
. the., notice's sent to-the powers remaining neutral, 
Spain'and-the-United States. '-The neutrality of Spain 
wasl, evidently. still'regarded as aýmatter of importance, 
and: one. -for-which'the French-government were prepared 
to, make., aý., significant concession I'Dans cett, e position, 
le Ministere,. espagnol, ne. sera sans. doute'pas etonne., 
que--nous lui, demander une reponse categorique et tr\es, 
prompte sur-. la neutralite""et le'de"sarmement.,... pour 
ne'pasýarrelterýla negociation par des considerations 
incidentes'-- vous-n1insisterez pas non plus sur la 
reconnaissance formelle deýla-Republique frangaiseq 
11(2) parce, que le moment ne parait pas tres favorable. 
GSnetl'in',. 'theXnited Statesý was given express instruct- 
ions'to combat, the-kind of propaganda which the British 
were likely to spread around in, the American press - 
Ivous ave-z pu connaltre-par vous-memes les demarches 
(1) Lebrun. to Bourgoing, January 29th. A. A. E. 
C. P. "I, Espagne'g -635. 
(2),, iLebrun,. to'Bourgoingg,, February 2nd. 'A. A. E. 9 idem. 
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conciliantes 
_qui- 
ont, Ae. f aites, de notre part pour 
1-11 '. prevenir, toute me'solintelligence entre deux peupl 
que des intereAts analogues. paraissaient, devoir re 
)ir. 
- 
L 
Mais cette cour ýperf ide apres avoir, secrement excit-e' 
toute. l'Europe-contre nous. et apree avoir empoisonneý 
a enfin cru devoirleverle la hation anglai 
maeq'ue. ----,,, ses pnee/ ugesq--ses-calomniesq elleme-marquera 
pasý, de'les s d1les partisans quIelle ij! ýP>ndre -. par se ýfi 
,,. a-, conserves dans. les Etats-Unis.; 0*009'ý(ý), 
Nowhere was French indignation -more forthrightly 
expressed than, in. Lebrun's explanation to Dumouriez 
of., the outbreak of, war and-the'abandonment of the 
proposed meeting,, with Auckland. The letter is very, 
similar'in its. mixture of pride, and regrett to the 
ourious: message,: which the, Poreign Minister had sent 
offýalmost simultaneously in the hands of the Welsh 
philosopher-David-Williamsp to,, be carried, back to 
ý2) Grenville in-London.,,, . '--In, apprizing. 
the general of 
recent decisionso Lebrun was scathing. in his criticism 
of, British. insincerity - "Yous ne sauriez regretter 
plus-sincerement que 
insultes: du, min stere 
(1) Lebrun to Genetp 
Unis 37., 
- 4.1 .IýI I- .I 
nous, que lee dedains et lee 
-angl 
I 
ais nous aient forcers(ýa 
February 3rd. A. A. E., C. P. Etats- 
(2)-- On the mission of David Williams, and the even more 
curious episode involving James Tilly Matthehaq see 
D. ', Williams, -"The Mission of David Williams and James 
Tilly Matthews, " E. H. R. f 1938. 
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Vil 
I. -, \1 declarer laýguerre'a une nation que nous n1avons 
'Jamaie cesse. dIestimer. Mais apres tous les proce-Ses 
OUtrageane que, clest permis a notre egard le cabinet- 
de, Saint.: -James, apre's la-connaissance certaineque nous 
avions des-traites d'allianoe qu , il a onclus avec 
lee-cours de-Berlin, deýVienne et de 
(Pe 
t ýsbourg, 
apres. toutes see intrigues pour exciter 1'Espagne a 
seýdeclarer'contre nous, intrigues. qui paraissent 
1-11, auJourd'hui-, avoir comp 
I 1ýtement reussip 
insultant IAA7t%e,. ministre de la Republiquep 
avoir., asseE de, confiance dans-la-, bonne-foi duroi 
Georges pour--le croire-dispose I 
ra)preter, lloreille"'a des 
ouvertures. pacifiques. 'La corresPOndaikige de Chauvelin 
qulil,, a'eu 11impudence de commiiniquer( 
Jason 
pArlement 
et, ', aux Etats-Generaux ne prouve-t-elle pas jusquIa 
la--derniere. evidence que, malgre toutes nos 
ee/mýn- 
strances,,, 
--malgre 
toute: notre-mode'r'ationv'il elt'ait 
decide pour, la. guerret-decide"de rompre avec la France 
a': quelque"ýprix et-'sous quelque pretexte que ce-soit., 
Pouvez vous craindre apres cela quIon-ait ete trop vite 
en France?,., Sans-doute on-a ete trop vite pour la poli- 
'tI'jue-'as'tiici_euse et perfide du Lord Auckland et de son 
maitre ..... 
The declaration of war by France left Dumouriez 
with no choice other than., to prepare-for an-offensive 
against Holland when the opportunity seemed right, 
8ýpres le renvoi 
pouvo"-nous 
Le. brun. 'to, D=ouriezg Febýruary 6th. A. K. F79 4683 
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t4oughýthere, was, to be no immediate invasiontaas the, 
Dutchrhad feared. De Maulde returned. to Antwerp and, ' 
thence. to-Paris, wheie he delivered a lengthy condem- 
nation, of, Lebrunle handling of the proposed negotiation 
to, the.; Conventiong in Marc# 1793o He was arrested 
after, Dumouiiez's defection and thereafter fades from 
sight. 
(2), 
t, 
The final step, taken by France, on February, 
let-, --was also to, contribute to the increasing diffi- 
culties of,. Lebrun and of Brissot and his circle, all 
of-whom-foundýthemselves progressively isolated and 
Unpopular in the-period between February and-June 1793. 
These, men, were. associated with a move which was later 
represented as, not, merely ill-judged bqt, deliberately 
designed. to imperil France. 
(3) 
Moreoverg the declar-" 
ation, of wardid, nothing to distract attention'from 
theýrising,, clamour. of the populace of Parisp whose 
economic position was rapidly worsening in the opening 
(4) 
months ofý From what one can, judge the French 1793. - 
government-may,, have viewed the onset of hostilities 
(1) De Maulde in the Convention, ' 16th March 1793. ',, - der Algmeene, 
GedenstuklenA op. cl-E. p. p. 220-223. 
(2) Ric'e'p-t' for a'curious report in H. O. 1/1'that he 
had'been-spotted in London, where he., was-livingwith 
kis"wife"and'several violin-playing daughteýýs. 
(3ý' A point hammered*home in the trials of both 
Brissot'and'Lebrunq -A. N. W. 292 and W. 305. ' 
(4) See Below. 
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with reluctance, and, misgivings but, the declaration 
seemed,. to, 'ý. them justified and unavoidable. They could 
not. ýunderstand the--passions brought into play in Britain 
since'November.: Pitt's government appeared not, just 
unwilling; they were incapable. of, listening. Rather 
as, Pitt, had--inherited the, standard 18th. 'century. con- 
cept-, of, the-shape and interesto of Ang; o-Frenchýwarfare, 
thecrevolutionaries had inheritdd a healthy Gallic,: -' 
distrustýof "perfidious Albion. "' It is by no, means 
apparent-1how the French government believed the'conflict, '__ 
would develop. ', Their main resources were manpower 
andý', the, small element of surprise in the'actual timing 
6f-the'declaration. They might possibly inflict_con- 
siderableý 'damage on. British trade through the activity 
of: their. ", privaieers, but for several-month - s-after the 
outbreak of war, while French politics entered a: new 
phase of intensityO the government-hoped that. a negoti- 
ight still-be ach 
'(1) ated settlement m ieved 
Reaction in Britain to the news, of the declaration 
was predictable "The confirmation of. the step. taken. 
by the faction that governs France, of-jointly. -declaring 
war against this kingdom and the Dutch Republic is 
highly agreeable to met'., as the mode adopted seems well 
calculated to rouse such, a spirit in this'country, 
that I trust will curb the insolence of those despots 
and be a means of restoring some degree of order to 
ki). See Below. 
418 
that, unprincipled country,, whose aim at present-is- 
to destroy, the. foundations'of every, civili'ze , d'state, 
George III's succinct assessment reflected the feelings, 
of'hia, ministers. Lord Auckland. was told by a corres- 
pondent in., the middle of. the monthp "All ranks of 
people. seethe necessity of the war ..... In 
realityg this was a far from accurate estimate Of the 
mood, 9f, the country and the problems*which the outbreak. 
of warhad created4in certain areas., -The movement. ' 
agýinst., impressment. was more vigorous than. ever. in the 
north., east,,, where it was reported that "even now we 
frequently hear from, the crowd -. 'No Kingg Tom Paine'ý_ 
fýý., ever. ',,, 
(3) 
From Wales and-from Scotlandg-inform-- 
ation, continued to arrive of, social discontent and-', 
(4) 
wage, -, strikes. 
East coast merchants early felt. the 
economic, bite of the, 
I '. French e- mbargoe(5. 
) Other, 
a- 
reas 
(1)"-George III to Grenvilleg February 9th. JFortescue 
MSS op,., cit'a P. 378e 
(2)-ý-Anthony Storer to Aucklando February' Auc'ý3ýd 
-an' Diaries d Correep'ondence J, 
(3)"'-Reports from South Shields-. -and Sunderlandt 
February 
22nd'., H; O '42/24 
(4)-'-'February 6th-9 l9th_oý'q`and 28th. report from Wal'es. 
ifooe 42/24*, " Reports from Robert Dundas for Scotland 
in-January'and February inH. O..,, 106/7" 
-Faversham oyster-fishers to Dundas, February 19th. 
H. O. . 42/24. 
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of the east'coast were alarmed at their defencelessness 
againB #t po I ssible Pr , ench . attack. 
(') 
ýThese problems 
made for some anxiety in the first months of war but 
theýgovernmentls overall position in parliament and in 
the country asa whole was strengthened rather than 
weakened-by th-e French declaration of warg, an act which 
provided'the focus for British-public opinion which 
Pitt's administration had been seeking. 
British objectives'had been made more explicit 
than the'-French before February lst. 'The government 
believed'that-axýy_semblance of central authority in 
France had'broken down*'- Alarmed as they were by the 
extent-to*which'French ideas, so damaging to orderly 
eocietyg-had spread to the rest of. Europe, it seemed 
inconceivable at the beginning of 1793 that France 
could survive'tolpose a-long-term. military threat. 
TO'Britain as to'the rest of Europeq France appeared 
weak, divided and economically unsound. - Despite real- 
izati6n_ýihat'British ; mobilization had not reached its 
full Offectivenessq and despite the burden of having 
I 
to act as protector of the United. Provincesq Pitt's 
administration believed that the war would be-short, 
would bring considerable territorial gains and that 
victory would stifle permanently the undercurrent of 
Britain which had been subdued but not i-disaffection in 
finally silenced. Such views would have been par. tic-' 
Mayor of Hull to. Dundasq'February 7th: H. O. 42/24. 
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ularly in keeping with_Pittle own outlook. - He had 
painstakingly built up British prestige and prosperity: 
over the last-decadeq which a prolonged war would 
jeopardize.,,. Such-a confrontation would threaten all' 
his achievements as well as thrusting-him into an'arena 
, 
in., which he,, was inexperienced. 
A'. few men in Britain had some glimmerings of a 
development: beyond the general frame of reference of' 
politicians. ,; Burke-himsLUf had'said that the-Revolution 
bore, noýrelation,,, to any preceding event.,, This opinion 
wasIwidely, accepted; but it also indicated that it 
, -could-be'unwise"-to,, ýprediat the course-of events in 
Frence.,,, tTheýresilience-of the spirit of the people 
and the, emergency, government of, the. yearý, _II were 
factors never, -seriously-. consideredý'by 
Britain'in' 
February:. 1793'-ý' Only, "Itime was to show thatýFrench mis- 
givings on-theý'gravity'-of a'conflict'. begun, in some 
haste-ý-. -andl. brought: about by fearýand. intro 
, 
versi 
, 
on, ', 
rather, than. ýgreed-and, hateg-wexe-thoroughly justified. 
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Epilogue 
-The First Months of a Twenty Years' War. 
. 
"They were outlaws of humanity,. an uncommiini- 
cable, people ..... ",, Burke in the, debate on, the King's 
Message respecting,. the Declaration of War with, Prance,. 
February. 1793. 
-'! Tout est. extre"me, en Anglet'erre. -' 
vertus, y 
semblent-, plue belles que partout ailleurs. Mais aussi 
voit-ron,, aveo, douleur que dans leur, lotterie, humaine, 
la. p? 7qRo: ýýion, entre la, vertu, et le vice. soit la meme 
qýi I entrý, 
ýJe--^, '-guine et, . le billet 
blane.. ", 
_Report 
of 
'Scipio Morgu)-eC1791, or 1792), in A,. A. E. 9 Memoires' 
et, Documen-t Fonds Diverst Angleterre. 539 (1743-1813). 
, _.,,., 
The, French declaration,, Of. war upon Great Britain 
on, February... lst.. 17939, marked. the end ofla six month 
period,, in. which, the, never solid. basis of relations_ 
between,, thel, two countries had disintegrated in a 
mixture, of,, fearg, prejudicel'and ignorance. One of the 
main; failures-which, was. to-contribute to the onset 
of., the last.. and fiercest confrontation of these long-' 
standing, rivals lay, not in mutual lack of knowledge-, 
_ 
of the other's'politics, and internal affairsq. but in 
a, more fundamental inability to understand the-forces 
which. moved-, the'two, societies. There was certainly 
aýgreat want of, information on the level of-diplomatic 
intelligencep but this provides only a partial. explan- 
ation;,. we must 
-search 
for more revealing indications 
beyond-even-the unparallelled situation of the Revolution. 
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The politicians, of the-ancien regime were accustomed 
to thinking, of. public affairs in. abstractions. The 
balance, 'of powerg the strategic, importance of the 
Mediterranean, 
-the necess. 
ity of establishing manipu- 
. lative. influence in small states$ were, all weighty 
considerations. They-seldom attempted-to'understand' 
-the; 
reality of, political. arrangements in other countries, 
perhaps., -. because then, as-nowt this, did not seem 
immediately relevant to wider considerations. These' 
restrictions of outlook could lead to lamentable mis- 
underbtandingsq such a's were revealed'in Great Britain's 
dealings with the, Dutoh in the autumn of 1792. It is 
hardly surprisingg, theng that in the fast changing 
events of., --this period,, the French and British could 
not, preserve a peace which had been built on two 
negativejactors, British indifference to the early 
stages--of. -the-Revolution and French , pre-occupation 
with internal struggle. Theintrusion, of a new and 
formidable, weapon, French ideas, into the tense-_ 
European continent was an aggravation almost more. 
potent. than the unexpected success of the French armies. 
At-a,, time of such turmoilg' the realization. that, there, 
were. a significant number of discontented men-in 
Britain. 
-triggered 
off a sudden. and I firm reaction by 
jDitt', s administration and its supporters. The-French 
vvere, locked in a. turbulent-struggle for political 
dominationg, connected with different and_developing 
int-erpretations ofthe best political, economic and 
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: sociaIstructure-for their new republic. Caught up 
in, so much emotion they had. no time to assess the 
i3tate, of. Great-Britain. and the actions Of its govern- 
ment. The, French entered the war with some misgivings 
as to its general effect but the conviction that the 
British were-totally unreasonable-and must-be fore 
stalled in their aggression if, France was to be safe. 
'The'British 
harboured similar feelings, though they 
were probably less*afraid of the likelihood of a direct 
attack by France than of the persistent signs of 
dissidenceýat. home. 
, ý,., ý, The months immediately following the outbreak of 
war,, saw the-hardening of the British attitude and the 
heightening of. discord in'the French Convention which 
culminated in the Montagnard coup of, 31st. May- 
2nd. Junet-1793. Until'the Brissotýns were removed as 
a, 
-threat-to 
national unity the. fate of. revolutionary 
France', remained undecided. A serious revol: t-broke-out 
in, the Vendee early in 1793. In April General Dumouriez 
defected, to the Austrians after the defeat. of his army 
at. the, battle of Neerwinden. In Paris itself February. 
and March. were troubled months, with threatened-in- 
surrections caused by the high cost of-living* The- 
Da. ntonist-Committee of Public Safety-was-created-in. 
Aprilp, furth, er diminishing the waning powers of, the 
Conseil Executif. Yet throughout this period there 
were no important engagements between French and 
-British forces and for a while'the French remained 
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hopeful-that, there was still ground-for peace negotia- 
ti o'n's 
On this score they were mistaken. The implaca-, 
bility of-the British, Parliament-did not subside-ijaethe 
relative inactivity of the-early-months of the war. 
F6-Ve'min"ority persisted in, opposing ministerial 
action, but they were more concerned with criticizing 
Pitt thsýn kth-supporting the'French. The only_issue 
discussed at some length in Parliament'w4ich'was' of 
little'limediate relevanceýto, the. war was'the renewal 
of-ihelEast India Company's-charter* In all other, 
respects: 'signs, of, anti-Gallicanism increased. Pitt 
showered'an effusion of praise on Britain in his- 
speech on the budget increases for 17930 
"France'had repaid. our scrupulouV. neutraýity, with 
insult and outrage; she-had presumed to interfere'in. 
the internal concerns of England; she, ha, d threatened 
to pull. down'our-darling, conatitution'under which we 
had so long flourished, and'been happy, -&nd to. 'force 
pon, us-her own principles of, anarchy and, confusion.. e.. '"_ 
9"-'ý-she had endeavoured to separate-the parliament from 
the nation and raise the peoplle--against, 
-their 
represent- 
atives, an4 legislators; -she 
had, dared to receive from 
this country ambassadors of, treason and sedition; and 
she had -'left nothing undone'to overthrowý, _, the whole 
government of Great-Britain. 11(. 1)'-'Her'e was writin' 9 
(1)'----Pi. tt's budget speechp March 11th. 1793. Hansard 
Vol. 30s 
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reminiscent of-John Reeves Association for thepPreserv- 
ation of-Liberty and Property against Republicans and, 
Levellers. 
_There were still those who 'had either not detected 
the collective political mood, of the'ruling class 
orýwho were, undeterred by it. 'Two petitions for 
parliam'entary'reformt from Nottingham and-from Sheffield, -, ` 
were introduced at-this time. The Sheffield, petition, 
was especially forthright, in its language and went far, 
beyondýthe demands of. the moderate reformers "Your 
petitioners are lovers of peace, of. liberty-and_-Justice., 
Theyýare, _inýgeneral tradesmen and'artificersq un----. - 
possessed of freehold land and consequently have no,, 
voice. in choosing members to sit in-parliament; ", but_ 
though't-they may not, be freeholders they are men and', 
do"not'think.. themselves fairly. usedg -in'being''exc, luded_ 
the'rights, of citizens ... I... 
they think men, are 
objects of representation and not the land of a free- 
holder ..... The. member who'introduced the, 
petition-observed that these were only manufacturers 
who'were-unfamiliar with the style and language custom- 
arilyýusedlin addressingthe House. It was not the 
vocabularylbut the concepts which'were expressed' 
that, the House of Commons. found so offensive. Pox 
was, swift to point out that he was no-believer in 
ý(1)' 
The Sheffield petition for Parliamentary reform, 
April,,, 25th. 1793. 'ibid. 
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universal representation, The general opinion in the 
House, appeared to be'that a country at war with a, foe 
such. as-France, could not endanger its security by 
making any alterations in its political syspem. 
;, The execution of Louis XVI had done nothing to 
lessen'the-intensity of disagreement, in the Frenc, h. 
Convention. The controversy was given renewed edge' 
by-a, Parisian street insurrection. on Februaryý25th. 
whichýseems to have shaken the doputies considerably. 
From-mid-February the Ministry. of Foreign Affairs was 
receiving detailed reports on the state of Paris-, whiEh 
*noted ominously that-unrest in thecapital was no,, ' 
longerýconfined to specific issues. 
(', )- 
Bar'ere, now 
beginning to move towards the Mo'ntagnards, spbke forcibly 
in. response. to the new troubles saying that the insti- 
gators. of insurrection must be found before they tore.,, 
(2) the country apart. Still the mood,, of-the Convention 
remained volatile and its grip'over the rest*of, the 
country seemed to be crumbling-finally, as reports. of-, 
counter-revolution came in. from Lyon and-the south-west. 
At. the end of Marchp Danton, and Robespierre, mada'im- 
passioned pleasp in-their differentýstylesfor the 
revival of revolutionary fervourg what'Robespierre called 
(1)ý. - A. A. E., Memoires et'Documents- France, 322. Report,, 
on. Paris by an anonymous-corresphndent, 19th Februaryp 1793. 
(2)'- Barýere to the Convention', -February, 26th, 1793, 
Moniteurt o p. c it. ',,, vol. 15, P. 568. 
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I'Venergie, du patriotisme. 't 
, Atý, the same point: in-. time, that it was becoming 
vitalýfor-, the executive-. functions of French govern- 
ment', to-be strengthened; by a body chosen from within 
the Convention which could, supersede the discredited 
Conseil. Exe'eutif,, the, legislators received the blow 
of, the news of, Dumouriez's defection. Despite in- 
creasing', doubts on the general's ardour in. the revol- 
utionary'. cause, few people seem to have anticipated his 
actions. ---As late as March 12th. Robespierre asserted 
that-it was not in Dumouriez's personal interest to- 
betray. the republice 
(2) 
The loss 
'of the'battle of 
Neerwinden on. March 18th. forced Dumouriez's-decision. 
He-could not count on'his ill-equipped'army, out-. 
_, 
numbered in- Belgium by the 'Austrians To return to 
ea? 6, (re. 4 
(3) 
court-ýdeath, In Novemberp-17929 his hopes had been 
(1) Danton and Robespierre to the Convention, March 27th. 
"Moniteur, 'ý. 15, - Y. hldell., 17939 ibidg. 
lp 
(2)ý'Robespierre to the, Convention, March 12th. 1793 ibid. 
Similar sentiments were expressed in reports to the 
bureau de surveillance de la Police - 'Iles dei`fiiances 
sur le compte de Dumouriez commencent a se dissiper; 
on, observe que, quand mýme il en aurait le desseint--il 
lui Perait actuellement impossible de trahir, la nation. " 
Report made 21st. Februaryo, 17939 A. N. qIA. F. iv, 1470. 
(3) He was, in-faetp'commanded to return to appear at 
the'ýbar of the Convention. Dumouriez-detained the comm- 
issioners'sent to accompany him back to Paris and handed 
them over as hostages to the Austrians. 
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great;,,, four. months later they-, were shatteredg" leaving 
him with, the-grim,, prospect'of a, future in exile amongst 
the auspicious and, resentful allies.., Dumouriez's action 
may have saved, -his-own lifev but'it jeopardized others. 
The-friendsýof Brissotq some of whom had probably 
scarcely spoken, --to'Dumouriezp'were implicated in his 
treason. Dumouriez's'actions were a'severeýembarr_ 
asement-to: Briesot's group, 'seeming to incriminate 
them further-in the counter-revolution; yet those 
who had'-beenýclose to'Dumouriez-were not in immediate 
danger of their lives.. De Maulde was imprisoned some- 
time in-, the summer -. of 1793 weU - af ter'he had made ,a 
scathing, attack on Lebrun', s handling of the, secret 
Auckland-Dumouriez. talksý, at, -the bar of the Convention 
(2) 
GeneralýMirandap,., thoughý-called-before the revolutionary 
tribunalt was not-convicted of, treason, 
(3) 
(1) At his trialg, Gensonne noted, "Je n1ai vu cet homme 
quIune-seule foisIdans ma vie.! P.. je ne lui ai jamais 
ecrit. 11 A-N. 9 W. 292p Affaire des Girondins. 
(2) De Maulde appeared before the 6onvention on March 16th 
179% The date of his imprisonment is not known, From 
his prison he continued to write letters pleading for 
release in the style which had characterized his diplomatic 
despatches. Since there is no record of his execution he 
may possibly have been released. 
(3) Miranda was questioned on April 8th. by the Comite 
de la Guerre on opinions which Dumouriez had expressed on 
the merits and activities of the Convention'. A. H. W. 271. 
Trial of Miranda. 
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'In response to the'unremitting urgency of the 
crýei'sl' the Commit'tee 'o'f Publi IcI Safety wqs inaugurated 
on-April*16th. - Initially it, wasýcomposed-of nine 
dep , uties who . were to , deliberate in'secret. - Its powers 
exceeded'those*of, the Conseil Executif and it was' 
required to take steps for both external and internal 
defence. " The Committee was never intended to be the 
dictatorial body of, historicalýmyth-' Members served 
only-one-month before being subjected to re-elbotion 
and weekly reports'were to, beý'givenýto`the Convention. _ý 
The ii, rs'i; *commiite4i in, which'Danton's'influenc e was 
paramount; '-could nevertheless do little to'stabilize 
the"Convention i or, alter-"the-effeetkits pro tracted 
quarrels-weri having'-on France*-,, Throughout Mayq the 
conveni'ion"dis'eussed the Constitution which Condorcetts 
c `ommittee 'd been, preparing since Octoberg'1792. ha 
There'were debgtes about property and about division-, 
of'France territorially or, by. inhabitants for represent- 
ation'purposes. The debates werev however, only an 
excuse for, further recriminations to be exchanged 
deputies on'either side of the Convention. ' 
On" May '14th. - therý6 was'- uproar when "a deputation from 
'Bordeaux accused', the Montagnards. and the city of Paris 
of being-the'authors of France's present troubles. ' 
The tension'was evidently moving towards a climax and, 
on : May 31 st . "the -Commune again proved itself to be a 
formidable influence. For three days the deputies were' 
barricaded in their meeting place by a san- s-culottes 
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army., The popular-revolution' necessitated-Robespierrist 
action, and on June 2nd. g"twenty-two so-called Girondin 
deputies were proscribedq and Claviere and Lebrun 
ale'o. arreated. During the summer and early - autiimn the 
Committee of Public Safety developed into the most 
powerful governmental organ of the Revolution and the 
key t6, French'survivalp 
-'The British'mood gn the-unavoidability of war and 
the-, iniquities of-the-French'is'evident in the tone 
and matter'of parliamentary debate in the spring of 1793. 
The'Prench, howevert, had not entirely abandoned hopes 
of a settlement. -. Their approach to the problems of 
an'early concilia'tion was opportunistic rather than 
organized and-deliberate and. some of the advice received 
by Lebrun continued in the more realistic vein-of 
appraisal of. British intentions first noticeable aftior 
Decemberg, 1792. The Conventionqý as during the'autumn, 
did-not concern itself greatly with foreign affairs in 
this. most intense phase of its p9litical'battle. The 
Ministry, of Foreign Affairs and even, the Council still 
played a significant role in the-direction of foreign 
relations. The Frenchieceived an early ýlow to their 
hopes when the Council allowed itself to be misled by 
a Welshman with delusions of grandeur. James Tilly., 
Matthews had apparently1cherished hopes of making him- 
self iýniirumental in negotiating an end to misunderstand- 
ings. The French believed that he was a secret emissary 
despatched by Whitehall and gave some attention to 
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their, response to what seemed,,, to be., a-.. set.. 
-of - 
British 
proposals as a groundwork. for, peace-talks., In-fact,,, 
Matthews, had only ever seeftPitt onceg, and that., was, 
before the outbreak of, war., When the French-found 
their'move rebuffed firmly by. Grenville. their-convic- 
tion of British duplicity was. naturally, increased. 
1(l) 
In the same. month as Matthews' behaviour, further 
retarded French, hopes for peace, the Foreign Affairs 
Ministry received a memoir, dealing with Francel, s 
situation in'the European, con4lict. The section on 
England was 1 pe? simistic, - i 
Ze! 
pas 
ledissimulerv nous nous sommes fait-illusion r le,,, 
veritable caractere du-ppuple anglais. 
rirt,,, 
Supers itieuse- 
ment attache a sa constitution, a sa religion, il n1a 
jamais aime et il ne peut aimer les principes francais. 11 
(2) The British'were interested in reform, not revolution. 
Nevertheless, the French government was still 
hopeful that if it could not make peace-directly, it 
could at least learn more about Briti'sh'intentions-and 
perhaps profit from differences withiththe coalition. 
(1), The mostdetailed, study-6ý the-strange events surr- 
ounding the Matthews debacle is in-D. Williamsg "The 
Missions of David Williams and James Tilly Matthews to- 
England (1793)"g English Historical-'Review 
p-p-: ý651 -ý 
668. 
(2) "Situation politique de la Republique francaise a 
llegard des puissances e "t"rang'e'res. 11 A. A. E. M6moires 
et documents9 France 65. 
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Shortly. after the Jacobin coup. the ministry-gave' 
'instructions to-two negotiators who were to have talks 
with General Murray on the possibility of an exchange 
of prisoners of war. The men were to attempt to. 
determine the British, attitude to France and to appear 
conciliatory. 'They should also wathh out for signs 
of a serious split between Britain and Prussia. The 
French were still attempting a degree of flexibility 
but they. no'longer anticipated any real prospect of, an 
immediate end to-the war "il nlest aucunement 
question'de faireq du moins dans le'moment-ciq a 
l'Angleterre, des propositions Serieuses. "(1) By June, 
17939 the French had begun to accustom themselves to 
the idea of a prolonged European conflict. 
(1) "Memoire pour servir d1instructions aux citoyens 
Forst I er e't Coquebert, nommes par. le Oonseil ExJ'cutif 
provi'soire pour negocier avec le, gener. al Murray un 
cartel dlechange pour les prisonniers de guerre. 11- 
18th. June, 1793, A*A. E. p C. P. Angleterre, Supplement 15. 
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